JUDGMENT
Mukul Mudgal, J.
1. This appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge dated 5th December, 2002 in Suit No.1112A/96 and IA No.11711/96 which dismissed the objections under Section 30 of the Arbitration Act, 1940(hereinafter referred to as the `Act’) has been preferred by the International Airport Authority of India(in short the IAAI). Objections were filed by the appellant/IAAI against the reasoned Award dated 10th April, 1996 passed by the Arbitrator, who was an employee of the IAAI/respondent.
2. The facts of the case according to the case set up by the claimant/respondent in this appeal is as under:-
(a) that under the Contract dated 19th November, 1987 and 3rd July 1990, the respondent, M/s Sea Hawk Cargo Carriers Pvt. Ltd, was awarded the job of loading and unloading export and import cargo at Delhi Airport for the following periods:
Contract date Period of validity 1st contract 19.11.1987 1.5.1986 to 30.4.1989 IInd contract 3.7.1990 1.4.1990 to 31.3.1992
(b) that since there was a gap between the expiry of one contract and the commencement of the second contract, from 1.5.1989 to 31.3.1990 which was referred to as the `interim period’, the respondent upon the expiry of the first contract on 30th April, 1989 was asked by the appellant to continue the work without a break during the interim period.
(c) that the terms and conditions between the parties for the interim period were not settled in advance but under the previous contract dated 19th November, 1987, the per tonnage rate payable to the respondent for export and import cargo was fixed. In addition thereto the appellant was to pay the respondent escalation of 50% of the increase in minimum wages payable to loaders employed by it in the cargo handling operations.
(d) that at the time of the commencement of the interim period, minimum wages for labour employed by the respondents increased abnormally by as much as 91% and the appellant, therefore, insisted with the respondent that the same terms and conditions as per the contract dated 19th November, 1987 would include 100% increase in minimum wages for all categories of workers as against 50% increase in minimum wages provided under the old Contract. Thus the respondent agreed to continue the work under the terms and conditions of the Contract dated 19th November, 1987 except for rates and the escalation formula which according to the respondent was to be revised so as to ensure that the respondent was compensated for the entire statutory increase in the minimum wages structure for all categories of workers.
(e) that the tenders which ultimately resulted in the second contract were floated in April, 1989 prior to the expiry of first contract against which the rates quoted by the respondent was the same which were claimed for the interim period.
(f) that it was the appellant which took 15 months to finalize the tender and to execute the second contract. Eventually in the second contract the rates quoted by the respondent as sought for the interim period were accepted by the appellant.
(g) that since the appellant did not respond to the requests and demands of the respondent for additional compensation for the interim period, the arbitration agreement was invoked by the respondents in June, 1991 for several claims including claims under the second contract by petitioning the Chairman of the appellant as per the Arbitration Agreement. On 19th August, 1991, the Chairman referred all claims of respondents to arbitration including the claim for additional compensation during the interim period and accordingly the arbitrator, an employee of Airport Authority of India, i.e., the appellant was appointed as the arbitrator.
3. While dismissing the other claims of the claimant/respondent the arbitrator by its reasoned award dated 10th April, 1996 accepted the claim for additional compensation for the interim period and awarded a sum of Rs.20,05,135/- Along with interest at 12% per annum from 15 days from the date of the Award till the date of payment towards this claim. The award is principally based upon the increase in the statutorily mandated minimum wages.
4. The following pleas while challenging the award under Section 30 of the Act of 1940 were raised by the appellant before the learned Single Judge:-
“(i) The award, is claimed to be barred by time, since it was made and published about 20 months beyond the date of the last extension;
(ii) The amount of Rs.20,05,135/- had been awarded in favor of the petitioner in relation to the intervening period which was not actually covered by any of the two written contracts, and therefore there was no arbitration agreement in existence, and as such the Arbitrator has misconducted himself by extending his jurisdiction in that behalf.
