JUDGMENT
S.N. Jha, C.J.
1. This civil revision is directed against the order of Additional District Judge, Kishtwar, dated 8th May, 2000 in yu8appeal titled Block Development Officer v. Abdul Rashid, setting aside the order of the Assistant Labour Commissioner, Kishtwar, dated 22nd March, 1999, as Authority under Section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936.
2. Section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act (in short, the Act) empowers the Authority appointed under Sub-section (1) to issue direction for refund of the amount of wages deducted by the employer or payment of the delayed wages together with compensation on application of the employed person concerned, or any legal practitioner or any official of a registered trade union authorized in that behalf or any Inspector under the Act.” Section 17 provides for appeal against an order dismissing wholly or partly an application or a direction for refund/payment under Section 15 to the Court of Small Causes in a Presidency town and elsewhere, the District Court. Sub-section (2) of Section 17 lays down that save as provided in Sub-section (1) i.e. subject to any order passed in appeal, the order/ direction of the Authority under Section 15 shall be final.
3. When this civil revision came up for consideration, a question arose as to whether, in view of the provisions of Sub-section (2) or Section 17, the appellate order could be challenged by civil revision under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Attention of the court was drawn to a Full Bench decision of this Court in Ghulam Rasool Wani v. Ghulam Muhammad Wani, 1990 KLJ 173, wherein the word final occurring in Section 17(2) was interpreted as not only prohibiting a further appeal, but also revision to the High Court from the direction of the Authority. The revision was referred to Division Bench for an authoritative pronouncement on the point, and that is how the case came up before us for hearing.
4. We find the point at issue covered by the ratio of the decision in Surindra Mohan v. Dharam Chand Abrol, AIR 1971 J&K 76, decided by a Full Bench of this Court. The decision was rendered in the context of Jammu and Kashmir Houses and Shops Rent Control Act but the point decided squarely covers the controversy in the present context. In that case the Chief Judicial Magistrates, Srinagar and Jammu was appointed as Controller under the Houses and Shops Rent Control Act within the municipal limits of Srinagar and Jammu, respectively, to discharge the powers and duties of Controller under the Act, Against an interlocutory order of the Chief Judicial Magistrate exercising the powers of the Controller under the Act, the applicant of an application for fixing fair rent, approached this Court in civil revision. On behalf of the respondent it was contended that the Chief Judicial Magistrate while exercising the powers of the Controller was a mere persona designata, exercising executive powers against whose orders no revision would lie to this Court. The Full Bench noticed the definition of ‘persona designata’ in different law dictionaries, and relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in Central Talkies v. Dwarka Prassad, AIR 1961 SC 606, held that where a Judge is appointed purely in his individual capacity by name, he acts as a persona designata but where he is appointed by his designation alone he acts as a court and not as a persona designata. Some of the definition of persona designata quoted by the Full Bench may usefully be noticed as under:
“A person pointed out or described as an individual, as opposed to a person ascertained as a member of a class, or as filling a particular character”. [Osborn’s Concise Law Dictionary (Second Edn.) at page 235].
“An individual as distinguished from a member of a class”. [Mosley and Whiteley’s Law Dictionary (Fifth Edn.) at page 237].
5. Applying the above definition, the Full Bench pointed out the distinction with the aid of an illustration. Where A is a District Judge, he may be referred to as merely A and described as A, the District Judge of place X. The designation of “A” in such a case would identify him but essentially the reference is to his individual capacity. But where A is not referred to by name, but by designation alone, for instance as District Judge of place X, in such a case his appointment would not be in his individual capacity, but as a member of the class or post which he holds. In other words, the test to determine whether an appointment has been made as a persona designata of as a member or a class is to find out whether the person appointed has been appointed by his name alone, the description or designation being given only to identify him. Where only the profession or the occupation of the person or the post held by him is mentioned, the appointment is not as persona designata. The following observations in Central Talkies v. Dwarka Prassad (supra) would also bring home the point:
“The argument that the District Magistrate was a persona designate can not be accepted. Under the definition of ‘District Magistrate’ the special authorisation by the District Magistrate had the effect of creating officers exercising the powers of a District Magistrate under the Eviction Act. To that extent, those officers would, on authorization, be equated to the District Magistrate. A persona designata is ‘a person who is pointed out or described as an individual, as opposed to a person ascertained as a member of a class, or as filling a particular character’. (See Osborn’s Concise Law Dictionary, 4th Edn. page 253). In the words of schwabe C.J. in AIR 1924 Mad 561 (FB) personae designatae are “person selected to act in their private capacity and not in their capacity as judges’.”
