ORDER
1. This petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution is for the quashing of two orders purporting to have been issue under the Drugs (Prices Control) Order, 1979 (DPCO) – these order begin at Exs. M and O appended to the petition.
2. Production, transport and supply of essential commodities to the common man is a major concern of the welfare state. Free India, like other such States, has been grappling with the problem in diverse ways. On such method is the framing and implementation of laws. The parent legislation designed to attain this object is the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 (EC Act). Medicinal products, also known as drugs, are essential to the prevention and curing of ailments that afflict the human race. Systems of medicine recognised s native to the country, have been fighting a losing battle against allopathy, and it is the increasing domination of the intruder, that has made the drug industry so suspect – the suspicion, not begin confined to the land mass surrounded by the waters of an ocean, sea and a bay. With a view to discipline the industry, there are no the statute book, amongst other enactments, 1. The Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 (Drugs Act), 2. The Drugs nd Cosmetics Rules, 1945 (Drug Rules,) and 3. DPCO this last begin subordinate legislation promulgated by the Central Government vide the powers conferred upon it under S. 3 of the EC Act. This DPCO repealed a namesake of the year 1970 In exercise of the powers vested by DPCO 1970, the Central Government fixed prices of seven formulations manufactured by petitioner No. 1 (Sandoz) as detailed in para 3 of the petition. These formulations contain vitamins and fall under Category III of the Third Schedule (being an appendage to the DPCO). R. 124-B of the Drug Rules mandates taht patent or proprietary medicines conform to a two fold standards as lid down by the Second Schedule to the Drugs Act an d Schedule V (“V” for victory) of the Drug Rules, Cl. 2 of Schedule V requires that medicines containing vitamins do not go below or above the minimum or maximum specified therein. Clause 2 was inserted into the Drug Rules on July 13, 1978 vide Notification bearing GSR No. 930.
3. The DPCO supplanted its precursor of 1970 and para 14 thereof laid down prior approval of Government to prices chargeable upon new formulations. In August 1979, Sandoz moved the respondent to accord approval under para 14 vis-a-vis the seven formulations duty changed to bring them into conformity with Schedule V’s Clause 2 of the Drug Rules. This was as detailed in Ex. A. For well over tow years, there was not reply and on 9-7-1982, the manufacture intimated that it was going to enforce its proposed price list. To this communication (Ex. B.) there was a delayed riposte viz. Ex.C dated 12-8-1983, purporting to be the fixation of prices by Government under para 13 of the DPCO. Sandoz applied for a review of Ex. C under para 27 and moved this Court vide Writ Petition No.2207 of 1983. The review petitions were rejected under order marked Exs. F-1 to F-6 Fro that reason, the pending writ petition was amended to also include a l challenge to this rejection. On 19-10-1983, Mr. Justice Pendse set aside Exs. C and F-1 to F-6, directing thus in para 3:-
“Orders dated 12th Aug. 1983 being Exhibit ‘N’ o the petition and five orders dated 24th Sept. 1983 begin Exhibits ‘AC’ to ‘AG’ order dated 14th Sept. 1983 being Exhibit ‘AH’ and order dated 9th Sept. 1983 being Exhibit ‘AI’ to the petition in so far as they relate to ht formulations referred to in paragraph 2 of the petition are set aside. The petitioners are permitted to file material in support of their claim of repudiating From III already filed by them with the respondent sand also to file additional material , if any, which they wish rely upon within four weeks from today. The respondents on receipt of the material shall proceed to give a personal hearing and pass appropriate speaking order on the materials produced by the petitioners before the respondents. In case the respondent s desire to rely on some material in their custody, the respondents shall disclose such material to the petitioners and the petitioners shall be permitted to rebut the same”.
4. Sandoz, on 14-9-1983, submitted a set of revised Form III applications (Ex. H) . Its representative s were personally herd on February 22 and July 16 of 1985. They also furnished additional material Exs. 1.J and K. Came March of 1986 and the manufacture received Exs. L and M. The two documents were an imposition of prices under para 13 together with an explanation for some features that had guided the exercise carried out. The past, it is said, repeats itself, and, Sandoz applied for a review vide Ex. N dated 29-3-1986. Predictably, the review was rejected on 16-6-1986 vide Ex. O and in July the present petition was lodged. Rule was granted and as an interim measure, the operation of Ex. M has been stayed.