(iii) On aspect No.(ii), a linked further contention has been argued to the effect that the award is beyond the reference, since according to respondent, the dispute which was referred pursuant to the communication of the petitioner invoking arbitration, and also in terms of the communication of the Chairman of the Airport Authority actually appointing the Arbitrator, both did not envisage any claim towards reasonable payment in relation to the intervening period.”
5. While dealing with the question of award being time-barred, the learned Single Judge held that both parties participated before the Arbitrator in the proceedings up to the stage of final arguments on 10th March, 1995 and no objections were raised by any of the parties for lapsing of the stipulated period and, therefore, the parties had acquiesced in the proceedings. Thereafter the Arbitrator took about a year to reserve and pronounce the award and the claimant could not be penalized for the delay on the part of the arbitrator for pronouncing the award. In any case the learned Single Judge in a connected OMP No.154/1997 by relying upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Punjab Vs Hardyal reported as had extended the time for making publication of award up to 10th April, 1996 i.e., the date of the impugned award and therefore, this objection was held not to survive.
6. The Learned Single Judge arrived at the following findings:-
(a) That the objector/appellant was not able to establish or suggest that the claimant had accepted to do the work at the at the old contract rates of the expired contract.
(b) The communications exchanged between the parties established that the claimant continued to work during the interim period on terms and conditions prevalent under the expired contract (except for the rates applicable) till the formal contract was executed for the forthcoming period.
(c) That the Arbitrator analyzed and considered by its reasoning that the that the erstwhile rates based on per tonnage rate had become totally inoperative by the drastic change of circumstances on account of abnormal statutory increase of minimum wages to the extent of 91%.
(d) That while considering the objections to the award of the Arbitrator, the Court does not sit like a Court of appeal and deal with the merits of the matter as per the law laid down by the Division Bench of this Court in Delhi Development Authority, New Delhi Vs M/s Alkaram, New Delhi reported as ; State of Orissa & Others Vs M/s Lall Brothers reported ; Bijendra Nath Srivastava Vs Mayank Srivastava & Ors. reported as ; M/s Hindustan Tea Co. vs. M/s K. Sashikant & Co. & Another reported as . The position of law stood summarized in Arosan Enterprises Ltd. vs Union of India & Another reported as where it was held as under:-
“36. Be it noted that by reason of a long catena of cases, it is now a well-settled principle of law that reappraisal of evidence by the court is not permissible and as a matter of fact exercise of power by the Court to reappraise the evidence is unknown to proceedings under Section 30 of the Arbitration Act. In the event of there being no reasons in the award, question of interference of the court would not arise at all. In the event, however, there are reasons, the interference would still be not available within the jurisdiction of the court unless of course, there exist a total perversity in the award or the judgment is based on a wrong proposition of law. In the event however two views are possible on a question of law as well, the court would not be justified in interfering with the award.”
(e) The correspondence exchanged between the parties indicated clearly that all other terms and conditions of the earlier contract except in relation to the labour rates stood finalized as per prevailing terms even for the intervening period. The arbitration clause contained in the terms of earlier agreement would, therefore, be applicable for the intervening period as found by the Arbitrator.
(f) That the Arbitrator held that the tendered rates of the second contract were received by the respondent/appellant in the April, 1989 before the expiry of first contract and the rates quoted for the second contract were in fact accepted in July, 1990 by the appellant.
(g) That the arbitrator in allowing the claims has considered that after the expiry of the first contract, the work was to be carried on terms and conditions contained in the contract which also contained the clause for reimbursement for enhancement of wages for the interim period from 1st May, 1989 to 31st March, 1990. The plea of the respondent that the reference order was in terms of agreement dated 3rd July, 1990 and hence not a subject-matter of the reference is not acceptable as it was a hyper-technical plea because at every stage of the proceedings the parties were aware of the dispute being primarily on the account of rate per tonnage for the interim period being dependent upon the minimum wage component which arose abnormally by 91%. Since the parties had agreed to be participate in the adjudication on the aspect of rate per tonnage being dependent upon the minimum wages rate component and there was an abnormal increase of 91% in minimum wages it was neither equitable nor permissible to permit the appellant to take a shelter behind such hyper-technical pleas after the award was delivered.
