JUDGMENT
B.N. Kirpal, J.
(1) Important question which arises in this writ petition is with regard to the interpretation and the validity of some of the provisions which have been newly added to Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 as a result of the amendment, by Act 57 of 1988.
(2) The petitioner became a tenant of respondent No. 3, on 1-5-1977 in respect of residential flat owned by the said respondent No. 3. On 15-7-1987 the respondent No. 3 filed a petition for eviction of the petitioner inter alia on the ground that respondent No. 3 required the said premises for his own use and for use of the persons dependant upon him. After the petition under Section 14(1)(e) read with Section 25B of the Rent Control Act was filed the petitioner applied to the Rent Controller for leave to contest the petition. On 26-5-1988 respondent No. 3 conceded the said application and leave to contest was granted.
(3) Respondent No. 3 is employed in the Northern Railway and is a Government servant. The Parliament passed the Delhi Rent Control (Amendment) Act 1988 seeking to incorporate certain important provisions in the Rent Control Act. According to the statement of Objects and Reasons the amendment was brought out for the following reasons :-
(A)To rationalise the present Rent Control Law by bringing about a balance between the interests of landlords and tenants;
(B)To give a boost to house building activity and maintain the existing houses in stock in a reasonable state of repairs; and
(C)To reduce litigation between the landlords and tenants and to ensure expeditious disposal of disputes between them.
ONE of the provisions which was inserted was Section 14-C which sought to give a right to recover immediate possession of premises to Central Government and Delhi, Administration Employees. Respondent No. 3, after the enactment of the said provision, withdrew the original eviction petition filed under Section 14(1)(e) with liberty to file a fresh petition. Thereafter the .present petition under Section 14(1)(e) read with 14C and 25B of the Act was. filed. On 3-4-1989 affidavit was filed by the petitioner seeking leave to contest the petition. After the respondent No. 3 had filed a reply to the same, the Controller did not grant leave as prayed for and on 4-7-1989 an order of eviction was passed against the petitioner. It may here be stated that in the present application for eviction it was categorically stated by respondent No. 3 that he was a central Government employee and he was due to retire on 31-12-1989, on his attaining the age of superannuation. It was also mentioned that respondent No. 3 would have to surrender the Railway accommodation which had been allotted to him and therefore, the premises in question were required for his residence, he being a landlord of whole premises.
(4) The petitioner thereupon filed the present writ petition in which it has been inter alia contended that the provisions of Section 14-C are ultra-vires and unconstitutional. It is also prayed that the eviction order which was passed in Eviction Petition No. E-52/1989 by the Rent Controller on 4-7-1989 should also be quashed.
(5) Rule Nisi was issued and considering the importance of the case the petition was set down for early bearing As this was a new piece of legislation affecting a large number of litigants in Delhi and as the decision in this case would affect a number of litigants we permitted all counsel, who so desired, to address arguments in the case. We would take this opportunity to express our appreciation of the assistance which we have received from the members of Bar in helping to understand and interpret the impugned provisions.
(6) The two main contentions which have been raised by Shri Chandiok and other counsel appearing on behalf of the tenants are that on a correct interpretation of the Act the summary procedure provided by Section 25-B cannot,be availed of in a petition filed under Section 14-B, 14-C, or 14-D. It is further submitted that the impugned provisions arc discriminatory in nature, and, in any case, they arc arbitrary as no guidelines have been laid down which have to be followed by the Rent Controllers while deciding the eviction petitions under the said provisions.
(7) In order to examine the aforesaid contentions it is first necessary to refer to the relevant provisions of the Act.
(8) Prior to 1st December, 1975 Section 14 alone dealt with the protection of the tenants against eviction. Section 14(1) ‘provided that notwithstanding any law or contract to the contrary no order or decree for recovery of possession of any premises shall be made by any court of Controller in favor of a landlord against the tenant. The proviso to the said sub-section however, enabled the Controller to pass an order for eviction on one or more of the grounds mentioned therein. One of the grounds on which eviction could be sought by a landlord against the tenant was(e) which reads as follows :- “THAT the premises let for residential purposes arc required bona fide by the landlord for occupation as a residence for himself or for any member of his family dependent on him, if he is the owner thereof, or for any person for whose benefit the premises are held ‘ and that the landlord or such person has no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation.”
