JUDGMENT
R.M.S. Khandeparkar, J.
1. Since common questions of the facts and law arise in both the petitions and are against the same order, they were heard together and are being disposed of by this common judgment. The petitioner in Writ Petition No. 69 of 2000 is the Corporation whereas the Writ Petition No. 1716 of 2000 is at the instance of the employees. The challenge to the impugned order at the instance of the Corporation is on the ground that the direction against the hospital, the opponent No. 2 before the Labour Court, is bad in law as there was no existing right in favour of the employees to claim wages under the provisions of law contained in section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, (hereinafter referred to as “the said Act”). The petition at the instance of the employees is mainly on the ground that the Labour Court erred in dismissing the application against the Corporation ignoring the facts that the assets and liabilities of the hospital, opponent No. 2 before the Labour Court, were taken over by the Corporation and the appointment of the employees by the Corporation was subsequent to the order of the Industrial Court in Complaint (ULP) No. 560 of 1997 and subject to the decision in the Writ Petition No. 1712 of 1991 which was filed by the hospital against the judgment of the Industrial Court in the said complaint and the said writ petition was dismissed and thereby the order of the Industrial Court against the hospital had attained finality, and the Corporation being its successor, it is bound by the said order, more particularly bearing in mind the provisions of section 29 of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the MRTU & PULP Act”) as well as the letter of appointment given by the Corporation to the employees. Besides that, the interference in the order of the Industrial Court by this Court in Writ Petition No. 2329 of 1991 filed by the Corporation Court was limited to the extent of setting aside of the finding in relation to the unfair labour practice and not in relation to the direction for reinstatement of the employees with continuity in service.
2. Few facts which are relevant for the decision, in the matter are that in 1890 a hospital by name Acworth Leprosy Hospital for the treatment of Leprosy Patients came to be established at Wadala, Mumbai. Though it was under the management of the trust, most of the trustees were appointed by the Corporation and the financial burden for the management of the hospital was mainly borne by the Corporation for last many years. A scheme called “Detection and Control of Leprosy Cases in Greater Bombay” was launched prior to taking over of the hospital by the Corporation in the year 1978. But the said scheme was terminated and discontinued from 4th August 1987 and consequently services of 25 employees, who were specifically employed for giving effect to the said scheme, 16 being Para Medical Workers and 9 being Registration Assistants were also terminated with effect from 4th August 1987. Thereupon the employees filed complaint in the Industrial Court alleging adoption of unfair labour practice under Item No. 9 of Schedule IV of the MRTU and PULP Act. After hearing the parties, the same was allowed by the Industrial Court by its judgment and order dated 1st November 1990, holding that the respondents to the said proceedings, viz. the Corporation as well as the said hospital were indulging in unfair labour practice, as was alleged in complaint and therefore directed the said respondents to desist from engaging in said unfair labour practice and further to withdraw and cancel the notice of termination of service of the said employees, whose identity was disclosed in Annexure A to the complaint filed by them and to reinstate them with continuity in service and to pay them full backwages and other allowances which they were entitled to immediately prior to 4th June, 1987.
3. Being aggrieved by the said judgment and order of the Industrial Court the Corporation as well as the hospital filed writ petitions, being Writ Petition No. 2329 of 1991 and 1712 of 1991, respectively. At the time of hearing on admission of the Writ Petition No. 1712 of 1991, Rule was issued and the execution of the judgment and order of the Industrial Court in (ULP) Complaint No. 560 of 1997 was stayed. During the pendency of the said petitions a joint meeting was held between the representatives of the employees and the Corporation on 4th January 1994 and the minutes thereof were drawn. One of the clauses of the said minutes which is sought to be relied upon by the Corporation in support of its contention reads thus:
“4. To take appropriate action as regards the period between 4th June 1987 (Date of the retrenchment) and the date of new appointment as per the decision of High Court or the pending Court case.”
