JUDGMENT
Thangamani, J.
1. The revision petitioner herein is fourth defendant in O.S. No. 701 of 1994 in the Court of the District Munsif, Karur. First respondent/plaintiff instituted that suit for permanent injunction restraining the revision petitioner and others from interfering with his peaceful possession of the suit property. Along with the suit he filed I.A. No. 657 of 1994 under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2, C.P.C. and sought for a temporary injunction till the disposal of the suit. The revision petitioner entered appearance through his counsel on 18.8.1994 and sought time to file his counter. On the same day notice was ordered to the other defendants/Respondents and the revision petitioner was directed to file his counter by 26.8.1994. The court also ordered both parties to maintain status quo till then. And this order is assailed by the fourth defendant in the present revision petition by invoking Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
2. Under Order 43, Rule 1, Clause (r), an order under Rule 1 or Rule 2 of Order 39 is an appealable one. While a remedy against impugned order is expressly provided for in C.P.C. evidently the provisions of Article 227 cannot be invoked in the absence of any special circumstance. A learned Counsel for the petitioner has not brought to my notice any fact peculiar to the present case which warrants interference wider-Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The grounds mentioned in the civil revision petition are only to the effect that plaintiff has failed to establish prima facie case for grant of an order of status quo. And the court has also failed to state what the status quo is Before passing of orders no opportunity was given to the present petitioner to file his objections. Needless to add that these grounds are to be raised even in an appeal.
3. Learned Counsel for the revision petitioner cited these decisions in support of his claim that the impugned order could be assailed by invoking the jurisdiction of the court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India even though a remedy is expressly provided for in the Code of Civil Procedure. In Sundaram Pillai v. Govindasami, 97 L.W. 630 cited by him, Chandurkar, C.J. has laid down that the trial court, even at the stage of making an ad interim order of injunction has to apply its mind seriously to the question whether the plaintiff has made out a prima facie case for the grant of injunction. He has also held that the High Court in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under Section 115, C.P.C. cannot allow any order which amounts to an abuse of the powers vested in the trial court to stand once such an order comes to the notice of the High Court. In Rajapalayam Industrial and Commercial Syndicate v. Vairaprakasam (1988) 2 L.W. 179 cited by the petitioner, Srinivasan, J. has held that an order of an interim injunction passed without recording any reason for granting the same without giving notice to the opposite side or hearing the opposite side is in violation of the procedure prescribed by Order 39, Rule 3. C.P.C. In Albert v. Lalitha (1988)2 L.W. 342, Srinivasan, J. has deprecated the practice of ordering status quo without stating what the status quo is. In Syed Abdul Rahiman v. c (1900) 1 L.W. 90. Abdul Hadi, J. has held that an order of injunction without finding as to prima facie possession is erroneous. In Md. Isha Haque v. Md. Azadur Rahman Hazarika A.I.R. 1993 Gau 72, a single Judge has held that when the findings regarding service of summons are concluded by facts there could be no interference in revision under Section 115, C.P.C. Evidently these citations cannot help the revision petitioner since all of them have been rendered either in the appeals against the orders or revisions under Section 115, C.P.C.
4. In Morgan Stanley Mutual Fund v. Piyush Aggarwal A.I.R. 1994 Del. 186, the impugned order was passed on the last working day, whereafter the civil courts closed for winter vacation and the respondent had no opportunity to move the trial court under Order 39, Rule 4, C.P.C. or could prefer an appeal earlier. He in that situation, that the court can exercise the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 227 as the act of trial court amounted to exercising the jurisdiction improperly.
5. In Contemporary Target Private Limited v. M.B. Enterprises A.I.R. 1994 Gau. 7 granting an ex pane ad interim injunction was challenged on the ground that it was made without notice to caveator. This order was challenged under Article 227 of the Constitution of India read with Sections 115 and 151 of C.P.C. The question of law that arose for determination there was whether the petition against the appealable order is permissible under Article 227 of the Constitution read with Sections 115 and 151 of C.P.C. Learned Single Judge invoked Article 227 following the decision rendered by the Apex Court in Meneck Gustodji Surjrji v. Sarafazali Nawabali Mina , where it has been held that the High Court cannot ordinarily in exercise of its discreation entertain a special civil application where an adequate alternative legal remedy is available to the applicant. It is true that this principle is not rigid and inflexible and there can be extraordinary circumstances where despite the existence of an alternative legal remedy the High Court may interfere in favour of an applicant but this was certainly not one of such extraordinary cases.
6. In V. Shanmugha Mudaliar v. IX Assistant, Judge, City Civil Court, Madras , Srinivasan, J. has held that the High Court must exercise its powers of Superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution when there was a clear abuse of the process of the Court.
7. In Rathinam v. Pavathal (1991)2 M.L.J. 323. temporary injunction was granted without notice to opposite party and without recording reasons. Application for injunction was also not disposed of within 30 days as enjoined under Rule 3-A of Order 39. Venkataswami J, has found that in spite of all the inbuilt precautions in Order 39, Rules 3 and 3-A, the District Judge has thrown overboard all the principles and granted interim injunction and adding insult to the injury continued the injunction even though the abuse of process of court by the plaintiff before him was clearly brought to his notice and also established before him. In that situation he held that it is true that the petitioners have remedies available under the Code of Civil Procedure. But when they have invoked such alternative remedy and finding that they could not get justice speedily then only they have filed this revision under Article 227 of the Constitution. Under such circumstances, this Court is not helpless to remedy this situation. If Article 227 of the Constitution is not available to remedy situations like this, one fails to understand under what better circumstances Article 227 of the Constitution can be invoked.
8. In Tamil Nadu Electricity Board v. Thiyagarajan (1991)2 M.L.J. 138, the trial court had passed an order of interim injunction mechanically without real application of mind. Learned single Judge of this Court felt that the trial court was not justified in passing of an order of interim injunction without the petitioner having been made a party. Therefore he held that the order of the trial court was totally without jurisdiction and was liable to be set aside under Article 227 of the Constitution.
9. Nainar Sundaram, J. (as he then was) has laid down in Savarimuthu v. Enforcement Directorate (1986)1 M.L.J. 206, the contingencies in which the power under Article 227 could be exercised. In the words of His Lordship, the power under Article 227 of the Constitution is an extraordinary power and it requires to be exercised sparingly and with extreme caution. It is a power of superintendence reserved for the High Court and is subject to its discretion and it cannot be claimed as of right by any party. The well accepted contingencies and features to warrant the exercise of such powers are: (1) lack of jurisdiction, erroneous assumption of jurisdiction or excess of jurisdiction or refusal to exercise jurisdiction, (2) grave dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of law or error of law apparent on the face of the record as distinguished from a mere mistake of law or an erroneous decision of law, (3) violation of the principles of natural justice, (4) perverse finding founded on no material whatever, and (5) arbitrary or capricious exercise of authority or discretion.
10. In The present case, I do not get any convincing explanation as to why the petitioner could not resort to the appellate process. This court under Article 227 does not assume and exercise appellate or re visional powers even on a question of law. There is no special circumstances pleaded in the present action for approaching this Court under Article 227. The present petitioner has an adequate alternative remedy of a statutory appeal and this remedy is more comprehensive than the one under Article 227. If he does not choose to avail of the same in the absence of extraordinary and special circumstances, he cannot seek the process under Article 227. And the citations above referred to do not support the contention of learned Counsel for the petitioner that he can avail the benefit of Article 227 by the mere asking of it even while an adequate other remedy is provided for in the Code of Civil Procedure.
11. I, therefore, find no merit in this civil revision petition and it is dismissed at the admission stage itself.