JUDGMENT
B.D. Singh, J.
1. These three appeals were filed separately by the plaintiff-appellant against the judgment and decree of the Second Additional Subordinate Judge, Muzaffarpur, affirming those of the Additional Munsif, Muzaffarpur. The three suits were filed by the plaintiff for eviction of the defendants from some katras (shop rooms) in Mohalla Saraiyaganj in Muzaffarpur town, and for the recovery of arrears of rent, and they were heard together by the trial court as the plaintiff in all the suits is the same and common questions of fact and law were involved in all the suits. Similarly, for the same reason the appeals were heard together by the lower appellate court and disposed of by one judgment. In this Court also, for the same reason, these appeals have been made analogous and this judgment will govern all of them.
2. The plaintiff’s case, in short, is that the defendants are the tenants of the three shop rooms which have become verv old and have outlived their utility and they are in a dangerous condition. A notice was also served upon the plaintiff by the Municipal authorities calling upon him to demolish the said katras due to their dangerous condition. Therefore, the demolition and reconstruction have become imperative. The plaintiff had submitted a plan in the Muzaffarpur Municipality for reconstruction of a double-storeyed building in place of the disputed katras. The plaintiff requested the defendants to vacate the katras so that they could be demolished and reconstructed. The plaintiff also required the katras for his own use. The arrears of rent was also due by the defendants which they did not pay in spite of repeated demands. The defendant did not agree to vacate. The plaintiff then sent notice to them to vacate the katras by July, 1958. The defendants sent replies to the notice served by the plaintiff, but they did not vacate the katras as stated above. Hence, the plaintiff filed the three suits.
3. The case of the defendants, in brief,
is that the disputed katras were built after
the earthquake of 1934 and have not out
lived their utility. They are not in a
dangerous condition and do not need
demolition. Their further case is that the
plaintiff has invented this plea only to
evict them somehow or the other. Accord
ing to them, the plaintiff got a collusive
notice under Section 194 of the Municipal
Act served upon them for the demolition
of the building. On enquiry by the Munici
pal authorities, however, it was found that
the katras were in good condition. There
fore, the proceeding contemplated under
Section 194 of the said Municipal Act was
dropped. Their further case is that the
plaintiff had been illegally increasing the
rent of the building under threat to evict
them. The initial rent of the Katras was
Rs. 10/-, Rs. 16/- and Rs. 26/-. The plain
tiff had gradually increased the same to
Rs. 20/-, Rs. 30/- and Rs. 50/- respectively.
The said enhancement, according to the
defendants, is illegal under the provisions
of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and
Eviction) Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter
referred to as ‘the Act’). No rent is due
bv the defendants. Further, no rent is
due to the plaintiff against the defendants
who have remitted the rent to the plaintiff as it fell due.
4. On the pleadings of the parties several issues were framed by the trial Court. Of these, the following are relevant for the disposal of these appeals:–
(1) Has the condition of the shops in question deteriorated and become dangerous and have they outlived their lives and do they require reconstruction ?
(2) Does the plaintiff require the shops in question for his own occupation?
(3) Is the plaintiff entitled to a decree for eviction ?
(4) Is the plaintiff entitled to a decree for the arrears of rent? If so, for what amount?
The trial Court after considering the entire evidence on the record held: -- (a) that the katras were not in a dangerous condition and did not require demolition; (b) the plaintiff did not require the house for his personal occupation; (c) that there was no default in payment of rent by the defendants; and
(d) that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover rent at the enhanced rate. However, it passed a decree at the original rate of rent, because, the defendants had been sending rent by money order all along at that rate but the plaintiff did not accept the same.
6. The appellate court also concurred with the above findings of the trial court and dismissed the appeal; Hence this second appeal by the plaintiff.
6. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant has urged the following points of law for consideration:–
(i) The Courts below have erred in holding that the katras were not in dangerous condition and that they did not require demolition and reconstruction.
(ii) The plaintiff required eviction of the katras on the ground of personal necessity under Section 11 of the Act. The words “personal necessity” are used in wider import which will also include their reconstruction. The trial court erred in not permitting the plaintiff to adduce evidence for the purpose of proving that he required the Katras for reconstruction.