5. The grounds taken to assail Exs. M and O may be summarised thus: Despite the verdict in the earlier writ petition, the Government made use of material not disclosed to the petitioner. This was in the face of repeated requests to furnish the material. Next, the hearing had not been effective. Even before its completion, the Government came out with Exs. L and M. The prices fixed were in violation of ht e principles laid down in paras 10, 11 and 13 of the DPCO. Ex. PP which was given out to be the backbone of the price fixation was in contravention of the above paras. The formulations were standards formulations and yet they were treated as non-standard. On d this misconception, the mark-up had been restricted to 60%. The restriction was said to be in conformity with an unproclaimed policy. In any case, the excuse given for the reduction in the mark-up was non-existent. For all the reasons given above. Exs. M and O deserved to be quashed and respondent directed to accord the approval solicited by Sandoz.
6. Respondent’s return is a catch-all defence justifying the price list imposed on the formulations. The mark-up had been restricted to 60% of the ex-factory cost as per the DPCO. Sandoz, despite a request, had not made available the financial date required for an assessment of its profitability. The formulations in this petition were not standard compositions and therefore could not get a mark-up of more than 60%. The price list fro which approval was sought, was an inflated one and not supported by date. Packing material costs were worked out on the basis of a ceiling or actuals whichever be less. There was no substance in the contention that the directions given in Pendse, J’.s judgment had not been complied with. There had been compliance ” in letter and spirt”. Ex. PP was the basis of the price schedule fixed for the formulations. It was the result of an in depth study of the working of a cross-section of the manufactures. There was no merit in the petition and it deserved to be dismissed.
7. Respondent has raised a number of preliminary objection to the maintainability of the petition . A few of these are specified in the return and the rest advanced during the course of the hearing. the omission, when pointed out, were dismissed as petitionerry unsuited to a proceeding under Art. 226. A complete dispensation from the ruels of pleadings is not the prerogative of writ proceedings . For good reasons a deviation from the rule requiring conformity between pleadings and proof may be permitted. But the rule remains and complete absolution therefrom is not permitted on specious grounds such as the one mentioned above. Having scrutinised the return, I find no reference therein to the pleas put forth by the learned counsel Mr. Desai. Forget this aspect and let us examine the points raised by him. The petition is said to be aimed against the application of Ex. PP. This statutory order under para 10 the DPCO was issued in May 1979. Sandoz cannot be permitted to assail it by a petition in 1986. That this S.O.’s application to the earlier price fixation was struck down does not deter the contradictory argument that the S.O. itself emerged unscathed. The ingenuity does not aid the respondent of the cause of action is not the issue of the S.O.; but its use in imposing prices on the products of a manufacture. The second in the series is the alleged dubiousness of Sandoz disentitling it from relief under Art. 226 . On Aug 6, 1983, the manufacture was asked to submit information so as to facilitate a profitability study, vide Ex. B. Instead of submitting he asked for details, Sandoz rushed to Court. This perhaps could have been ruged at the hearing of the 1983 petition . The respondent far from so doing, allowed the petitioner, the reliefs claimed by it. The respondent far from so doing, allowed the petitioner, the reliefs claimed by it. The judgment in that petition was delivered on Oct. 19, 1983, i.e. a good two months after the issue of Ex. B. The occasion to urge the defence is gone. Third, it is said the company should have followed the price list imposed upon it, seen how its profitability was affected and then come to Court. Sandoz contends that Ex. M is a violation of the DPCO. Whether it rally is so, is a different question. That however gives rise to an actionable claim. There is no requirement that a manufacture follow (should?) the fiat of the if the same be in contravention of the law and come only if it finds the same jeopardising its financial position. Next, it is contended that Sandoz has not come out with material revealing its present finances pursuant to the non-implementation of Ex. M. This it is argued would have borne out the justness of the prices fixed by the Government . This somewhat incongruous plea merits the short answer that an infraction of the law suffices for access to a Court, without it being further proved that financial ruin stares the suitor in the face in case he is made to put up with the legal violation. Last is the submission that the present petition is misconceived. The main plank of the Sandoz’s case is that the judgment in the 1983 petition had not been complied with. Petitioners should have sought a revival of that petition or proceeded against the respondent for committing contempt of Court. It is Exs. L and M which gave petitioners the reason to move this Court. These did not exist when the earlier petition was decided. In fact, respondent inconsistently enough maintains that no violation of the verdict has occurred. Respondent cannot therefore be heard to urge the non-maintainability of the present petition. The shorter answer however is that the cause of action for this petition is not limited to non-observance of the obligation cast on the respondent by Pendse, J.’s verdict. The preliminary objections are all berefit of merit, and have therefore, to be negatived.
