JUDGMENT
V.K. Jhanji, ACJ
1. This Letters Patent Appeal has been directed against order dated 11th June, 2002, passed by the learned Single Judge, whereby the writ petition filed by the appellant herein, has been dismissed.
2. Briefly, the facts are that the petitioner was working as a Chowkidar in Government Sheep Husbandry Department. His activities, as being a Government servant, were found to be prejudicial to the security of the State in as mush as he was found involved in subversive activities, instigating/motivating youth and sending them across the border to take arms training. He was arrested by the security forces on 26th March, 1989 and, thereafter detained under the provisions of J&K Public Safety Act, 1978 till 24th February, 1992. Taking note of the activities of the appellant, it was considered necessary to dismiss him from service. Resultantly, vide Government Order No. 535-GR of 1990 dated 9.5.1990, he was dismissed from service by the Governor in exercise of the power vested in him under Section 126 (2) (c) of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir. This order was challenged by the appellant in SWP No. 663/92. The learned Single Judge, after, hearing learned counsel appearing on either side, thoroughly considering the matter as also perusing the original record produced before the Court and noticing the law laid down by this Court in State v. Muhammad Afzal Lone, LPA No.385/97, decided on 5th October, 2001, dismissed the writ petition vide judgment dated 11th June, 2002. The writ-petitioner has come in appeal against the said judgment of the learned Single Judge.
3. On hearing learned counsel for the parties and on carefully going through the impugned judgment, we are of the view that the learned Single Judge has rightly dismissed the writ petition. Learned counsel for the appellant has argued that the learned Single Judge has not considered the judgment of the Apex Court in Jarnail Singh v. State of Punjab despite the fact that the writ-petitioner had made a mention of it in ground (b) of the writ petition and, in fact, the relevant portion of which was quoted in the writ petition.
4. We have perused the record of the writ petition, in particular ground (b) thereof. The learned counsel has not given the full citation of the case in the writ petition. It contains only the title of the case, as reflected above. Even if that had been done, the ratio of that judgment, as quoted by the appellant in ground (b) of the writ petition, is that the courts should lift the veil to see whether the order was made on the ground of misconduct/inefficiency or not.
5. Broadly, misconduct is a term relatable to the decorum, demeanour and discipline of a Government servant during his official dealings. The assessment of the gravity of an act of misconduct on the part of a Government servant may vary from person to person, depending upon their perceptions, personal biases, likes and dislikes. If an order of punishment is challenged on these grounds, the court may, in appropriate cases, endeavour to lift the veil and go behind the allegations and the material on the basis of which the order is passed. But in case, where the Government is satisfied that a public servant, deriving sustenance from the State exchequer, is engaged in digging out the substratum of the State-structure by his unlawful activities, is bent upon destroying the weft and warp of the social fabric of a democratic set-up and, thereby, is a potential threat to the security of the State, and the State, in exercise of its constitutional power, nips the evil, this Court will not embark upon an enquiry to look into the material on which such satisfaction of the Governor is founded. However, in the present case, the learned Single Judge, in the judgment impugned has noticed the satisfaction recorded thereon and has recorded a firm finding to which no exception can be taken.
6. Further, as noticed above, the appellant was also detained under the provisions of J&K Public Safety Act, 1978, on account of his unlawful activities. Detention of a public servant under the preventive detention laws is not a penance so as to endue him, or make him worthy of entrustment with, public duties.
7. Since in the present case, the appellant was dismissed on the ground of his activities, being detrimental and prejudicial to the security of the State, therefore, the ratio of the judgment, even if there be any such judgment, as quoted by the learned counsel in grounds (b) of the writ petition, has no application to the facts of the present case.
8. We find no merit in this appeal. It is, accordingly, dismissed.
