JUDGMENT
Bucknill, J.
1. This is an application in criminal revisional jurisdiction and it arises in a connection with an order made by a Magistrate of the First Class at Darbhanga purporting to act under Section 107 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The circumstances under which the law was thus put into operation are very simple and arose out of a quarrel between the complainant and the present applicant as to who had the right to collect rents from the tenants of a certain mouza. There is no question but that the right to collect rent may be regarded as a matter which might fall within the purview of Section 145, Criminal Procedure Code. It is argued here for the complainant that the Magistrate had no jurisdiction, in the circumstances of this case, to deal with the matter under Section 107 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and that, therefore, his order should be set aside. It is contended that Section 145. Criminal Procedure Code, was the section which the Magistrate was bound to utilise, Now, I am far from saying that Section 145, Criminal Procedure Code, would not have been useful for application to this particular case and I am inclined to think, looking at all the circumstances that it would have been probably more appropriate to have applied the provisions of Section 145, Criminal Procedure Code rather than to have dealt with the matter under Section 107. There does seem to have been some definite sort of dispute between parties as to who had the right to collect the rents, and I do not know that I can definitely say that the applicant here had no sort of right or pretension to his claim. It is important to observe that the Magistrate did undoubtedly some to a conclusion as to who had this right, for he bases the view that the complainant was in the right upon the evidence which was adduced by him to that effect. At the same time, he comes to the conclusion that the applicant should be bound over personally to keep the peace for 9 period of one year and enter into a bond of Rs. 200, on the ground that there was likelihood of a breach of the peace owing to the probability that the applicant would commit acts of force and had, indeed, attempted forcibly to collect rents from the villagers. The question, therefore, whether the Magistrate had jurisdiction to deal with this question under Section 107, Criminal Procedure Code, does not strictly, therefore, depend upon any mere determination of who had the lawful claim to the right to collect the rents, but hinges on the fact found by the Magistrate that the actions of the applicant were such as were likely to disturb the public peace. It has been very ably argued for the applicant that, where there is a dispute about land, Section 145. Criminal Procedure Code, binds down the Magistrate to deal with such a matter under its provisions. I have already, however, pointed out that in this case it does not seem to me that materiality of the question of possession of the right to collect the rents is very evident or that the Magistrate’s decision need depend entirely upon such a foundation. The position of the law is not, I think, in my opinion, altogether very satisfactory. So far, at any rate, as it has been placed before me, it would seem from the case of Emperor v. Abbas 12 Ind. Cas. 833 : 39 C. 150 : 14 C.L.J. 429 : 16 C.W.N. 83- 12 Cr. J. 569 that the Full Bench of that Court has quite clearly laid down that the fast that there is a dispute concerning land likely to cause a breath of peace does not deprive a Magistrate of jurisdiction under Section 107, Criminal Procedure Code, where the Magistrate is informed that any person is likely to commit a breath of the peace or disturb public tranquillity or to do any wrongful act that might probably occasion a breath of the peace or disturb the public tranquillity. What I understand, this is very clear language to me, is that when a Magistrate has reason to think that an individual is likely to commit a breath of the peace he has jurisdiction, even though the case for the apprehended breath of the peace may relate to a dispute about land, to put into operation the provisions of Section 107, Criminal Procedure Code. Now, it is quite true that in this Court Mr. Justice Jwala Prasad in the case of Himmat Mian v. Emperor 46 Ind. Cas. 296 19 Cr. L.J., 712 has held that when there is a clear dispute regarding the possession of land, the proper section to proceed under is Section 145, Criminal Procedure Code, which not only is more effective in order to prevent the breath of the peace, but also is one which causes the least prejudice to the contending parties. I have no reason to quarrel with that expression of opinion. I think that, where there is a dispute about land and where there is some bona fide claim on the part of both parties, the appropriate and proper section to be operated is Section 145, Criminal Procedure Code. But I do not feel justified in stating that a Magistrate who has reason to believe that there is a likelihood, owing to the action of an individual, of the occurrence of the breath of the peace, had no jurisdiction even when the cause of the likelihood of the breach of the peace has its origin in a dispute about land, to put into operations the provision of Section 107, Criminal Procedure Code. That is what the Magistrate has. I think, here done and I cannot see any good authority for saying that what he has done has been done without jurisdiction even though it may be that it would have been preferable that the provisions of Section 145. Criminal Procedure Code, should have been brought into
2. For these reasons. I see no ground for interference in this matter.