8. The crucial question is whether Exs. L and M are violative of the law” This question I will first consider dehors the attributed contravention of the verdict in the 1983 petition. Shortly stated, the petitioners’ case is that Ex. M is an exercise under para 13(1) of the DPCO with Ex. PP as the base therefor. Para 13 (1) has an inextricable connection with paras 10 and 11. Para 10 requires not only formulation of norms in relation to material cost, conversion cost, process loss in cost of packing material and packing charges, but also their notification in the official gazette in this behalf . para 11 deals with the mark on ex-factory costs as worked out vide para 10. In so far as the formulations in this petition are concerned, they being in Category III of the Third Schedule, the mark up cannot be more than 100%. The mark-up has to take care of the manufacture’s margin and the trade – commission apart from a host of other things. Are the statutory orders at Ex. PP “norms” as conceived of by para 10? Even the irrepressible Mr. Desai had to concede that Ex. PP fell short of the requirement in that the norm to work out the cost of packing material did not find a place therein. This failing, according to him, was of no consequence as a norm did not ceases to be one merely because it had not l been notified. I shall deal with this aspect at a later stages. The primary question is whether Ex. PP can be said to be the “norms” spoken of by para 10? This necessitates a search for what the word implies. No meaning having been ascribed to it by the DPCO , I turn to the Chambers 20th Century Dictionary. Therein the following are the meanings, amongst others, ascribed to the expression:-
“a rule; a pattern; an authoritative standard: a type”.
Tested thus, is it possible to accept Ex. PP as setting forth norms? Ex. PP gives figures as to how the various items are to be valued with reference to the inputs. These figures may be acceptable as the product of calculations based on a rule, pattern, standard or type. The return says that these are based on in depth studies or surveys carried out. Para 10 requires the notification of the rule, pattern standard or type on which the figures in Ex. PP rest. As the figures stand, there is no Knowing what date or reasoning has gone into their formulation. The figures to not get converted into norms because the statutory order at Ex. PP says so. Instead of specifying the norms, the respondent has presented the manufactures with a fait accompli. Mr. Desai contends that the quarrel of Sandoz is not that Ex. PP does not incorporate norms, but that the same formulated in 1979 had become out dated in 1986 and could not therefore the applied. This is a wrong construction of the Sandoz stand. Not that they have not put forth the contention afore mentioned. Apart thereform, it is also submitted that Ex.PP cannot be viewed as norms. The same vice afflicts respondent ‘s fiat vis-a-vis the mark-up . Para 11 permits a mark-up up to 100% of the ex-factory cost. Ex. L restricted the mark-up admissible to Sandoz at 60% because the formulations were said to have “non-standard compositions”. Petitioners rightly take umbrage at these words. First, neither in Ex. L nor in the return has the Union of India cared to specify what a non-standard composition is. Admittedly, the formulations comply with the standards set forth in Schedule V. At the hearing , Mr. Desai flourishes the third edition of a publication titled “National Formulary of India”. Conformity to this formulary is not a prescription of the Drugs Act, Drug Rules or the DPCO. The Union of India cannot make use of standards other than those set up by the statute. However laudable the objective behind the Government’s desire to compel compliance with the formularly, its user in the matter of price fixation is not sanctioned by DPCO. No extraneous influence can be brought to bear upon the exercise of a statutory power. If the formulary was to be applied, the proper thing to do was to incorporate it in Schedule V. This also is the stage where I will consider the plea that non-notification of a norm does not make it any less so. If the statute requires the publication of a norm in the gazette, the obvious reason is that people in the trade are made aware of the same. The need to make them aware is so that they can plan their future course of action. It is not therefore possible to agree that a norm evolved on the basis of some in depth study though not notified, still conforms to the requirement of DPCO para 10.
