ORDER
1. Since the issue involved in both these writ petitions is one and the same, they are being disposed of by this common order.
2. The petitioners, who are the employees of Electricity Department of the erstwhile Government of Hyderabad, aggrieved of the withdrawal of concession granted to them by the Respondent Board, filed these writ petitions.
3. It is the case of the petitioners that the Respondent Board has issued proceedings in B.P. Ms. No. 349 dated 2.9.1959 entitling for the supply of electrical energy to the employees at the concessional rates for lightings and fans at the rate of Rs. 0.1.6 per unit if the employee was sole occupant of the premises and at Rs. 0.4.0 per unit if he was a member of the joint family; the said concession was also applicable to the retired employees of the Electricity Department who have put in 25 years of service or more and also to a few retired officers of the Mint and allied Department. Out of seven concessions under the said proceedings, concessions 1 and 7 were covered by GO No. 434/ Electricity/PWD dated 24.4.1950 and concession No. 7 was based on an award of the Industrial Court, to the effect that all the workers should be supplied electricity at a concessional rate of Rs. 0.1.6 per unit and thus. The concessional rates in the said BP 349 dated 2.9.1959 granted to the erstwhile Government of Hyderabad Employees by the then Government of Hyderabad, has become part of the conditions of service and is reflected in Government Letter No. 2529/ C&1 dated 22.4.1950 and Para 9 of the said letter reads as under:
“…Concession in Electricity rates to retired workers: All the workers of the CED who have put in 25 years of service and retired should be allowed electricity supply at a concessional rate of Rs. 0-1-6 per unit…”
Thus the GO 343/Electricity/PWD dated 24.4.1950 and the letter of the Finance Department of the then Government of Hyderabad dated 22.4.1950, coupled with the Award No. 1 of 1950 by the Industrial Court dated 6.2.1950, was considered by the Council of Ministers in the meeting dated 18.5.1950 and the Notification No. 58 was gazetted on 31.3.1950 of the Labour Department and has become one of the service conditions of the erstwhile employees of Government of Hyderabad. In recognition of the same, the Respondent Board through its Letter No. 10280/F1/6646 dated 18.3.1970 addressed to all the Associations of the employees of the Board stating that the Board has tentatively decided that on transfer of the services of the personnel to the Board, the terms would be in no way disadvantageous compared to those obtaining in the Government and further that where charges are contemplated in future, the rights which have accrued to persons, who have opted to Board’s service would be respected. Thus the said concession has become a part of service condition and it was honoured by the Board and it was accepted by the Board that they will not alter it to the disadvantage of the employees.
4. The Board has issued BP Ms. No. 954 dated 16.11.1979 revising the concessional rates per unit, at the following rates, in contravention of the earlier rates enjoyed by the erstwhile employees of the Government of Hyderabad, since inceptions of the Electricity Department:
First 100 units 12 paise per unit. Next 100 units 16 paise per unit Above 200 units 21 paise per unit Against the said Board Proceedings, the petitioners have submitted representation dated 9.6.1979, objecting to the said proceedings and the Board again issued BP Ms.No. 1038 dated 27.12.1980 revising the concessional rates as follows: First 100 units/per month at 13 paise per unit Next 100 units/per month at 14 paise per unit Above 200 units/per month at 15 paise per unit The petitioners again submitted a representation on 6.1.1981 raising an objection that the concessions given to the petitioners form part 6 of conditions and hence, it cannot be altered which amounts to setting aside the BP Ms. No. 954 dated 16.11.1979, but without considering the said, the Respondent Boards replied through their letter dated 28.5.1981 confirming the revised rates notified in B.P. Ms. No. 1038 dated 27.12.1980. Subsequently, the Board issued BP Ms. No. 988 dated 30.11.1981 revising the rates as follows: First 100 units per month at 13 paise per unit Above 100 units per month at 15 paise per unit
While the matter stood thus, the Respondent Board issued Memo dated 24.8.1987 stating that in view of the general revision of tariffs to all categories ordered in BP Ms.No. 671 dated 10.6.1987, the concessional tariffs hitherto available to the erstwhile Electricity Department Employees as per B.P. Ms. No. 988 dated 30.11.1981 was withdrawn and requested the Superintending Engineer (Operation) City Circle and Superintending Engineer (Operation) Rural, Hyderabad, to implement the orders in B.P. Ms. No. 671 dated 10.6.1987 to all the consumers of Board scrupulously. Aggrieved of the said proceedings, Writ Petition No. 13263 of 1987 was admitted on 10.7.1987 and interim orders were also granted. Realizing the mistake committed by the Board, on the same day, pending consideration, the Board has issued B.P. Ms. No. 901 dated 10.9.1987 filling the lacunae and having regard to the issuance of B.P. Ms. No. 901 dated 10.9.1987, the writ petition was dismissed on 9.3.1994. Questioning B.P. Ms. No. 901 dated 10.9.1987, which is to the effect that in view of the general revision of tariffs to all categories of consumers, ordered with effect from 15.7.1987 in B.P. Ms. No. 671 dated 10.7.1987 the Superintending Engineer was requested to implement the orders in B.P. Ms. No. 671, one Mr. Mir Shujath Ali Khaisar, Regional President, of the Board Employees Union, filed WP No. 3513 of 1988 and the operation of the impugned Board Proceedings by interim order dated 9.3.1988 was suspended. The Board, consequent upon the dismissal of the WP No. 13263 of 1987 on 9.3.1994, by their Memo dated 6.5.1994 issued instructions to the authorities to recover the tariff difference from the employees of erstwhile Government of Hyderabad, who have been enjoying the concession with effect from 15.7.1987.
