ORDER
L. Narasimha Reddy, J.
1. The 1st petitioner is the Association of A.P. Motor Vehicles Dealers. Petitioners 2 to 8 are the dealers of Motor Vehicles, particularly, in three wheelers, having their business at Hyderabad. Petitioners 9 to 15 are the employees of the dealers, who have figured as petitioners 2 to 8. They challenge the order of the 2nd respondent in G.O. Ms. No. 137, Transport, Roads and Buildings (TR-II) Department dated 6-8-2002, as being violative of Articles 14, 19(1)(g) and 21 of the Constitution of India and contrary to the provisions of Section 74 of the Motor Vehicles Act 1988 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’). Through the impugned order, the 2nd respondent restricted the number of three wheeled contract carriages at Hyderabad to 68,467 as on 5-9-2002 and directed the Regional Transport Authority, Hyderabad, 4th respondent, to restrict the number of three wheeled contract carriages to that number, it was further directed that no new permit shall be granted to such vehicles from 6-8-2002 onwards. Replacement of the existing three wheeled contract carriages was permitted by LPG driven three wheeled contract carriages.
2. It is the case of the petitioners that it shall be competent to the 2nd respondent to restrict the number of vehicles of any category only when it is authorised on the basis of a statutory notification issued by the 1st respondent, in exercise of its powers under Section 74(3)(a) of the Act. According to them, the notification dated 12-9-1990 issued by the 1st respondent is not in conformity with the provisions of
Section 74(3)(a) of the Act and, as such, the notification as well as the impugned order, issued on the basis of the same, are illegal and void. The petitioners contend that respondents 1 and 2 are empowered to restrict the number of vehicles under Section 74(3)(a) of the Act only in respect of ‘city routes’ and the restriction imposed through the impugned order on the ‘area’ as distinguished from ‘routes’ cannot be sustained. It is also their case that the respondents have violated the principles of natural justice while issuing the impugned order and that the hard decision crippling the business of the petitioners and affecting livelihood of several unemployed persons was totally unwarranted. The petitioners have also raised certain contentions as regards delimitation of Hyderabad district. According to them, the three wheeled contract carriages are permitted to operate in a radius of 60 kms., and in that view of the matter, the vehicles registered in the neighbouring Ranga Reddy District cannot be prevented from entering the Hyderabad City.
3. Respondents 2 to 10 have filed a common counter-affidavit, it is their case that way back in the year 1990, the 1st respondent issued notification under Section 74(3)(a) of the Act directing the State Government as well as the State and Regional Transport Authorities, to limit the number of contract carriages in the cities of Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada. Taking into account the enormous growth of the three wheelers in the City of Hyderabad, and the resultant traffic congestion and atmospheric pollution, the impugned G.O., has been issued in the public interest. The respondents contend that since the relevant provisions as regards the radius within which the three wheeled contract carriages can operate, stipulate only maximum limit, necessary measures have been taken to restrict the
entry of three wheeled contract carriages registered in the Ranga Reddy District into Hyderabad City. The respondents state that the notification issued by the 1st respondent is strictly in accordance with the provisions of Section 74(3)(a) of the Act and the consequential notification issued by the 1st respondent i.e., the impugned order, conforms to the notification as well as the relevant provisions of the Act and the Rules. As regards the violation of principles of natural justice, it is stated that though the Act does not contemplate issuance of notices or inviting objections, wide consultations were made with the automobile industry as well as the other concerns before the impugned order was issued.
4. During the course of arguments, the learned Counsel for the petitioner did not proposed to challenge the validity of the notification issued by the 1st respondent. Accordingly, at their request, the matter was proceeded without awaiting the response of the 1st respondent The challenge, therefore, in this writ petition is to the restriction of three wheeled contract carriages in the city of Hyderabad to a particular figure and prohibition of grant of any further permits.
5. Regulation of operation of motor vehicles, particularly, those engaged for the benefit of public in general, has been one of the important aspects of the enactments on the subject. The Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (for brevity ‘the 1939 Act’) dealt with various categories of vehicles, the procedure for registration thereof, grant of permits for stage carriages, contract carriages, goods vehicles and other related matters. The 1939 Act contemplated grant of permits for passenger vehicles in two categories, viz., stage carriages and contract carriages.
