JUDGMENT
S. Ravindra Bhat, J.
1. The petitioner, in these proceedings, impugns a charge sheet dated 24.7.1998 issued by the respondent, Delhi Development Authority (hereafter DDA). The charge sheet pertains to an agreement for procurement of cast iron spigot from Indu Engineering Textiles Ltd in 1981-82, by contract No. 7/EE/HD.III/81-82. The allegations leveled were about the inclusion of certain stipulations in the contract, which eventually led to a demand for arbitration. The contractor’s claims were adjudicated, and an award was made against DDA on 16-5-1985.
2. The DDA issued the impugned charge sheet, proposing disciplinary action against the petitioner, on 24th July, 1998. The allegation was that the stipulations were drafted in a manner favorable to the contractor, who ultimately succeeded in arbitration proceedings. The petitioner was working as a Upper Division Clerk. The contract was ultimately finalized by senior officers.
3. The petitioner’s principal ground of challenge to the disciplinary proceedings is that it is vitiated on account of inordinate delay. It is averred that the agreement/ supplies in question was performed /completed sometime in 1982. The claim was made by the contractor soon thereafter, and the award of the arbitrator was announced in 1985. Therefore, issuance of a charge sheet for some alleged negligence or omission which took place in 1981, after a lapse of about 17 years, and 13 years after the award of arbitrator, has been questioned as arbitrary.
4. The respondents, in their reply, have denied that the inquiry is illegal or arbitrary; it has been urged in a general manner that the petitioner has not demonstrated any sure case of prejudice in preparing his defense in the inquiry. The Counter affidavit states that the contract was requisitioned from the store in 1986 and 1987, and a preliminary investigation was conducted in 1987; the petitioner’s version was called in 1988. The DDA also avers that certain intra departmental correspondence took place, and the matter was referred to the Central Vigilance Commission, which tendered its advice in 1997, after which the impugned show cause notice was issued in 1998.
5. Mr. Shali, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the issue of the inquiry being arbitrary on the ground of the delay has often arisen for consideration. He relied upon two judgments of this Court. The judgment of a learned Single Judge reported as R.P. Nanda v. DDA, 2004 (2) AD(Del.) 156, was cited. In that case, the learned single judge had considered several other decisions, including a decision of the Division Bench, and applied its ratio. The learned Single Judge had allowed the petition.
6. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the instant case is squarely covered by the reasoning in R.P. Nanda’s case (supra). It is pointed out that there too, the issue was delay in the issue of a charge sheet to an official of the DDA, for certain over payments alleged to have been made to a Contractor in 1981; the charge sheet, however, was issued in the year 1995. The Court, after noticing the law and applying it to the facts, held that the delay in issuance of charge sheet was totally un-explained and that the petitioner was being prejudiced by the delayed inquiry. On the basis of these findings, the petition was allowed.
7. The learned counsel for the petitioner also relied upon another decision, in R.L. Jain v. DDA, CW 4155/1998, decided on 7-1-2005. That case concerned the delay in issuance of charge sheet in respect of the very same contract, namely No. 7/EE/HD.III/81-82, entered into by the DDA. The court had considered the explanation of the DDA, and found it wanting; it noticed that all the evidence necessary for initiating action was with the employer, who chose to not take action for an inordinately long time. Hence, the delay was held to be unexplained; the proceedings were accordingly quashed.
8. Learned counsel for the DDA reiterated the position taken in the counter affidavit. He further stated that the CVC itself had recommended action in the matter; the petitioner could not claim to be prejudiced in any manner, since whatever defense he wishes to put forth in the proceedings, would still be available. Counsel also relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in State of Punjab v. Chaman Lal Goyal ; Registrar of Co-operative Societies v. FX Fernando , and Union of India v. Kacker 1995 Suppl (1) SCC 180 to say that mere delay in initiation of proceedings does not vitiate departmental action; there must be an element of grave prejudice, and corresponding culpability or lack of explanation on the part of the department, for the delay, for it to be termed unreasonable.
9. The principles to be followed in cases where employees complain of invalidity of charge sheets and arbitrariness in departmental proceedings on account of inordinate delay have been summarized in the decision reported as Delhi Development Authority v. DP Bambah (LPA No. 39/99, decided on 29th October, 2003). It was held, in that judgment as follows:
“In our opinion the legal position, when an action is brought seeking quashing of a charge sheet on grounds of issuance of the charge sheet or grounds of inordinate delay in completion of the disciplinary inquiry may be crystalised as under :-
(i) Unless the statutory rules prescribe a period of limitation for initiating disciplinary proceedings, there is no period limitation for initiating the disciplinary proceedings ;
(ii) Since delay in initiating disciplinary proceedings or concluding the same are likely to cause prejudice to the charged employee, courts would be entitled to intervene and grant appropriate relief where an action is brought ;
(iii) If bone fide and reasonable explanation for delay is brought on record by the disciplinary authority, in the absence of any special equity, the court would not intervene in the matter.
(iv) While considering these factors the court has to consider the speedy trial is a part of the facet of a fair procedure to which every delinquent is entitled to vis-a-vis the handicaps which the department may be suffering in the initiation of the proceedings. Balancing all the factors, it has to be considered whether prejudice to the defense on account of delay is made out and the delay is fatal, in the sense, that the delinquent is unable to effectively defend himself on account of delay.
(v) In considering the factual matrix, the court would ordinarily lean against preventing trial of the delinquent who is facing grave charges on the mere ground of delay. Quashing would not be ordered solely because of lapse of time between the date of commission of the offence and the date of service of the charge sheet unless, of course, the right of defense is found to be denied as a consequences of delay.
(vi) It is for the delinquent officer to show the prejudice caused or deprivation of fair trial because of the delay.
(vii) The sword of damocles cannot be allowed to be kept hanging over the head of an employee and every employee is entitled to claim that the disciplinary inquiry should be completed against him within a reasonable time. Speedy trial is undoubtedly a part of reasonableness in every disciplinary inquiry.”
10. The above principles were quoted and followed in Nanda’s case. The facts of the present case, in my opinion, present a close parallel to those in RL Jain’s case. In Jain’s case, the decision in Nanda ( which in turn noticed all the judgments cited by learned counsel for the respondent) was applied. The delay of 13 years in the issuance of charge sheet has not been satisfactorily explained. The court had noticed the facts leading to the formation of the self-same contract, as are involved in the present proceedings and concluded that the explanation afforded by DDA was inadequate. In my considered opinion, there cannot be any view other than that taken in RL Jain’s case. The delay in issuance of charge sheet has not been sufficiently explained. I am, therefore, of the view that the petitioner is entitled to the reliefs claimed, following the decision in Nanda’s case and RL Jain’s case.
11. In view of the above conclusions, the petition and pending applications are allowed. The charge sheet dated 24.07.1998 and consequent disciplinary proceedings are accordingly set aside/quashed.
No costs.