5. In response to the Rule Nisi, the respondent filed counter-affidavit, objecting to the filing of the writ petitions questioning B.P. Ms. No. 901 dated 10.9.1987 after lapse of seven years of its issuance and, therefore, it is liable to be dismissed. It is further stated that the petitioners Association is not a recognized registered employees unit and, therefore, not entitled to espouse the cause of certain employees of the Board. It is further submitted that once this Court has already decided the issue in WP No. 13263 of 1987 by order dated 9.3.1994, these writ petitions are liable to be dismissed. It is also submitted that the respondent Board is constituted under the provisions of Electricity Supply Act, 1948 on 1.4.1959 and is vested with the powers to supply energy to its customers on such terms and conditions as it deems fit and also by framing tariffs rules. It is further submitted that the Board is also empowered to frame regulations governing the service conditions of its employees and in exercise of its powers, the Board issued B.P. Ms. No. 349 dated 2.9.1959 extending the concession tariffs to the employees of erstwhile Hyderabad State and later by B.P. Ms. No. 171 dated 28.2.1969 confined the concessions only to the employees residing in the twin cities, which was further modified in B.P. Ms. No. 1038 dated 27.12.1980 by enhancing the tariff rates and the rates were further revised under B.P. Ms, No. 988 dated 30.11.1991. It is the further case of the respondent that during the general revision of tariffs in the year 1987, the Board decided to do away with the said concessions by their Memo dated 24.8.1987 initially and later issued B.P. Ms. No. 901 dated 10.9.1987. It is further contended that there is neither any provision in the Electricity Supply Act nor any saving clause to protect and preserve the award passed by the Industrial Tribunal or making the same binding on the Board and when the award is not binding, the question of challenging B.P. Ms. No. 349 dated 2.9.1959 does not arise. It is also stated that as per the pronouncements of the Courts in the country, the Board has got unilateral powers to revise the tariffs and therefore, the petitioner is not entitled to prevent the Board from exercising such powers. It is denied that the concession is not on account of any Industrial Award or GO that a category of employees were provided and when the Board is empowered to grant concession on its own, it is equally empowered to withdraw the same.
6. A reply is also filed by the petitioner to the counter stating that there is no necessity for the petitioners to file another writ petition inasmuch as the interim orders passed on 10.9.1987 in WP No. 3513 of 1988 are still in force. In reply to the contention that the petitioner forum has no locus standi to espouse the cause of the petitioners, as it is not recognized, it is submitted that the Board has always entertained their representation and, therefore, the respondent is estopped from raising such a contention. It is further submitted that the fact that the general power of the Board to supply the electricity to the consumer and also to frame tariff has no application to the subject- matter, inasmuch as the concession given to the employees of the erstwhile Government of Hyderabad, is one of the conditions of service by the award made by the Industrial Tribunal constituted under the Trade Disputes Order of 1351 Fasli, which has got the force of law and accepted by the Government, which says that all the workers who have put in 25 years of service and who have retired should be supplied electricity at concessional rate and one half anna per unit. It is further submitted that from the letter of the Accountant General dated 6.12.1945, it is clear that the employees of the erstwhile Electricity Department of Hyderabad State were given concession even prior to 1945. It is further stated that the award passed by the Industrial Tribunal was considered by the Council of Ministers in the meeting held on 18.3.1950 and the Finance Department had communicated the sanction to the Government.