The relevant conclusion arrived at by the Full Bench may also usefully be quoted as under:
“Where a presiding officer of a civil court is selected as an authority, the selection is not as a persona designata but as a member of the court because the authority so appointed to fill in a particular character, e.g. a Chief Judicial Magistrate, District Judge, Civil Judge so on and so forth.”
6. The above observation fully covers the point at issue in the instant case. Following the said decision, a learned Single Judge of this Court in Shanker Dass v. Shanker Singh, 1990 KLJ 551, held in the context of the Payment of Wages Act that the District Judge by virtue of Section 17(1) of the Act functions as a court and not as persona designata, therefore, being subordinate to the High Court, his orders are subject to revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The following observations may be quoted:
“It is true that the authority appointed under the Payment of Wages Act is not a civil court subject to the revisional jurisdiction of this court under Section 115 of CPC and the orders passed by such Authority cannot be disturbed, set-aside or varied by the High Court in the exercise or its revisional jurisdiction. However, when an appeal is preferred under the Payment of Wages Act before the District Judge, the order passed by the appellate court cannot be equaled with the order passed by the authority under the Payment or Wages Act…”.
7. The Full Bench decision in Ghulam Rasool Wani v. Ghulam Muhammad Wani (supra) is clearly distinguishable as in that case the civil revision was preferred against order of the Authority under Section 15 of the Act. Head note (a) in the report no doubt gives an impression as if revision would not lie to the High Court against the appellate order of the District Court, but the following observations at page 181 of the report shows that it does not correctly cull out the ratio decidendi of the case:
“…The aggrieved could file an appeal against the order of Authority in certain conditions, and the order of the appellate court being a ‘case decided’ within the meaning of Section 115 of the CPC and the appellate court itself being under the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court, the revision against its order was maintainable under Section 115 CPC … I need not dwell on this aspect any further but the Authority under the Act not being a civil court its directions or orders are not ‘case decided’ in terms of Section 115 CPC and therefore, the orders or the Authority were final subject only to appeal to District Judge or to any other given authority.”
8. The said decision is an authority on the point that revision under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure would not lie to this Court against the order or the Authority under Section 15 of the Act, and not on the question whether the appellate Order of the District Court is amenable to revisional jurisdiction of this Court under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
In fact, the observations quoted hereinabove suggest to the contrary that revision against the appellate order may lie.
9. As a matter of fact, there appears a consensus of judicial opinion throughout the country In Debidutt Dube v. Central India Electrical Supply Co., AIR 1945 Nagpur 244, the Nagpur High Court held that District Court acting under Section 17 of the Payment of Wages Act is subordinate to the High Court. It decides a ‘case’ within the meaning of Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code when it decides an appeal under Section 17 of the Act and the High Court has power to revise an order passed by the District Court in appeal under Section 17 of the Payment or Wages Act.
In Jogendra Nath v. Chandreswar Singh, AIR 1951 Calcutta 29, it was held by a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court that the Small Causes Court (which is at par with the District Court within the meaning of Section 17 of the Payment or Wages Act) does not act as a persona designata but as a court and, therefore, its orders are revisable by the High Court under Section 115 of Civil Procedure Code.
In Rajkumar Mills Ltd., Inspector, Payment of Wages, AIR 1955 MB 60, a Division Bench of the then Madhya Bharat High Court held that when an appeal is provided under Section 17 of the Payment of Wages Act to the District Court, that Court is appealed to as one of the ordinary courts of the country, consequently its orders and decrees will be governed by the rules of Civil Procedure Code. Therefore, a revision is competent against the decision of the District Court under Section 115 of Civil Procedure Code.