9. In the foregoing discussion I have restricted myself testing Exs. L and M on the anvil of DPCO para 13(1). Nothing wrong in this user as the parameter, for Exs. L and M quote that para as the source of power. Flexible as the respondent has kept its return )to permit the use of any plea found convenient) that does not permit recourse to the argument that the price list impugned is the product of an exercise under paras 14, 15 or 16. The shelter of these paras is sought to avoid the consequence of non-compliance with paras 10 and 11 as is the requirement of para 13. Having quoted chapter and verse in Exs. L and M, respondent cannot now turn around and seek to bring them under paras not specified. Secondly, the power under paras not specified. Secondly, the power under para 14 had been once exercised. The shelter of these paras is sought to avoid the consequence of non-compliance with paras 10 and 11 as is the requirement of para 13. Having quoted chapter and verse in Exs. L and M, respondent cannot now turn around and seek to bring them under paras not specified. Secondly, the power under para 14 had been once exercised. The price so fixed were struck down in the 1983 petition. This however did not wipe the slate clean as was suggested by Mr. Desai to permit a fresh exercise under the last proviso to para 14 had been once exercised. The prices so fixed were struck down in the 1983 petition. This however did not wipe the slate clean as was suggested by Mr.Desai to permit a fresh exercise under the last proviso to para 14. Counsel argued that the power conferred by paras 15 and 16 was unfettered by the other provisions of the DPCO and Ex. M should be viewed thereunder. If so, Government should have so specified in Ex. M itself. The search for the umbrella of paras 14 to `6 is sought to get the benefit of certain, observations in the Cyanamid case reported at . The observations do not imply that prices fixed for the first time are a legislative act, not subject to the need to conform to paras 10 and 11 as Mr. Desai wants to suggest. But assuming otherwise, Ex. M cannot be viewed as the maiden effort at price fixation under the second proviso to para 14. Paras 15 and 16 do not provide a power parallel to paras 13 and 14. In fact, the former two are an exercise pursuant to a call for information from manufacturers and/or the failure to furnish the same. Having regard to the verdict in the 1983 petition. Ex. M cannot be ascribed to an exercise under para 14, for the power thereunder stood exhausted with the issue of Ex. C.
10. It is time now to deal with Mr. Desai’s off-repeated theme of Ex. M being legislation, and therefore, immune from attack, unless it be shown as contravening the fundamental rights of the petitioner. The petition does list the ground of petitioner’s right under Art. 19(1) (Government) of the Constitution being violated incase Ex. M is enforced. But is the contention of Ex. M being legislation correct? The DPCO gives Government power to legislate the prices vide paras 12, and 13(6) (a). But Ex. M is not the product of an exercise of power under these provisions of an exercise of power under these provisions which deal with leader prices. To refute the respondent’s contention, Mr. Setalvad relies on the following lines from Professor De.Smith’s “Judicial Review of Administrative Action” (4th Edition) P.71:-
“A distinction often made between legislative and administrative acts is that between the general and the particular. A legislative act is the creation and promulgation of a general rule of conduct without reference to particular cases.”
Ex. M pertains to Sandoz formulations and not identical formulations manufactured by all in the trade. Not that this is decisive of the question, for there can be legislation concerning one single entity. Mr. Desai has cited a large number of decisions to support the propositions that prices can be fixed by legislation and if so fixed, are immune from judicial scrutiny bar the limitation aforementioned. These are reported at AIR 1983 SC 1015, AIR 1960 SC 475, AIR 1978 SC 1296, AIR 1972 SC 1168, AIR 1971 SC 474 and AIR 1954 SC 465. What is common to all these decisions, are, that barring one (which is irrelevant), they arose out of subordinate legislation framed under the EC Act or its predecessors. The determinative element is the content of such legislation. As I have shown earlier, the DPCO contains paras which permit legislative price fixing. But para 13(1), where under Exs. L and M have been issued, condition the power of price fixation by requiring the government to conform to the provisions of paras 10 and 11. These paras read as below:-
“10. Calculation of retail price of formulations – The retail price of a formulation shall be calculated in accordance with the following formula, viz.
R.P = (M.C + C.C+P.M+P.C) * 1 + MU/100 + ED
Where —
“R.P”. means retail price.
“M.C” means material cost and includes the cost of drugs and other pharmaceutical aids used including averages, if any, and norms as may be specified by the Government from time to time by notification in the Official Gazette in this behalf.
“C.C” means conversion cost worked out in accordance with such norms as may be specified by the Government from time to time by notification in the Official Gazette in this behalf.
“P.M.” means the costs of packing material including process loss thereon worked out in accordance with such norms as may be specified by the Government from time to time by notification of Official Gazette in this behalf.
“M.U.” means mark-up referred to in paragraph 11.
