JUDGMENT
Gurusaharan Sharma, J.
1. The Plaintiff-Opposite party filed Title (Eviction) Suit No. 9 or 1990 for eviction of the defendant petitioner from the suit house described in detail in schedule A to the plaint from her personal necessity under Section 14 of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1982 (hereinafter to be referred to as “the Act” for short).
2. According to the plaintiff, she has purchased the suit house by registered sale deed dated 14.8.1988, where in the defendant was a tenant from before. Her husband is aged about 56 years and is a practising advocate and there was no other house either belonging to the plaintiff or her husband at Dhanbad. Her husband was experiencing great difficulty in attending court from village Lakurka, which was at a distance of 25 Kms. from Dhanbad court. Her eldest son was also attending school at Akusa near Dhanbad from the village covering a distance of 20 Kms. and was experiencing serious inconvenience. As such the plaintiff required the suit house for her bonafide need and occupation of her family members. The plaintiff further pleaded that partial eviction of the defendant would not serve her purpose in view of the fact that besides residential accommodation her husband has also to shift his office and library and a garage for car was also required.
3. In the written statement, the defendant pleaded, inter alia, that the husband of the plaintiff ordinarily practices at Chas and resides in his native village. He seldom comes to Dhanbad court. There was absolutely no inconvenience either to the husband of the plaintiff in attending court or her eldest son in going to school. The plaintiff did not require the suit premises for the bonafide need of her family. Alternatively, her requirement, if any, can be fully satisfied by partial eviction of the defendant, as the premises has got more or less 2-1/2 Katha land consisting of three rooms, a Veranda in the front besides latrine, bathroom and kitchen as well as vacant land in back and only two rooms plus a kitchen and bathroom would serve her purpose.
4. The plaintiff examined 8 witnesses in support of her case and filed documents which were marked as Exhibits 1,2 and 2/A. On the other hand, the defendant examined 4 witnesses and filed documents, which were marked as Exhibits
A,B,C and D series. The defendant while examining himself as D.W. 3, admitted in paragraphs 43, 45, and 46 of his evidence that he was residing in the suit house as a tenant and tried to pay monthly rent to the plaintiff after her purchase. The defendant also admitted that the plaintiff’s husband was practising as lawyer at Dhanbad and Chas and that her children were reading in School. The plaintiff’s assertion that she has got no house other than the suit house at Dhanbad was not controverted.
5. The admitted position is that one Smt. Gouri Rani Debi was the owner of the suit house. She had inducted Adhirkant Moitra as a tenant. She had filed title (Eviction) Suit No. 31 of 1985 against him. During the pendency of the said suit Smt, Rekha Biswas purchased the said house property. Smt. Gouri Rani Devi died and in her place her heirs were substituted in the said suit. The purchaser got herself added as co-plaintiff and the names of the original plaintiffs were expunged. Certain amendments in the plaint of the said suit was allowed at the instance of the purchaser, who was added as plaintiff. The tenant-defendant preferred Civil Revision No. 414 of 1989(R) in this Court, which was allowed on 6.9.1989 and the impugned order was set aside with a direction that if so advised the purchaser may file a fresh suit. Thereafter the plaintiff filed the present suit.
6. The counsel for the opposite party submitted that the plaintiff’s purchase of the suit house, during the pendency of Title Eviction) Suit No. 31 of 1985, without permission of court, was hit by Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act and was void and she was not entitled to file the present suit. In my opinion, this submission is devoid of any merit. The broad purpose of Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act is to maintain the status quo unaffected by the Act to the parties to litigation pending its determination. It is the essence of the Rule of Lis pendents that, in order to obtain the protection of the Rule, the property must be directly and sufficiently in question in the suit. It is obligatory on the Court to determine in every case whether, having regard to the nature of the litigation, the doctrine of lis pendens has any application. The suits in which no right to immovable property is in question, are out-side the scope of the Section. The suit filed by Smt. Gouri Rani Debi against the tenant-defendant was a simple suit for eviction under Section 11 of the Act, wherein no right to immovable property was directly and specifically in question. There was no question of any right or title of the tenant involved in the subject matter of the suit and the only question was as to whether the tenant was liable for eviction under the provisions of the Act. The landlady-the original plaintiff had every right to transfer the suit house to a third party and for that court’s permission was not required. In my opinion, having regard to the nature of litigation involved in the said pure and simple eviction suit, the provision of Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act was not applicable.
7. The defendant’s admission in his deposition as D.W. 3 that after purchase he tried to pay rent to the plaintiff proved relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties.
8. It is not disputed that the plaintiff’s husband is a practising advocate and her children are school going. It is certainly inconvenient for them to attend court and school from the village, which is at a distance of 25 and 20 Kms. respectively. The requirement of the suit house by the plaintiff, in the fact and circumstances of the case, in my opinion, is quite reasonable and bonafide and she has been able to prove it. I, therefore, confirm the findings of the trial court in this regard.
9. The plaintiff pleaded that partial eviction of the defendant would not serve her purpose. It has come in evidence that she required the whole of the suit premises. Deposition of independent P. Ws. 3,5 and 6 besides the evidence of her husband and son (P. Ws. 7 and 4 respectively) are relevant in this regard. The defendant also admitted that the plaintiff’s husband was a practicing Advocate and her children were school going. The trial court considered the question of partial eviction in paragraph-7 of the impugned judgment and came to the conclusion that partial eviction of the defendant from the suit house would not serve the plaintiff’s purposes; rather whole of the premises was required for her need. There are only three rooms in the suit house besides outer Varanda, Latrine, bath room and Kitchen. In my view the house contains only three rooms, out of the one bed room is required for the plaintiff and her husband and another bed room for the children. A third room is required for the Chambers of her husband, who is a practising Advocate. Besides that there are Latrine, bath-room, Kitchen and the outer Varanda, for which there is no question of partial eviction. Therefore, in my opinion, the partial eviction of the defendant would not satisfy the requirement of the plaintiff and the trail court has rightly held as such,
10. In the circumstances, 1 do not find any reason to interfere with the findings of the trial court either on the bonafide and reasonable requirement of the plaintiff and consequently the defendant’s eviction from the suit house or on the non-possibility of his partial eviction.
11, In the result, the impugned judgment/order is confirmed and this Civil Revision application is dismissed, but without costs.