6. The term ‘stage carriage’ is defined under Section 2(29) of the 1939 Act as
the vehicle carrying or adopted to carry more than six persons excluding the driver, which carries passengers for hire or reward at ‘separate fares paid by or for individual passengers’ either for the whole journey or for stages of the journey.
7. The term ‘contract carriage’ is defined under Section 2(3) of the 1939 Act as the one which carries a passenger or passengers “for hire or reward under a contract, expressed or implied, for the use of the vehicle as a whole at or for a fare, on a time basis or from one point to another”, without stopping to pick up or set down along the line of route passengers not included in the contract.
8. Sections 46 and 47 of 1939 Act dealt with the procedure for grant of stage carriage permits and Sections 50 and 51 of the said Act deal with procedure for grant of contract carriage permits. So far as the restrictions as regards grant of stage permits are concerned, Section 47(3) empowered the Regional Transport Authority (RTA) to limit the number of stage carriages in the region. The provision read as under:
“47(3) A Regional Transport Authority, may, having regard to the matters mentioned in Sub-section (1), limit the number of stage carriages generally or of any specific type for which stage carriage permits may be granted in the region or on any specified area or on any specified route within the region.”
9. The RTA was also empowered to restrict the number of the contract carriage permits. The languages employed in this regard in Section 50 of 1939 Act was, however, somewhat different, it reads as under:
“50. Procedure of Regional Transport Authority in considering application for contract carriage permit, — A Regional Transport Authority shall in considering an application for a contract carriage permit,
have regard to the extent to which additional contract carriages may be necessary or desirable in the public interest; and shall also take into consideration any representations which may then be made or which may previously have been made by persons already holding contract carriage permits in the region or by any local authority or police authority in the region to the effect that the number of contract carriages for which permits have already been granted is sufficient for or in excess of the needs of the region or any area within the region.
Though the nature of power differed with respect to these two categories of permits, it was the RTA alone that was conferred with the power in this regard.
10. The Parliament repealed the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. In its place, it enacted the Motor Vehicles Act 1988. In the present writ petition, we are concerned only with the restriction placed on the grant of permits; particularly on the contract carriage permits. For the sake of comparison, reference is also made to the procedure relating to stage carriage permits.
11. Under the Act, the procedure for grant of stage carriage permits is laid down in Sections 70 and 71, whereas the one relating to grant of contract carriage permits is prescribed under Sections 73 and 74. One significant feature of the Act is that the Central Government is conferred with the power to issue directions to the State Government to restrict and limit the number of stage carriages as well as contract carriages operating on city routes and in towns with population of not less than 5 lakhs. Section 71(3)(a) of the Act read as under:
“71. Procedure of Regional transport authority in considering application for stage carriage permit (3)(a) :–The State Government shall, if so directed by the
Central Government having regard to the number of vehicles, road conditions and other relevant matters, by notification in the Official Gazette, direct a State Transport Authority and a Regional Transport Authority to limit the number of stage carriages generally or of any specified type, as may be fixed and specified in the notification, operating on city routes in towns with a population of not less than five lakhs.”
Except for the word ‘contract’ in the place of ‘stage’, Section 74(3)(a) of the Act is identical. Wherever such notification is issued by the Central Government, the Stage Government acquires the power to direct the State Transport Authority or RTA to limit the number of such vehicles.
12. The 1st respondent, in exercise of its power under Section 74(3)(a) of the Act, issued notification dated 12-9-1990 directing the various Stage Governments to restrict the number of contract carriages in certain cities in their respective States. So far as the State of Andhra Pradesh is concerned, such restrictions were directed to be imposed in cities of Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada.
13. Though the 1st respondent issued the notification way back in the year 1990, claiming to be acting in pursuance thereof, the 2nd respondent issued G.O. Ms. No. 14 dated 11-2-2002. Through this G.O., the 2nd respondent directed the RTAs’ of Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam and Krishna Districts, to take steps to restrict the number of contract carriages, keeping in view the local conditions, the RTA, Hyderabad, in turn, passed a Resolution dated 3-4-2002 to the effect that no fresh contract carriage permits shall be granted to any three wheeled passengers vehicles after 17-4-2002 and that the existing vehicles of that category will be permitted to be replaced subject to certain conditions.