7. In view of the aforesaid findings the objections to the award were dismissed by the learned Single Judge and the award was made a Rule of the Court.
8. The above judgment of the learned Single Judge has been challenged in appeal only on the ground that there is serious material irregularity in making the award in respect of a dispute which does not exist inasmuch as the reference in this case ought to have on the basis of the arbitration clause in the contract executed on 3rd July, 1990 which extended from 1st April, 1990 to 31st March, 1992 and thus there was no reference based upon the arbitration clause contained in agreement dated 19th November, 1987 which may be accepted as having remained in operation from 1st May, 1986 to 31st March, 1990. Thus there was no valid reference for the interim period before the Arbitrator for giving him the jurisdiction to decide the claim of payment of alleged dues said to have become payable for the interim period from 1st May, 1989 to 31st March, 1990.
8(a) The principal plea as urged before this Court by the appellant is that by perusal of two contracts dated 19th November, 1987 and 3rd July, 1990 entered into with the respondent for handling cargo during the period 1st May, 1986 to 30th April, 1989 (first contract) and 1st April, 1990 to 31st March, 1992 (second contract), the respondent continued rendering his service for 11 months period 1st May, 1989 to 31st March, 1990 as has been done prior to the expiry of the term of the first contract. The respondent continued handling cargo during the period of 11 months as per oral instructions of the Appellant. Since both the above contracts contained arbitration clauses there was admittedly no arbitration agreement from 1st May, 1989 to 31st March, 1990. Both the contracts provided that any future differences arising out of the contract shall be referred to an arbitrator to be appointed by the Chairman of the AAI/appellant i.e. third party. The respondent on 14th June, 1991, raised claim in respect of disputes described by respondent as unresolved issues for payment during interim period of contract i.e. from 1st May, 1990 to 31.3.1991. The Chairman by his order dated 19th August, 1991 appointed Shri S.P. Singh, as a Sole Arbitrator as per Agreement dated 3rd July, 1990 which covered period from 1st April, 1990 to 31st March, 1992.
The claimants averred before the arbitrator that in the dispute raised in the letter dated 14th June, 1991 by mistake interim period was described as 1st May, 1990 to 31st March, 1991 instead of 1st May, 1989 to 31st March, 1990. This was objected to by the appellant by denying that there was any reference made for 1st May, 1989 to 31st March, 1990. Mr. S.P.Singh was substituted by another employee of AAI by Shri H.P. Dash, by the Chairman vide letter dated 14th May, 1993 and inherited the dispute which did not cover the period 1st May, 1989 to 31st March, 1990.
8(b) The Arbitrator therefore could not assume jurisdiction and deal with subject matter for the period 1st May, 1989 to 31st March, 1990 which period was not covered by any of the two arbitration agreement. This amounts to misconduct. Correspondence between the parties shows that contract of the respondent was extended on the existing terms and conditions. The learned counsel for the appellant relied upon the following judgments:-
1.1992(2) Arbitration Law Reporter 119.
2..
3..
4.AIR 1963 SC 1687
5.
9. In response to the plea of the appellant that there was no arbitration agreement applicable for the interim period and hence the Arbitrator had no jurisdiction to entertain any claim for the said period and the Arbitrator had thus exceeded its jurisdiction, the learned counsel for respondent has contended as under:-
(i) that the Annexure A to the Order of Reference clearly demonstrated that the respondent’s claim for the interim period was the first item on the list of disputes.
(ii) that the appellant’s Chairman itself having made the reference and to its own employee, it is not open for the appellant to contend that such a claim could not have been referred to arbitration.
(iii) that the reference made in August, 1991 which makes a reference to the second contract dated 3rd July, 1990 then subsisting is, therefore, of no significance.
(iv) In any event whether a particular claim was admissible or not was an arbitrable dispute to be decided by the arbitrator which he has decided in favor of the respondent.