SECTION 14 contains two other provisions relating to Section 14(1)(e) and those are contained in sub-Section 6 and sub-Section 7. According to Sub-section 6 a landlord who had acquired the premises on transfer could not invoke the provisions of Section 14(1)(e) unless a period of 5 years had elapsed from the date of acquisition. Sub-section 7 provided that: when an order for eviction was passed the landlord was not to be entitled to obtain possession before the expiration of the period of six months from the date of the order
(9) The provisions of Section 14(1)(e) had been subjected to various judicial pronouncements. It has now been held that in order to evict a tenant the following ingredients have to be satisfied :-
(A)The applicant has to be a landlord;
(B)He has also to be an owner ;
(C)The premises in question should have been let only for residential purposes;
(D)The said premises are required bonafide by the landlord for occupation as a residence for himself or for any member of his family dependent upon him; and
(E)That the landlord or such person dependent upon him has no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation.
(10) It appears that in 1975 the Government decided that all those government servants who were in occupation of Government Accommodation but also owned residential premises should be asked to vacate the government premises. In order to assist those persons, who were in occupation of the government’ premises, to acquire possession of their own residential accommodation, which was owned by them, from the tenant Section 14-A was inserted by Act 18 of 1976 w.e.f. 1-12-1975. The said Section reads as follows :-
“14-ARight to Recover Immediate Possession of Premises to Accrue to Certain Persons.
(1)Where a landlord who being a person in occupation of any residential premises allotted to him by the Central Government or any local authority is required by, or in pursuance of, any general or special order made by that Government or authority, to vacate such residential accommodation, or in default, to incur certain obligations, on the ground that be owns, in the Union territory of Delhi, a residential accommodation either in his own name or in the name of his wife or dependent child, there shall accrue, on and from the date of such order, to such landlord, notwithstanding, anything contained elsewhere in this Act or in any other law turn the time being in force or in any contract (whether express or implied), custom or usage to the contrary, a right to recover immediately possession of any premises let out by him:
PROVIDED that nothing in this section shall be construed as conferring a right on a landlord owning, in the Union Territory of Delhi, two or more dwelling houses, whether in his own name or in the name of his wife or dependent child, to recover the possession of more than one dwelling house and it shall be lawful for such landlord to indicate the dwelling house, possession of which he intends to recover.
(2)Notwithstanding anything contained elsewhere in this Act or in any other law for the time being in force or in any contract, custom or usage to the contrary, where the landlord exercises the right of recovery conferred on him by Sub-section (1), no compensation shall be payable by him to the tenant or any person claiming through or under him and no claim for such compensation shall be entertained by any Court, tribunal or other authority:
PROVIDED that where the landlord had received.
(a) any rent in advance from the tenant, he shall, within a period of ninety days from the date of recovery of possession of the premises by him, refund to the tenant such amount as represents the rent payable for the unexpired portion of the contract, agreement or lease;
(B)any other payment, he shall, within the period aforesaid, refund to the tenant a sum which shall bear the same proportion to the total amount so received, as the unexpired portion of the contract or agreement, or lease bears to the total period of contract or agreement or leas: Provided further that, if any default is made in making any refund as aforesaid, the landlord shall be liable to pay simple interest at the rate of six per cent per annum on the amount which he has omitted or failed to refund.
WEmay, at this stage, note that the validity of the said Section 14-A was challenged in the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court while upholding the validity of the said provision has also interpreted Section 14-A to mean that, the said provision enables a landlord to recover possession of any premises let out by him if that landlord is under an order of the Government or any local authority to vacate the residential premises which were occupied by him. It was further observed that, even though it was not so specifically provided, the provisions of Section 19 of the Act would also apply to cases under Section 14-A.
(11) Simultaneously with the insertion of Section 14-A the Parliament also enacted. Chapter III-A. This Chapter consists of three Sections ie Sections 25-A, 25-B, and 25-C. The special procedure Provided in this Chapter stipulated that there should be summary trial of applications filed under Section 14(l)(e) by Section 14-A of the Act.
