ORDER
Khan, J.
1. It is all about a wall proposed to be constructed by petitioner on the road starting from G.T. Karnal Road upto New Azadpur Railway Station. Petitioner claims it to be part and parcel of Subzi Mandi and invokes powers to regulate ingress and outguess on it. Respondents say it is public pathway which runs through “Abadideh” of their village and on which some of their houses and shops about. According to them petitioner and also the DDA had proposed to construct a wall on this sometime in 1979 also constraining some of them to file suit against them which ended up into a compromise whereby parties agreed to raise an Iron girder railing in front of shops instead of a brick wall. But ignoring all this, petitioner had renewed its attempt to reconstruct the wall in place of iron railing which would result in demolition of their shops or blocking access to these.
2. Respondents filed CS No. 583/79 to stop this along with an application for ad-interim injunction which was resisted by petitioner disputing any compromise between the parties in the past and claiming the road as its property which was dismissed by Trial court declining grant of interim stay. Respondents took appeal against this and Appellate court on consideration of the matter took the view that respondents’ suit would be rendered infructuous if the interim relief was not granted to them. The court, accordingly, restrained petitioner herein from constructing the wall in place of Iron-railing but at the same time left it free to clear any encroachment made by respondents on the road.
3. Petitioner is aggrieved of this order and has filed this revision to assail it.
4. Petitioner’s counsel, Ms. Pinky Anand attacked the impugned order on the ground that it had proceeded on an imaginary compromise between the parties. According to her respondents were trespassers on the land which admittedly belonged to petitioner and they were not entitled to any protection whatever. Nor could they ask for the regulation of movement on Mandi land in a particular way. She relied upon AIR 1993 Delhi 359 and AIR 1996 Delhi 351 to urge that a trespasser could not seek injunction against a true owner.
5. Mr. Lonial, on the other hand, traced the history of dispute between the parties which was resolved by a mutual settlement in earlier revisional proceedings before this Court. He submitted that so long as respondents claimed a right of access on the road, it could not be blocked pending adjudication of the issue.
6. I have examined both the orders passed by the courts below and the disagreement between them indicates the boarder line nature of the matter. It may be true that Trial Court’s view declining interim injunction also proceeded on a sound reasoning but the other view taken by Appellate court appears more mature and sound.
7. The issue is not whether the land covered by the road belongs to petitioner but whether the road was a public pathway as asserted by respondents. So long as it remained to be determined by Trial Court, respondents’ interest was required to be protected or else they would be nonsuited. Therefore, even going by the legal propositions pressed in service by Ms. Anand, survival of respondents’ suit deserved attention and an adinterim injunction to restrain petitioner from raising a wall in place of iron-railing till the decision in the suit. There can be no two views that non-grant of such injunction would render respondents’ suit infructuous as found by Appellate court in its order which is affirmed. However, Trial Court is directed to expedite the trial of suit and to see it though within six months from receipt of this order. Revision Petition is accordingly dismissed.