In the said meeting it was also agreed upon that 16 para medical workers and 9 registered assistants who were employed by Acworth Leprosy Hospital were to be new recruits on the establishment of the said hospital of the Corporation and on completion of all administrative procedures regarding the said appointments they were required by resume to their duties from 10th January 1994. Meanwhile, the establishment of the said hospital was taken over by the Corporation by resolution dated 27th November 1991. The said resolution was to the effect that the taking over of the hospital shall be alongwith the land admeasuring 81,600 sq. yards, with structures, equipments and instruments thereon, with assets and liabilities of the said establishment as also the staff of the said hospital from 1st April, 1991, as a separate department of the Public Health Department of the Corporation, considering their previous service in the same grade of payment with same allowances and designation.
4. The Writ Petition No. 1712 of 1991 came to be dismissed on 27th July 1994 as neither the petitioners nor their Advocates remained present before the Court and accordingly it was dismissed for default. The Writ Petition No. 2329 of 1991 was disposed of on 1st August 1994 with a speaking order observing that since the Bombay Municipal Corporation had absorbed the employees from 10th January 1994, the certificate granted against the Corporation on the ground that the Corporation was guilty of unfair labour practice was set aside and that there was in fact a settlement arrived at with the workmen. The settlement was taken on record, and it was ruled that:
“In the above circumstances, the writ petition is disposed of in terms of settlement with no order as to costs.”
5. Meanwhile the employees were issued with the appointment orders by the Corporation on 7-2-1994, stating that they were appointed as the fresh recruits and on probation for a period of 2 years, further informing that their appointments were made without prejudice to the rights and contentions in Writ Petition No. 1712 of 1991 filed in the Bombay High Court. On 18th October 1996 the said employees through their Advocates served a notice upon the Corporation informing that in view of dismissal of Writ Petition No. 1712 of 1991 and considering Clause 4 of the Minutes of the Joint Meeting held on 4th June 1987, the judgment and order passed by the Industrial Court in Complaint (ULP) No. 560 of 1987 was fully enforceable and therefore the said employees were entitled for the benefits which were ordered to be granted to them under the said order of the Industrial Court, including the backwages and the same therefore be paid to them. The Corporation in reply to the said notice informed the Advocate for the employees by its letter dated 21st March 1997 that in view of the order passed by the High Court in Writ Petition No. 2329/1991 read with Clause 4 of the settlement dated 4th June 1987 and the employment of the employees with the Corporation as fresh recruits from 10th January 1994, the said employees were not entitled for backwages for the period from 4th June 1987 till the date of their fresh recruitment and hence refused to comply with the request for payment of backwages. The said employee, who are the petitioners in Writ Petition No. 1716 of 2000 filed an Application, bearing No. 1111 of 1997 before the Labour Court under section 33-C(2) of the said Act. In the said proceedings the Corporation was shown as the respondent No. 1 and the hospital as the respondent No. 2. The respondents in the said proceedings contested the same and the Labour Court by the impugned order while holding the hospital to be liable to pay backwages, dismissed the claim against the Corporation. Hence, the present petitions.