(iii) The word ‘occupation’ used in Section 11 (1) (c) of the Act does not necessarily mean residence. Reconstruction should be held to be comprehended in the term “occupation” within the meaning of Section 11, (1) (c) of the Act. The interpretation which would exclude the right to reconstruct, in all circumstances, would be unreasonable.
(iv) Section 11 (1) (c) of the Act is ultra vires of Article 19 (1) (f) of the Constitution of India imposing restriction 6n the fundamental rights of the plaintiff. The contents of the guaranteed rights under the said Article include the right to put the property to its best and most profitable use.
7. Regarding point No. (i) raised by learned Counsel for the appellant, in my opinion, the findings of the courts below that the katras were not in a dangerous condition and they did not require reconstruction, are purely findings of fact based upon the evidence adduced bv the parties. The trial court has discussed this matter in paragraphs 8 to 19 of its judgment whereas the lower appellate court -has dealt with this matter in paragraphs 5 to 9 of the judgment and they have given valid reasons for arriving at the said conclusion. I find no reason to interfere with the findings of the courts below so far as this point is concerned.
8. For the consideration of point No. (ii) it will be necessary to refer to Section 11 of the Act, the relevant portions of which, for the purposes of these appeals, are:–
“(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any contract or law to the contrary but subject to the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and to those of Section 12, where a tenant is in possession of any building, he shall not be liable to eviction therefrom except in execution of a decree passed by the court on one or more of the following grounds: —
XX XX XX XX (c) where the building is reasonably and in good faith required by the landlord for his own occupation or for the occupation of any person for whose benefit the building is held by the landlord: XX XX XX XX"
From the above it is quite clear that the words “personal necessity” do not exist in the aforesaid Clause (c) of Section 11 (1). The following words used in the above quoted clause are clear and distinct:
“… .required by the landlord for his own occupation or for the occupation of any person for whose benefit the building is held by the landlord.”
Therefore, in my opinion, the intention of the Legislature is apparent and there is no scope for interpretation and to hold that the legislature intended thereby to mean ‘personal necessity’. Had it been so, the contention of learned counsel for the appellant would have been acceptable that the words “personal necessity” have wider meaning and may also include reconstruction of the katras, but as observed above, there is no scope for such interpretation in the absence of the words “personal necessity” in the aforesaid clause.
Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the trial court erred in not permitting the plaintiff to adduce evidence for the purpose of proving that he required the katras for reconstruction. This matter has been considered by the trial court in paragraphs 20 and 22 of its judgment. It seems that in the original plaint there is absolutely no mention of the necessity for the personal occupation of the house by the plaintiff. An amendment petition to this effect was filed on 26-3-62 and was allowed on 30-3-62. The trial court, after considering the evidence regarding personal necessity led by Abdul Ghaffar, the plaintiff, who was examined as P. W. 5, held that the contention that the katras were required for personal occupation was entirely a bogus one and it did not rely on his evidence. It further held that in the plaint also there was a vague claim of personal necessity and this claim was also introduced at a late stage bv the aforesaid amendment. Originally the only ground for eviction given in the plaint was that the house had become dangerous and had outlived its age. In paragraph 2 of the plaint it is stated:–
“That the said holding is a very old one which has outlived its life and due to lapse of time it began to deteriorate so much so that it became dangerous and its reconstruction became necessary.”
In paragraph 7 of the plaint, as it stood before the amendment, it was stated:
“That it is respectfully submitted that the defendants are the lessees from month to month and they have no right not to allow the plaintiff to demolish the structure and make fresh construction as may be convenient and beneficial to the plaintiff and in case of the collapse of the house the plaintiff will be put to irreparable loss and as such he is entitled to evict the defendants, as he requires the house bona fide for improvement.”
Subsequently, as stated above, the amendment sought by the plaintiff was allowed and in this paragraph the following passage was added: —
“and thereafter for his own occupation or in alternative he is entitled to demolish his premises and appropriate materials thereof and take khas possession of the land on which the premises in dangerous condition stand.”