(v) That the respondent in order to ensure that the cargo unloading work at the airport does not come to a standstill and public interest does not suffer had agreed at the behest of the respondent to continue working pending finalization of the succeeding contract.
10(a). The learned counsel for respondent has relied upon the plethora of correspondence between the parties to contend that the appellant had extended the contract dated 19th November, 1987 for the interim period on the same terms and conditions then existing and, therefore, it is not now open to the appellant to back out and state that there was no arbitration clause for the interim period. Every letter written by the appellant, stating that the interim period covered by the same terms and conditions, was responded by a letter from the respondent effectively stating that the same terms and conditions of the contract were acceptable except for the rates for labour.
(b) Consequently it was clear that all the terms of the contract dated 19th November, 1987 were made applicable for the interim period except for the formula for sharing increase in minimum wages as per clause 5 which constituted the dispute referred.
(c) The terms and conditions governing the interim period were that of the contract dated 19th November, 1987 including the arbitration clause.
(d) The consideration payable therefore were the erstwhile rates together with a reasonable increase thereon calculated on the basis of the minimum wages as applicable on the commencement of the interim period.
(e) The only claim decided by the arbitrator in favor of the appellant concerned the difference between the existing compensation and the reasonable compensation payable to the respondent and there was no doubt about the applicability of the arbitration clause contained in the agreement dated 19th November, 1987, in view of the correspondence between the parties.
(f) The Arbitrator gave a calculation linked to increased minimum wages and awarded an amount of compensation which is eminently reasonable.
11. Even otherwise the award is sustainable and cannot be termed perverse or unreasonable in view of the following :-
(1) that it is an admitted fact that as per the same rates which the respondent had offered for the new tender in April 1989 which led to second contract dated 3rd July, 1990 which were demanded by the respondents for the interim period. These rates were finally accepted by the appellant in the second contract and therefore cannot be termed as unreasonable.
(2) that as held by the learned Single Judge that once it was admitted that there was an abnormal increase of 91% of the minimum wages during the interim period it was neither equitable nor permissible to the appellant to take shelter behind hyper-technical pleas after the award.
(3) that in Hyderabad Municipal Corporation Vs M. Krishnaswami Mudaliar and Another reported as it has been clearly held that for the interim period between the two contracts where rate has not been agreed in advance the affected parties were entitled to reasonable rate.
In Hyderabad Municipal Corporation’s case (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as follows:-
“After considering the correspondence exchanged between the parties and the other material on record the high court has taken the view that the government was liable to make extra payment for the work done as there was no dispute that the rates of material, etc. had increased during the extended period of two years and plaintiff was entitled to such extra payment. After considering the relevant material on record we are of the view that both in equity and in law the plaintiff contractor is entitled to receive extra payment and the High Court was right in deciding the question in respondent-plaintiff’s favor. Since subsequent to the entering into the agreement Ex.A-1, the Drainage Division was transferred from P.W.D. To Hyderabad Municipal Corporation the liability to make this extra payment in our view has been properly saddled on the appellant Corporation.”
12. The following correspondence as per the learned counsel for the respondent, clearly indicated that the parties were ad idem that there was reference for the interim period:
(a) Letter dated 29th April, 1989 from the appellant to the Respondent (Exhibit C 128) by which the appellant asked the respondent to continue for two months in the interim period on same terms and conditions as those of contract dated 19.11.1987. Which was responded on 3rd May, 1989 (Exhibit C-127) and full wages of employees were sought by the respondent on the basis of increased minimum wages.
(b) The letter dated 27th July, 1989 by the appellant again requested the respondent to work for further two months during the interim period on same terms and conditions of the contract dated 19th November, 1987. In response, by the letters dated 5th September and 18th October, 1989 (Exhibits C-112 & C-116), the respondent again maintained its position that such terms were acceptable except for the rates. By the letter dated 17th October, 1989 (Exhibit C-118), the respondent categorically informed the appellant that had the respondent known that its request for additional compensation for the interim period would not be accepted, it would not have continued to work during the interim period and the appellant was seeking to take unfair advantage of the respondent’s agreeing to work during the interim period so that loading and unloading of cargo was not disturbed in the national interest.