6. It is the contention of the Corporation that the employees were fresh recruits from 10th January 1994 and that therefore the Corporation is not liable for any claim of the employees based on the order of the Industrial Court in Complaint (ULP) No. 560 of 1987. It is their contention that consequent to the said disposal of the complaint by the Industrial Court there was a settlement arrived at on 4th July 1994 during the pendency of the writ petitions against the judgment of the Industrial Court and as per the said settlement, the employees were to be absorbed in the employment of the Corporation as fresh recruits and as regards the claim of the employees for the period from the date of the termination of their services i.e. 4th June 1987 till the date of their recruitment by the Corporation, it was to be decided separately and the said settlement was accepted by the High Court and formed part of the decision in Writ Petition No. 2329 of 1991 and was never challenged by the said employees. It is also their contention that consequent to the taking over of the establishment by the Corporation in the year 1991, the said hospital ceased to be a legal entity from the said date and it got merged with the Corporation. Being so, whatever order that might have been passed by the Industrial Court in Complaint (ULP) No. 560 of 1987 merges with the order passed by this Court in Writ Petition No. 2329 of 1991 as also the rights which might have been accrued in favour of the employees under the said order, no more subsist, in view of the settlement dated 4th January 1994 as well as the said order of the High Court and therefore there were no existing rights in favour of the employees on the date when the application under section 33-C(2) was filed by them. In the absence of existing rights in favour of the employees the Labour Court could not have ordered the payment of the amounts claimed by the applicants in the said application and therefore the order is bad in law. According to the Corporation the absorption of the employees as being as fresh recruits with effect from 10th January 1994 and the issue as regards the claim pertaining to the period from 4th June 1987 till 9th January 1994 was left to be decided separately and there having been no adjudication in that behalf till the date of the application under section 33-C(2), the application was premature and therefore no relief could have been granted to the employees by the Labour Court. On the other hand it is the case of the employees that the Writ Petition No. 1712 of 1991 having been dismissed by order dated 27th July 1994 the judgment of the Industrial Court in Complaint (ULP) No. 560 of 1987 had attained finality. The appointment orders issued to the employees consequent to the understanding arrived at in the joint meeting on 4th January 1994 clearly reveal the absorption of the employees by the Corporation was without prejudice to the rights and contentions of the parties in Writ Petition No. 1712 of 1991 in this Court. The said writ petitions were dismissed and the said dismissal was not challenged. There being no further condition imposed at the time of absorption of the employees in the employment of the Corporation, the decision of the Industrial Court in Complaint (ULP) No. 560 of 1987 was binding upon the Corporation. Section 29 of the MRTU and PULP Act clearly establishes the Corporation to be the successor of the said hospital, and therefore the liability of the Corporation cannot be disputed and hence, the Labour Court erred in holding the Corporation to be not liable, and dismissing the application against the Corporation. It is their further contention that in view of dismissal of the Writ Petition No. 1712 of 1991, the order of the Industrial Court having attained the finality, the rights of the employees were already crystallized in their favour in relation to the backwages and therefore, they had existing rights to claim the said backwages on the date of the application under section 33-C(2). It is further contended that in any case the Corporation having taken over the hospital along with the subsisting assets and liabilities, including the staff members, considering the resolution dated 12th November 1991 of the Corporation, the rights of the employees to claim the backwages and the liability of the Corporation in that regard cannot be disputed. It is their further contention that the order of this Court in Writ Petition No. 2329 of 1991 merely set aside the finding in relation to the adoption of unfair labour practice by the employer in the judgment of the Industrial Court in Complaint (ULP) No. 560 of 1987 and it did not disturb any other finding or direction. Therefore the directions for reinstatement and payment of backwages in the judgment of the Industrial Court still stand and have attained the finality.
7. It is also sought to be contended that the proceedings of 4th January 1994 were in relation to the Joint meeting and the decision therein cannot be read as a settlement within the meaning of the said expression under the said Act and further that even if it is assumed to be a settlement, it nowhere includes any settlement in relation to the period between 4th June 1987 till 9th January 1994 as it was left out for the decision in Writ Petition No. 1712 of 1991. Since the said writ petition has been dismissed, the decision in that regard by the Industrial Court in the Complaint No. 560 of 1987 stood revived. Reliance has been placed in the decision of the Supreme Court in the matter of Central Bank of India Ltd. v. P.S. Rajagopalan and others, .