“E.D.” means excise duty :
Provided that in the case of an imported formulation the land cost shall form the basis for fixing its price along with such margin as the Government may allow from time to time.
Provided further that where an imported formulation in repacked. Its landed cost plus the cost of packing materials and packing charges as worked out in accordance with such norms as may be specified by the Government from time to time by notification in the Official Gazette, shall from the basis for fixing its price.
Explanation – For the purposes of this paragraph, “landed cost” shall mean the cost in import of drug inclusive of customs duty and clearing charges.
11. Mark-up – Mark-up referred to in paragraph 10 includes the distribution cost, outward freight, promotional expenses, manufactures margin and the trade Commision and shall not exceed-
(a) forty per cent in the case of formulations specified in Category 1 of the Third Schedule;
(b) fifty -five per cent in the case of formulations specified in category 11 of the said Schedule;
(c) One hundred per cent in the case of formulations specified in Category III of the Third Schedule.
13. Power of Government to fix retail price of a formulation specified in category III of the Third Schedule in accordance with the provisions of paras 10 and 11.”
Even a cursory perusal of the above shows that these paras provide for exercise of an administrative or executive power. That this power has to be in conformity with what is legislation, does not make the end product, legislation, does not make the end product, legislation in character. The end product is a consequence of the application of the legislation to a particular case. It was, argued, and in the alternative, the prove fixation by the Government partakes the character of legislation. Sustenance for this submission was sought to be drawn from Saraswati Industrial Syndicate Ltd. v. Union of India , wherein it was observed:-
“Price fixation is more in the nature of a legislative measure even though it may be based upon objective criteria found in a report or other material.”
Next, reliance was placed upon this passage from the opinion of Chief Justice Beg on behalf of himself and D.A. Desai J. in M/s. Prag Ice and Oil Mills v. Union of India Reported in .
“We think that unless, by the terms of a particular statute, or order, price fixation is made a quasi-judicial function for specified purposes or cases, it is really legislative in character in the type of control order which is now before us because is satisfied the tests of legislation. A legislative measure does not concern itself with the facts of an individual case. It is meant to lay down a general rule applicable to all persons or objects or transactions of a particular kind or class. In the case before us, the Control Order applies to sales of mustard oil anywhere in India by any dealer. Its validity does not depend on the observance of any procedure to be complied with or particular types of evidence to be taken on any specified matters as conditions precedent to its validity. The test of validity is constituted by the nexus shown between the order passed and the purposes for which it can be passed, or, in other words by reasonableness judged by possible or probable consequences.”
The above observations have to be read in the light of the fact that the Control Orders in both the cases permitted fixation of prices of the commodities by legislation. Under Para 13(1), the prices to be fixed by the Government from time to time , have to be in accordance with paras 10 and 11 of the DPCO. This is a vital difference excluding the application of the cases relied upon by Mr. Desai. Until now, I have been considering the question dehors an authority directly applicable . The precedent applicable is the judgment of the Delhi High Court in the Cyanamid case (supra). Para 40 from that judgment is applicable to the question under consideration and I cannot improve upon the exposition which reads thus:-
“Another question on which there is considerable divergence between the parties is with regard to the working of the formula provided in para of 10 of the Order with regard to the fixation of the retail price of formulation. According to the petitioners, Para 10 requires that norms on which conversion cost, cost of packing material and packing charges are to be calculated have to be notified by the Government from time to time in the Official Gazette. The submission was that this was not being done. On the other hand, the respondents contend that by order dated 3rd May, 1979, the norms have been fixed. Our attention has been drawn to the said Order. The said Order merely lays down the conversion cost and the packing charges which have to be taken into consideration while fixing the price of formulations. The basis on which these costs have been arrived at is not indicated. What is required to be notified under paragraph 10 is not the conversion cost or the packing charges but the norms on which the same are to be calculated. The petitioners are justified in contending that they do not know as to what is the basis or norms adopted while fixing the conversion cost and packing charges by order dated 3rd May, 1979. As regards packing material, it is admitted that no notification at all has been issued. It is true that in the notification of 3.5.1979 it is said that norms for conversion cost and packing charges are being issued, but the plain reading of the said notification shows that norms are not indicated. It is only the conversion cost and packing charges must have been arrived at by the Central Government by applying some norms. What those norms or principles are have not been indicated or disclosed either to this Court or to the petitioners. In our opinion, therefore, while fixing the price of formulations the respondents must inform the petitioners as to the basis of the calculation of the conversion cost, packing charges cost of packing material. The Government should take into consideration the representations and the submissions which the submissions which the petitioners may make in this behalf before determining the conversion cost, cost of packing material and packing charges. Furthermore, unless and until the norms as postulated by para 10 are notified, which norms again ought not to be arbitrary or unrealistic, the petitioners would be entitled to contend that the actual cost of conversion, the actual packing charges incurred should be taken into consideration while fixing the price of the formulations. If however, the Central Government feels that there is justification for ignoring the figures so submitted by the petitioners, it should give out its mind to the petitioners, let them make a representation and then take a final decision in the matter.”
