JUDGMENT
RANCHI BENCH
S. B. SINHA J. – In this writ application, the order dated October 20, 1982, passed by the Commercial Taxes Tribunal, Bihar, Patna, in Revision Case No. URN-165-166 of 1982 is in question.
By reason of the said order, the Commercial Taxes Tribunal condoned the delay in preferring the revision application filed by the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes.
Mr. Debi Prasad, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, has drawn my attention to paragraph 8 of the order and submitted that the grounds upon which the application for condonation of delay was based, were wholly non-existent. He submitted that the question of obtaining a certified copy by the Department did not arise as the Department was already in possession of the certified copy. Further, he submitted that the Tribunal proceeded on the basis that the date of sanction would be the date of knowledge which is wholly erroneous.
There cannot be any doubt that an application for condonation of delay has to be judged on its own merits. It may also be possible that the Commercial Taxes Tribunal, while passing the said order, has taken into consideration the facts which might not have been available to the Department but the question that arises for consideration is whether in such a matter, the jurisdiction of the High Court should be invoked or not.
It is now well-settled that a writ of certiorari is a discretionary right. Such a discretion has to be exercised keeping in view the well-known limitations which are self-imposed by the High Courts with regard to the exercise of their jurisdictions. It is also well-settled by various decisions of this court and also the Supreme Court that while issuing a writ of certiorari, the High court cannot correct mere errors of law or of facts but can issue such a writ only when there is a jurisdictional error in passing the order impugned before it.
In this context, it should be mentioned that the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to condone delay is not in question. The Tribunal had the necessary jurisdiction to condone the delay. It might have committed some wrongs while exercising its power, but only therefor, the power of this court under article 226 cannot be exercised. This aspect of the matter is wholly covered by a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Mohd.
Further, it is now well known that matters relating to condonation of delay should be judged broadly and should not be judged in a pedantic manner. In a very recent decision, the Supreme Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition v. Mst. Katiji [1987] 167 ITR 471, clearly held that the court should exercise its jurisdiction liberally to condone delays.
In this view of the matter, I am not inclined to exercise my jurisdiction to interfere with the impugned order.
This application is, accordingly, dismissed.