(c) By its letter dated 5th December, 1989 ( Exhibit C-114), the respondent informed the appellant that it is entitled to additional compensation for the interim period. This letter was responded by the appellant on 16th December, 1989 (Exhibit C-115), reiterating that the extension was on the same terms and conditions.
(d) By letter dated 18th January, 1990 (Exhibit C-109) the appellant asked the respondent, whether it was prepared to continue to work on the same terms and conditions. In response dated 20th January, 1990 (Exhibit C-107), the respondent categorically informed the appellant that it was not in position to continue on the same terms and conditions.
(e) By letter dated 22nd January, 1990 (Exhibit C) time was further extended on the same terms and conditions and it was responded by respondent by letter dated 23rd January, 1990 (Exhibit C-102) categorically informing the appellant that it cannot work on the same terms and conditions.
(f) By letter dated 8th February, 1990 (Exhibit C-101) the appellant again extended time on the same terms and conditions and in response and respondent refused to work on the same terms and conditions qua the labour rates reiterating again its claim for full compensation for the increased labour rates.
13. In our view a perusal of the correspondence between the parties as detailed above clearly indicated that in so far as the interim period of 1st May, 1989 to 31.3.1990, that both the appellant and the respondent were at idem in so far as the existence and applicability of the terms and conditions contained in the first contract dated 15.11.87 were concerned. The only difference between parties was the labour rates which were payable for the interim period. It is also not in dispute that prior to the expiry of the first contract on 30.4.89, in tenders floated for the forthcoming period, the rates quoted by the respondent for the second contract for the period 1.4.90 to 31.3.92 were the same as claimed for the interim period and eventually accepted by the respondent for the second contract. In the letter dated 29th April/1st May 1989 sent by the appellant to the respondent it is stated as under:-
“As you are aware your handling contract with IAAI is expiring on 30th April 1989. This matter is under consideration with IAAI and shall take some more time for the final outcome, therefore, competent authority has extended your contract for a period of 2 months on the existing terms and conditions.”
This could only refer to the terms and conditions contained in the agreement dated 19th November, 1987 which included the arbitration clause as there was no other agreement or clause in existence on that date. It is worth mentioning that in the correspondence dated 3rd May 1989 by respondent to the appellant it has, inter alia, been stated as follows:
“…… In our previous letter dated 29.4.89 we had advised you the possibility of the increase in minimum wages and the same was expected earlier than May, 1989, however the same has now been made effective from 1st May’89.
We reiterate that under present terms and conditions and in light of all stated above it will be naturally impossible for us to absorb the statutory expense. You will also appreciate that it is not possible for any organization to anticipate such phenomenal increase in minimum salary as such the compensation should be in t to.
Till such time as the competent authority decides on new terms and conditions, it is requested that in order to avoid any inconvenience in disbursing labour wages , kindly instruct accounts department to reimburse us to the extent of latest increase in toto effective 1st May’89.”
14. The other correspondence exchanged between the parties as referred to above also shows that the appellant kept on reiterating the present terms and conditions which related to the contract dated 19th November 1987. The correspondence before the arbitrator clearly discloses that the terms and conditions of the contract dated 19th November 1987 contained an arbitration clause. In the other correspondence between the parties also, there is no dispute about the existing terms and conditions being applicable to the interim period though in the correspondence, the appellant disputes the claim set up by the respondent for higher remuneration for labour charges which however has no bearing on the question of existence of the arbitration clause.
15. Learned counsel for the appellant had relied upon Ruby Plastic Industries vs. Food Corporation of India, 1992 Arb.L.R 119 wherein it was held that an award beyond the scope of reference was liable to be set aside. He further placed reliance on a judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of J&K and Another vs. Dev Dutt Pandit in it has been held that the court can examine the award if it is not in the terms of reference or the terms of the contract. He has also relied on Prem Sagar Chawla vs. Security and Finance P. Ltd., to contend that if arbitration clause is non existent the award must be set aside. The judgments relied upon by the appellant in our view would not be applicable to the facts of the present case because that both the learned Single Judge and this Court, have come to the conclusion that the correspondence between the parties clearly revealed that there was an agreement by virtue of correspondence between the parties which contains the arbitration clause as per the Agreement dated 19th November, 1987.