The passage above applies on all fours to the instant case. Ex. PP has in terms been rejected as not prescribing norms. Mr. Desai submits that the above decision is wrong. All that he could say in support of this contention was based upon observations which have no bearing on the issues that have arisen. For instance, one of the arguments canvassed by Mr. Desai is that price fixation has necessarily to be left to the judgment of the executive and unless it is patent that there is hostile discrimination against a class of operators, the price fixed by the executive have to be accepted as valid. A somewhat similar argument was negatived by the Division Bench in the Cyanamid case in these words:-
“The decision in Prag Ice case, therefore, is of little assistance to the respondents, because whereas in Prag Ice case the challenge was to the provisions of the Central Order itself, in the present case the challenge is to the alleged non-compliance with the provisions of the Central Order.”
To repeat times without number, Exs. L and M are not legislation, but an executive order purporting to be based upon legislation. Ex. PP on which Ex. M is based does not constitute a norm as contemplated by para 10 and Ex. L which deals with the mark-up introduces an extraneous element in laying down 60% as the permissible mark-up. Agreeing with the passages from Cyanamid case reproduced above, I hold that Exs. L and m cannot be sustained.
11. Last, I deal with the contravention of the judgment in the 1983 petition. Surprisingly, respondent has made use of Ex. PP. despite the criticism merited by that statutory order in the Cyanamid judgment. Mr. Desai submits Ex. PP was sustained or rather escaped being struck down in the 1983 petition. The price fixation based upon Ex. PP. was struck down, and, the primary reason for that was the concession that Government had not gone through the exercise prescribed by paras 10 and 11. According to Mr. Desai, all that the 1983 petition decided was the furnishing of an opportunity to the petitioners to submit material so as to update the application material so as to update the application for price fixation submitted by them. In other, words, only a review was permitted, and that, on account of the passage of time. If this were true, the judgment has only to say that petitioners were at liberty to apply for a review under para 27 of the DPCO and that on receipt of a request to that effect, the Government would do the needful. But the verdict was a quashing of the price list imposed upon sandoz by the Government. Next, the respondent was called upon to disclose to the petitioners the material it proposed to use in framing prices a new seeing that the 1983 order was quashed. Petitioners are also right in contending that Exs. L and M were issued without fully hearing them and after keeping them under the belief that the hearing had not been completed. In specific terms, the complaint is voiced in Ex. N.Ex.O avoids a reply to the charge that Ex. M had been issued without the hearing having been completed, Mr. Desai replies that the telegram sent by respondent made it clear that the hearing to be held on 16.7.1985 would be a final one. But this was before the hearing final one. But this was before the hearing took place. If the petitioners contended the contrary – and they did so in Ex. N – nothing stopped the respondent from pointing this out. It did not do so and the sure inference is that Ex. M was issued without an effective hearing as directed in the verdict of the 1983 petitions. Surprisingly, despite the obvious of ailure to comply with the directions in a binding judgment, respondent maintains the contrary. Mr. Desai even went to the extent of saying that the said judgment had in no way prejudiced respondent that Ex.PP emerged unscathed and that petitioners had scored a pyrrhic victory. The correct position is otherwise. There was a failure to comply with the judgment and that by itself suffices to invalidate Exs. L and M.
12. The result of the foregoing discussion is that petition succeeds. Having regard to the complex questions that arose for determination, parties would be left to bear their own costs. Hence the order.
ORDER
13. Orders incorporated in Exs. M and O are here by quashed. Respondents is injuncted from seeking to enforce Ex.M. Respondent is directed to permit the petitioners to sell the petition formulations at the prices set out in their applications Exs. J-1 to J-15. Rule in the above terms made absolute, with parties being left to bear their own costs.
14. Petition allowed
