JUDGMENT
S. Ravindra Bhat, J.
1. In these petitions under Sections 482 Cr.P.C. initiated by the Respondent complaining of commission of offences under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (hereinafter referred to as the “Act”) have been sought.
2. The respondent had filed four complaints alleging, inter alia, that pursuant to commercial transactions, and in discharge of legal dues, the petitioner had issued various cheques amounting to Rs. 2,41,000, Rs. 13,18,600/-, Rs. 1,19,000/- and Rs. 95,000/- each aggregating to Rs. 18,44,600/- to it. Upon their presentation, the cheques were not honoured. The complainant claimed that the notices were issued, and yet, went unheeded. In these circumstances the complaints were preferred.
3. The summoning orders in these proceedings were issued some time in 1999. During the course of the proceedings, the petitioner, accused arrayed as such in all the proceedings, and were alleged to be involved in the commission of offences, moved applications for recall of the summoning orders. The applications did not succeed. Notices were served under Section 251. The summoning orders and the proceedings are challenged as not maintainable.
4. Mr. Srivastava learned Counsel submitted that the trial Court committed error in entertaining the complaints and issuing the summoning orders since the complaints did not conform to the requirements under Section 138 as they did not enclose valid return memos, from the payers’ banks, to evidence non-payments. Learned Counsel took me through the copies of the relevant “return memos” and submitted that they cannot be termed as “information” under Section 138(b). It was contended that this amounted to a fatal infirmity which undermined the proceedings and they had to be necessarily quashed.
5. The trial Court records were summoned during the course of proceedings. They reveal that the Banker of the payee, had issued letters enclosing the returned cheques. The cheques, upon the face of the instrument bore the remark “Accounts closed”.
6. The requirement of law in this regard is to be found in Section 138 proviso (b). The relevant part of the said provision may be usefully extracted below:
138. Dishonour of cheque for insufficiency, etc., of funds in the account.- Where any cheque drawn by a person on an account maintained by him with a banker for payment of any amount of money to another person from out of that account for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability, is returned by the bank unpaid, either because of the amount of money standing to the credit of that account is insufficient to honour the cheque or that it exceeds the amount arrange to be paid from that account by an agreement made with that bank, such person shall be deemed to have committed an offence and shall, without prejudice to any other provision of this Act, be punished with imprisonment for [a terms which may be extended to two years], or with fine which may extend to twice the amount of the cheque, or with both:
Provided that nothing contained in this section shall apply unless —
(a) the cheque has been presented to the bank within a period of six months from the date on which it is drawn or within the period of its validity, whichever is earlier;
(b) the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque, as the case may be, makes a demand for the payment of the said amount of money by giving a notice in writing, to the drawer of the cheque, [within thirty days] of the receipt of information by him from the bank regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid; and
7. As is evident, the requirement of proviso (b) is that the aggrieved payee or holder in due course should issue notice to the drawer of the cheque within the stipulated time, about receipt of information by him from the Bank regarding return of the cheque as unpaid. The provision understandably does not specify the nature of the information required to be spelt out, by the bank, or even any format of such communication. In the absence of such form the law, as it is in general terms, can be said to be satisfied for the purpose of issuance of summoning orders, if the complainant alleges in the averments and produces convincing material showing that the cheques were returned for some reason disclosed or apparent from a reading of the documents or the complaint, by the Court. In this case the face of the instrument bore the remarks “Accounts closed”.
8. In this context, it must be remembered that the Act was amended in 1988 – and later in 2002- to achieve a specific end, viz. speedy resolution of grievances of those who present cheques and which are dishonoured. An obligation is cast upon the person seeking the remedy to adhere to the time frame i.e. 15 days (now 30 days) and issuing a notice demanding the payment from the drawer. That object would be defeated if narrow and artificial conditions are read into a provision that is, on a plain reading, cast in the broadest terms. Receipt of “information” constitutes the starting point from which time begins, for issuance of notice. “Information” is synonimous, in the context, with communication, or notice. It can be in any language, and through any mode – written, electronic, fax, or even verbal. In SIL Import USA v. Exim Aides Silk Exporters 1999 Crl. LJ 2296, the Supreme Court interpreted the terms “notice” broadly to comprehend fax messages.
9. Another way of looking at the issue is to juxtapose the two expressions – “notice” and “information”. The former expression “notice” is qualified and controlled by the use of the further words “in writing” whereas “information” which is a broader terms, is left without any controlling term. Thus, information or communication is not restricted to any mode, or form.
10. In this case the face of the instrument bore the remarks “Accounts closed”. The existence or absence of remarks on returning memos issued by the bankers is a matter of detail. At any stage they are not stipulations which fatally undermine the maintainability of criminal complaints of the respondent. I see no merit in the contention that since the complainant did not receive proper memos, they could not have filed the proceedings. That contention has to fail.
11. For the above reasons, I am of the opinion that there is no merit in these petitions.
12. The records of the trial Court shall be sent back and the Court is directed to conclude the proceedings as expeditiously as possible, i.e. within one year from today. The parties shall present themselves before the trial Court on 23.4.2007 for further directions and proceedings. A copy of this order shall be sent to the trial Court for due compliance.
13. The petitions are dismissed, subject to the above directions.