ORDER
T.S. Doabia, J.
1. In this public interest litigation challenge is being made to the entire process of examination held by the State of Madhya Pradesh for the promotional posts of Naib-Tahsildar. It is not in dispute that this process is governed by the Rules known as Kanishtha Prashaskiya Bharati Niyam, 1980. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that under Rule 7 of the Rules of 1980 60% of the posts are to be filled by the Public Service Commission and 40% are to be filled through departmental candidates. It is vis-a-vis these departmental candidates a grievance has been made. It is stated that 20% of the posts are to be filled out of revenue inspectors; 10% posts are to be filled out of the clerical staff of the Collector’s office and the Commissioners’ office through departmental examination and 10% of the posts are to be filled out of the Revenue Inspectors and Patwaris. This again is through the departmental examination. In para 4 of the petition it has been specifically stated that the present dispute relates to the posts to be filled up through the departmental examination from Revenue Inspectors and Patwaris. It is stated that numerous irregularities have been committed in the matter of conducting this examination. It is stated that the result was declared by the respondent No. 2 on 13-8-1996. 568 incumbents were declared successful. It is further stated that some retotalling is being resorted to and in the garb of this retotalling about 67 persons have been reshuffled in the list. It is thus stated that persons who were not successful initially are likely to be selected and the persons who had failed earlier are likely to find place in the list of candidates who are to be appointed.
2. It is not in dispute that a challenge is being made to the filling of posts by promotional exercise under the Rules of 1980. The persons who have taken part in the process of selection are already in service. They are governed by the rules of promotion. The question thus which arises at the very outset is as to whether interference can be made by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
3. It be seen that on account of the provisions contained in Article 323A of the Constitution of India and in view of the fact that the Parliament enacted a Statute by the name of Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, the power of this Court to interfere under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been taken away. This power stands vested now in the Tribunals created under the Act. Notwithstanding this the learned counsel for the petitioners submits that this Court can interfere. This aspect of the matter having been argued at some length it would be apt to notice these arguments.
4. It be seen that there are two aspects of the matter. One aspect would deal with the jurisdiction of this Court to initially entertain the petition seeking to entertain a dispute which falls within the purview of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985. The second would be when the Tribunal is seized of the matter and then the power of superintendence is to be exercised over the Tribunal. The third question which may also arise is as to whether the final order passed by the Tribunal is amenable to writ jurisdiction or not.
5. So far as the power of this Court to entertain a dispute is concerned, there can be no two opinions. In Moti Many v. Superintendent, Lady Elgin Hospital, Jabalpur, 1993 MPLJ 628 a Division Bench of this Court has observed that the jurisdiction of the High Court in regard to entertainment of disputes and complaints regarding service matters at initial stage is barred. It was, however, observed that the superintendence over the Administrative Tribunal is not barred. This decision given by the Division Bench of this Court was again subject matter of consideration before a Full Bench of this Court. This is reported as S. C. Verma v. Central Government Industrial Tribunal, 1995 MPLJ 853 = 1996(1) SCT 228 (FB) = 1995 JLJ 646. In para 8 of the judgment Shri Justice A. K. Mathur (now Chief Justice of this Court) made following observations :-
“8. A bare reading of Sections 14 and 15 of the Act will show that what was intended to take away was the original jurisdiction of any Court except that of the Supreme Court to entertain any service matter of the Union or the State.”