16. The learned counsel for the AAI also submitted that the reference was made on the basis of 3rd July 1990 agreement and hence could not have covered a period prior thereto. We have already arrived at a finding that the correspondence between the parties clearly revealed that the reference was made for the interim period of 1.5.89 to 31.3.1990 and reference to the agreement dated 3.7.1990 in the context of this interim period for which reference was made could not in any event make the reference for the later period as it is not in dispute that the only interim period understood by both the parties was the period 1.5.89 to 31.3.1990 falling between the first contract dated 9,.11.1987 (for the period 1.5.86 to 30.4.1989) and the second contract dated 3.7.1990 ( for the period 1.3.1990 to 31.3.1992). Thus clearly there is no other interim period. Even the said contract of 3.7.1990 contained an arbitration clause similar to that contained in the agreement dated 19.11.1987. Since reference was made in August 1991 during the subsistence of the second contract, the reference was made to the second contract dated 3.7.1990. Besides the letters dated 24.9.1989, 27.7.1989, 16.12.1989, 18.1.1990 and 82.1990 issued by the appellant clearly extended the existing terms and conditions for the interim period. This could only have been in reference to the first contract dated 19.11.1987 as up to 8th February, 1990 the contract dated 3rd July, 1990, had not come into being.
17. In answer to the plea raised by the respondent that the reference made did not arise from the first contract and was thus without jurisdiction, we find that the reference was made in respect of several disputes some of which including the present one arose from the first contract. This is evident from the following extract from the letter of the claimant/respondent dated 14th June 1991 addressed to the chairman of the appellant which details the disputes on which reference was sought:-
“This is to bring to your kind notice the following issues of which remain unresolved for nearly a year.
Payment during interim period of contract i.e. from 1/5/90 to 31/3/91.
Damage caused to 3 drums – consignee RANBAXY and subsequent deduction of Rs.52,803/-.
Deduction of Rs.2,500/- against theft case.
Meat shipment deduction (1350 MT) in the month of April, May, June & July’90 _ amount Rs.2,11,504/-.
Deduction of Rs.7,442/- for damage to Fork-lifts.
Deduction of Rs.91,07/4- in March’91 against strike period of Nov.’88.
Deduction of Rs.2,500/- against theft case for which the involvement of our staff, yet to be proved.”
In this letter which eventually resulted in the reference, the deduction of Rs.91,074/- is clearly for the period of November 1988 which was admittedly before the first contract expired on 30th April 1989. The reference was also made in the same terms by incorporating the above eight disputes in the order of reference as annexure I. Thus, the plea of the appellant that the dispute was referred in terms of only the 3rd July 1990 contract is belied by the reference of a deduction for strike during November 1988 which was clearly covered by the first contract dated 19th November 1987 in force from 1st May 1986 to 30th April 1989. Hence, there is no merit in the plea of the appellant that reference was only for claims which arose after 3rd July 1990.