8. The proceedings having been initiated under section 33-C(2) of the said Act what is primarily to be seen is whether the claim made by the applicants/employees in the application is based upon the existing right or not. In that regard, as rightly submitted by the learned Counsel for the employees the Apex Court in P.S. Rajgopalan’s case (supra) has held that before proceeding to compute the benefit in terms of money, this Labour Court inevitably has to deal with the question as to whether the workmen had a right to receive that benefit. If the said right is not disputed, nothing more needs to be done and the Labour Court can proceed to compute the value of the benefit in terms of money; but if the right is disputed the Labour Court must deal with that question and decide whether the workmen has the right to receive the benefit as alleged by him and, it is only if the Labour Court answers this point in favour of the workman, that the next question of making the necessary computation can arise. While laying down such law, dealing with the scope of the powers of the Labour Court under section 33-C(2) of the said Act, the Apex Court has observed thus:
“If an employee is dismissed or demoted and it is his case that the dismissal or demotion is wrongful, it would not be open to him to make a claim for the recovery of his salary or wages under section 33-C(2). His demotion or dismissal may give rise to an Industrial dispute which may be appropriately tried, but once it is shown that the employer has dismissed or demoted him, a claim that the dismissal or demotion is unlawful and, therefore, the employee continues to be the workman of the employer and is entitled to the benefits due to him under a pre-existing contract, cannot be made under section 33-C(2). If a settlement has been duly reached between the employer and his employees and it falls under section 18(2) or (3) of the Act and is governed by section 19(2), it would not be open to an employee notwithstanding the said settlement, to claim the benefit as though the said settlement had come to an end. If the settlement exists and continues to be operative, no claim can be made under section 33-C(2) inconsistent with the said settlement. If the settlement is intended to be terminated, proper steps may have to be taken in that behalf and a dispute that may arise thereafter may have to be dealt with according to the other procedure prescribed by the Act.”
9. Applying the law laid down by the Apex Court in relation to the scope of powers of the Labour Court and entitlement of the employees claiming relief under section 33-C(2) to the facts of the case in hand, if one peruses the application which was filed by the employees before the Labour Court claiming relief under the said provisions of law, it is apparent that the claim was on the basis that the employees were entitled for certain benefits under order dated 1st November, 1990 in Complaint (ULP) No. 560 of 1987 and the availability of those benefits was postponed on account of certain intervening factors like the Writ Petition No. 1712 of 1991 and a settlement dated 4th January 1994, as well as the order of appointment, and that in view of disposal of said Writ Petition No. 1712 of 1991, as having been dismissed, the employees were thereupon entitled for the said benefits under the said order of the Industrial Court. The basis for the said application are apparently disclosed from the contents of para No. 7 of the said application wherein it has been stated that while the Writ Petition No. 1712 of 1991 filed by the hospital was dismissed, the Writ Petition No. 2329 of 1991 was disposed of in terms of settlement dated 4th January 1994 and under Clause 4 of the settlement it was specifically provided that appropriate action would be taken in respect of the period from 4th June 1981 till the employees were absorbed, depending upon the outcome of the writ petition, and that, the appointment orders given by the Corporation stated that the appointments were without prejudice to the rights and contentions in Writ Petition No. 1712 of 1991, without any reference to Writ Petition No. 2329 of 1991 and as the Writ Petition No. 1712 of 1991 having been dismissed, the order dated 1st November 1990 in Complaint (ULP) No. 560 of 1987 was in force and, therefore, the employees were entitled to be treated as being in continuous employment and entitled for full backwages.
10. Considering the rival contentions, the question which arises for determination is as to whether the order dated 1st November 1990 in the said complaint was subsisting on the day of the filing of the said application under section 33-C(2) of the said Act, as is sought to be contended on behalf of the employees.
