JUDGMENT
N.P. Chapalgaonker, J.
1. In the early hours of 6th October, 1990 two brothers namely, Baswaraj and Dhanraj, were sleeping in a cattle shed situated in Survey No. 29-A of village Badur, Taluka Nilanga, guarding crops and cattle when they were assaulted by some persons. One of the victims namely, Dhanraj, died on the spot and Baswaraj, also injured, managed to escape and then lodged a complaint. Crime No. 84 of 90 was registered under sections 302 and 307 of the Penal Code by Kasarsirsi Police Station and petitioner Nos. 1 to 3 were arrested on 6th October, 1990 and petitioner No. 4 was arrested on 10th October, 1990. Charge-sheet in this case came in be filed on 16th January, 1991 and as the charge-sheet was filed beyond the statutory limitation for detention of accused during investigation as laid down by section 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, accused prayed for bail and were released on bail by an order of learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Latur, dated 31st January, 1991.
2. On 7th February, 1991 an application was moved by the State for cancellation of the bail granted to the accused on 31st January, 1991. In this Criminal Misc. Application No. 49 of 1991, it was contended by the State that the complainant himself is an injured eye-witness who has witnessed the assault on deceased Dhanraj and his testimony would go to show that accused have committed a serious offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life. It was further alleged that one of the accused is Sarpanch of the village and all of them are influential persons in the village and they are threatening the prosecution witnesses and thus they are likely to tamper with the prosecution evidence. Learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Latur, after hearing parties was pleased to allow this application and by his order dated 30th March, 1991 cancelled the bail granted to the petitioners. It is this order which is subject-matter of challenge in this Criminal Application.
3. Shri N.H. Patil, learned Counsel appearing for petitioners, submitted that once the accused are released on bail under section 167, cancellation of bail would be governed by the same considerations which would be relevant for cancellation of the bail if it is granted under other provisions of the Code. He further submitted that though the bail granted for the non-compliance of the provisions of section 167 is not a bail on consideration of the merits and is a result of default on the part of the prosecution, it would stand on par with bail granted under section 437 or section 439. Relying on a judgment of Supreme Court in The State through the Delhi Administration v. Sanjay Gandhi, , he further contended that the consideration for rejection of the bail when it is applied for would not be sufficient for the cancellation of the bail and unless it is made out that the accused enlarged on bail have misused their liberty, bail cannot be cancelled.
4. Shri S.K. Barlota, learned Addl. Public Prosecutor appearing for respondent-State, submitted that there are reasonable grounds to believe that accused-petitioners have committed a serious offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life and they are threatening witnesses in this case and, therefore, order of cancellation of bail is proper and is in the interest of justice. Shri Barlota further submitted that a right to get oneself released on bail if the investigation is not completed within the statutory limitation comes to an end when the charge-sheet is filed and merely because it was filed beyond the statutory limitation, accused shall not be entitled for bail if they apply after the charge-sheet is filed. In support of this contention Shri Barlota relied on a judgment of Full Bench of Gujarat High Court in the case of Shardulbhai Lakhmanbhai Panchali & another v. State of Gujarat, 1990 Cri.L.J. 1275, which dissents from an earlier view of Full Bench of the same High Court in the case of Babubhai Parshottamdas Patel v. State of Gujarat, 1982 Cri.L.J. 284, on the ground that later pronouncements of the Supreme Court should be deemed to have overruled Babubhai’s case (cited supra).
5. Firstly, I will consider whether submission, of Shri Barlota that the right created under section 167 comes to an end as soon as the charge-sheet is filed, is correct. Detention of an accused person for the purpose of investigation and trial is restriction on personal liberty as guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution. A person cannot be deprived of the personal liberty except according to the procedure established by law and by virtue of section 167. Legislature has limited the power otherwise granted to the investigating agency and the courts to detain a person accused in an offence. This being the purpose of the provision, a valuable statutory right is created in favour of a person accused of a non-bailable offence and any such provision will have to be interpreted strictly and in consonance with the spirit of Article 21 of the Constitution of India.
6. In Babubhai’s case (cited supra), Full Bench of Gujarat High Court had taken a view that the right conferred on the accused to be released on bail after 90 days of his custody must be considered to be an absolute right subject, of course, only to the cancellation of the bail if the requirement of section 437(5) are satisfied. In Bashir and others v. State of Haryana, , Supreme Court considered power of the Court to cancel the bail, in case, accused is released granting benefit of section 167(2). High Court of Punjab & Haryana had taken a view that the bail order under section 167 Cr.P.C. is not an order on merits of the case and as soon as the ground on which the Court had released the accused on bail ceases to exist by subsequent filing of the charge-sheet, the Magistrate or the Court of Session or the High Court can on that ground cancel the bail allowed earlier. Negativing this proposition Supreme Court observed :
“As the provisions of section 437(1), (2) and (5) are applicable to a person who has been released under section 167(2) the mere fact that sequent to his release a challan has been filed is not sufficient to commit him to custody.”