(12) In 1988, as already mentioned, Sections 14-B, 14-C and 14-D were enacted which read as follows :
“14-B. Right to Recover immediate Possession to Accrue to members of the Armed forces etc.
(1)Where the landlord-
(A)is a released or retired person from any armed forces and the premises let out by him arc required for his own residence; or
(B)is a dependent of a member of any armed forces who had been killed in action and the premises let out by such member are required for the residence of the family of such member, such person or, as the case may be, the dependent may, within one year from the date of his release or retirement from such armed forces or, as the case may be, the date of death of such member, or within a period of one year from the date of commencement of the Delhi Rent Control (Amendment) Act, 1988, whichever is later, apply to the Controller for recovering the immediate possession of such premises.
(2)Where the landlord is a member of any of the armed forces and has a period of less than one year preceding the date of his retirement and the premises let out by him arc required for his own residence after his retirement, he may, at any time, within a period of one year before the date of his retirement, apply to the Controller for recovering the immediate possession of such premises.
(3)Where the landlord referred to in Sub-section (1) or Sub-section (2) has let out more that one premises, it shall be open to him to make an application under that sub-section in respect of only one of the premises chosen by him.
14-C.Right to Recover immediate possession of premises to accrue to Central Government and Delhi Administration Employees-
(1)Where the landlord is a retired employee of the Central Government or of the Delhi Administration, and the premises let out by him are required for his own residence, such employee may, within one year from the date of his retirement or within a period of one year from the date of commencement of the Delhi Rent Control (Amendment) Act, 1988, whichever is later, apply to the Controller for recovering the immediate possession of such premises.
(2)Where the landlord is an employee of the Central Government or of the Delhi Administration and has a period of less than one year preceding the date of his retirement and the premises let out by him are required by him for his own residence after his retirement, he may, at any time within a period of one year before the date of his retirement, apply to the controller for recovering the immediate possession of such premises.
(3)Where the landlord referred to in Sub-section (1) or Sub-section (2) has let out more than one premises, it shall be open to him to make an application under that sub-section in respect of only one of the premises chosen by him.
14-DRight to recover immediate possession of premises to accrue to a widow
(1)Where the landlord is a widow and the premises let out by her, or by her husband are required by her for her own residence, she may apply to the Controller for recovering the immediate possession of such premises.
(2)Where the landlord referred to in Sub-section (1) has let out more than one premises, it shall be open to her to make an application under that sub-section in respect of any one of the premises chosen by her.”
SIMULTANEOUSLY with the aforesaid amendment the Legislature also amended Section 25-B(1) by inserting Sections 14-B, 14-C. & 14-D in Sub-section 1 thereof. Sections 25-A, 25-B & 25-C now read as follows :-
25-A.Provisions of this chapter to have overriding effect. The provisions of this Chapter or any rule made there under shall have effect notwithstanding anything contained elsewhere in this Act or in any other law for the time being in force.
25-B.Special procedure for the Disposal of Applications for eviction on the ground of bona fide Requirement- (1) Every application by a landlord for the recovery of possession of any premises on the ground specified in Clause (e) of the proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 14, or under Section 14-A (or under Section 14-B or under Section 14-C or under Section 14-D), shall be dealt with in accordance with the procedure specified in this Section, (2) The Controller shall issue summons, in relation to every application referred to in Sub-section (1), in the form specified in the Third Schedule. . (3) (a) The Controller shall, in addition to, and simultaneously with the issue of summons for service on the tenant, also direct the summons to be served by registered post acknowledgment due, addressed to the tenant or hii agent empowered to accept the service at the place where the tenant or his agent actually and voluntarily resides or carries on business or personally works for gain and may, if the circumstances of the case so require, also direct the publication of the summons in a newspaper circulating in the locality in which the tenant is last known to have resided or carried on business or personally worked for gain. (b) When an acknowledgement purporting to be signed by the tenant or his agent is received by the Controller or the registered article containing the summons is received back with an endorsement purporting to have been made by a postal employee to the effect that the tenant or his agent had refused to take delivery of the registered article, the Controller may declare that there has been a valid service of summons. (4) The tenant on whom the summons is duly served (whether in the ordinary way or by registered post) in the form specified in the Third Schedule shall not contest the prayer for eviction from the premises unless he files an affidavit slating the grounds on which be seeks to contest the application for eviction and obtains leave from the Controller as hereinafter provided; and in default of his appearance in pursuance of the summons or his obtaining such leave, the statement made by the landlord in the application for eviction shall be deemed to be admitted by the tenant and the applicant shall be entitled