The appellate court has dealt with it in paragraph 10 of its judgment. From the order sheet of the trial court dated 7-1-63 it is apparent that when examination-in-chief of Abdul Ghaffar, the plaintiff, was going on, a petition on his behalf was filed praying to allow him to put questions that the katras were required by the plaintiff for using them as his own shop. In the plaint, as it stood even after the amendment, there is no mention that the plaintiff required them for the purpose of opening shop or for using them for his own shop. Therefore, by the said order dated 7-1-63 the trial court rejected the petition to put further questions to the plaintiff in order to elucidate that the katras were required for the purpose of opening shop by the plaintiff. In my opinion, the trial court was right in not allowing such questions to be put to the plaintiff, because, he has not made out such a case in the plaint even after its amendment. The appellate court has also approved the same. Therefore, I find no reason to differ with the findings of the courts below so far point No. (ii) also is concerned.
9. Now I turn to consider point No. (iii) raised by the learned counsel for the appellant. It has been contended that even the word “occupation” should be held to comprehend “reconstruction.” It has been urged that how the plaintiff will occupy without rebuilding the katras and in order to support his contention he has relied on a Supreme Court decision in Ramniklal Pitambardas Mehta v. Indradaman Ararat Lal, AIR 1964 SG 1676 at p. 1680 wherein their Lordships at paragraph 29 have held:–
“‘Occupation’ of the premises in Clause (g) does not necessarily refer to occupation as residence. The owner can occupy a place by making use of it in any manner. In a case like the present, if the plaintiffs on getting possession start their work of demolition within the prescribed period, they would have occupied the premises in order to erect a building fit for their occupation.”
But, in my opinion, this judgment of their Lordships of the Supreme Court does not help the appellant, for, their Lordships have clearly held that the plaintiff on getting possession can start the work of demolition and building. So, in the instant case also after taking the possession the plaintiff can start re-building or repairing the katras, but the possession has not been given to him. Further, their Lordships of the Supreme Court, in that case, were dealing with the provisions contained in Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act (57 of 1947) which, as to be seen later, clearly provides for demolition, repair etc.; the relevant portions of which I have quoted hereinafter.
On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents has submitted that the appellant required the building for reconstruction and repair is not a ground falling within Section 11 (1) (c) of the Act and that cannot be a ground for eviction of the tenants under the said section; and, in order to prove his contention, has relied on a single Judge decision of this Court in H. H. Ansari v. Mohboob Hussain, 1962 BLJR 579. In that case it was found that the building was in a dilapidated condition and the landlord submitted a plan for reconstruction of the house to the Ranchi Municipality which was sanctioned. The case of the landlord was that he vacated the tenant to be evicted, because the building had to be reconstructed. It was not the case of the landlord that he required the building for his occupation or of any person for whose benefit the building was held by the landlord. It was held by his Lordship:–
“In my opinion, the landlord has no legal right to evict the defendant under Section 11 (1) (c) of Act III of 1947 because it is not the case of the landlord that be required the building for his own occupation or for the occupation of any person for whose benefit the building is held by butt. The circumstance that the landlord required the building for reconstruction and repair is not a ground falling within Section 11 (1) (c) of Bihar Act III of 1947 and that cannot be a ground for eviction; of the tenant under that section . . .”
In my opinion, the contention of learned counsel for the respondents is well founded. The dictionary meaning of the word “occupation”, as we find from the Oxford English Dictionary, Volume VII, reprint 1961, at page 46, is:–
“taking possession xx xxx the action of occupying or condition of being occupied.”
The fuller meaning of the word “occupation” we find in Halsbury’s Laws of England. Third Edition, Volume 14, at p. 9 which reads as follows:–
“An occupier is one who actually exercises the rights of an owner in possession. The primary element of occupation is possession, but it includes something more, for mere legal possession cannot constitute an occupation. The owner of a vacant house is in possession, though not in occupation but if he furnishes the house and keeps it ready for habitation, he is am occupier, though he may not have resided in it for a considerable time before the qualifying date. So a trader occupies premises by merely keeping his stock, tools, vehicles or other goods upon those premises. A merchant or businessman occupies an office of counting-house by using it during ordinary business hoars by himself or his clerks for the purpose of his business.