7. Therefore, it is the contention of the petitioners that once the concession was given by the erstwhile Government of Hyderabad, to the employees of the Electricity Department giving an assurance that they will not only honour the said concession as condition of service, but also they will not alter to the disadvantage of the employees, withdrawing the same unilaterally effects the service conditions of the petitioners and, therefore, the impugned action of the Board is illegal, arbitrary and contrary to the Rules and Regulations governing the service condition of the employees of the Board. It is further contended on behalf of the petitioner that if the Respondent Board intended to withdraw concessional tariff rates, it ought to have followed the procedure contemplated under Section 19(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since no notice was issued for withdrawing the concessional rates, which is part of the service conditions of the petitioner members, the impugned Board Proceedings are liable to be set aside being violative of Section 19(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. In support of this argument, reliance is sought to be placed on a decision of Apex Courts in Management of Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation v. KSRTC Staff and Workers’ Federation and Anr., .
8. On the other hand, the learned Standing Counsel for the respondent contends that the Board was constituted on 1.4.1959 under the provisions of Electricity Supply Act, 1948 and the respondent is competent to provide for the continuance of the concessional tariff in respect of those employees who were in service as on 25.8.1959. It is further argued that the Board is well within its powers under the provisions of the Electricity Supply Act to revise the tariff rates. It is further his contention that there is neither a saving clause under the provisions of Electricity Supply Act nor there is any clause to protect and preserve the award passed by the Industrial Tribunal, which gives a binding effect on the Board. Therefore, the Board is competent to revise the tariff rates and, therefore, the question of issuing any notice under Section 19(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, as contended by the petitioners, does not arise. Arguing so, he placed reliance on a judgment of the Supreme Court in Karnami Properties Limited v. State of West Bengal and Ors., 1994 III LLJ 378 (SC).
9. For better appreciation of the lis involved in these writ petitions, it is apt to quote relevant provisions of Section 19 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
10. Section 19(1) provides for the period of operation of settlements and awards. It says that a settlement shall come into operation on such date as is agreed upon by the parties to the dispute, and if no date agreed upon, on the date on which the memorandum of the settlement is signed by the parties to the dispute. Sub-section (2) of Section 19 reads that such settlement shall be binding for such period as is agreed upon by the parties, and if no such period is agreed upon, for a period of six months from the date on which the memorandum of settlement is signed by the parties of the period aforesaid, until the expiry of two months from the date on which a notice in writing of an intention to terminate the settlement is given by one of the parties to the other party or parties to the settlement. Sub-section (3) of Section 19 reads that the award shall, subject to the provisions of Section 19, remain in operation for a period of one year from the date on which the award becomes enforceable under Section 17-A, provided that the Government may reduce the said period and fix such period as it thinks fit and that the appropriate Government may, before the expiry of the said period, extend the period not exceeding one year at a time as it thinks fit, so however, that the total period of operation of any award does not exceed three years from the date on which it came into operation.
11. Admittedly, it is nobody’s case that the written notice referred to in Section 19(2) of the Industrial Dispute Act was by either party to the other, more particularly the Respondent Board, intending to withdraw the concession hitherto given to them under the Industrial Tribunal’s award, which virtually became a condition of service. Therefore, when no such written notice is given, Section 19(2) mandates that the settlement shall be binding for such period as is agreed upon by the parties and if no such period is agreed upon, for a period of six months from the date on which the memorandum of settlement is signed by the parties to the dispute and shall continue to be binding on the parties after expiry of the period aforesaid, until expiry of two months from the date on which a notice in writing of an intention to terminate the settlement is given by one of the parties to the other party or parties to the settlement. Evidently, if one of the parties intends to terminate the settlement, it has to give two months written notice. As can be gathered from the facts and circumstances of the case, when such written notice is not issued by either party, the only inference that can be drawn is that the concession in electricity tariff, granted to the electricity Department employees of the erstwhile Government of Hyderabad, stands. The learned Standing Counsel for the respondent draws origin of power of the Board to withdraw such concession, to the provisions of Electricity Supply Act, which enables the Board to unilaterally revise the tariff rates.