to an order for eviction on the ground aforesaid. (5) The Controller shall give to the tenant leave to contest the application filed if the affidavit filed by the tenant discloses such facts as would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order for the recovery of possession of the premises on the ground specified in Clause (e) of the proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 14, or under Section 14-A. (6) Where leave is granted .to the tenant to contest the application, the Controller shall commence the hearing of the application as early as practicable. (7) Notwithstanding anything contained in Sub-section (2) of Section 37, the Controller shall, while holding an inquiry in a proceeding to which this Chapter applies, follow the practice and procedure of a Court of Small Causes, including the recording of evidence . (8) No appeal or second appeal shall lie against an order for the recovery of possession of any premises made by the Controller in accordance with the procedure specified in this Section : Provided that the High Court may, for the purpose of satisfying itself that an order made by the Controller under this section is according to law call for the records of the case and pass such order in respect thereto as it thinks fit. (9) Where no application has been made to the High Court on revision, the Controller may exercise the powers of review in accordance with the provisions of Order Xlvii of the First Schedule to the Code of Civil Procedure. 1908 (5 of 1908), (10) Save as otherwise provided in this Chapter, the procedure for the disposal of an application for eviction on the ground specified in Clause (c) of the proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 14, or under Section 14, shall be the same as the procedure for the disposal of application by Controllers.
25-C.Act to Have effect in a Modified form in Relation to Certain Persons- (1) Nothing contained in Sub-section (6) of Section 14 shall apply to a landlord who .being a person inoccupation of any residential premises allotted to him by the Central Government or any local authority is required by, or in pursuance of, an order made by that Government or authority to vacate such residential accommodation, or in default, to incur certain obligations, on the ground that be owns a residential accommodation either in his own name or in the name of his wife or dependent child in the Union territory of Delhi. (2) In the case of a landlord who, being a person of the category specified in Sub-section (1), has obtained, on the ground specified in Clause (e) of the proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 14, or under Section 14-A, an order for the eviction of a tenant from any premises, the provisions of Sub-section (7) of Section 14 shall have effect as if for the words “six months”, occurring therein, the words “two months” were substituted.”
(13) The submission of Shri Chandiok was that Section 25-B no doubt provides for special procedure for disposal of applications for eviction on. the ground of bonafide requirement but this summary procedure cannot be made applicable to a petition which is filed under Sections 14-B, 14-C or 14-D.
(14) The provisions of Section 25-A make it clear that the provisions of this Chapter are to take effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent there with .contained elsewhere in the Act or any other law for the time being in force. Prior to its amendment in Section 25-B Sub-section I thereof clearly stipulated that an application under Sections 14(l)(e) or 14-A had to be dealt with in accordance with the procedure specified in that Section. On an application for eviction being filed Subsection 2 and Sub-section 3 stipulated the manner in which the Controller bad to issue summons and the acknowledgement thereof by the tenant. Summons which were to be issue were to be in a form specified in the Third Schedule which form reads as under:- Form of Summons in a case where Recovery of Possession of Premises is Prayed for on the ground of Bonafide Requirement or under Section 14-A. To (Name, description and place of residence of the tenant). Whereas Shri………………has filed an application (a copy of which is annexed) for your eviction from (here insert the particulars of the premises) on the ground specified in Clause (e) of the proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 14, or under Section 14-A; You are hereby summoned to appear before the Controller within fifteen days of the service hereof and to obtain the leave of the Controller to contest the application for eviction on the ground aforesaid; in default whereof, the applicant will be entitled at any time after the expiry of the said period of fifteen days to obtain an order for your eviction from the said premises. Leave to appear and contest the application may be obtained or an application to the Controller supported by an affidavit as is referred to in Sub-section (5) of Section 25-B. Given under my hand and seal. This………day of………………19……… CONTROLLER.) Sub-section 4 provides that no tenant, who had been duly served with a summons, would be entitled to contest the eviction petition unless he filed an affidavit staling the grounds on which he sought to contest the application for eviction and also obtains leave from the Controller. It was provided therein that if the tenant made a default in appearance or did not obtain the leave to contest then the statement made in the eviction petition would be deemed to be admitted and the applicant would be entitled to an order of eviction. Leave to contest could be granted by the Controller, under Sub-section 5 of Section 25-B, if he came to the conclusion that the affidavit filed by the tenant disclosed such facts as would disentitle the landlord to recover the premises. Section 25-B further provides that where leave to contest is granted the Controller will follow the practice and procedure of the Court of Small Causes while disposing of the said eviction petition.