11. It is not in dispute that at the time the Writ Petition No. 1712 of 1991 was admitted, an interim relief was granted staying the execution of the order of the Industrial Court dated 1st November 1990. Simultaneously, Writ Petition No. 2329 of 1991 was also filed by the Corporation and both the petitions were admitted for final hearing. During the pendency of those writ petitions, there was a joint meeting of the parties on 4th January, 1994 wherein a settlement was arrived at between the parties that the employees would be recruited as the new recruits in the establishment of the said hospital of the Corporation with effect from 10th January 1994. Prior to that on 27th November, 1991, the hospital was taken over by the Corporation. Clause 4 of the settlement dated 4th January 1994, already quoted above, specifically provided that the as regards the period from 4th June 1987 till the date of appointment of the employees in the service of the Corporation i.e. 10th January 1994, an appropriate action was required to be taken as per the decision of the High Court or the pending Court cases. In this regard, the contention of the employees is that the reference to the “decision of the High Court or the pending Court cases” in Clause 4 of the said settlement refers to the Writ Petition No. 1712 of 1991 whereas the contention on the part of the Corporation is that it refers to both the petitions. In fact the controversy in this regard is not of much relevancy, once it is clear from the records that both the writ petitions were between the same parties. Undoubtedly on behalf of the employees, it is sought to be contended that they were never served with the notice in both the writ petitions and that there is nothing on record that the parties while entering into the settlement dated 4th January 1994, the employees had knowledge about the pendency of Writ Petition No. 2329 of 1991 and that therefore, Clause 4 is to be understood in those facts and circumstances and therefore reference to the pendency of the case in the High Court should be understood as having been made with reference to Writ Petition No. 1712 of 1994. As already observed above, irrespective of these rival contentions, once record discloses that both the parties were also parties to both the petitions. In the absence of specific reference in Clause 4 to only one writ petition or anywhere else in the settlement, a specific reference to Writ Petition No. 1712 of 1991, the contentions of the employees in this regard cannot be accepted. Besides, from the records it is difficult to assume the absence of knowledge of the pendency of the Writ Petition No. 2329 of 1991 to the employees. It is the case of the employees themselves that they were aware of the filing and pendency of the Writ Petition No. 1712 of 1991 and that the reference to the writ petition to Clause 4 of the agreement relates to the said writ petition. The order dated 1st August 1994 in Writ Petition No. 2329 of 1991 specifically records that Writ Petition No. 2329 of 1991 was admitted along with Writ Petition No. 1712 of 1991. That being so if the employees had knowledge of the Writ Petition No. 1712 of 1991 which was admitted along with Writ Petition No. 2321 of 1991, it is difficult to accept the contention of the employees that they were not aware of the Writ Petition No. 2329 of 1991, in the absence of specific reference to Writ Petition No. 1712 of 1991 in Clause 4 of the said agreement.
12. Clause 4 of the said agreement therefore discloses that the parties had agreed for appropriate action as regards the period between the date of termination of services of the employees i.e. from 4th June 1987 till the date of appointment of the employees in the service of the Corporation i.e. on 10th January 1994, “as per the decision of the High Court or pending Court cases”. In other words the appropriate action in relation to such period was made subject to the decision of the High Court.
13. Undoubtedly there are two orders of the High Court one in Writ Petition No. 1712 of 1991 and other in Writ Petition No. 2329 of 1991. The order in Writ Petition No. 1712 of 1991 discloses that apart from dismissal of the writ petition for default, the learned Single Judge of this Court while disposing the said petition, had also taken note of certain facts disclosed from the order of the Industrial Court and they included the fact of absorption of some of the employees of the hospital by the Corporation while others being treated as temporary employees and their total number being 26. The order passed on 1st August 1994 in Writ Petition No. 2329 of 1991 also discloses dismissal of the petition on account of the failure on the part of the petitioner therein to take appropriate steps to serve the respondents after issuance of the Rule nisi as well as disposal of the petition in terms of settlement, a copy of which was placed on record of the said writ petition. It is not in dispute that the settlement which was placed on record in the said petition was the decision in the said meeting dated 4th January 1994. The order also refers to the fact that since the Corporation was absorbed the employees from 10th January 1994, the certificate granted on the ground that the Corporation was guilty of unfair labour practice by the Industrial Court was set aside. The order specifically states that in the above circumstances, the writ petition is disposed of in terms of settlement with no order as to costs.
14. Undisputedly the order of this Court in Writ Petition No. 2329 of 1994 discloses disposal of the petition in terms of the settlement dated 4th January 1994. It is sought to be contended on behalf of the employees that this Court also noted therein that the petition was dismissed for failure to serve Rule nisi upon the employees in the said petition and further that the order merely set aside the certificate granted against the Corporation regarding adoption of unfair labour practice and did not interfere with the order of the Industrial Court in relation to the direction for reinstatement and payment of backwages. This contention is strenuously contested on behalf of the Corporation, submitting that the employees themselves having agreed for absorption as fresh recruits from the date of appointment in the service of the Corporation and having left the claim in relation to the period between 4th June 1987 till the date of the appointment in the service of Corporation being made subject to the decision of the High Court and there being no relief obtained from the High Court, nor thereafter any adjudication in that regard being sought for by the employees, if at all they were entitled for the same, it is the contention of the Corporation that there was no subsisting right in favour of the employees on the date on which the application under section 33-C(2) was filed.