12. The Supreme Court dealt with the binding effect of notice Section 19(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act in KSRTC Staff and Workers’ Federation case (supra). The factual matrix of the case are that the Pay Roll Check-off facility was made available to the respondent union by a binding settlement between the parties dated 28.7.1988 and the settlement was current when the Memorandum of Understanding dated 10.5.1993 was entered into between the respondent Union and the Corporation. The said Memorandum of Understanding dealt with various demands including revision of pay scales and in none of the demands, there is any whisper about the then existing Pay Roll Check-off Facility covered by the settlement of 28.7.1988, but the Government, however, while approving the Memo of Understanding imposed a condition to withdraw the Pay-Roll-Check-off Facility. It was contended that the saving clause contained in Memo dated 10.5.1993 covered the subject of Pay-Roil Check-off Facility. The saving clause provided that, benefits already granted under the earlier settlements, facilities, continuing by way of conventions and or practice to be continued in respect of the employees who are in the services of the Corporations as on the date of signing of this Settlement. In such circumstances, it is held that the first part of Clause 24 which deals with benefits already granted under the earlier settlement but excepting those covered by the settlement at hand, namely the Memorandum of Understanding dated 10.5.1993, these benefits were to be continued for the employees who were in service of the Corporation on the date of signing of the settlement and those benefits were obviously already made available to the workmen under any earlier settlement, that the Pay-Roll Check-off Facility cannot be considered to be a benefit available to the workmen, but at the most, it will be a facility to the Union to get an ensured method of securing membership fees from its members on regular basis. The first part of paragraph 24 states that facilities continuing by way of contentions and or practice will be continued and it is obvious that such facilities may include any of the then available facilities to the Union or even to workmen, but however, facilities given to the Union of getting benefit of the scheme of Pay Roll Check-off is obviously not a facility available to workmen. It is available only to the union, that too under a binding settlement and not by way of convention or practice. Such a facility will not be covered by latter part of first paragraph of Clause 24 as the facilities contemplated therein referred to only those which were continuing by way of conventions and or practice. Therefore, when the entire paragraph No. 24 of the settlement does not apply to the question of Pay Roll Check-off Facility, there was no occasion for the State in the light of the Memorandum of Understanding to pass the impugned order dated 10.9.1993 on a wrong assumption that it was called upon to make any observation or convey its decision whether it approved or did not approve the grant of Pay Roll Check-Off Facility to the respondent Union. The Government Order dated 10.9.1993 laying down the impugned conditions No. 2 in connection with Pay Roll Check off Facility was ex facie uncalled for.
13. In Karnani Properties case (supra), the Supreme Court while meeting the contentions of the learned Counsel for the appellant therein, that the Industrial Tribunal was not competent to make the award as the earlier award dated 3.3.1960 had not been validly terminated, that the earlier award was in the nature of settlement under Section 2(p) of the Industrial Disputes Act and it could be terminated only in accordance with Section 19(2) of the Act and that for terminating a settlement under Section 19(2) a written notice was necessary whereas for termination of an award under Section 19(6) of the Act, a written notice is not required and a notice is sufficient; has held that the view of the finding recorded by the Division Bench of the High Court that the letter dated 24.11.1966 was a notice under Section 19(6) as well as under Section 19(2) of the Act. It is further observed that the said letter of the Union which was addressed to the Labour Commissioner was sent to the appellant company therein and that in the said letter there is a clear intimation of the intention of the employees to terminate the Award and from the letter of the appellant dated 13.2.1967, it appears that the appellant had become aware of the intention of the union to terminate the Award and that the order of reference was made on 29.7,1967, long after the expiry of the period of two months. It is held that it is not the requirement of Section 19(2) of the Act that there should be a formal notice terminating a settlement and notice can be inferred from the correspondence between the parties and therefore, the Apex Court held that the High Court was justified in holding that the Award dated 3.3.1960 had been validly terminated before passing of the order of reference.
