Allahabad High Court High Court

Angad Yadava Son Of Sri Ram Badan vs Election Commission Of India … on 16 October, 2006

Allahabad High Court
Angad Yadava Son Of Sri Ram Badan vs Election Commission Of India … on 16 October, 2006
Equivalent citations: AIR 2007 All 72
Author: B.S. Chauhan
Bench: B Chauhan, D Gupta


JUDGMENT

B.S. Chauhan, J

1. This writ petition has been filed for quashing the order dated 8.4.2004 rejecting the nomination papers of the petitioner for contesting the election of the Parliament and declaring him disqualified for a period of six years from the date of his release from the jail.

2. The facts and circumstances giving rise to this case are that petitioner was elected as an M.L.A. in 1989, in 1991, and again in bye-election in 1993. He also remained the Minister of Forest and Small Scale Industries in U.P. During the said period, he was tried in a Criminal Case under Section 302/304 I.P.C. in Police Station Hazrat Ganj, Lucknow. The competent Court convicted and sentenced him for life imprisonment vide judgment and order dated 17/18.11.2000 and a fine of Rs. 20,000/- was also imposed. The Appellate Court granted him bail and suspended the sentence also by a further order dated 9.1.2002. The petitioner filed the nomination papers before the Returning Officer, Azamgarh on 5.4.2004, for contesting the election from 41 Parliament Constituency. The Returning Officer rejected his nomination papers vide order dated 8.4.2004 in view of the provisions of Section 8 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (hereinafter called the Act 1951) on the ground of sentence and conviction, and further by the aforesaid impugned order the Returning Officer debarred the petitioner from contesting election for a period of six years from the date of his release on bail. Hence this petition.

3. This Court heard the matter on 10.5.2004 and Shri U.N. Sharma, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner restricted his case only to the competence of the Returning Officer to make a declaration of disqualification for a period of six years. This Court issued notice to the respondents only on the said limited issue. The affidavits have been exchanged and the matter is heard finally at admission stage with the consent of the counsel of the parties.

4. Shri B.N. Singh, learned Senior Counsel appearing for respondents has raised preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of the writ petition contending that it is an election dispute and in view of the provisions of Article 329(b) of the Constitution, cannot be agitated in writ jurisdiction, as the only mode of adjudication of all such disputes is by filing election petition. In order to fortify his submission, he has placed reliance upon a large number of judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, particularly, in N.P. Ponnuswami v. The Returning Officer and Ors. ; Daya Shankar Mehta v. Raghuraj Singh and Ors. ; Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad Ishaque and Ors. ; Brundaban Nayak v. Election Commission of India and Anr. ; Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner ; Krishna Ballabh Prasad Singh v. Sub Divisional Officer, Hilsa-cum-Returning Officer and Ors. ; election Commission of India v. Shivaji and Ors. ; and Manda Jaganath v. K.S. Rathnam and Ors. AIR 2004 SC 3601.

5. We have considered the submissions made by Shri B.,N. Singh but we do not find the same worth entertaining, for the reason that in exceptional circumstances, where the facts are not in dispute, the controversy regarding eligibility/qualification/disqualification etc. Can also be agitated in writ jurisdiction. Vide K. Venkatachalam v. A. Swamickan and Anr. ; and Lal Chand v. State of Haryana and Ors. ; Manda Jagganath (Supra); and Harnek Singh v. Charanjit Singh . Shri U.N. Sharma, learned Senior Counsel, appearing for the petitioner, has restricted his case to the competence of the Returning Officer to declare the petitioner disqualified for a period of six years from the date of release from jail and his grievance is not against rejection of his nomination paper.

6. The controversy lies in a very narrow compass, as to whether the Returning Officer could declare that petitioner was disqualified to contest the election for a period of six years from the date of his release from the jail, i.e., upto 24.11.2006 as he had been released on bail by the order of the High Court dated 25.11.2000. The order has been passed in view of the provisions of Section 8 of the Act 1951, which provides that a convict for certain offences is disqualified to contest the election for a particular period. There is no dispute regarding the power of the Returning Officer to reject the nomination of a convict who has been enlarged on bail even if his conviction has also been put under suspension by the Appellate/Revisional Court. The controversy may arise if a person stands convicted after filing the nomination papers but prior to the election or after being convicted and his conviction has been put under suspension by the appellate forum and his nomination papers are accepted but the conviction is set aside prior to the decision of the election petition. In such a situation the question does arise as to whether he would have a right to say that the election dispute has become infructuous.

7. A Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in N.P. Poonuswami v. Returning Officer, Namakkal and Ors. observed that the Representation of People Act is self-contained enactment so far as elections are concerned, which means that whenever the true position in regard to any matter connected with elections is to be ascertained, the Court has only to look at the Act and the Rules made thereunder.

8. In Chatturbhuj Vithaldas Jasani v. Moreshwar Parashram and Ors. , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that election is a continuous process consisting of several stages and embarrassing many steps, of which nomination is one. Nomination is the foundation of candidate’s right to go to the polls and must be treated as an integral part of the election. If a person is disqualified on the date of nomination, he cannot be chosen as a candidate because of the disqualification attaches to him on that day. The Hon’ble Court rejected the submission that the disqualification, being a transient one, can be completely wiped off by subsequent developments so that there could be nothing against the person being chosen on the polling day. The wiping off the disqualification does not have any retrospective effect and, therefore, the disqualification, which subsisted on the date of filing the nomination, does not cease to subsist at the later stage.

