JUDGMENT
Swatanter Kumar, J.
1. This is an application under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code praying for recalling the order dated 9.12.1996 passed by this Court in Crl. Misc. No. 20204 M of 1996.
2. The necessary facts are that a FIR No. 290 dated 18.7.1996 under Sections 406, 420 and 120 of the Indian Penal Code was registered at the police station Narnaul against Ajay Bansal and four other petitioners. The petitioners in the Criminal Miscellaneous (main) prayed for quashing of the above FIR and also prayed for staying of further investigation of the aforestated FIR. The main petition came up for hearing on 4.11.1996 when at the request of the learned counsel for the petitioner the matter was adjourned to 6.12.1996. The case was again adjourned to 9.12.1996, on that date the Court passed the following order :-
“The FIR registered discloses a prima facie case. No interference is called for. Dismissed.”
The present application was filed on 16.1.1997 for recalling the order dated 9.12.1996.
3. As is clear from the aforestated order the Court had not dismissed the petition for default simplicitor, on the contrary, the Court had applied its mind to the facts and circumstances of the case and had found that the FIR prima facie disclosed an offence. In other words, the dismissal of the petition was on merits and not for default. The basic question that arises for consideration is whether this court would have jurisdiction to review and/or recall the order passed by it earlier which disposed of the petition on merits. May be once the case is dismissed for default and the Court does not adjudicate upon the merits of the case, the power of the Court under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code could be exercised in the interest of justice to re-hear the matter and dispose of the case on merits and in accordance with law. But having determined the merits of the case, the Court is obviously functus officio of the case and loses its jurisdiction, as the code does not postulate any power of review exercisable by this Court under its provisions. Once such a power is absent in the code, in that event, the inherent powers cannot be brought in to aid such a case. Power of review must be specifically provided for ; or such power would be exercisable only if the provision and scheme of the enactment provides it by necessary implication. At this stage, it may be relevant to make reference to a judgment of the Supreme Court of India in the case of State of Orissa v. Ram Chander Agarwala, A.I.R. 1979 Supreme Court 87:
” Once a judgment has been pronounced by a High Court either in exercise of its appellate or its revisional jurisdiction, no review or revision can be entertained against that judgment as there is no provision in the Code which would enable the High Court to review the same or to exercise revisional jurisdiction.
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This decision instead of supporting the respondent clearly lays down, following Chopra’s case (A.I.R. 1955 SC 633) (supra) that once a judgment has been pronounced by a High Court either in exercise of its appellate or its revisional jurisdiction, no review or revision can be entertained against that judgment as there is no provision in the Criminal Procedure Code which would enable the High Court to review the same or to exercise revisional jurisdiction. This Court entertained the application for quashing the proceedings on the ground that a subsequent application to quash would not amount to review or revise an order made by the Court. The decision clearly lays down that judgment of the High Court on appeal or revision cannot be reviewed or revised except in accordance with the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code. The provisions of Section 561A of the Code cannot be invoked for exercise of a power which is specifically prohibited by the Code.”
4. The learned counsel for the respondent referred to another judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of ‘Mej. Genl. A.S. Gauraya and Anr. v. S.N. Thakur and Anr., Chandigarh Law Reporter 1997(1) 408. This judgment is of no help to the respondent’s case because the Hon’ble Apex Court was concerned in this case with the exercise of inherent powers by the trial Court. The Supreme Court held that the trial Courts do not have inherent powers as are exerciseable by the High Court under Section 482 of the Code.
5. For the reasons aforestated, I do not find any merit in this application because the matter stood finally concluded and judgment pronounced vide order dated 9.12.1996. It needs to be noticed that considerable time has otherwise passed from the date of the registration of the FIR and the State counsel was not in a position to state whether the report has been filed before the Court of competent jurisdiction or not. At this stage, when some further investigations must have taken place, it even otherwise will not be fair for this Court to quash the FIR merely on the averments made in the FIR, specially, when the FIR prima facie makes out commission of an offence. Thus, this Court would have no jurisdiction to entertain such an application. Consequently, this application is dismissed.