14. It is apt to extract Section 19(6) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, for better understanding:
“.. Notwithstanding the expiry of the period of operation under Sub-section (3), the award shall continue to be binding on the parties until a period of two months has elapsed from the date on which notice is given by any party bound by the award to the other party or parties intimating its intention to terminate the award…”
15. Admittedly, no notice, as contemplated under Section 19(6) of the I.D. Act is issued by any of the parties terminating the award passed by the Industrial Tribunals, nor can it be inferred by the conduct of the parties that they intend to terminate the award passed by the Industrial Tribunal. Therefore, applying the ratio that emerges from the above decision to the facts and circumstances of the case on hand, when admittedly the petitioners are enjoying the concession in electricity tariff right from 1950 and the concessions granted to the employees of the erstwhile Government of Hyderabad, by the then Government is a condition of service and it was equally recognized and accepted by the Board that they will not only honour the said condition of service but also they will not alter to the disadvantage of the employees and that the concessions are not only extended to those employees who have completed 25 years of service, but also to those who retired after completing 25 years of service and there is an award passed by the Industrial Tribunal in favour of the petitioner and by virtue of its long precedence and acceptance by the Board, the concession has acquired the status of service condition and as such the Board has been revising the tariff from time to time and on representations from the petitioner and others, the Board has entertained such representations, considered and revised the tariff suitably, the unilateral action of the respondent in withdrawing the concession which was hitherto given to the petitioners, without complying with the provisions of Section 19(2) and (6) of the Industrial Disputes Act i.e. written notice under Section 19(2) for termination of settlement and a notice to terminate the award under Section 19(6) of the Act, during the subsistence of the award of the Industrial Tribunal, under the impugned B.P. Ms. No. 628 dated 15.12.1994 is unsustainable.
16. We are unable to countenance the contention of the learned Standing Counsel for the respondent that under the provisions of the Electricity Supply Act, the Board is empowered to frame regulations governing the service conditions of its employees and in exercise of such powers, the Board issued various Board Proceedings, including the impugned proceedings withdrawing the concessions and therefore, it cannot be challenged, for the foregoing reasons. That apart, the Board is well within its powers to grant such concession under Section 49 of the Electricity Supply Act, which deals with provision for the sale of electricity by the Board to persons other than licensees. Sub-section (1) of Section 49 reads as under:
“… Subject to the provisions of the this Act and of regulations, if any made in this behalf, the Board may supply electricity to any person not being a licensee upon such terms and conditions as the Board thinks fit and may for the purpose of such supply frame uniform tariffs.
2…………..
(a) to (d)……
(3) Nothing in the foregoing provisions of this Section shall derogate from the powers of the Board, if it considers it necessary or expedient to fix different tariffs for the supply of electricity to any person not being a licensee, having regard to the geographical position of any area, the nature of the supply and purpose for which supply is required and any other relevant factors…”
17. The Supreme Court, as early as in 1986, in Kerala State Electricity Board v. S.N. Govinda Prabhu and Brothers and Ors., , answering the contention of the learned Counsel for the respondents therein and while considering the Sections 49(3) of the Electricity (Supply) Act and fixation of different tariff for different consumers having regard to the geographic position of area, nature of supply and purpose of supply, has held that Section 49(3) expressly reserves the power of the Board, if it considers it necessary or expedient, to fix, tariff for the supply of electricity to any person having regard to the geographical position of any area, the nature of supply and purpose for which supply is required and other relevant factors.
18. In yet another judgment Shriram Bearings Limited v. Bihar State Electricity Board and Ors., , the Apex Court, while considering Sections 49(3) and 59 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948, held that Section 49(3) of the Act expressly authorises the Board to fix different tariffs for the supply of electricity to any person, not being a licensee, having regard, inter alia, to the nature of supply, the purpose for which the supply is required and other relevant factors. The power to classify the consumers into different categories and to fix differential tariffs, has thus, been conferred on the Board by the section itself. It is further held that where the State Electricity Board has levied the fuel surcharge by its tariff notification on the consumers receiving high tension supply to their factories, while the consumers of the electricity, for domestic, commercial and irrigation purposes were left unaffected by such burden, the imposition of fuel surcharge on such consumers could not be said to be arbitrary and violative of Article 14. It is noteworthy that Section 49 of the Act or any other provision thereof, does not contemplate that as against consumer falling within a specified category different rates are to be charged depending upon the financial capacity of the particular consumer to pay and on the other hand, the very core of the scheme of Section 49 is that the tariff should be uniform in respect of each class or category. Thus the Apex Court held that the challenge against the tariff fixation on the ground that the financial capacity of the individual at the rate proposed to be fixed had not been taken into consideration, as unsustainable.
19. In the instant case, the employees of the Electricity Department of Erstwhile Government of Hyderabad, constitute a class by themselves; and therefore, the respondent Board is well within its powers under Section 49(3) of the Act to fix different rates for the supply of energy having regard to the nature of supply, the purpose for which the supply is required and other relevant factors.
