ORDER
A.P. Misra, J.
1. Heard learned counsel for the applicant and Sri S. K. Sharma appearing for the opposite party. The applicant by means of this application has sought for punishing the opposite party Sri J. N. Singh, the Regional Manager, U.P. State Road Transport Corporation Jhansi Region, Jhansi for violating the order of this Court dated 17-4-1990 which is filed as Annexure-1 to this application.
2. Briefly stating the facts of this case is that about 100 posts of Conductors fell vacant in Jhansi Region to which the petitioner applied. In the advertisement made by the said department the minimum qualification of the said post was Intermediate but later on while calling the candidates for written test, restriction of 55% marks was imposed. Aggrieved by that restriction the petitioner challenged the said order by means of a writ petition before this Court. Initially, interim order was passed directing the respondents not to debar the petitioner from appearing in the said examination scheduled to be held on 11-5-1989 on the ground that he had not obtained 50% marks in the Intermediate Examination. Later on in another order passed by this Court a direction was issued to the candidates similar to the petitioner who approached to this Court in the writ petition to declare the result. Similarly in the case of the petitioner also this Court directed the Corporation to declare the result. It was further directed that it would be done within three weeks from the date of the presentation of the certified copy of that order by the petitioner before the relevant authority. The averment made in the application is that in pursuance of the said order the applicant approached the respondent on 29-5-90 which was duly received. It is further contended that about one and half months have passed since then but the result has yet not been declared and the stipulated period of three weeks has lapsed. On account of the said reasoning the application for contempt is moved by the applicant for punishing the opposite party. After notice to the opposite party, a counter affidavit has been filed. As per averments made in para XII of the counter affidavit it is stated that those candidates who had succeeded in the written test were called for interview which was held from 5-7-89 to 8-7-89 and since the petitioner succeeded in the written test he was permitted to appear in the interview. However, after appearing in the said interview he did not succeed and was not finally selected. The contention is that since the petitioner has already appeared in the written test in accordance with the interim order passed by this Court and after he being declared successful was permitted to appear in the interview but only he was not found in the select list of the conductors of the region, no appointment letter was issued to him. It is on these facts the contention has been raised by the petitioner that since the opposite party has not declared the result within the stipulated period of three weeks from the date of service of the order, the opposite party be punished.
3. Before dealing with the present case it is necessary to refer to the legal position pertaining to contempts of courts. This has to be done because time and again cases are regularly increasing the number of contempt proceedings, both on account of approach of the person, officer, authority towards the orders passed by this Court and also on account of delay in implementing those orders, the parties approach to expedite its execution.
4. The law of contempt prior to the Constitution and even prior to 1926 follows the corresponding British law which regulated Superior Courts of Record. The High Courts which were courts of record often adopted British legal principles enunciated in regard to contempt law. Contempt of Courts Act XII of 1926 was incorporated thereafter and Section 2(1) whereof gave powers, statutorily to the High Courts of Judicature established by Letters Patent to punish contempts of courts “subordinate” to them. After coming into force of the Constitution, 1926 Act was repealed and was substituted by Contempt of Courts Act XII of 1952 which has now been substituted by the present Act No. 20 of 1971. Irrespective of the aforesaid legislative enactment Article 215 of the Constitution itself declares that every High Court shall be a court of records and thereafter all powers of such records including the power to punish for contempt itself. Section 3 of 1952 Act provides that every High Court has and exercises the same jurisdiction, powers and authority in accordance with the same procedure and practice in respect of contempt of courts subordinate to it as it has and exercises in respect of contempt of itself. In AIR 1954 SC 186 : (1954 Cri LJ 460) Sukhdev Singh v. Teja Singh, it has been held:
“The only limitation to the power is, as provided by Sub-section (2), that it shall not take cognizance of a contempt committed in respect of a court subordinate to it where such contempt is an offence punishable under the Penal Code.”
So far as contempt of the High Court itself is concerned, as distinguished from that of a court subordinate to it, the Constitution vests these rights in every High Court, and so no Act of a Legislature could take away that jurisdiction and confer it afresh by virtue of its own authority.
5. Further the contempt of courts is not an offence within the meaning of Section 4(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code, nor the alleged contemnor is an accused person within the meaning of Section 5 of the Indian Oath Act, 1973 and similarly the alleged contemnor cannot be said to be a person accused of an offence within the meaning of Article 20(3) of the Constitution.
6. It is on this ground repeatedly the courts have been suggesting that the contempt proceedings should be conducted with care, caution and circumspection. Opinions are also not wanting that, instead of there being a spate of contempt cases, only extreme types of contumacious behaviour, scurrilous attacks on courts, or scandalisation or vilification of a Judge may be dealt with. It should also be kept in mind while dealing with contempt of courts cases that it is an offence purely sui generis and that its punishment involves in most cases an exceptional interference with the liberty of the subject, and that too by a method of process.