After making the aforementioned observations it was observed that Sections 14 and 15 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, were never intended to take away the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court conferred under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
6. Thus, the decisions given in Moti Marry v. Superintendent L. E. Hospital, Jabalpur, 1993 MPLJ 628 and S. C. Verma v. Central Government Industrial Tribunal, 1995 MPLJ 853 = 1995 JLJ 646 lay down in no uncertain terms that the original jurisdiction of this Court to entertain a dispute under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is clearly barred Under Sections 14 and 15 of the Act. In this regard it would be apt to refer to decisions given by the Supreme Court of India which deal with election disputes arising under the Representation of People Act, 1951. These decisions are reported as T. C. Bassappa v. T. N. Naggappa, AIR 1954 SC 440 and Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Syed Ahmed Ishaque, AIR 1955 SC 233. These two decisions were considered by this Court in the case reported as A. S. Bhalla (Dr.) v. State of M.P., 1996 (2) SCT 449. The two decisions of this Court i.e. Moti Marry v. Supdt. L. E. Hospital (supra) and S. C. Verma v. Central Government Industrial Tribunal (supra) were also taken note of and following observations were made :
“It was observed that the non obstante clause would not stand in the way of the High Court in exercising writ jurisdiction. The question of there” being a bar at the initial stage and there being no bar at the final stage was expressly gone into. In para 6 of the judgment the Supreme Court of India pointedly mentioned that the first question for decision was whether the High Courts had the jurisdiction under Article 226 to issue writs against decisions of Election Tribunals. It was observed that Article 226 confers power on the High Courts to issue appropriate writs to any person or authority within the territorial jurisdiction in terms which are absolute and unqualified and the Election Tribunals functioning with the territorial jurisdiction of High Court will fall within the sweep of that power. The argument that a total ban stands imposed under Article 329(b) of the Constitution was negatived. While dealing with this aspect of the matter what was observed by the seven-member Bench of Supreme Court of India is relevant and be noticed :
“The first question that arises for decision in this appeal is whether High Courts have jurisdiction under Article 226 to issue writs against decisions of Election Tribunals. That functioning within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Courts would fall within the sweep of that power. If we are to recognise or admit any limitation on this power, that must be founded on some provision in the Constitution itself. Now the question is whether a writ is a proceeding in which an election can properly be said to be called in question within the meaning of Article 329(b). On a plain reading of the Article, what is prohibited therein is the ‘initiation’ of proceedings for setting aside an election otherwise than by an election petition presented to such authority and in such manner as provided therein. A suit for setting aside an election would be barred under the provision.
But when once proceedings have been instituted in accordance with Article 329(b) by presentation of an election petition, the requirements of that Article are fully satisfied. Thereafter, when the election petition is in due course heard by a Tribunal and decided, whether its decision is open to attack, and if so, where and to what extent must be determined by the general law applicable to decisions of Tribunals. There being no dispute that they are subject to the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Courts under Article 226, a writ of ‘certiorari’ under that Article will be competent against decisions of the Election Tribunals also. The Supreme Court of India in para 7 observed as under :
“The view that Article 329(b) is limited in its operation to initiation of proceedings for setting aside an election and not to the further stages following on the decision of the Tribunal is considerably reinforced, when the question is considered with reference to a candidate, whose election has been set aside by the Tribunal. If he applies under Article 226 for a writ to set aside the order of the Tribunal, he cannot in, any sense be said to call in question the election; on the other hand, he seeks to maintain it. His application could not, therefore, be barred by Article 329(b). And if the contention of the first respondent is well founded, the result will be that proceedings under Article 226 will be competent in one event and not in another and at the instance of one party and not the other. Learned counsel for the first respondent was unable to give any reason why this differentiation should be made. We cannot accept a construction which leads to result so anomalous.”
It was further said that:
“This question may be said to be almost concluded by authority. In Durga Shankar v. Raghuraj Singh, AIR 1954 SC 520, the contention was raised that this Court could not entertain an appeal against the decision of an Election Tribunal under Article 136 of the Constitution, as that would be a proceeding in which an election is called in question, and that that could be done only before a Tribunal as provided in Article 329(b).”
In overruling this contention, Mukherjee, J. observed :
“The ‘non obstante’ clause with which Article 329 of the Constitution begins and upon which the respondent’s counsel lays so much stress, debars us, as it debars any other Court in the land to entertain a suit or a proceeding calling in question any election to the Parliament or the State Legislature. It is the Election Tribunal alone that can decide such disputes and the proceeding has to be initiated by an election petition and in such manner as may be provided by a statute. But once that Tribunal has made any determination or adjudication on the matter the power of this Court to interfere by way of special leave can always be exercised.”
By parity of reasoning it must be held that the power of the High Court under Article 226 to issue writ of ‘certiorari’ against decisions of Election Tribunals remains equally unaffected by Article 329(b). It was finally concluded :
“We are also of opinion that Election Tribunals are subject to the superintendence of the High Courts under Article 227 of the Constitution, and that superintendence is both judicial and administrative. That was held by this Court in Waryam Singh v. Amamath, AIR 1954 SC 215, where it was observed that in respect of Article 227 went further than Section 224 of the Government of India Act, 1935, under which the superintendence was purely administrative and that it restored the position Under Section 107 of the Government of India Act, 1915. It may also be noted that while in a ‘certiorari’ and for other reliefs was maintainable under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.”
