ORDER
B. L. Yadav, J.
1. This is an appeal by the plaintiff appellant husband against the judgment and order dated 16-11-1990 passed by the Principal Judge, Family Court arising out of an application for dissolution of marriage filed by the plaintiff appellant against the wife, the defendant respondent under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act 1955 (for short the Act).
2. The factual matrix of the case is that the appellant has fileld an application for divorce under Section 13 of the Act. The respondent filed a written statement. Ultimately a compromise signed by the parties was arrived at on 15-11-1990 (Annexure 6). That compromise was filed before the Family Court, which was to the effect that an amicable settlement has been arrived at and the parties are withdrawing the allegations made against either side. The respondent wife agreed that all the applications made against her husband by her would be withdrawn or got dismissed. This was very specifically agreed upon that any specific amount payable as compensation to her would be acceptable. This condition was very material keeping in view the provisions of Section 25 (Twenty Five) of the Act. Another application was also
filed on the same date by the wife which is a part of Annexure 6, which was to the effect that the respondent would get the criminal case under Section 406/498, I.P.C. withdrawn. Taking into account the compromise application the impugned judgment has been pased, awarding a sum of Rs. 60,000/- to the wife as permanent alimony. This has also been stated in the judgment that the parties belong to a well-to-do family. The aforesaid compromise dated 15-11-1990 was recorded on the dictation of Principal Judge, Family Court. Consequently it is not possible for either of the parties to resile from that statement contained in that application. It is also to be noticed that the compromise has been signed by the wife as well as by the husband. Under these circumstances, the judgment has been passed making the compromise as its part. That compromise also contains averments on oath by both the parties. Taking into account the averments made in the compromise application the impugned judgment has been passed decreeing the suit for divorce, but at the same time awarded a sum of Rs. 60,000/- to the respondent as permanent alimony provided under Section 25 of the Act. The present appeal has been filed against that judgment and order passed by the Family Court with the consent of parties.
3. Sri P. N. Saxena, learned counsel’for the appellant strenuously urged that the appeal would lie under Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, 1984 even if there is provision under Section 19(2) of the Act to the effect that no appeal shall lie from decree or order passed by the Family Court with the consent of the parties. It was further urged that as the amount of Rs. 60,000/- has been awarded against the husband as permanent alimony payable to the wife which was totally illegal and without taking into account the factors or circumstances mentioned in Section 25 of the Act as to how permanent alimony has to be fixed Consequently the judgment and decree could not be said to be a judgment passed on the basis of compromise or with the consent of the parties.
4. We have perused the judgment. The conditions under Section 25 are that the court shall fix the amount of permanent alimony having regard to the respondent’s own income and other property, if any, conduct of the parties and circumstances of the case. In the present case we have noticed that both the parties have jointly filed the application and the averments contained therin have been stated on oath. Both the parties have signed it. The contents were taken down on the diction of the court. It was specifically agreed upon by the husband, the appellant, that whatever amount of compensation or amount in the form of permanent alimony will be fixed by the Court, he would pay it. If the court has taken into account the conduct of the appellant and as he agreed upon in the compromise without reservation to pay any amount that was fixed by the court, the court has fixed Rs. 60,000/-. The said amount cannot be said to be excessive or illegal. As there was no limitation imposed on the quantum of amount, consequently we are satisfied that the compromise was legal and the impugned order was perfectly correct having been passed with the consent of the parties.
5. The matter can be viewed from another angle. The object of the Family Courts Act is to provide for the establishment of family courts with a view to promote conciliation and to secure speedy settlement of disputes relating to marriage and family affairs and all the matters indicated therein. One aspect to be highlighted in respect of the Act is that it is essentially a social and beneficient legislation. The construction for such legislation should be with a view to further the object of such enactment. The object was to promote conciliation and to secure speedy settlement of disputes relating to marriage and family affairs. In such matters even if there is any particular class of person in respect of whom the provision has been made applicable and there appears to be some doubt about the provision in matters of interpretation, it should be with a view to preserve benefit in favour of that class which is required by the legislation to be benefitted.
6. In the Preamble of our Constitution,
‘justice’ social economic and political is the goal to the people of India. Administration of justice can no longer be merely protector of legal rights, but must whenever be possible, dispenser of social justice. Benthem’s greatest happiness of greater number — theory has to be remembered. In administring justice –social or legal — jurisprudence has shifted away from the fine spun technicalities and abstract rules to recognition of human beings as human beings and human needs as human needs and if these can be fulfilled without depriving existing legal rights of any party concerned, courts must lean towards that. (See Sadhu Ram Bansal v. P. B. Sarkar, (1984) 3 SCC 410 : (AIR 1984 SC 1471).
7. The approach to a statute of predominant social nature has to be made in that light. The Court is required to take into account the background and policy of the statute in question. The intention of the legislature and the policy underlying the enactment has to be considered while considering the specific provision. (See Okereke v. Brent London Borough Council, (1967) 1 QB 42; Otheyath Lakshmi Amma v. Nellachin-kuniyal Govindan Naiyer, JT (1990) (3) SC 230. We are, accordingly, conscious while interpreting the social beneficient legislation which is of predominant social nature, we would try to place such construction of S. 19 of the Act which would advance the object and purpose of the Act.
8. The whole purpose of S. 19(2) of the Act was that if conciliation between the parties has been arrived at, the parties are bound by it and cannot wringgle out of it. This is the reason why it has been provided against a decree passed on the basis of compromise. If the arguments of the learned conunsel for the appellant were to prevail it would mean that the object of the Act, i.e. conciliation and early settlement of disputes between the wife and husband would be fraught with danger and would be completely outside the aims and objects of the Act. We are accordingly of the considered opinion that in view of the provisions of S. 19(2) of the Act no appeal would be maintainable against
the judgment and decree of divorce based on conciliation between the parties. As the appeal itself is not maintainable the other submissions need not be considered.
9. In view of the premises aforesaid the appeal fails and is dismissed. Under the circumstances, however, the appellant shall pay the sum of Rs. 60,000/- by the first week of December, 1991.
10. Appeal dismissed.