Andhra High Court High Court

Andhra Pradesh State Road … vs Andhra Pradesh State Road … on 28 June, 1995

Andhra High Court
Andhra Pradesh State Road … vs Andhra Pradesh State Road … on 28 June, 1995
Equivalent citations: 1995 (2) ALT 761
Bench: S Nayak


ORDER

1. The petitioner claims to be a Trade Union operating in the respondent-Corporation. It has filed this writ petition questioning the validity and justification for the respondent-Corporation to issue the impugned notification dated March 24, 1995 proposing to create two cadres of service, namely, Driver Grade III and Conductor Grade III in the pay scale of Rs. 1700-2350 and Rs. 1700 to 2100 respectively.

2. The petitioner-trade union claims that there is a binding settlement entered into between their union and the management of the Corporation during the course of conciliation proceedings under Section 12(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act on April 28, 1994. Sri Ramachandra Rao, the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner, drew attention of the Court, particularly to clause 18.1 of the said settlement which reads as follows :

“The casual employees who are in the categories of Driver/Conductor will be regularised to an extent of 2.6 norm against the regular schedules/sanctions/requirement as on 31 st July of every year. It is noted that casuals are working in the categories of Driver, Conductor and Cleaner even for more than three years. The particulars of these candidates will be obtained and methodology finalised to regularise their services.”

As could be seen from this clause, what is reserved to the workmen who are working as casual employees In the establishment of the Corporation, is a right to be considered for absorption at a particular ratio. It should be noted that what is reserved is not a right to be employed in the cadre of Conductor or Driver. Therefore, this clause is not helpful to the petitioner-union to contend that there is a right vested in the casual employees to claim that they should be appointed to the cadre of conductor or driver. This question need not be, in my considered opinion, dilated upon further because find that there is no necessity also. Assuming that under the settlement the casual employees working on the date of the settlement acquired a right to be considered or right to be employed against the posts in Grade-II and Grade-III drivers, such a right can be enforced in a Court of law. If the Corporation proceeds to absorb the casual employees who are members of the petitioner-trade union in the newly created Conductor or Driver Grade-III post, they may seek necessary direction either from the industrial Court or any other Court having jurisdiction in that matter to appoint them or absorb them only in Grade-II post of driver or conductor. But, certainly neither the petitioner-union nor its members have any right to complain against the impugned action of the management to create one more grade of service of drivers or conductors. It is needless to state that creation of new service or new cadre or new posts is essentially an inherent power available to any employer Common Law. Sri Rao who argued on behalf of the petitioner-union quite fairly submitted that even the statute under which A. P. S. R. T. C. is created grants power to the Corporation to create new services, posts and cadres. Therefore, I do not find any merit in the first submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the impugned notification issued by the Corporation would affect the right reserved to the casual employees under clause 18.1 of the settlement.

3. The next contention advanced by Sri Rao is that the terms of settlement dated April 28, 1994 binds not only the existing employees of the Corporation but also the employees who may be appointed subsequent to the signing of the settlement. Looking from that angle, Sri Rao submits that clause 18.1 of the settlement contemplates absorption of services of causal employees into the existing Grade-I and Grade-II posts of conductors or drivers and that their right would be impaired and affected if the Corporation is permitted to create new Grade-III posts of Conductors and Drivers. This argument is required to be noticed only to be rejected. It cannot he gainsaid that any settlement arrived at between the Management and the workmen during the course of conciliation proceedings under Section 12 (3) of the Industrial Disputes Act would bind not only the then existing workmen but also the workmen who may be appointed subsequent to the date of settlement entered into between the parties. There cannot be any second opinion over this. In that view of the matter, if any person, subsequent to the date of settlement, is appointed to the post of Grade-I or Grade-II Conductor or Driver, he would be entitled to all the benefits, advantages, pecuniary and otherwise, which flow from the terms of the settlement. But, any person who seeks employment to the newly created post of Grade-III Conductor or Driver, shall not have any vested right to claim that he should also be entitled to all the benefits, advantages, pecuniary or otherwise, which are reserved for the employees working in the cadre Grade-I or II Conductors or Driver. This is so simply because when the settlement was arrived at on April 28, 1994, there was no cadre called Grade-III Drivers and Conductors. This problem can be looked from another angle also. The settlement is nothing but a contract between the Management and its employees and governed by principles of law of Contract. There was no consensus ad idea between the parties when the settlement was arrived at on April 28, 1994 in respect of the cadres now created under the impugned notification. This was not in contemplation of any of the parties on the date when the settlement was arrived at. Therefore, the second submission of the learned Counsel suffers from an initial inherent flaw.

4. Thirdly, Sri Rao placing reliance on the terms of settlement incorporated in clause 2.3 submitted that all appointments whether by promotion or direct recruitment made to the existing posts or any additional posts of drivers or conductors created on or after April 1, 1993, shall automatically be in the revised scales of pay. This clause only provides that if any appointment made to any of the posts then existing as on the date of settlement either by promotion or by direct recruitment, then the pay scales and other allowances attached to the posts as agreed to between the parties under the settlement shall apply. Further, this clause also provides that if any new posts or additional posts are created in a cadre then existing, then also such newly created posts or additional posts shall carry the same pay scales and other allowances as agreed to between the parties under the settlement. The Court is not confronted with such facts situation in this case. It is nobody’s case that any new posts are created in the then existing cadres. As already pointed out supra, the creation of new cadres, namely, Grade-III Conductors and Drivers was never in the contemplation of any of the parties to the settlement and there is no specific term of agreement in the settlement governing any proposed creation of Grade-III Drivers or Grade-III Conductors. Therefore, I do not find any merit in this submission also. No other point is argued before the Court.

5. In the result and for the foregoing reasons, the writ petition fails and it is accordingly dismissed. No costs.