18. The terms of the contract dated 19th November, 1987 repeated and reiterated by the appellant in writing through their correspondence during the interim period repeatedly stated that the continuance was on the existing terms. This could only be in reference to the 1st contract dated 19th November, 1987 as the second contract had not come into being. The 19th November, 1987 terms also contained the arbitration clause. This is also in consonance with the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Union of India Vs A.L. Rallia Ram wherein it was held that to constitute an arbitration agreement within Section 2(a) of the 1940 Act the agreement must be in writing and accepted by both parties but it was not a condition of an effective arbitration agreement that it must be in the form of a formal agreement. We have held that the terms of the agreement dated 19th November, 1987 were reiterated in several letters sent by the appellant to the respondent. These terms of 19th November, 1987 agreement included an arbitration clause and thus such correspondence constituted an arbitration agreement in writing contemplated by the above judgment in Rallia Ram’s case. Except the labour rates the terms and conditions as per the existing contract dated 19th November, 1987 put forth by the appellant were accepted by the respondent. Consequently the arbitration clause in contract dated 19th November, 1987 was applicable. It is also not in dispute that the respondent did work for the interim period and throughout in the correspondence kept on reiterating its demand for higher labour charges based on abnormal statutory increases though he was agreeable to the other terms and conditions put forth by the appellants which included the arbitration clause. Thus the reference for arbitration was made by the chairman and the 1st dispute referred was the payment for interim period which was wrongly mentioned as 1.5.90 to 31.3.91. The counsel for the appellant has sought to highlight this fact by submitting that thus the interim period for which the claim is made i.e. 1.5.89 to 31.3.90 was not referred. This in our view is a very unfair attempt by the appellant to profit from an obvious clerical error which was corrected later. This correction of the dates by the respondent apart, in any case the appellant’s counsel was unable to show whether there was any other interim period for which reference could be made. Consequently the two pleas of the appellant that (a) there was no arbitration agreement for the interim period and (b) there was no reference of this dispute which was wrongly adjudicated upon and leading to the impugned award thus cannot be sustained.
19. Once such pleas relating to jurisdiction raised by the appellant are found not to be sustainable then the arbitration award which is based on evidence on record can not be assailed in the challenge under objection under Section 30 of the 1940 Act as per the well settled position of law laid down in the following decisions applied by the learned Single Judge:-
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Neither before the learned single Judge or before us, the award was challenged on merits or even on the quantum of interest awarded. Nevertheless we find that the arbitrator’s award is based upon the increase in labour rates inclusive of rise in minimum wages. Furthermore, these increased rates sought by the respondent prior to conclusion of the first contract on 30th April 1989 were in fact accepted by the appellant themselves for the second contract commencing from 3rd July 1990 after the interim period from 1.5.89 to 31.3.1990 was over. There is no dispute before us that there was abnormal increase in the labour charges for the interim period of 1.5.89 to 31/3/1990. Thus the award grants a reasonable increase in such rates and has also been upheld by the learned single Judge by a well reasoned judgment by giving cogent reasons already noted in this judgment by affirming the award and affirming the 12% interest awarded by the arbitrator from the date of the award till the payment. Indeed we are in entire agreement with the conclusions of the learned Single Judge on the amount awarded and the interest awarded thereon from the date of the award till payment and endorse the same.
20. It is also clear that reference was made even according to the appellant under the second contract and admittedly the respondent had worked for the interim period at the request of the appellant and it is also not in dispute that prior to the commencement of interim period, abnormal escalation in minimum wages of 91% had taken place. We have also noted the fact that the abnormal increase of 91 per cent in the minimum wages and increased emoluments in accordance with other cognate labour legislations have not been disputed. Thus, it is clear that the arbitrator has given a reasoned award and has given cogent reasons for allowing the claim of the respondent. The appellant itself has accepted the rates quoted prior to the beginning of the interim period. In this view of the matter the claim was entirely justified and the respondents had in public interest not stopped work of unloading of the cargo which would have affected the entire cargo business of the Airport Authority of India impacting adversely the national and international trade. It does not lie in the mouth of the appellant now to contend that there was no reference for the interim period after having asked the respondent to work for that interim period.
21. Furthermore the increase in rates and the working by the respondent at the behest of the appellant being undisputed, even otherwise the upholding of the pleas of the appellant would be unjust and unfair particularly in view of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Hyderabad Municipal Corporation’s case (supra) and the respondent continuing to work during the interim period in a public utility at the behest of appellant.
22. Accordingly there is no merit in this appeal and it accordingly dismissed with costs. Consequently the judgment of the learned Single Judge making the impugned award dated 10th April, 1996 with 12% interest from the date of award till payment, a rule of the Court is upheld.