JUDGMENT
Dipak Misra, J.
1. In this intra-Court appeal assail is to the order dated 5-12-2002 passed in W.P. No. 4361/2002.
2. The essential facts which are requisite to be stated are that a notification was issued under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for brevity ‘the Act’) for acquiring certain land for a company, namely, J.P. Bela Cement Plant, respondent No. 5 herein. A notification was issued for dispensation of enquiry as contemplated under Section 5A of the Act treating the acquisition meant for public purposes. It is pertinent to mention here that the Land Acquisition Officer proceeded for determination of quantum and the present petitioners appeared before him as is perceptible from Annexure R-3 filed by the respondent/Company.
2-A. Before the learned Single Judge it was contended by the present appellants that acquisition of the land can not be for the public purpose and, therefore, all the necessary provisions of the Act were to he strictly followed, but as the same had not been done the notification has to pave the path of vitiation. It was also put forth that though the Land Acquisition Officer had passed the award yet that would not create any kind of impediment in quashing of the notification as the award is basically a nullity. The learned Single Judge addressed himself to the contentions urged on behalf of the writ petitioners and came to hold that the pleadings in the petition were absolutely sketchy and scanty to attract the provisions for the purpose of acquisition for a private company; that the award having been passed is beyond assail as per the law laid down in the case of Municipal Council, Ahmednagar and Anr. v. Shah Hyder Beig and Ors., AIR 2000 SC 671; that the petitioners had appeared before the Land Acquisition Officer and participated in the proceedings of the award and, therefore, they would not be entitled to get any relief having waived their rights; and that there was delay of two years in challenging the notification before the High Court and hence, the extra-ordinary jurisdiction was not invocable.
3. We have heard Mr. S.L. Saxena, learned Senior Counsel along with Mr. Choubey for the appellants.
4. Submission of Mr. Saxena is that the passing of the award is hot relevant as it is culmination of entire procedure which a foundation on nullity; that the appearance of the petitioners before the Land Acquisition Officer can not be a factor to be considered for annihiliation of their rights; and that the acquisition of land for a private company can not have the status of public purposes and, therefore, all other provisions of the Act are to be strictly followed and as the same has not been followed the entire proceeding including the award is per se illegal, unsound and unjustified. To bolster his submission he has commended us to the Division Bench decision of this Court rendered in the case of Chaitram Verma v. Land Acquisition Officer and Ors., 1993 MPLJ 572.
5. Per contra, Mr. P.N. Dubey, learned Deputy Advocate General for the State and Mr. Rakesh Jain, learned Counsel appearing for the private company have submitted that once the award had been passed the controversy is put to rest and the same can not be reopened by this Court. It is also urged by them that as the petitioner had participated in the land acquisition proceeding in passing of the award and the same being found unsustainable he can not be allowed to take a somersault and challenge the notification. They have also propounded that there has been delay in challenging the notification and on that ground alone this Court should refuse to exercise its inherent jurisdiction.
6. To appreciate the rivalised submissions raised at the Bar, we have carefully perused the law laid down in the case of Chaitram Verma (supra). In the aforesaid case acquisition of land was not for public purposes and in such a case whole gamut of procedure is to be followed. We do not intend to enter into that debate whether the acquisition for the company was for public purpose or not as we are disposed to think that the intra-Court appeal can be dealt with on other grounds. On a careful scrutiny of the order passed by the learned Single Judge it is noticeable in Paragraph 9 that the learned Judge has categorically recorded a finding that the appellant had participated in the proceeding of the award and claimed compensation and when the compensation was determined they took a chance to challenge the award. This finding of the learned Single Judge gets support from the document contained in Annexure R-3 as the same has not been controverted in any manner. It is well settled in law, a person who participates in a proceeding of this nature and gets award passed thereafter can not be permitted to pave the path of tersgiversation and challenge the notification on the ground that the initiation was bad. Quite apart from the above, there is a time for challenging an action. In the case at hand, it is not disputed that two years have passed from the date of notification. Hence, we are disposed to think that the cumulative effect of the order passed by the learned Single Judge is impeccable. We do not find any error in the same. True it is, there might not be a public purpose but the petitioner has given the said assail a go by and participated in passing of the award and claimed for compensation and entered into hibernation for a considerable length of time and hence, he can not be allowed to seek a reopen as this kind of open seasame is not countenanced in law.
7. Accordingly, the LPA, being devoid of merit, stands dismissed without any order as costs.