20. The Apex Court while dealing with Andhra Pradesh Electricity Reforms Act (30 of 1998) and the judicial review over fixation of electricity tariff, in a decision, Association of Industrial Electricity Users v. State of A.P. and Ors., , has held that the judicial review in a matter with regard to fixation of tariff has not to be as that of an appellate authority to exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, all that the High Court has to be satisfied is that the Commission has followed the proper procedure and unless it can be demonstrated that its decision is on the face of it arbitrary or illegal or contrary to the Act, the Court will not interfere. It is further held that fixation of tariff and providing for cross subsidy is essentially a matter of policy and normally a Court would refrain from interfering with a policy decision unless the power exercised is arbitrary or ex-facie bad in law.
21. As stated earlier, the decision taken by the Respondent Board, withdrawing the concessions granted to the employee of the Electricity Department of Erstwhile Government of Hyderabad, which have become part and parcel their service conditions, is arbitrary, illegal and in a way not observing the principles of natural justice and non-compliance the provisions of Section 19(6) of the I.D. Act, and is ex facie bad in law.
22. Thus the contention of the respondent that there is no saving clause to protect and preserve the award passed by the Industrial Tribunal or making the same binding on the Board, cannot be countenanced, more particularly for non-compliance of Section 19(6) of the Industrial Disputes Act and the judicial pronouncements. Section 49(1) of the Electricity Supply Act, 1948 begins with the words subject to the provisions of this Act and of regulations, if any made, in this behalf, the Board may supply electricity to any person not being a licensee upon such terms and conditions as the Board thinks fit and may for the purpose of such supply frame uniform tariffs. At the cost of repetition, we add that an award came be passed by the Industrial Tribunal, as early as in the year 1950 and the Government after considering the same, issued BP No. 349 dated 2.9.1959, and it is regulation of service, unless and until it is validly terminated or withdrawn following due process of law. Further under Section 49(3) of the Act, 1948, the Board is well within its powers to fix the tariff having regard to the nature of the supply and purpose for which the supply is made. In the instant case, evidently, the supply is to the employees of the Electricity Department of erstwhile Government of Hyderabad who have put in 25 years of service and the purpose is domestic and that too for lighting and fans.
23. Therefore, having regard to these facts and circumstances, we are of the considered view that the duty cast on the respondent under Section 19(6) is not discharged and, therefore, any withdrawal of the concession given under the award of Industrial Tribunal, is illegal.
24. It is pertinent to note here that a learned Single Judge of this Court while considering BP Ms. No. 901 dated 10.9.1987 by order dated 21.8.1998 passed in W.P. No. 677 of 1988, has quashed the same observing that the withdrawal of concessions which the petitioners were enjoying under service conditions is not only harsh and illegal but also inhuman and thus directed that they shall continue to enjoy the concessions in respect of the tariff as it stood immediately before the issuance of the impugned order.
25. The Memo dated 24.8.1987 issued by the Member Secretary of the Board, under which the concessions in electricity tariff in favour of the retired employees was challenged in Writ Petition No. 13263 of 1987. The said Memo was subsequently withdrawn by the Board and B.P. Ms. No. 901 dated 10-9-1987 was issued withdrawing the concessions in the tariff. A learned Single Judge of this Court, while accepting the contention of the Board that the respondent board has power to enhance the tariff, in spite of the adjudication of the Industrial Tribunal, has allowed the, writ petition on the grounds of discriminations among the employees inter se, who are equally situated and thus held that the withdrawal of concession is justified.
26. We are unable to concur with this finding of the learned Single Judge for the simple reason that no reasons are assigned for withdrawal of the concession, more particularly when the award of the Industrial Tribunal was not terminated under Section 19(6), of the I.D. Act and such actions of respondent Board are saved under Section 49(3) of the Electricity Supply Act. For all these reasons we hold that the unilateral withdrawal of concession in electricity tariff in favour of the petitioner is unjust and illegal Therefore, we set aside the B.P. Ms. No. 628 dated 15.12.1994 issued by the respondent in respect of the petitioner and the writ petitions are allowed. We, however, made it clear that this order docs not preclude the respondent from taking any action, in accordance with law, after following the procedure contemplated under Section 19(6) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 or any other law for the time being in force. There shall be no order as to costs.