(16) The perusal of Section 25-B shows that it is only Sub-section (1) of Section 25-B which was amended so as to include therein Sections 14-B, 14-C and 14-D, In other words reference to these three provision is specifically made only in Section 25-B(1).
(17) The submission of the learned counsel for the tenant is that none of the other provisions of Section 25-B especially Sub-sections (2), (4), (5) and (10) apply to an application filed under Sections 14-B, 14-C or 14-D. It is submitted, with reference to Sub-section (2), that the form specified in Third Schedule, refers only to Section 14(l)(e) and Section 14-A. According to the learned counsel it is mandatory to issue summons in the said form and the wording of the said form cannot be amended or altered so as to incorporate therein Sections 14-B, 14-C or 14-D. Elaborating the argument further, it was contended, that Sub-section (4) made a. reference to a tenant who had been served with the summons issued in a form specified in Third Schedule and as Sections 14-B, 14-C, or 14-D could not be incorporated in such a form therefore Sub-section (4) of Section 25-B would also not apply. It was also submitted that Sub-section (5), again, makes no reference to Sections 14-B, 14-C. or 14-D but on the other hand provides for leave to be granted only if the Controller is satisfied that the same should be granted with reference to the grounds specified in Section 14(l)(e) or Section 14-A. In other words while deciding an application for leave to contest the Controller, under Sub-section (5) is not obliged to make any reference to the conditions specified in Sections 14-B, 14-C or 14-D, and therefore, it mast follow that Section 25-B(5) does not apply to. the newly added provisions. Similar was the contention with regard to Sub-section (10) of Section 25-B.
(18) At first blush the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner appears to be quite attractive. If is clear that whereas reference ia specifically made to Sections 14-B, 14-C and 14-D in Sub-section (1) of Section 25-B but other sub-sections of Section 25-B make no reference to the said provisions. Relying upon Nallnakhya v. Shyam Sunder ‘, it had been contended by the learned counsel that a court cannot assume a mistake having been committed by the draftsmen and, furthermore, if there is a defect then the court cannot make good the deficiency or add any words or provide to meet omissions. Reliance was placed by the Supreme Court, in this case on Hansraj Gupta v. Dehra Dun’ Mussoorie Electric Tramway Co. ; and Hira Devi v. Distt. Board, Shojahanpur’,. Our attention was also drawn by the learned counsel to the case of Slate of Kerata v. Mathai Varghese ; it was observed that it was not for the court to reframe the legislation for the very good reason that the power to legislate have not been conferred on the court.