It was further added that:
(1) ‘Certiorari’ will be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction, as and when an inferior Court or Tribunal acts without jurisdiction or in excess of it or fails to exercise it.
(2) ‘Certiorari’ will also be issued when the Court or Tribunal acts illegally in the exercise of its undoubted jurisdiction, as and when it decides without giving an opportunity to the parties to be heard, or violates the principles of natural justice.
(3) The Court issuing a writ of ‘certiorari’ acts in exercise of a supervisory and not appellate jurisdiction. One consequence of this is that the Court will not review findings of fact reached by the inferior Court, or Tribunal, even if they be erroneous. This is on the principle that a Court which has jurisdiction over a subject matter has jurisdiction to decide wrong as well as right, and when the Legislature does not choose to confer a right of appeal against that decision, it would be defeating its purpose and policy, if a superior Court were to rehear the case on the evidence, and substitute its own findings in ‘certiorari’. These propositions are well settled and are not in dispute.”
7. Thus, there is a bar in the matter of entertaining petitions by way of original jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Not only there is a bar at the initial stage but the Supreme Court of India has observed that the High Court should not interfere even against the final orders passed by the Tribunal. H. N. Patro v. Ministry of Information and Broadcasting 1993(2) MPWN 165, is the judgment which deals with this aspect of the matter. The short judgment given at the motion stage be noticed :-
“Heard learned counsel for the parties. We are of the opinion that the order of the Central Administrative Tribunal was not open to challenge before the High Court. The Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, which is a wing of the Union of India, would be presumed to be aware of the provisions contained in the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 which read with Article 323A of the Constitution of India, bars the jurisdiction of the High Court and, therefore, it should not have gone before the High Court invoking exercise of its jurisdiction. The High Court should also have been careful to satisfy itself that it had jurisdiction to deal with the matter, and make an order nullifying the direction of the Tribunal.
The learned Attorney General concedes, we hold that the concession is right, that the High Court had no jurisdiction to deal with the matter. The appeal is allowed and the impugned order of the High Court set aside with costs of Rs. 5,000/-.”
The aforementioned decisions were taken note of by this Court, one of us (Hon. Shri T S. Doabia, J.) in A. S. Bhalla (Dr.) v. State of M.P., 1996(2) SCT 449. The following observations were arrived at:-
“22.1 am accordingly, of the view :
(i) That the Tribunals constituted under the Central Act of 1985 are amenable to supervisory jurisdiction of this Court. See the two decisions of this Court reported as Motiram and S. C. Verma (supra).
(ii) A direction can again be given that an order passed by the Tribunal, which is in direct conflict with the decisions of the Supreme Court which decisions are binding on all under Article 141 of the Constitution of India, be not given effect to.
(iii) That, the bar created under Article 323A is only at the initial stage and once this initial stage is over then interference can be made with the interim as well as with the final orders passed by the Tribunal and for this purpose the view expressed by the Supreme Court in T.C.B. and Hari’s case (supra) would equally be attracted.
(iv) That, bar created by way of appeal Under Section 28 of the Central Act, 1986 would be governed by all those limitations which apply to the exercise of power under Article 226 when an alternative remedy is available. This bar is only qua the final orders and not qua interim orders of Tribunal.
(v) That, the forum of appeal has been found to be unsatisfactory by the Supreme Court of India in R. K. Jain’s case (supra).
Even though, I have reached above five conclusions on the basis of judicial precedents, however, in view of the decision given in H. N. Matro’s case (supra) which decision is under the Central Act of 1985 itself, it would not be apt to interfere with the order passed by the Tribunal at this stage.”
8. Thus, we are of the opinion that it is not possible for this Court to interfere with the process of promotion vis-a-vis candidates who are in service. Before parting with the judgment we may refer to the decisions given by the Division Bench in Writ Petition No. 994/94. In this case some instructions were quashed. It be seen that this was a case where the persons who had moved the Court were yet to enter the service. This is not the position so far as this petition is concerned. This petition as indicated above deals with in service candidates and, therefore, they must seek their remedies available to them before the Tribunal constituted under the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985. If they have any grievance, they can go before the Tribunal. They can also move representation to the State Government. If any representation is preferred by them, that be disposed of within a period of 15 days. Beyond this no relief can be granted to the petitioners. This petition is otherwise found to be not maintainable and is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.