14. The 2nd petitioner herein filed WP No. 8551 of 2002 challenging the G.O. Ms. No. 14 dated 11-2-2002 as well as the consequential Resolution dated 3-4-2002 on several grounds. One of the contentions raised was that wherever a notification under Section 74(3)(a) of the Act is issued by the 1st respondent, it is the concerned State Government that has to limit the number of vehicles and such power cannot be delegated or permitted to be exercised by the RTAs. Taking a prima facie view that the 2nd respondent ought not to have permitted the 4th respondent to restrict the number, a learned single Judge of this Court passed orders in WP No. 16025/2002 on 18-6-2002. It is stated that the said writ petition is still pending.
15. The 2nd respondent issued the impugned order i.e., G.O. Ms. No. 137 dated 6-8-2002. After referring to the relevant facts, the operative portion of the impugned G.O., reads as under: –
“In exercise of the powers conferred by Clause (a) of Sub-section (3) of Section 74 of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (Central Act 59 of 1988) and in accordance with the direction of the Government of India, Ministry of Surface Transport (Transport Wing) in its notification in SO 700 (e) dated 12-9-1990 and in supersession of the notification issued in G.O. Ms. No. 14 TR &B (Tr.II) Department dated 11-2-2002, the Government of Andhra Pradesh hereby restrict the number of 3-wheeled contract carriages in Hyderabad at 68,469 existing permits as on 5-8-2002 and accordingly, direct the Regional Transport Authority Hyderabad to restrict the 3-wheeled contract carriages in Hyderabad at 68,469. Replacement of any of the existing 3-wheeled contract carriages covered by permit as per Rule 211 of A.P. Motor Vehicle Rules, 1989 shall be by LPG driven 3 wheeled contract carriages only. 6-8-202 is the date from which no new permit in respect of the 3-wheeled contract carriages shall be granted by the Regional Transport Authority, Hyderabad.
16. Sri S. Venkat Reddy, learned senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners has raised several contentions. He submits that the restrictions contemplated under Section 74(3)(a) of the Act are on contract carriages ‘operating on city routes’ and inasmuch as the Auto rickshaws are not required to operate on any particular route, no restrictions can be placed on grant of permits to such vehicles. Another contention raised by him is that under Rule 177 of the A.P. Motor Vehicle Rules, Auto rickshaws are to be granted permits to operate and ply in an area within the radius of 60 Kms., which may be within the area of operation of a RTA or may spill over to the neighbouring region. He states that such being the entitlement of the Auto rickshaws to ply, there ought not to have been any restrictions for grant of permits in the neighbouring districts and to prevent the contract carriages so permitted to operate in the city of Hyderabad. He also raised certain other contentions, such as, failure to follow the principles of natural justice while issuing the impugned order and the G.O., resulting in an unreasonable restriction on the right of the petitioners under Articles 19 to 21 of the Constitution of India; and, the whole exercise being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. He placed reliance upon the various Judgments of the Privy Council and the Supreme Court.
17. The learned Additional Advocate General appearing for respondents 2 to 10, on the other hand, submits that the levels of pollution and instances of traffic jam have increased substantially and a stage has come when it is no longer permissible for addition of the contract carriages, particularly, three wheelers in the city of Hyderabad. He submits that no exception can be taken to the notification issued by the 1st respondent and the consequential orders passed by the State Government, which are nothing but a step to implement the objects
underlying the Act. It is his case that the purport of Rule 177 of the A.P. Motor Vehicles Rules 1989, is only to exempt from the counter signature of the Regional Transport Authority of the neighbouring districts in the matter of grant of permits to Auto rickshaws. As regards the radius within which such vehicles are entitled to ply, the learned Additional Additional General submits that 60 kms., is the maximum radius and the said provision cannot create a right for an applicant to be granted contract carriage permit up to the maximum limits of area as of right. It is his contention that the Act and the Rules do not contemplate hearing before any notifications or orders are issued by the competent authority, in exercise of powers under Section 74(3) (a) of the Act. He states that the restrictions imposed in public interest cannot be treated as unreasonable as there is no procedural or substantive irregularity in issuing the impugned order.
18. Though an averment was made in the affidavit that the notification issued by the 1st respondent is contrary to the provisions of Section 74(3)(a) of the Act, that point was not pressed further. The main ground of attack by the learned senior Counsel for the petitioners is that the restrictions that are contemplated under Section 74(3)(a) of the Act relate to contract carriages operating on ‘city routes’. According to him, the Auto rickshaws are not required to operate on a particular route and, as such, no restrictions can be placed upon them through the notifications issued under that provision. Therefore, it needs to be verified as to what the term ‘route’ connotes, and to what extent the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners deserves to be accepted.
