JUDGMENT
M.M. Pareed Pillay, C.J.
1. The question that arises for consideration is whether the decision in Rajan Nair v. Mohan, (1993) 1 Ker LT 782 requires reconsideration. In the above decision a Division Bench of this Court held that the action initiated by directing issue of notice to the contemner should be within a period of one year from the date of the alleged contempt. The Division Bench held that if the court has not initiated proceedings by passing some order within a period of one year from the date of the alleged act of contempt the bar contained in Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 comes into operation. The court held that on a reading of Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act it is clear that it places absolute fetter on the power of the High Court to initiate proceedings for contempt after the expiration of the period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed.
2. In the above decision N. Venkataramanappa v. D. K. Kaikar, AIR 1978 Karnataka 57 was relied. In that decision Karnataka High Court held that Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act operates as an absolute bar to initiation of contempt proceeding whether suo motu or at the instance of complainant after expiry of one year’s limitation, starting point of limitation being the date on which contempt is alleged to have been committed and not date of knowledge of complainant. That decision was overruled by the Full Bench of that Court in M/s. A. V. Kowdi & Co. v. R. V. Lakshmtdevamma ILR (1990) Karnataka 4355. The Court held that the period of one year prescribed in Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act is applicable only in respect of contempt of subordinate courts and it has no application in cases of contempt of High Court and that the power conferred under Article 215 of the Constitution of India is absolute and unfettered. In Pritam Pal v. High Court of M.P, the Supreme Court held that the power of the Supreme Court and the High Court being the Courts of Record as embodied under Articles 129 and 215 respectively cannot be restricted and trammelled by any ordinary legislation including the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act. The Supreme Court further observed that the inherent power of the Supreme Court and the High Court is elastic, unfettered and not subjected to any limit. As the power conferred upon the Supreme Court and the High Court being Courts of Record under Arts. 129 and 215 of the Constitution respectively is an inherent power and as the jurisdiction vested in these courts is a special one not derived from any other statute but from the aforesaid Articles of the Constitution of India, such power cannot be either abridged by any legislation or abrogated or cut down. The Supreme Court has expounded the position in explicit terms.
3. In Rajath v. M.S.P. Rajesh, 1980 Ker LT 802 a Division Bench of this Court held that provisions of Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act would apply to cases of civil contempt. The wording of the Section is wide enough to embrace all proceedings for contempt taken either suo motu or on a motion by parties, and the starting point of limitation under the Section can only be the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed by the person against whom the charge is levelled. This was a case where contempt proceedings were initiated for alleged disobedience of an order passed by” the Sub Judge, Palakkad on Report No. 2 of 1978 submitted to that court by the receivers appointed in O.S. No. 237 of 1975. The Division Bench held that in view of the language used in Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act the starting point of limitation under the Section can only be the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed by the person against whom the charge is levelled.
4. Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act provides that no court shall initiate any proceedings for contempt, either on its own motion or otherwise, after the expiry of a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been, committed. Section 20 cannot make any inroad into the power vested in the High Court under Article 215 of the Constitution of India. The period mentioned in Section 20 cannot be made applicable to a case of contempt of the High Court. Article 215 of the Constitution of India gives a supreme position to the High Court compared to the Lower Courts. As the Article envisages that every High Court shall be a court of record and shall have all the powers of such a court including the power to punish for contempt of itself we cannot approve Rajan Nair v. Mohan (1993) 1 Ker LT 782. As every High Court has power to determine questions about its own jurisdiction and it has inherent power to punish for its contempt summarily period of limitation in Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act has no application to contempt proceedings initiated in the High Court on its own motion or on complaint regarding contempt of the High Court.
5. In view of the decision of the Supreme Court it is not possible for us to hold that the period of one year mentioned in Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act is applicable to a case where contempt proceeding is initiated by the High Court for having disobeyed or not complied with its order. As the power conferred on the High Court under Article 215 of the Constitution of India is absolute and unfettered it cannot be said that the time limit specified in Section would apply and the proceeding before this court is barred by limitation.
6. The original petition was allowed as per Ext. P5 dated 12-6-1990. The third respondent (Joint Registrar of Co-operative Societies) was directed to issue certificate to the petitioner pursuant to Exts. P1 to P4 for recovering the amount of arrears due from the first respondent within one month from the date of receipt of a copy of the judgment. The second respondent (Joint Registrar) instead of issuing certificate issued Ext. P6 to the Assistant Registrar directing him to issue the certificate. The Assistant Registrar (third respondent) issued Ext. P7 stating that in Ext. PI the amount is not specified and so he” cannot issue the certificate. After Ext. P7 the present C.C.C. was filed on 30-9-1991.
7. In view of Pritam Pal v. High Court of M.P. the decision of the Division Bench of this Court Rajan Nair v. Mohan (1993) 1 Ker LT 782 cannot be held good law. We hold that the proceeding initiated against the first respondent is not barred by limitation.
Call on 17-7-1995 for further orders.