High Court Jharkhand High Court

Avinash Prasad vs State Of Jharkhand & Anr on 19 November, 2009

Jharkhand High Court
Avinash Prasad vs State Of Jharkhand & Anr on 19 November, 2009
            In the High Court of Jharkhand at Ranchi

                  W.P.(Cr.) No.174 of 2009

            Avinash Prasad............................ Petitioner

                   VERSUS

            State of Jharkhand and another... Respondents

            CORAM:HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE R.R.PRASAD

            For the Petitioner: Mr.Indrajit Sinha
            For the State     : Mr. R.N.Roy, G.P.III

4.   19.11.09

. On 10.8.2004 when the Forest Guard found that illegal

Mining of Iron Ore has been done in the forest area, bearing plot

no.893 under Thana no.747, leased out to M/s. TISCO situated at

Noamundi by digging pits without taking permission of the Forest

Department, a prosecution report was submitted alleging therein

that said illegal mining has been done by M/s. TISCO, for which its

Managing Director, Abinash Prasad is responsible. On enquiry,

when the allegations were found to be true, the offence report

was filed before the court of learned Chief Judicial Magistrate,

Chaibasa, who took cognizance of the offence under Section 33 of

the Indian Forest Act against the petitioner on 8.4.2005.

Accordingly, summons issued by the court was received by him.

Thereafter an application was filed under Section 205 of the Code

of Criminal Procedure on 23.6.2005, upon which an order was

passed on 12.9.2005 whereby personal appearance was

dispensed with on the condition that the petitioner would appear

physically at the stage of explanation of the accusation and at the

stage of recording statement under Section 313 of the Code of

Criminal Procedure. On the next date i.e. on 29.9.2005 fixed in the

case an application was filed on behalf of the petitioner under

Section 251 praying therein that substance of accusation be

explained to accused through his Lawyer. The case was adjourned
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to some other date for appearance of the petitioner. However, in

the meantime, a writ application bearing W.P.(Cr.) No.282 of 2005

was filed in this Court by the petitioner challenging the order taking

cognizance on amongst other on the ground that the petitioner has

never committed any offence under Section 33 of the Indian Forest

Act, rather it was the other person who committed mischief by

extracting iron ore from the leasehold area of the petitioner and

for that, the petitioner had even lodged a case against the named

accused. However, the said writ application was allowed to be

withdrawn by this Court, vide its order dated 16.5.2006 giving

liberty to the petitioner to raise all the points at the time of framing

of charge. After very long gap, an application was filed for

discharge before the court below taking the same ground that it

was not the petitioner, who did commit offence as alleged, rather

one Mangal Singh Soren has committed all the mischief against

whom, the petitioner had lodged information. The said application

was dismissed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Chaibasa,

vide its order dated 4.3.2009 holding therein that whatever point

has been taken for discharge, that can be looked into only during

trial and that there has been no provision under the Code to

discharge an accused in a summons case triable by the Magistrate

and as such, petition filed for discharge was held to be not

maintainable.

Being aggrieved with that order, the petitioner has filed the

instant writ application.

Mr. Indrajit Sinha, leaned counsel appearing for the

petitioner submits that learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, keeping in

mind the provision as contained in Section 258 of the Code of

Criminal Procedure, did hold that there has been no provision

under the Code to discharge a person, who is an accused in a
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summons case instituted upon a complaint but the learned

Magistrate misdirected himself in holding so as the complaint which

has been referred to in Section 258 would always mean that

complaint in which court has taken cognizance after examining

complainant under Section 200 or after postponement of the issue

of process summon is issued to a person under Section 204 of the

Code of Criminal Procedure and as such, it was well within the

domain of leaned Magistrate to pass order relating to discharge or

dropping of the proceeding.

Learned counsel further submits that as per the case of the

prosecution disclosed in the offence report and even in the

prosecution report that illegal mining was done by the Company,

namely, M/s. TISCO petitioner being Managing Director in that

event, in absence of any allegation, cannot be held vicariously

liable, specially when the statute, i.e, Indian Forest Act is silent

over fixing the vicarious liability upon the Managing Director and

as such, prosecution is bad, in view of the decision of the Hon’ble

Supreme Court rendered in a case of Maksud Saiyed vs. State

of Gujarat and others [(2008) 5 SCC 668]. Thus, entire

prosecution is fit to be quashed.

As against this, learned counsel appearing for the State

submits that on account of the fact that the petitioner had earlier

withdrawn the writ application, the plea which had been taken

presently and was also available earlier, cannot be allowed to be

agitated again and that the court below is absolutely justified in

holding that there has been no provision for discharge of a person

who is an accused in a summons case arising out of a complaint

case and as such, the instant application is fit to be dismissed.

The submission advanced on behalf of the petitioner that the

‘complaint’, reference of which is there in Section 258 of the Code
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of Criminal Procedure, relates to that complaint upon which

Magistrate has taken cognizance after taking statement of the

complainant or after the postponement of the issue of process

under Section 204 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is devoid of

any substance, in view of the definition of ‘complaint’ given under

section 2(d) of the Code of Criminal Procedure which reads as

under:

“2(d) “Complaint” means any allegation made orally
or in writing to a Magistrate, with a view to his
taking action under this Code, that some person,
whether known or unknown, has committed an
offence, but does not include a police report.”

Thus, the definition of the complaint does suggest that the

complaint can be made either orally or in writing. If the complaint

is made in writing by a public servant acting or purporting to act in

discharging of his official duties, the Magistrate in terms of sub-

section (a) of Section 200 need not to examine him on oath. If the

complaint in writing does constitute offence, the Magistrate would

competent to take cognizance under Section 190(1)(a) of the Code

of Criminal Procedure whereas if oral or written complaint is made

by a person in his personal capacity and not in official capacity, the

court may take cognizance after examining the complainant or may

postpone the issue of the process but in both the cases, it would

be a complaint and as such, the word ‘complaint’ used in Section

258 of the Code of Criminal Procedure cannot have two different

connotation for the purpose of Section 258 of the Code of Criminal

Procedure and in that view of the matter, the trial court appears to

be quite justified in holding that Code of Criminal Procedure never

contemplates dropping of the proceeding or discharge of a person

accused in a summons case arising out of a complaint case. In this

context, case of Adalat Prasad vs. Rooplal Jindal and others

[(2004) 7 SCC 338] and also a case of Subramanium
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Sethuraman vs State of Maharashtra and another [ 2005

SCC (Cri) 242] be referred to wherein it has been held by the

Hon’ble Court that in a summon case it is not open to the accused

person to seek discharge.

Coming to other point, it does appear that the petitioner had

earlier challenged the order taking cognizance on several grounds

which application was dismissed on its withdrawal on behalf of the

petitioner and under this situation, the point raised on behalf of the

petitioner that in absence of any allegation on the part of the

petitioner of committing offence, the petitioner cannot be held

liable vicariously for the offence committed by the Company does

not deserve to be adjudicated in this application, rather it would be

open for the petitioner to raise all these points in course of trial.

Accordingly, I do not find any merit in this application.

Hence, it is dismissed.

( R.R. Prasad, J.)

ND/