ORDER
M. Katju and Umeshwar Pandey, JJ.
1. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner.
2. The petitioner is challenging the suspension order dated 19.5.2003 (Annexure-1 to the writ petition). The petitioner was a Secretary of a Co-operative Society and one of his duties was to make recoveries of the money advanced by the society. In the impugned suspension order it has been mentioned that Rs. 20,54,000 is in arrears from the members of the society but the petitioner recovered only a sum of Rs. 59,000. Thus, he recovered only 2.87% of the demand.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the Full Bench decision of this Court in Ram Chandra Pandey v. District Administrative Committee, Primary Agricultural Co-operative Credit Societies Centralised Service, Bahraich and Ors., 1997 AWC (Supp) 761. In para 15 of the said judgment, it is mentioned that a Member/Secretary can suspend a member of the Centralised Service under Regulation 59 (1) (f) (i) or (iii) in absence of a decision of the District Committee, but he cannot suspend a member under Regulation 59 (1) (f) (ii) without any decision of the District Committee.
4. Regulation 59 (1) (f) (i) states :
“(f) A member other than one referred to in Clause (e) above may be placed under suspension by the District Committee or any other officer authorised for the purpose in the following circumstances :
(i) when the said authority is satisfied that a prima facie case exists, which is likely to result in the removal, dismissal or reduction in rank of the member ;
(ii) when an inquiry into his conduct is immediately contemplated or is pending and his further continuance on his post is considered detrimental to the interest of the society or the authority ;
(iii) when a complaint against him of any criminal offence is under police investigation for which he has been arrested or he is undergoing trial in a court of law for an offence under the Indian Penal Code, U. P. Co-operative Societies Act, 1965 or any other Act or charges have been proved against him by a Criminal Court.”
5. In our opinion, the case of the petitioner falls within Clause (i) of the above provision because the very fact that the petitioner made recovery of only 2.87% of the demand prima facie indicates that he was in collusion with the loanees. It is so shocking that it leads to a reasonable inference that the petitioner colluded with the persons who took the loans.
6. It may be mentioned that employees who are in collusion or take bribe normally do not do so before the eyes of the public. They do it secretly and surreptitiously, and hence the proof can only be circumstantial evidence and not direct evidence. However, circumstantial evidence is also one of the well known legal methods of proving an offence. People have even been sentenced to death on the basis of circumstantial evidence in criminal cases.
7. In the present case, the petitioner collected only 2.87% of the demand which is a strong circumstantial evidence indicating that he was in collusion with the loanees. In such a case, if the petitioner is found guilty, he certainly deserves removal, dismissal or reduction in rank.
8. Learned counsel for the petitioner also relied upon the decision of the Lucknow Bench of this Court in Writ Petition No. 1212 (SB)/1997 decided on 27.10.1997. We have carefully perused the said decision, in which it is mentioned that a member can be placed under suspension only after the disciplinary authority records in writing his satisfaction that there is a prima facie case which is likely to result in the removal, dismissal or reduction in rank of the member. He has submitted that the impugned order does not indicate any such satisfaction.
9. It may be noted that Clause (i) of Regulation 59 (1) (f) states that when the authority is satisfied that a prima facie case exists, which is likely to result in the removal, dismissal or reduction in rank of a member, he can be suspended. There is no requirement in this provision to record this satisfaction in writing, and hence it can appear from other circumstances. Hence it cannot be laid down as a universal proposition that unless the satisfaction of the disciplinary authority is recorded in writing, the suspension will be illegal. It all depends on the facts of each case, as already mentioned above. In the present case, the facts are so shocking that the disciplinary authority’s satisfaction is implicit. As the latin maxim goes “res ipsa loquitur” which means “the matter speaks for itself. The very fact that the petitioner recovered only 2.87% of the demand is a strong circumstantial prima facie evidence that the petitioner was in collusion with the loanees, and he was deliberately not making recoveries for extraneous considerations.
10. Writ is a discretionary remedy and we are not inclined to exercise our discretion under Article 226 in favour of such person who appears to be in collusion with the loanees. The Writ Petition is, therefore, dismissed. However, we direct that the inquiry be completed expeditiously preferably within four months from the date of production of a certified copy of this order before the authority concerned.