15. Once it is not in dispute that Writ Petition No. 2329 of 1991 was filed against the order dated 1st November 1990 in Complaint (ULP) No. 560 of 1987 and while dismissing the writ petition, though the same was sought to be dismissed for failure on the part of the petitioners therein to take appropriate steps to serve the respondents in the said writ petition, admittedly the petition was also disposed of by a speaking order, accepting the settlement dated 4th January 1994 and making an order that the petition was being disposed of in terms of the said settlement. In other words, the settlement arrived at between the parties on 4th January 1994 was accepted by this Court as the settlement between the parties and it was given judicial sanction by the said order by observing that the petition was disposed of in terms of the said settlement. Undoubtedly, the Clause 4 of the said settlement discloses that the parties were required to take appropriate steps as regards the period between 4th June 1987 to the date of appointment of the employees in the service of the Corporation, as per the decision of the High Court in pending Court case. Being so, it was left to the parties by the said settlement that they were required to take appropriate action as regards the said period consequent to the decision of the High Court. The decision of the High Court was of setting aside of the order holding the Corporation having adopted unfair labour practice. Undisputedly, the learned Advocate for the employees is justified in contending that applying the provisions of law contained in section 29(C) of the MRTU and PULP Act, the order which was passed against the hospital would clearly bind the Corporation, as the Corporation is the successor to the hospital, since the hospital was a separate legal entity, and was taken over by the Corporation and had merged with the Corporation. The said order of the High Court was on 1st August 1994, i.e. after the hospital was taken over by the Corporation. Being so, there was no occasion for this Court to pass any order against the hospital independently of the order against the Corporation as the direction given against the hospital were binding on the Corporation and the hospital having merged with the Corporation, the order of the Industrial Court could have been executed only against the Corporation.
16. It cannot be disputed that on 1st August 1994, the hospital was not a separate legal entity and therefore there was no question of passing the order in favour of the hospital as such, on the said date. Indeed this is also clear from the provisions of MRTU and PULP Act which clearly provides for obligation of the successors of the employer to comply with the order passed by the Industrial Court under the MRTU and PULP Act. Being so the order of this Court holding that the certificate granted against the Corporation holding it to be guilty of unfair labour practice would apply with equal force in relation to the hospital and more particularly in respect of the relief which was granted during the time when the hospital was a separate legal entity. Once it is clear that the declaration of adoption of unfair labour practice by the employer having been set aside, there can be no occasion for the Industrial Court to grant any further relief in such proceedings in the absence of any such unfair labour practice by the employer. Therefore the order passed by this Court on 1st August 1994 holding the Corporation having been not guilty of unfair labour practice being adopted against the employees would result in setting aside all the effects which were to follow from the order of the Industrial Court dated 1st August 1990 on account of the finding that the hospital was guilty of adoption unfair labour practice. Viewed from this angle, the order dated 1st August 1990 in Writ Petition No. 2329 of 1991 would result in modifying the order of the Industrial Court and substituting the same by the settlement arrived at between the parties on 4th January 1994. In the result, what would remain consequent to the order dated 1st August 1994 of this Court, would be settlement between the parties arrived at on 4th January 1994.
17. Learned Advocate for the employees has also placed on record certain documents being correspondence prior to taking over of the hospital establishment by the Corporation. One such document is dated 21st September 1991 which is stated to be a copy of the letter from the Commissioner of the Corporation dated 7th August 1991, circulated to the Councillors on 21st September, 1991. The letter apparently appears to have been written disclosing various factors which were required to be considered while taking decision regarding the taking over of the establishment of the hospital. Para 14 of the said letter provided as follows:—
“14. The existing staff in A.L. Hospital shown in Annexure A will bee absorbed on the Corporation on the same day, pay-scales, allowances and status. However, A.L. Hospital will be treated as a separate Unit under the Health department of the Corporation on the lines of Kasturba Hospital and G.T.B. Hospitals. Seniority of the Medical and Labour, Nursing and Technical staff of A.L. Hospital will be maintained separately in the A.L. Hospital Unit. However, in case of other staff such as Clerk, Head Clerk etc. their seniority will be maintained in Health Department on the date of taking over of A.L. Hospital by the Corporation and they will stand junior to all the employees in the cadre on that day in the Health Department. For absorbing these employees in the Corporation, necessary posts are being created on the establishment of Public Health Department within my powers. However, one post of Medical Superintendent is proposed to be created with the sanction of the Corporation as the same falls within powers of the Corporation.”