In the very case, Supreme Court has pointed out that while exercising powers under sub-section (5) of section 437, Court can cancel the bail when there are sufficient grounds to believe that the accused had committed a non-bailable offence and that it is necessary that be should be arrested and committed to custody.
7. In State of Uttar Pradesh v. Lakshmi Brahman and another, , the question for consideration of the Supreme Court was whether general power to remand the accused in custody when the enquiry or trial is still continuing comes to an end as soon as the statutory limitation prescribed by section 167, is over, and whether a Magistrate is empowered to remand accused for further custody even after 90 days period allowed for completion of the investigation under section 167 is over. Supreme Court ruled that further detention of the accused person does not become ipso facto illegal or void, power to remand him under section 309 shall always be there. Supreme Court further ruled that the accused would be entitled to an order for being released on bail if he is prepared to and does furnish bail. Therefore, if an accused person is not prepared to furnish bail, then Magistrate is not powerless and he can remand accused person to custody even when charge-sheet is not filed within the statutory limitation. High Court of Allahabad had held that a Magistrate had no jurisdiction, power or authority to remand the accused to custody after the charge-sheet is submitted and before the commitment order is made because that period (according to Allahabad High Court) could not be said to be an enquiry). Supreme Court ruled that :
“Thus, from the time the accused appears or is produced before the Magistrate with the police report under section 170 and the Magistrate proceeds to enquire whether section 207 has been complied with and then proceeds to commit the accused to the Court of Session, the proceeding before the Magistrate would be an inquiry as contemplated by section 2(g) of the Code.”
Therefore, during that period powers under section 309 to remand accused can be exercised. This case does not lay down a proposition that as soon as the charge-sheet is filed, right of the accused as conferred by section 167(2) to get himself released on bail because of non-observance of the statutory limitation gets exhausted. Same view is reiterated by the Supreme Court in Raghubir Singh and others v. State of Bihar, , and after discussing the case law on the point, Supreme Court has observed thus :-
“The result of our discussion and the case-law in this ; An order for release on bail made under the proviso to section 167(2) is not defeated by lapse of time, the filling of charge-sheet or by remand to custody under section 309(2). The order for release on bail may however be cancelled under section 437(5) or section 439(2). Generally the grounds for cancellation of bail, broadly, are, interference or attempt to interfere with the due course of administration of justice, or evasion or attempt to evade the course of justice, or abuse of the liberty granted to him. The due administration of justice may be interfered with by intimidating or suborning witnesses, by interfering with investigation, by creating or causing disappearance of evidence etc. The course of justice may be evaded or attempted to be evaded by leaving the country or going underground or otherwise placing himself beyond the reach of the sureties. He may abuse the liberty granted to him by indulging in similar or other unlawful acts. Where bail has been granted under the proviso to section 167(2) for the default of the prosecution in not completing the investigation in sixty days, after the defect is cured by the filing of a charge-sheet, the prosecution may seek to have the bail cancelled on the ground that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the accused has committed a non-bailable offence and that it is necessary to arrest him and commit him to custody. In the last mentioned case, one would expect very strong grounds indeed.”
8. In Shardulbhai Lakhmanbhai Pancholi’s case (cited supra) Full Bench of Gujarat High Court took the view that Babubhai’s case stands overruled in view of Lakshmi Brahman’s case (cited supra) and the learned Judges interpreted Lakshmi Brahman’s case to lay down that the accused cannot claim to be released on bail on account of default committed in submitting charge-sheet within prescribed time after submission of the charge-sheet. With great respect to the learned Judges constituting Full Bench, it will have to be said that this is not the ratio of Lakshmi Brahman’s case. This case only deals with two questions. Firstly, whether the period after the charge-sheet is filed and the accused are committed to the Court of Sessions can be taken to be a part of the enquiry within the meaning of section 2(g) of the Code and whether during this period powers under section 309 can be exercised by the learned Magistrate. Second question was whether an order of further remand under section 309 would be competent in the face of the fact that the charge-sheet is submitted beyond the statutory limitation. Supreme Court said that further detention does not become ipso facto illegal but again reiterated that the accused had a right to get himself released on furnishing bail. This case is not a departure from the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Bashir’s case , (cited supra) that the subsequent filing of the charge-sheet after release of the accused is not a valid ground for cancellation of bail under section 437(5). Right created by section 167 does not come to an end by mere filling of the charge-sheet. The only course open for the prosecution is to get cancellation of the bail if it is able to satisfy the Court about the existence of the grounds relevant under section 437(5) or under section 439(2). What those considerations can be has already been laid down by the Supreme Court in Sanjay Gandhi’s case and also in Raghubir Singh’s case, (Both cited supra). Since the bail granted under section 167(2) is to be deemed to be a bail granted under Chapter XXXIII of the Code of Criminal Procedure, same considerations would be relevant for cancellation of bail under section 167 also. Instances of such valid reasons are misuse of liberty granted to the accused, interference with the administration of justice, an attempt to evade the trial, likelyhood of commission of similar serious offences again and so on. What material would be sufficient to hold that there are reasonable grounds for cancellation of bail would differ from case to case but the contentions must be relevant and must be at least prima facie proved.