A person’s occupation of a dwelling-house is not deemed to be interrupted by reason only of permission being given by letting or otherwise for its occupation furnished by some other person if he intends to resume actual occupation within nine weeks of giving it up and will not be prevented by the permission given as aforesaid.”
The meaning of ‘occupation’ is also mentioned in Firm Ram Kishun Shah Etwari Sagu v. Jamuna Prasad, AIR 1951 Pat 469 at p. 470 where their Lordships in paragraph 5 quoted with approval a passage from Rex v. St. Pancras, (1877) 2 QBD 581 at p. 588, which is as follows:–
“Occupation includes possession as its primary element, but it also includes something more. Legal possession does not, of itself constitute an occupation. The owner of vacant house is in possession and may maintain trespass against any one who invades it; but as long as he leaves it vacant he is not in occupation; nor is he an occupier.”
Therefore the concept of “occupation” does not include “reconstruction.”
Section 11 (f) of the West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temp. Provs.) Act, 1948, clearly provides for eviction on the ground of building or rebuilding of the premises and it reads as follows:–
“(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, the Presidency Small Causes Courts Act, 1882, or the Indian Contract Act, 1872, no order or decree for the recovery of possession of any premises shall be made as long as the tenant pays to the full ex-lent the rent allowable by this Act and performs the conditions of the tenancy:
Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall apply,–
XX XX X
(f) Where the premises are bona fide re-red by the landlord either for purposes of building or rebuilding, or for his own occupation or for the occupation of any person for whose benefit the premises are held.”
Similarly, Section 13 (h), (hh) and (i) of the Bombay Rent Control Act, 1947. which provides for eviction on the grounds of repairs, demolition and erection of a new residential building, reads as follows: —
“(1) Notwithstanding anything contained fax this Act but subject to the provisions of Section 15, a landlord shall be entitled to recover possession of any premises if the Court is satisfied –
XX XX X
(h) that the premises are reasonably land bona fide retired by the landlord for carrying out repairs which cannot be carried out without the premises being vacated; or
(hh) that the premises consist of not more than two floors and are reasonably and bona fide required by the landlord for the immediate purpose of demolishing them and such demolition is to be made for the purpose of erecting new building on the premises sought to be demolished;
or
(i) that where the premises are land, such land is reasonably and bona fide required by the landlord for the erection of a new residential building;
XX XX X ”
Reliance has further been placed on behalf of the appellant on a decision in R. V. N. Chandrasekara Cherry v. Kakumani Adikesavalu Chetty’s Charities, AIR 1966 Mad 14, at p. 17, but here also his Lordship was dealing with the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act (18 of 1960), which, as to be seen later, cleary provides for demolition of the building for the purpose of reconstruction, the relevant provision of which is quoted hereafter. Therefore, this decision also is of no avail to the appellant.
Section 9 (1) (j) of the Delhi and Ajmer Merwara Rent Control Act, 1947 provides for eviction on the ground of carrying oat building work, which reads as follows:–
“Notwithstanding anything contained in any contract, no court shall pass any decree in favour of a landlord or make any order in favour of a landlord whether in execution of a decree or otherwise, evicting any tenant, whether or not the period of the tenancv has terminated, unless it is satisfied either –
xx XX X (j) that the landlord requires the premises in order to carry out any building work- (i) at the instance of the Government or the Delhi Improvement Trust in pursuance of an improvement scheme or development scheme, or (ii) because the premises have become unsafe or unfit for human habitation;"
Similarly Section 13 (1), (f), (g) and (1) of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952, which provides for eviction of a tenant on the ground of repairs, rebuilding or building, reads as follows:–
“Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or any contract, no decree for the recovery of possession of any premises shall be passed by any Court in favour of the landlord against any tenant (including a tenant whose tenancy is terminated:
Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall apply to any suit or other proceeding for such recovery of possession if the court is satisfied –
XX XX X
(f) that the premises have become unsafe or unfit for human habitation and are bona fide required by the landlord for carrying out repairs which cannot be carried out without the premises being vacated; or
(g) that the premises are bona fide required by the landlord for the purpose of rebuilding the premises or for the replacement of the premises by any building or for the erection of other buildings and that such building or rebuilding cannot he carried out without the premises being vacated; or
XX X XX
(g) that the landlord requires the premises in order to carry out any building work at the instance of the Government or the Delhi Improvement Trust in pursuance of any improvement scheme or development scheme.”