9. In Sewaram v. Sobran Singh , the Apex Court held that if a person stands disqualified on the date of filing of the nomination papers and the date of scrutiny of the nomination papers, he incurs disqualification and becomes ineligible to contest the election.

10. In Dilip Kumar Sharma and Ors. v. State of Madhya Pradesh , the Hoh’ble Supreme Court considered the case of imposing the penalty of death under the then existing Section 303 of the Indian Penal Code and held that if the sentence once imposed stands set-aside at a later stage and does not remain executable, it cannot be taken into account while imposing punishment under Section 303, viz., in a case of murder by a life-convict, for the reason that the acquittal wipes out the effect of conviction.

11. In Manni Lal v. Parmai Lal and Ors. , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the question of disqualification on the ground of a candidate being convicted by a criminal court, has to be considered by the Court at the time of deciding the election petition and if on that date the conviction is set-aside, the person cannot be held to be disqualified as the acquittal takes away the effect of conviction. The Court observed as under:

It is significant that the High Court under Section 100(1)(a) of the Act is to declare the election of a returned candidate to be void of the High Court is of the opinion that, on the date of his election; a returned candidate was not qualified, or was disqualified, to be chosen to fill the seat under the Constitution or the Act. It is true that the opinion has to be formed as to whether the successful candidate was disqualified on the date of his election; but this opinion is to be formed by the High Court at the time of pronouncing the judgment in the election petition.

12. In that case, the last date for filing the nomination paper was 9.1.1969. His conviction was set-aside in appeal on 30.9.1969 and the election petition was decided on 17.10.1969. The Hon’ble Apex Court held that as prior to the decision of the election petition the returned candidate stood acquitted, the disqualification disappeared. But the special features of the case remained that the candidate was not disqualified on the date of filing the nomination papers.

13. In Vidya Charan Shukla v. Purshottam Lal Kaushik , the Apex Court considered that undoubtedly the issue: whether a person is qualified or disqualified for being chosen, is to be decided giving reference to the crucial date of filling of the nomination form and date of scrutiny but if before the election petition is decided, the disqualification of being a convict is wiped out by his acquittal, acceptance of his nomination does not remain open to challenge. The Court observed as under:

that the acquittal of appellant in appeal prior to the pronouncement of judgment by the High Court in the election petition had the result of wiping out his disqualification as completely and effectively as if it did not exist at any time including the date of scrutiny of the nomination papers and that his nomination paper was properly accepted by the returning officer. The challenge to the election of the appellant on the ground under Clause 100(1)(d)(i) must, therefore fail.

14. As there had been conflicting views on the issue, the matter was considered by the Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in K. Prabhakaran v. P. Jayarajan . After re-examining the whole issue, the Court held that in such a situation the rejection of the nomination of a convict, even if the conviction has been put under suspension under Section 389 Cr.P.C, would be valid as on that date he was definitely a convict and the setting aside of sentence and conviction would not wash off the disqualification from its inception.

15. In the instant case, petitioner has been enlarged on bail by this Court and his conviction has also been put under suspension. The question is as to whether the Returning Officer had a competence to make a declaration that he was disqualified to contest the election for further a period of six years from the date of his release on bail, while rejecting his nomination papers.

16. The Returning Officer has placed a very heavy reliance on instructions dated 22.8.1997 (Annex. C.A.-1), issued by the Election.

17. We have examined the same carefully. It explains that the nomination papers of a convict, for certain offences as mentioned in Section 8 of the Act 1951, cannot be accepted and are liable to be rejected. The last part of the same reads as under:

Accordingly, the Election Commission in exercise of its powers of superintendence, direction and control of election to Parliament and State Legislature vested by Article 324 of the Constitution, hereby directs that all the Returning Officers, at the time of scrutiny of nominations, must take note of the legal position and decide accordingly about the validity or otherwise of a candidature of the suspended disqualified candidate under the said Section 8 of the Act 1951.

18. It simply empowers the Returning Officer to consider the candidature and accept or reject the nomination. The said Instructions did not confer any power upon the Returning Officer for making of declaration of disqualification for a further period.

19. Disqualification is by operation of law. In case the appeal of the petitioner is allowed and conviction is set aside, the Returning Officer shall not have a power to review or recall the order impugned herein disqualifying the petitioner for a further period, for the simple reason that the Returning Officer becomes functus officio, after declaration of the result of the election. The statute has not conferred any power of review upon him.

20. It is settled legal proposition that review is a statutory right and unless it is conferred by the legislature, the Court/Tribunal/Authority cannot exercise the same. Vide Narender Chand Hem Raj v. Lt. Governor, Union Territory, Himachal Pradesh ; State of Himachal Pradesh v. The Parent of a Student of Medical College, Shimla ; Asif Hamid v. State of Jammu and Kashmir ; Mullikarjuna Rao and Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Ors. ; and Union of India v. Deoki Nandan Aggarwal AIR 1992 SC 96

21. The order passed by the Returning Officer to the extent that the petitioner stands disqualified for a period of six years from the date of release on bail is not justified and there was no occasion for him to pass such an order. Such an order is not justified even otherwise in case his appeal fails, he would continue to be disqualified for a further period, and therefore, the order passed by the Returning Officer is liable to be set aside.

22. In view of the above, petition succeeds partly and is allowed to the extent that the order passed by the Returning Officer that the petitioner is disqualified for a period of six years from the date of release on bail from 25.11.2002 to 24.11.2006 is hereby quashed. No costs.