(19) It may be that the court may not be in a .position to legislate but recent judicial pronouncement a of the Supreme Court make it quite clear that the provisions of an Act should be interpreted in such a way so as to bring out real intent and purposeful meaning of the legislation. In fact that the courts have, in appropriate cases, even added some words to the enactments so as to give full meaning and effect to the intention of the Legislature. In this connection reference may .usefully be made to Bangalore Water Supply v. -4. Rajappa ‘ (AIR 1978 Sc 549) where the Supreme Court quoted with approval the following observations of Lord Denning :
“THE English Language is not an instrument of mathematical precision. Our literature would be much proper if it were………He must set to work in the constructive task of finding the intention of Parliament, and he must do this not only from the language ol’ the statute, but also from a consideration of the social conditions which gave rise to it and of the mischief which it was passed to remedy, and then he must supplement the written word so as to give force and life to the intention of the legislature…….A Judge should ask himself the question, how, if the makers of the Act had themselves come across this nick in the texture of it, they would have straightened it out ? He must then do so as they would have done. A judge must not alter the material of which the Act is woven, but he can and should iron out the creases……” It was submitted by Shri Chandiok that the aforesaid observations of Lord Denning were over-ruled by the House of Lords in a later judgment and, possibly, the Supreme Court was not aware of this fact. We are unable to agree with this. In the judgment of Chief Justice Beg, reference is made to the decision of the House of Lords which bad criticised the aforesaid observations of Lord Denning. Nevertheless the Supreme Court preferred to follow and apply the aforesaid observations of Lord Denning in preference to what had been held by the House of Lords. Our attention has been drawn to a number of decisions where, in fact, words had been added into a Statute to bring out and given effect to the legislative intent. As already noted when Section 14-A was inserted there was no corresponding amendment which was made in Section 19 of the Act which prohibits a landlord who recovered possession on the ground of personal need from letting out the said premises within 3 years of bids obtaining possession of the same, without permission of the Controller. A question arose whether Section 19 could be applicable to a case where a landlord obtains possession by invoking the provisions of Section 14-A ? In the case of Busching Schmitz v. Menghani ; the Supreme Court noted that if landlord, after exploiting the easy process of Section 14-A. re-lets the premises at a higher rent, the social goal boomerangs. It was also observed that in literal terms Section 19 did not apply to eviction petitions under Section 14-A. Dealing with such a situation the Supreme Court applied the provisions of Section 19 by observing as follows :
“BUT the scheme of that section definitely contemplates a specific representation by the petitioner-landlord to the Controller that because be has been ordered to vacate the premises where be is residing, therefore, he requires the immediate possession for his occupation. The non obstante clause, the vesting of a right of immediate recovery, the creation of a summary process under Section 25B and the package of connected provisions, all emphasize that the amendments have to be viewed as a whole, that the Court cannot be fooled and the Statute mocked at. The law, as Mr. Bumble (in Oliver Twist) said, is a ass-a-idiot’; but today the socio-economic project cannot be frustrated by legalistics. Underlying the whole legislative plan and provision is the fundamental anxiety to recover, for the officer’s occupation, his own premises. Once we grasp this cardinal point, the officer’s application for eviction under Section 14A can be entertained only on bids averment that be, having been asked to vacate, must get into possession of his own. For instance, if he has a vacant house of his and, on getting an order to vacate, he moves into his vacant house, he cannot thereafter demand recovery under Section 14-A. The cause of action is not only the Government order to vacate, but bids consequential urgency to recover, his own building. That is the ration legis. To interpret otherwise is to vindicate Mr. Bumble ! We hold that Shri Nariman’s apprehension is unfounded and Section 14-A is largely a rider to Section 14 and the condition indicated in Section 19 must, mutates mutants, bind the landlord. Parliament cannot be assumed not to intend the obvious, or to intend the ludicrous. Literality is not right where absurdity is the result.”
It is clear from above that the Court, by a judicial pronouncement, extended the applicability of Section 19 to Section 14-A as well even though Section 14-A was not specifically mentioned in Section 19. We may here note that by the amendment in 1988, Along with Sections 14-B, 14-C and 14-D the legislature have also added Section 14-A to Section 19, In Smt. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India & another’, principles of natural justice were read into an enactment. Another case which is more apposite is Stale Bank of Travancore v. Mohd. Mohammed Khan ‘, . The Supreme Court in that case was concerned with the interpretation of Section 2(4) of Kerala Agriculturists’ Debt Relief Act, 1970. It had been contended before the Supreme Court that the said provision should be interpreted literally as it was generally a safe guide to give plain and grammatical meaning to the words of a Statute. Repelling this argument the court observed as follows : “THE plain language of the clause, if interpreted so plainly, will frustrate rather than further the object of the Act. Relief to agricultural debtors, who have suffered the oppression of private money-lenders, has to be the guiding star which must illumine and inform the interpretation of the beneficent provisions of the Act. When Clause (1) speaks of a debt due “before the commencement” of the Act to a banking company, it does undoubtedly mean what it says, namely, that debt mult have been due to a banking company before the commencement of the Act. But it means something more : that the debt must also be due to a banking company at the commencement of the Act. We quite see that we are reading into the clause the word ‘at’ which is not there because, whereas it specks of a debt due ‘before’ the commencement of the Act, we are reading the clause as relating to a debt which was due ‘at’ and ‘before’ the commencement of the Act to any banking company. We would have normally hesitated to fashion the clause by so restructuring it but we see no escape from that course, since that is the only rational manner by which we can give meaning and content to ‘it, so as to further the object of the Act.”