7. Similarly a distinction has to be kept in mind between a civil and criminal contempt. Civil contempts are ‘offences’ essentially of a private nature since they deprive a party of the benefit for which the order was made. On the other hand, the criminal contempts are penal. The aim being to protect the public interest in ensuring that the administration of justice is duly protected. Further a civil contempt is a failure to obey a court’s order issued for the benefit of the opposite party, and the principle object of a civil contempt is to secure the enforcement of the said order. However, the courts would not interfere unless it is shown that the disobedience is wilful. Similarly a proceeding for civil contempt cannot be initiated mainly for the purpose of getting execution of the order passed by a court for which there is remedy provided under law. Thus the proceeding for civil contempt cannot be merely for the enforcement or execution of the order passed by a court.
8. It is significant that now under Section 2(b) the civil contempt has been defined. Section 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 has defined as under:
“”Civil contempt” means wilful disobedience to any judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a court or wilful breach of an undertaking given to it.”
By a bare reading of this section it is clear that the legislature does not intend to punish a person merely if it is shown that there is disobedience of an order passed by a court. The applicant has to prove that the dis-obedience was wilful.
9. Before coming to the conclusion that a person has committed wilful disobedience of an order of the court burden rests on the applicant to prove the service of the order which is alleged to have been violated on the person concerned. In other words, the conduct of the alleged contemnor must be wilful showing deliberate and conscious disregard of the court’s order of a despising or disdainful attitude towards the verdicts of courts. Similarly, where an order alleged to have been violated is subject to two interpretations, it cannot be said that a person has committed wilful disobedience of that order, if he takes a defence one of the two possible interpretations. Similarly, the order has to be precisely clear and unambiguous for its obedience.
10. Keeping the aforesaid principles of law in mind it has to be seen on the facts of this case whether the opposite party has committed any contempt of this Court by violating the order dated 17-4-1990 passed by this Court. In this case earlier during the pendency of the writ petition an interim order was passed with a direction to the respondent not to debar the petitioner from appearing in the examination scheduled to be held on 11-5-1989 on the ground that he did not obtain 50% marks in the Intermediate Examination and finally on 17-4-1990 while disposing finally the said writ petition a direction was given for declaration of the result of the petitioner within a period of three weeks from the date of the presentation of the certified copy of the order filed by the petitioner before the said authority. From the affidavit on the record it is not in dispute that the petitioner was not debarred from appearing in the examination as scheduled in terms of the interim order. The only question which the learned counsel for the petitioner urged was that the declaration of the petitioner’s result was firstly not made within the specified period and secondly illegality had been committed in the said selection.
11. On behalf of the respondent it has been argued that in compliance of the interim order the petitioner was not at all debarred from appearing in the examination but he actually appeared in the said examination was also declared successful but in the final selection he was not selected. It has been further stated that in terms of the order passed by this Court even the results were declared of all those candidates who were successful in the said examination. To this, the grievance of the petitioner is in the declaration of the result the petitioner’s name was not mentioned whether he was successful or unsuccessful. The argument for the respondent is that always the results of successful candidates are declared and whose names are not declared are unsuccessful.
12. Having heard learned counsel for the parties I feel that in the petitioner’s case that the respondents have not complied with the order passed by this Court is without any merit. In fact, the petitioner was permitted to sit in the said examination in accordance with the direction of this Court and subsequently the result which was declared was that of the successful candidates would amount to declaration of the result of the petitioner also. In terms of the said order it was not necessary for the opposite party to declare the result that the petitioner had failed. It is known that whenever the result is declared it is that of the successful candidates, the other candidates know that they have not been successful. Similarly the second argument that illegality has been committed in the said selection is beyond periphery of the present proceeding which could not be raised. By reading the entire contempt petition I find it to be entirely misconceived. The applicant seems to have filed this petition only in order to put the pressure on the opposite party which is not a proper approach in any proceeding initiated under it. It may be in a given case where the authority is deliberately showing disobedience of the order of this Court by deliberations, conduct or otherwise. It is always proper that such matter be brought to the notice of the Court so that such erring person, officer or authority is corrected or punished for disobedience. It is always expected in a democratic set up where society functions through rule of law, everyone performs his duties with sincerity keeping the object and rule for which he has been entrusted with authority, power and even duty of an individual. The obedience of the orders of the course is one of the most sacrosanct obligation of all individuals or authority and unless it is followed in spirit it does give rise to various proceedings including the proceeding for contempt. On one hand, the courts take precaution not to punish any person in a civil contempt unless one wilfully disobeys the order of the courts. Similarly such persons who are performing the duties must take care that it does not reach even to the periphery where it is said to have violated the order of this Court.
13. However, in the present case 1 find that by no stretch of imagination it can be concluded that the opposite party has committed or has violated either the interim order passed by this Court earlier or the order dated 17-4-1990. Therefore, it is held that the present proceeding for contempt is misconceived and it is accordingly dismissed with costs. Notice of contempt issued to opposite party is hereby discharged.