19. The term, ‘route’ is defined under Sub-section 38 of Section 2 of the Act as under:
” ‘route’ means a line of travel which specifies the highway which may be traversed by a motor vehicle between one terminus and another.”
Generally, a stage carriage operates on a specified route, whereas the contract carriage operates in a prescribed area. For the latter category of carriages, no definite route as such is stipulated. That is the reason why in the applications to be made for these two categories of permits, the particulars to be furnished are little different. For stage carriage permits, the requirement is as follows:
“70 (1)(a) the route or routes or the area or areas to which the application relates;”
For contract carriage permits, the relevant provision is Section 73(b), which reads as under:–
“73(b):– the area for which the permit is required”
This distinction did not percolate into the respective provisions relating to the restrictions as to number of stage or contract carriages, as the case may be, in Sections 71(3) (a) and 74(3) (a) respectively. Such omission, however, hardly makes any difference. The distinction between route, on the one hand, and high way, on the other, employed in the legislations relating to Regulation of Motor Vehicles came to be considered by the Privy Council in K.V. Motor Transit Company v. C.R. Omnibus Company, AIR (33) 1946 PC 137. The distinction was aptly explained as under:
“A ‘highway’ is the physical track along which an omnibus runs, whilst a ‘route’ is an abstract conception of a line of travel between one terminus and another, and is something distinct from the highway traversed.”
20. In D. Papiah v. Mysore State Transport Appellate Tribunal, , the term ‘Area’ used in the context of grant of contract carriage permits was considered by the Supreme Court. A pointed discussion was undertaken on the distinguishing features of ‘route’ and ‘area’. In fact, that precisely is the issue in the present case. The context in which the term ‘area’ has been explained is as under: –
“A contract carriage does not ply along a fixed route or routes but over an area, which is why an application for a contract carriage permit has to contain a statement as to the proposed area”
Even the term ‘area’ has been defined under Section 2(1) of the 1939 Act as under:-
“area” in relation to any provision of this Act, means such area as the State Government may, having regard to the requirements of that provision, specify by notification in the Official Gazette;
The same is the definition under the Act. Following the judgment in Dosa Satyanarayanamurty v. Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation, , wherein the Supreme Court took the view that there is no inherent inconsistency between an area and a route and that the proposed route is also an area limited to the route proposed, it was observed as under:
“A route may mean not only the notional line of travel between one terminus and another, but also the area of the road over which the motor vehicles ply, yet the two terms are not interchangeable.”
21. From the observations made by the Supreme Court as indicated above, it is evident that the distinction between the ‘route, on one hand, and the ‘area’ on the other, is more in the context of procedure and to regulate the mode of plying and nothing more.
22. From the context of imposing restriction on the number of vehicles, be
it contract or stage carriages, under the old or the new Act, there is hardly any distinction in this regard. The grant of permits to contract carriages with reference to area is more from the point of view of convenience. Granting a permit with reference to a route to a contract carriage, would, many a time, render the very permit unworkable. In a way, it can be said that what is route to a stage carriage is area to a contract carriage. Both the terms are used to connote the limits within which the respective categories of vehicles are to operate. A wider connotation in which the permits are granted to contract carriages, cannot water down the power of the competent authorities to impose restrictions in the larger public interest.
23. The power to impose restrictions on the number of permits for stage or contract carriages has been very much recognised even under the 1939 Act. As observed earlier, the power as regards such restrictions under the 1939 Act was at the level of RTA. It was held in several cases that once the RTA fixed the number of permits under Section 47(3) of the 1939 Act, the same can not be deviated. The only exception taken by the Courts was that the restriction should not be placed while considering the application itself and that the decision as to restriction should precede the consideration for grant of restriction. In this context reference may be had to the judgments of the Supreme Court in R.O. Naidu v. Addl. S.TA.T. Madras, , Mohd. Ibrahim v. S.T.A.Tribunal, Madras, AIR 1970 SC 3 542, Mithilesh Garg v. Union of India, , etc.