it is evident from above that, with a view to achieve its object, the court found it necessary to read the word ‘at’ in the said provision. A ‘similar exercise was undertaken by the Supreme Court in I he case of Champa Kumari v. Board of Revenne when at page 1111 it observed as follows:
‘TObegin with there is an error in the fourth clause of the first proviso inasmuch as the words ‘be reckoned’ have been inadvertently left out in that clause. The intention to use those words is obvious from the way in which the first three clauses are worded. Supplying those words, because they were indvertentlyomitted, it is clear that one of two limitations is applicable to the present case, according to the circumstances of the case.”
Reference may also be usefully made to the case of Commissioner of Income Tax v. National Taj Traders’, where the Supreme Court referred to the two principles construction-one relating to Casus Omissus and the other in regard to reading the statute as a whole. After quoting Maxwell it was noted that Casus Omissus cannot be supplied by the Court except in the case of clear necessity and when reason for it is found in the four corners of the statute itself. While observing that Casus Omissus should not be readily inferred it was noted that “all the parts of a statute or section must be construed together and every clause of a section should be construed with reference to the context and other clauses thereof so that the construction to be put on a particular provision makes a consistent enactment of the whole statute. This would be more so if literal construction of a particular clause leads to manifestly absurd anomalous results which could not have been intended by the Legislation……………… Where to apply words literally would ‘defeat the obvious intention of the legislation and produce a wholly unreasonably result’ we must ‘do some violence to the words’ and so achieve that obvious intention and produce a rational construction.”
(20) Lastly reference may be made to the case of Vinod Kumar Chaudhry v. Narain Devi , (1980 Rlr 159) in which case tie Court bad to construe the provisions of Sub-section (8) of Section 25-B. Question arose.. in that case, whether Sub-section (8) of Section 25-B could be invoked by a landlord if an order lor recovery of possession is not made by the Controller. The submission was that as the said sub-section provided for it to applicable only if there was an order for recovery of possession, therefore. the said provision would not be applicable when no order for recovery of possession was made and, consequently, the landlord could not invoke the said provisions against an order of the Controller dismissing his application for eviction. Repelling this argument, and giving a logical construction to the said provision, the Supreme Court observed as follows : “LEARNED counsel for the tenant however, argued that for an order to be covered by Sub-section (8) of Section 25B it mast be an order for the recovery of possession of any premises made by the Controller. According to him, if an order docs not direct recovery of possession by the landlord from the tenant, it is not an order which Subsection (8) would embrace. This contention, though not wholly implausible, runs counter to the decision in Devi Singh v. Chaman Lal (supra) (which was followed in Bhagwati Prasad v. 0m Prakash (supra) and Mahavir Singh v. Kamal Narain (supra) and does not find favor with us. Sub-section (8) no doubt in terms speak only of an order ‘for the recovery of possession of any premises’ and does not mention one which refuses the relief of eviction to the landlord, but then it appears to us that the expression ‘order for the recovery of possession of any premises’ has to be construed, in the context in which it appears, as an order deciding an application for the recovery of the possession of any premises. Our reasons in this be halt are two-fold. Firstly, if an order in favor of the landlord alone was meant to be covered by Sub-section (8), an order refusing. relief would be liable to be called in question by way of an appeal or second appeal under Section 38 so that there would be two procedures for the end-product of the Contrller’s proceedings being called in question; one when the same is in favor of the landlord, and another when it goes against him, which would obviously entail discrimination and make the subsection suffer from a constitutional invalidity. It is an accepted rule of interpretation that if a provision can be construed in a manner which upholds its legal or constitutional validity it should if possible be so construed rather than the other way round. We do feel than the language used is not happy but then it would be doing voilence to it if it is construed as just above stated.”