Likewise Section 13 (3) (iii) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949, clearly provides for eviction of a tenant on the ground of re-erection or replacement of the building and its relevant portion reads as follows: —
“in the case of any building, if he requires it for the re-erection of that building, or for Its replacement by another building, or for the erection of other buildings. ….” (Control of Rent and Eviction).
Similarly. Clause (k) of Section 13 (1) of Rajasthan Premises Act, 1960 provides
for eviction on the ground of carrying on any building work and its relevant portion reads as follows:–
“that the landlord requires the premises in order to carry out any building work-
(i) at the instance of the Government, in pursuance of an improvement scheme or development scheme; or
(ii) because the premises have become unsafe or unfit for human habitation” We find similar provisions in the Madras Building (Lease and Rent Control) Act (18 of 1960). The words used in the relevant section thereof are “bona fide required for immediate purpose of demolition” and such” a demolition is to be made for the purpose of “erecting a new building.”
10. It is thus manifest that all the above mentioned States have clearly provided for eviction of tenant on the grounds of construction, reconstruction, demolition or repairs etc., of the building, whereas Bihar Act III of 1947 has not so provided. It has been contended by learned counsel for the appellant that the object of Bihar Act III of 1947 is to ensure accommodation and if the accommodation is increased by rebuilding of the katras, it is manifestly in harmony with the object of the Act. In order to support this contention reliance has been placed upon a decision in Messrs. Moolji Jaitha and Co. v. Khandesh Spinning and Weaving Mills Co. Ltd., AIR 1950 FC 83 at p. 118. para 138, wherein their Lordships have held:–
“….. In cases where there is doubt about the meaning of words used in a statute, a recognised method of construction is to take the words in the sense in which they would harmonise with the subject of the enactment and the object which the Legislature had in view; Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, Edn. 9, p. 20”.
But in my view, this case does not help the appellant, because, it is clearly held that in cases where there is doubt about the meaning of the words used in a statute (Sic). In the instant case, however, it is to be noticed that in Section 11 (1) (c) of the Act from the words “required by the landlord for his own occupation or for the occupation of any person for whose benefit the building is held by the landlord” the intention of the Legislature is quite distinct and clear. There is no ambiguity about it. Further, reliance has been made on a decision in AIR 1960 Mad 14 at page 17 (Supra) where their Lordships have quoted with approval in paragraph 11 a passage from the judgment in Md. Azizuddin v. Asiz Hussain, 1960-2 Andh WR 203 at p. 205, relevant portion of which reads as follows:
” …. If the landlord had the means to build and intends to build a three-storeyed building, as in this case, that does not go counter to the policy of the Rent Control Act. In fact, it may effectuate the policy because the policy of the Rent Control Act, is to protect the tenants, having regard to the scarcity of accommodation. If a landlord can afford to build premises with greater accommodation, certainly that would in some way relieve the scarcity”.
In my opinion, this case also is of no avail to the appellant, because their Lordships were dealing with the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act (18 of 1960) which, as stated above, specifically provides for demolition and rebuilding. Learned counsel for the appellant has also relied upon a decision in Umayal Achi v. Lakshmi Achi, AIR 1945 FC 25 at p. 37, col. 1, but in my opinion, it is not pertinent to the point at issue.
11. Therefore, it is clear that we cannot interpret the word “occupation” occurring in Section 11 (1) (c) of the Act to include construction or reconstruction of the building. No doubt, the absence of such a provision in the Act causes some hardship to the landlords, but we are helpless to give any relief on this score to the landlords for the reasons stated above. It is for the Legislature alone to look into the matter and to consider the propriety of amending the Act suitably in the light of the provisions in the Building Control Acts of the different States, referred to above.