In A. C. Arumughan v. Manager, Jawahar Mills Ltd., AIR 1956 Madrass, 79, it was held that the word ‘final’ in Section 17(2) of the Payment of Wages Act prohibits further appeal and not revision under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure and, therefore, the revision would be competent.
In Manager, Codialabail Press v. K. Monappa, AIR 1963 Mysore 128, the Mysore High Court taking the same view, observed that since the District Court hearing an appeal under Section 17 from an order under Section 15 is a ‘court subordinate to the High Court’, the revisional power of the High Court under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, clearly extends to its decision and to the proceedings before it. The District Court functioning under Section 17 is not a persona designata, but a court, and, so long as that court is subordinate to the High Court, the proceedings before it are clearly revisable under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. There is nothing in Sub-section (2) of Section 17 which precludes the exercise or such revisional jurisdiction.
In The General Manager v. Paras Nath Tewari, AIR 1967 Allahabad 576, a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court held that when the power to hear an appeal is given under Section 17 to the District Judge as such, and not to any individual, it must be assumed as power given to the court of the District Judge and not as a persona designata to any particular Judge. Hence the District Court hearing an appeal under Section 17 of the Payment of Wages Act acts as a civil court subordinate to the High Court and not as a persona designate.
In Rameshwar Lal v. Jogendra Das, AIR 1970 Orissa 76, a Division Bench of the Orissa High Court held that though an order passed by the authority under Section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act is not directly revisable by High Court under Section 115 of Civil Procedure Code for the reason that the Authority is not a ‘Court’ but only a persona designata, the appellate order by the Court of Small Causes or the District Court, as the case may be, passed in an appeal under Section 17 of the Act from the original order by the Authority under Section 15 of the Act is revisable, they being civil courts subordinate to the High Court.
In French Motor Car Co. Ltd. Workers’ Union v. French Motor Car Co. Ltd., 1989 Lab. I. C. 2134, the Gauhati High Court has also held that the appellate court constituted under Section 17 of the Payment of Wages Act is amenable to the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court and error of jurisdiction committed by them can be corrected under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
10. It would appear from the above brief survey of the case law on the point that almost all the High Courts have unanimously taken the view that the appellate orders — passed by the District Court or the Small Causes Court, as the case may be, being courts subordinate to the High Court in the hierarchy, their orders would not lie outside the scope of Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure which empowers the High Court to interfere with the orders of any court subordinate to it. Whereas opinion seems to be divided as to whether the Authority under Section 15(2) is amenable to the revisioinal jurisdiction of the High Court, there is no discordant note as regards the amenability of the appellate orders of District Court/Small Causes Court to the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court.
11. Though the decisions aforesaid adequately answer the question of maintainability of this civil revision, yet reference to a recent decision of the Supreme Court in I.T.I. Ltd. v. Siemens Public Communications Network Ltd., AIR 2002 SC 2308, would not be out of place. In that case, appeal was filed before the Civil Judge against the interim order of the Arbitral Tribunal under Section 37(2)(b) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1976. A question arose as to whether revision against the appellate order would lie under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure to the High Court. Answering in the affirmative, the Supreme Court observed:
“…The term ‘Court’ referred to in the said provision is defined under Section 2(e) of the Act. From the said definition, it is cleat that the appeal is not to any designated person but to a Civil Court. In such a situations, the proceedings before such Court will have to be controlled by the provisions or the Code, therefore, the remedy by way of a revision under Section 115 of the Code will not amount to a judicial intervention not provided for by Part I of the Act. To put it in other words, when the Act under Section 37 provided for an appeal to the Civil Court and the application of Code not having been expressly barred, the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court gets attracted. If that be so, the bar under Section 5 will not be attracted because conferment of appellate power on the Civil Court in Part I of the Act attracts the provisions of the Code also.”
12. In the above premises, this revision is held to be maintainable which may now be listed for hearing on merits before the Single Judge as par roster.