This proposal apparently discloses that the absorption of the employees of the hospital in the service of the Corporation was in the same status and the pay scale as those employees were receiving from the hospital establishment as a separate legal entity, but their seniority was to be maintained in the Health Department on the day of taking over of the hospital by the Corporation and they were to be junior to all the employees in the cadre on that day in the Health Department. Besides for the purpose of absorption of those employees necessary posts were to be created. Apparently it was not merely a simple absorption of the entire class of employees from the hospital but they were to be absorbed as juniors to all the employees in the cadre in the Health Department of the Corporation on the day of their absorption, protecting their status and pay scale, for the posts to be created for their absorption. The settlement arrived at on 4th January 1994 also discloses that the employees were to be absorbed in the service of the Corporation as new recruits from 10th January 1994. Not only, that, the settlement specifically excludes the period from 4th June 1987 till 10th January 1994 for the purpose of settlement between the parties. Apparently while excluding the period of 4th June 1987 to 10th January 1994 from the settlement in relation to the status or the wages of the employees for the said period, it was simultaneously agreed that the same should be as per the decision of the High Court. It is a matter of record that the High Court disposed of the writ petition by accepting the said settlement and did not pass any order as regards the said period. It is also a matter of record that the employees did not act in any manner against the said order of the High Court. It was sought to be contended on behalf of the employees that the records apparently disclosed that they were never served with Rule nisi of the writ petition and therefore they had no knowledge of the order passed in Writ Petition No. 2329 of 1991. Assuming that the employees were not aware of the said decision on the day it was passed and subsequent thereto for some period, undoubtedly by reply dated 21st March 1997 on behalf of the Corporation with reference to the notice dated 18th October 1996 by the Advocate for the employees, the order passed in Writ Petition No. 2329 was clearly referred and made known to the said employees. There is no explanation on record as to what prevented the employees from taking appropriate steps and therefrom in relation to the said order in Writ Petition No. 2329 of 1991, if at all they were aggrieved in any manner on account of the said order being in terms of the settlement without dealing with the issue pertaining to the period from 4th June, 1987 till 9th January, 1994. The petitioners having been not served with the rule in the said petition if they were aggrieved by the same and, by the ultimate order passed therein, certainly they were not without remedy, the moment they were made known about the said order. Being so, as on the day of filing of the application under section 33-C(2) the said order of this Court had attained finality and as there was no adjudication in any manner in relation to the period from 4th June 1987 till 9th January, 1994 in the said order, neither there was any decision in that regard in the order dated 27th July, 1991 in Writ Petition No. 1712 of 1991, apparently there was no decision by the High Court in relation to the said period. At the same time as already held above the order dated 1st November 1990 in Complaint (ULP) No. 560 of 1987 was no more in subsistence in view of the said order of this Court in Writ Petition No. 2329 of 1991. The net result of the circumstances disclosed from the records is that in terms of the said order of this Court and the settlement dated 4th January 1994, there was no decision regarding entitlement of the employees to claim wages for the period from 4th June, 1987 till 9th January, 1994 and for the same reason, there was no existing right to claim backwages for the said period under section 33-C(2) of the said Act on the day the application was filed by the employees.
18. For the reasons stated above, therefore, Writ Petition No. 69 of 2000 succeeds and the Rule is made absolute in terms of prayer Clause (b) while Writ Petition No. 1716 of 2000 is hereby dismissed and Rule is discharged. There shall be no order as to costs. Parties to act on the authenticated copy of this order.