12. Now I take up point No. (iv) which is the last point raised by Sri S. S, Asghar Hussain, learned counsel for the appellant It has been contended that Section 11 (1) (c) of the Act imposes unreasonable restriction on the fundamental rights of the owner of the property, who cannot put it to its best and most profitable use in the absence of provisions in the said section for eviction of the tenant for the purposes of reconstruction of the premises. Therefore, he urged that the said section is ultra vires of Article 19 (1) (f) of the Constitution of India.
On the other hand, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents, has submitted that the said section does not impose unreasonable restriction and it is not ultra vires of the said Article.
13. In order to appreciate the contentions of the parties it will be necessary to quote the relevant portions of Art, 19 (1) (f) and Clause (5) of the Constitution of India which read as follows:–
“19 (1) All citizens shall have the right-
XX XX X (f) to acquire, hold and dispose of property: XX XX X (5) Nothing in Sub-clauses (d), (e) and (f) of the said clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevent the State from making any law imposing, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of any of the rights conferred by the said sub-clauses either in the interests of the general public or for the protection of the interests ......".
Therefore, the main question to be decided is whether the restriction imposed under the aforesaid section is unreasonable. In L. N. Mukherjee v. State of Madras, AIR 1961 SC 1601 at p. 1603, para 21 their Lordships while dealing with the criteria of such restriction have observed:–
“The criteria for determining the degree of restriction on the right to hold property which would be considered reasonable, are by no means fixed or static, but must obviously vary from age to age and be related to the adjustments necessary to solve the problem which communities face from time to time. ..”
In order to appreciate the object of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act, 1947, we will have to refer to the past history as to how it came into existence. Just after the Second World War there was scarcity oi houses in the towns and their rents began to increase and it became difficult for the tenants to get suitable accommodation at fair rent. Therefore, the Bihar House and Business Premises Rent Control Order, 1942, was promulgated under Rule 81 Clause (2) of the Defence of India Rules, which ceased to exist after the 30th September, 1946, with the expiration of the Defence of India Act, 1939. As the housing problem continued to be acute in many towns it was necessary to continue the control of the letting of the houses, the rent of such houses, and any unreasonable eviction of tenants from houses. As the Bihar Legislature was not in Session, an Ordinance under Section 88(1) of the Government of India Act, 1935 was promulgated on the 1st October, 1946. This was on the lines of the previous Order with such modification as was considered necessary in the light of the experience gamed as a result of the working of the said Order. Since there had not yet been any improvement in the situation, the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act, 1947, was enacted. The object of the Act we get from its very preamble which reads as follows:–
“Whereas it is expedient to regulate the letting of buildings, to control the rent of such buildings and to prevent unreasonable eviction of tenants therefrom in the State of Bihar ………”
Therefore, it is clear that the Act has been enacted with a view to controlling the rent of the buildings and unreasonable eviction of tenants therefrom. The Act is a special Act which the Legislature has enacted to meet the emergency created by the scarcity of the house accommodations and to prevent, as far as possible, the special rise in the rent of houses, (vide Balmukund Khatry v. Hari Narain, AIR 1949 Pat 31 at p. 34). Section 11 of the Act provides various grounds on which a landlord can get the tenant evicted from his premises, for example, for breach of the condition of tenancy, sub-letting, where the condition of the building has materially deteriorated, where the building is reasonably and in good faith required by the landlord for his own occupation, where the amount of two months, rent lawfully payable by the tenant has fallen due and in case of the tenant holding on a lease for a specified period, on the expiry of the period of tenancy. It is true that in the Act there is no provision for getting the premises evicted by a landlord on the ground of reconstruction or repair of the building as we find in the case of Buildings Control Acts of the various other States. Even then, in my opinion, the restrictions imposed by the Bihar Act are reasonable. In the Uttar Pradesh (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 (U. P. Act III of 1947) we find that Section 3 provides the grounds on which a tenant can be evicted, but like the Bihar Act in the said Act also there is no provision for eviction of the tenant on the ground of reconstruction or repair of the building. Besides, in the Uttar Pradesh Act we find that under Section 7(2) “the District Magistrate may by general or special order require a landlord to let or not to let to any person any accommodation which is or has fallen vacant or is about to fall vacant”. Apparently, it seems a greater restriction upon the fundamental rights of the landlords, But in Raman Das v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1952 All 703 (FB) their Lordships of the Full Bench held that Section 7 of the U. P. Act does not in any way interfere with the fundamental rights of a citizen under Article 19{l)(f) of the Constitution of India. In P. V. S. Vencatachellum v. P. W. S. Kabalamurthy Pillai, AIR 1955 Mad 350 at p. 359 it was held:–
“The various Acts, etc., relating to the control of accommodation in urban areas which are in force in different States in India are all instances of legislation affecting more or less the right to hold and dispose of property under Clause (1)(f) of Article 19 of the Constitution of India. But such provisions are obviously necessary in public interest in times of shortage of houses. Hence, in so far as such restrictions are not unreasonable, they will be upheld by the Court as being valid . . . .”