24. Under the new Act, the power to place restrictions on the number of permits has been rendered more objective and made to flow from one stage to another. The places as regards, which such restrictions
can be placed, are squarely bracketed, viz., those with population of not less than 5 lakhs. The purport of such an exercise is not difficult to be discerned. Traffic congestion and problems of pollution are rampant in towns; They are were the guiding factors in enacting such provisions and for implementation of the notifications issued thereunder. The fact that in the city of Hyderabad permits of three wheeled contract carriages as on 5-8-2002 has reached the figure of 68,469 is not disputed. It cannot be said that the twin problems of traffic congestion and the air and sound pollution have no contribution from these vehicles.
25. The learned Counsel for the petitioner relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Mithilesh Garg case (supra). In that case, the complaint was by the existing operators against grant of any new permits. Drawing distinction between the provisions of the old and new Acts, the Supreme Court observed as under:
“There is no provision under the Act like that of Section 47(3) of the old Act and as such no limit for the grant of permits can be fixed under the Act. There is, however, a provision under Section 71(3) (a) of the Act under which a limit can be fixed for the grant of permits in respect of the routes which are within a town having population of more than five lakhs.”
The power conferred on the State and Central Governments to restrict the number of permits in respect of routes in towns having population more than 5 lakhs was recognised by the Supreme Court and in fact the same was treated as a distinguishing feature.
26. One of the contentions raised by the learned senior Counsel is that under Rule 177 of the A.P. Motor Vehicle Rules, the contract carriage permits for a three wheeled vehicle can be granted, enabling it to operate in a radius of 60 kms., from the
place of registration, even where part of it falls in the area of the neighbouring district or regions; and in that view of the matter, no restriction can be placed for grant of permits in the Ranga Reddy district. Consequently, the three wheeled vehicles which were granted permit by the RTA of Ranga Reddy district should be permitted to operate even in the city of Hyderabad. According to him, the restriction imposed under the impugned order does not cover such vehicles.
27. From a reading of the provisions relied upon by the learned senior Counsel, it is evident that 60 Kms., is the maximum radius within which the 3 wheeled contract carriage which is granted permit can operate. It is difficult to discern from the same that a three wheeler should invariably be accorded permits to operate in an area not less than 60 kms. It is settled principle of law that an enabling provision does not confer the right on the beneficiary to get the maximum out of the provision. It rather prescribes the extent to which the authority can exercise its power. Further, it was only having regard to the size and limited scope of operation of the three wheeled contract carriage that the necessity of counter signature by the Regional Transport Authority of neighbouring region was obviated. This facility cannot be permitted to defeat the statutory exercise. Even if it is assumed that there is anything in Rule 171 of the A.P.Motor Vehicles Rules to enable the RTAs of the districts adjoining the towns where limit as to number of category of contract carriages is imposed, the same cannot prevail over the specific provisions of the Act. If there exists any inconsistency in this regard, the Rule has to give way to the provisions of the Act.
28. One of the contentions was that the petitioners were not afforded any opportunity before the drastic step of limiting the permits to the three wheeled
vehicles was imposed. It needs to be noticed that the main flow of the power is from respondent No. 1. The notification was issued by it way back in the year 1990. The same was not challenged at any point of time. The 2nd respondent has less than an absolute power in this regard. No provision of law is cited which can be said to have vested any right in the petitioners to be heard. Policy matters, by their very nature, are not directed against an individual or group of individuals or firms. The principles of natural justice have a very scanty role to play in cases where the decisions are taken as a policy measure. In such instances, the constituency, which needs to be heard, if at all, is unlimited and indefinite. Therefore, it cannot be said that there was any infraction of principles of natural justice.
29. The last limb of argument was as to the effect of the impugned order on the rights of the petitioners under Articles 19(1)(g) and 21 of the Constitution of India. As observed earlier, there is hardly any element of subjectivity in the decision or decision-making process, resulting in the impugned order. The measures are to be made applicable to the towns having population of more than 5 lakhs. Imposition of such restriction was treated as almost a statutory obligation. A measure taken in such circumstances cannot be said to be an unreasonable restriction or being violative of Articles 19(1)(g) and 21 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, no exception can be taken to the impugned order.
30. From the above, it is evident that the petitioners were not able to establish-
(a) absence of power in respondents 1 and 2 to issue the notification or the impugned order;
(b) absence of factual basis for exercise of the power under Section 74 (3)(a) of the Act; and
(c) any lapse or defect in the decision making process.
Hence the impugned G.O., cannot be said to be illegal or unconstitutional.
31. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed. No costs.