JUDGMENT
J. Gupta (Judicial Member)
1. The instant application under Section 8 of the West Bengal Taxation Tribunal Act, 1987 is directed against a finding of the West Bengal Commercial Taxes Appellate and Revisional Board (in short, “the Board”) whereby an order of assessment made by the Commercial Tax Officer (respondent No. 2) as well as the order of affirmation by the appellate authority, have been struck down. The circumstance leading to the filing of this application before this Tribunal is as follows :
Assessment on the business account of A.K. Mukherjee & Co. Pvt. Ltd., a dealer registered under the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941 (in short, “the 1941 Act”) for the 4 quarters ending on March 31, 1987 was completed by respondent No. 2 on May 10, 1991. Being aggrieved the assessee (respondent No. 2) preferred an appeal before the applicant of this case (Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Chowringhee Circle) who affirmed the assessment. In revision the Board struck down assessment as well as the appellate order on the ground that the assessment was done beyond the period of limitation. Against this order of the Board the present application has been filed before this Tribunal.
2. Respondent No. 2, the assessee, has not filed any affidavit-in-opposition. Shri G.C. Mookerji, learned Advocate for the respondent No. 2, contends that the issue involved here is one of law and can be straightaway argued without recourse of any affidavit-in-opposition.
3. The issue which calls for decision is whether in the given facts the impugned assessment can be said to be barred by limitation.
4. The uncontroverted position is that the assessment under Section 11(1) of the 1941 Act for the period of 4 quarters ending on March 31, 1987 was completed on May 10, 1991 and that according to the law as stood on March 31, 1987 no assessment for the said period could be done beyond four years from March 31, 1987. Shri K.K. Saha, learned Advocate for the applicants, submits that the amendment to Section 1 l(2a) which came into force on June 1, 1987, has introduced a change whereby the period of limitation has been enlarged and that because of this enlargement the impugned assessment was done within time. But the Board held that this amendment had no application to the impugned assessment.
5. For better appreciation of the position of law before and after the amendment, we quote below the relevant excerpt of the original and amended text of Section 1 l(2a)–
Text as stood on March 31, 1987 :
“(2a) No assessment under Sub-section (1) shall be made after the expiry of four years, and no assessment under Sub-section (2) shall be made after the expiry of six years, from the end of the year in respect of which or part of which the assessment is made………………………………”
Text of the relevant part of Sub-section (2a) effective from June 1, 1987 :
(2a)(a)……………..
(b) No assessment under Sub-section (1) shall be made–
(i) after the 30th day of June next following the expiry of four years from the end of the year in respect of which or part of which the assessment is made, where such four years end on any date from the 1 st day of January to the 29th day of June ; and
(ii) after 31st day of December next following the expiry of four years from the end of the year in respect of which or part of which the assessment is made, where such four years end on any date from the first day of July to the 30th day of December.
(c)……………………………………”
6. The Board in coming to its decision negated the plea of certain practical difficulties in commencing the assessment proceeding. This aspect is, however, not a matter of dispute before us. In striking down the assessment the Board also opined that the amended provision shall have no application to an assessment year ending on March 31, 1987 because the amendment became effective from June 1, 1987. But such view is not in consonance with the position of law. The law of limitation being a branch of procedural law any amendment will have application to a pending proceeding. It is not correct to say that since assessment period was the fourth quarter ending on March 31, 1987 the period of limitation, as would apply to the assessment, cannot but be the period prescribed in the law as it stood on March 31, 1987 and would remain unchanged despite any amendment of the provision. In the instant case before the expiry of the 4 years on March 31, 1991, there was an amendment to section I l(2a), effective from June 1, 1987, whereby it became permissible to assess under Section 11(1) up to the 30th day of June next following the expiry of 4 years from the end of the year in respect of which or part of which assessment is made, where such 4 years end on any date from the first day of January to the 29th June. Since the amendment came into force before the expiry of 4 years’ period on March 31, 1991, the new provision was quite applicable to the impugned assessment. Therefore, the assessment having been made on May 10, 1991 was made within the period of limitation as provided in the amended provision and is, therefore, valid. In this context, the decision of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in Munaga Peraiah v. State of Andhra Pradesh [1962] 13 STC 26 may be referred to. It was held in that case that where the period of limitation was enlarged before the right of the assessing authority to reassess was barred, it was the amended law that determined the liability of the assessee. Though the dispute before us is related to assessment and not to any reassessment, the principle will very much apply here. In an earlier case, namely, N.K.C. Syed Mohammed Ravoother v. Deputy Commercial Tax Officer [1958] 9 STC 1 (Mad.) an identical view was taken in the context of assessment. It was held in that case that where the period of limitation prescribed by law was enlarged before the right of the assessing authority was barred, it is the amended law that determined the liability of the assessee. The decision reported in [1968] 21 STC 45 (AP) (T.K. Khadar Mohiuddin v. State of Andhra Pradesh) has also the identical ratio. The fact that the cause of action arose before the amendment will not affect the applicability of the above principle.
7. The learned Advocate for the respondent No. 2 has not been able to dispute the above position of law by referring to any reported decision or otherwise. Thus, we hold that the Board was erroneous in holding that the impugned assessment was barred by limitation.
8. The application is, therefore, allowed and the decision of the Board is set aside. The impugned assessment dated May 10, 1991 is declared as not barred by limitation. We make no order as to costs.
M.K. Kar Gupta (Technical Member)
9. 1 agree.