9. Prosecution has mainly alleged two grounds for cancellation of the bail. The first one is that there is evidence against the petitioners that they have committed a non-bailable offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life. Once the accused are released on bail under section 167(2), this alone can hardly be a sufficient ground. If the nature of offence is such that by enlargement of the accused on bail they are likely to indulge in similar activities then this can be a matter of consideration.
10. Shri S.K. Barlota, learned Addl. Public Prosecutor, relied on a judgment of the Supreme Court in Rajnikant Jivanlal Patel & another v. Intelligence Officer, Narcotic Control Bureau, New Delhi, , to support his contention that the seriousness of an offence should also be looked into in the matter of cancellation of bail. In that case, the offence was under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 and it was alleged that heroin was tried to be smuggled out of India and accused were participants in the offence. Therefore, Delhi High Court exercised its discretion by cancelling the bail and the Supreme Court did not interfere into the said discretion. The facts of this case differ from the facts of case at hand and no yardstick useful for every case can be made available in such matters. The second contention of the prosecution is that the accused are influential persons and, therefore, they are likely to tamper with the prosecution witnesses. It was also alleged that they are threatening the prosecution witnesses. These allegations are too vague to inspire confidence. No affidavit has come forward on behalf of the prosecution sworn by any of such witnesses who was threatened by the petitioner. No specific instances have been cited and, therefore, even this reason is not sufficient for cancellation of the bail. Learned Sessions Judge appears to have been moved by the fact that the complainant is an eye-witness to the crime of murder which is according to the prosecution, is commuted by the petitioners and, therefore, in the normal circumstances, barring the result of lapse on the part of the prosecution to submit charge-sheet in time, they would not have been released on bail. Therefore, no plausible and relevant ground was alleged or made out before the learned Sessions Judge to cancel the bail which was granted to accused petitioners.
11. It is true that a situation may arise that the prosecution may not be able to investigate within the statutory limitation a serious offence in which normally the bail would not have been granted but the legislative mandate being clear will have to be availed. Learned Judges of the Supreme Court expressed their anguish about this eventuality in Natabar Parida and others v. State of Orissa, , as follows :
“In serious offences of criminal conspiracy-murders, dacoites, robberies by inter-state gangs or the like, it may not be possible for the police, in the circumstances as they do exist in the various parts of our country, to complete the investigation within the period of 60 days. Yet the intention of the Legislature seems to be to grant to discretion to the Court and to make it obligatory for it to release the accused on bail. .. … ….. .. Such a law may be a “paradise for the criminal’s”, but surely it would not be so, as sometimes it is supposed to be because of the courts. It would be so under the command of the Legislature.”
12. When we come to the conclusion that unless there is a necessity to arrest accused and commit him to custody, the bail need not be cancelled, it will have to be held that the learned Sessions Judge erred in law in cancelling the bail which was granted to the accused-petitioners. If the said order is viewed as order under section 437(5) or under section 439(2), it becomes unjustifiable order and, therefore, it will have to be quashed.
13. In the result, Criminal Application is allowed. Order dated 30th March, 1991 passed by learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Latur, in Criminal Misc. Application No. 49 of 1991, is hereby quashed. Order passed by Addl. Sessions Judge, Latur, dated 31st January, 1991 in Criminal Misc. Application No. 23 of 1991 is restored. In addition to the conditions imposed by order dated 31st January, 1991 on petitioners-accused, petitioners are directed to attend the Police Station Nilanga on every Monday and Thursday between 10.00 a.m. to 12.00 Noon. Rule is made absolute in the above terms.