In S. B. Trading Co., Ltd. v. Shyamlal Ramchandra, AIR 1951 Cal 539 at p. 547 his Lordship observed:–
“Housing accommodation is a necessity of life & some control of such accommodation in the present economic context appears to me to be in the ‘interest’ of everyone concerned.”
His Lordship held:–
“I see nothing unreasonable In such restriction or control. Section 18(5), Rent Act 1950, does no more than put reasonable restriction, reasonable in the present social & economic context, on the exercise of the landlord’s right in such cases to hold the property…………”
Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant has relied on a decision in M. R. Puttiah v. Mysore City Municipality, AIR 1955 Mys 121, but in my opinion this case is of no avail to the appellant,” because, their Lordships were dealing with Article 14 of the Constitution of India and in that judgment their Lordships held in paragraph 7:–
“The petitioners also contend that the notification infringes Article 19 of the Constitution. The reference is apparently to Article 19(1)(f). It cannot be said that either Section 20 of the Act or the notification in question affects any right of the tenants to acquire, hold and dispose of property since under the operation of the general law the tenants are liable to be evicted and such security as is conferred on them under the House Rent and Accommodation Control Act is necessarily subject to all the provisions of the Act including the provision for exemption.”
So, it is apparent that in the Mysore case their Lordships were dealing with the rights of the tenant and not of the landlord.
Further, reliance has been placed on behalf of the appellant on a decision in Chiranjit Lal Chowdhuri v. Union of India, 1950 SCR 869 = (AIR 1951 SC 41) but in my opinion this case is also not relevant to the point at issue. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the said case were dealing with the application by the share-holder of one ordinary share of the Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Company Ltd. for a writ of mandamus and certain other reliefs under Article 32 of the Constitution of India. In that case the Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Company (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1950 (XXVIII of 1950) was challenged. Further, the Act dismissing the Managing Agents of the Company, removing its directors, authorising Government to appoint new Directors and curtailing rights of share-holders in the matter of voting etc. was at issue in that case. Further decision of the majority in that case was that the restriction complained of in that case did not amount to infringement of any right under Article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution. Therefore, the observation In that case is not relevant at all for the purposes of the instant case.
Reliance has further been placed on a decision in S. P. Jinadathappa v. R. P. Sharma, AIR 1961 SC 1523 at p. 1525, paragraph 6, but in my opinion, this case does not help the appellant. On the contrary, it goes against the contention raised on behalf of the appellant, because, their Lordships have clearly held that Section 3(3)(a) of the Mysore House Rent and Accommodation Control Act, 1951 is constitutional and its validity cannot be challenged on the ground that it puts ah unreasonable restriction on the fundamental right of landlord to property under Article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution. At page 1525 in paragraph 6 their Lordships while dealing with the Mysore Act observed that the Act further makes ample provision to see that the tenant chosen is suitable. By providing the appeal to the District Judge and the right to move the High Court in revision, full safeguard has been given to secure that unsuitable person is not foisted on an owner as his tenant. Therefore, this case also, as stated above, does not help the appellant.
14. After considering the provisions under Section 11(1)(c) of the Act and the decisions referred to above, in my opinion, section 11 of the Act even in the absence of provision for reconstruction is not ultra vires of Article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution of India. Thus the contentions raised by learned counsel for the appellant cannot be accepted.
15. In the result, there is no merit in any of the three appeals which are accordingly dismissed with costs.
Misra, A.C.J.
16. I agree.