(21) The Court, in that case also noted that the scheme and objects of the Act was to provide that all disputes between the landlord and tenants were to be dealt with by a uniform procedure before the Controller and that no distinction was to be made between one kind of dispute and another. it was with an idea to cut down the lime factor that Chapter III-A was inserted and therefore Sub-section 8 had to be so construed so as to provide for abolition of the right of appeal and second appeal and to replace by a power of the High Court to revise the order passed by the Controller.
(22) Applying the aforesaid principles to the present case it is dear that the Object of enacting Sections 14-B, 14-C and 14-D was to provide turn a most speedy process of recovery of she premises to the category of the landlords specified therein. The normal procedure under the Delhi Rent Control Act being not speedy enough. Section 25-B was enacted with the intention of providing for expeditious disposal of cases relating to those where eviction was sought on the ground of personal need.
(23) It was hoped that with the enactment of Section 25B frivolous defenses would not be raised and landlords who were genuinely in need of premises for their own need would be able to recover possession an expeditiously as possible. It is with this object in view that the speedier route to success was sought to be provided by enacting Sections 14-B, 14-C & 14-D and incorporating the same in Section 25-B(1) Looked at from another point of view if Sections 14-B, 14-C and 14-D bad not been enacted then a landlord like the present one could have, on the grounds similar to Section 14-C, applied to the Controller under Section 14(l)(e) for eviction of ihe tenant on the ground of bonafide personal necessity. If such an application had been filed the provisions of Section 25B would have been applicable. By enacting Section 14-C it could not have been the intention of the Legislature to take the case of the landlord out of the purview of Section 25-B and to compel him to follow a very long and tortuous route.
(24) SUB-SECTION I of Section 25-B makes it mandatory for the Rent Controller to apply the procedure specified in that Section to every application which is specified in Sub section 1. This being so the intention of the Legislature clearly was that the whole of Section 25-B was to be applicable not only to application under Section 14(l)(e) and 14-A but the said procedure was also to be made applicable to applications under Section 14-B, 14-C and 14-D. In order to give effect to this legislative intent it would be the duty of the court, without doing any violence to the language, to so construe the rest of the provisions of Section 25-B so as to make the same applicable to Section 14-B, 14-C and 14-D.
(25) We find no difficulty in undertaking the aforesaid exercise. It is true that in Sub-section (2) to Section 25-B reference is made to a form specified in the Third Schedule. No doubt the said form does not mention Section 14-B, 14-C or 14-D but then the said form can be easily adapted by inserting the appropriate Sections 14-B, 14-C or 14-D without changing any other words in the said form. This has to be done because Sub-section (1) itself provides that the summons are to be issued by the Controller “in relation to every application referred to in Sub-section (1)”. Sub-section (1) not only refers to Section 14(l)(e) and 14-A but also refers to Section 14-B, 14-C and 14-D. Therefore under Section 25-B(?) it is imperative that summons be issued by the Controller in respect of every application which is referred to under Sub-section (1) of Section 25-B. In a sense the form, which is contained in Third Schedule, is to be used as a specimen and could be suitably amended or adapted for giving effect to the legislative intent.
(26) Once we come to the aforesaid conclusion it would follow that Sub-section (4) would also apply to a case under Sections 14-B, 14-C and 14-D. Sub-section (4) does not specifically mention the aforesaid sections but it enables the tenant to file an affidavit staling the grounds on which he seeks to contest the application for eviction and. further, obtain leave from the Controller. When summons are served on the tenant he has to comply with the requirements thereof and if he does not enter appearance or obtain leave then the consequences envisaged by the said sub-section must follow and applicant would be entitled to an order of eviction.
(27) Once we come to the conclusion that an affidavit for leave to contest can be filed under Sub-section (4) of Section 25-B it must follow that the plea raised by the tenant has to be decided by the Controller. The Controller has jurisdiction to decide on the plea so raised by exercising powers under Sub-section (5) of Section 25-B Sections 14-B, 14-C and 14-D are not specifically mentioned in Sub-section (5). We however, feel no difficulty, in the present circumstances, in so construing Sub-section (5) as to make it applicable even to cases falling under Sections 14-B, 14-C and 14-D. The opening portion of Sub-section (5) clearly refers to an affidavit filed by the tenant which has to be taken into consideration by the Controller. This affidavit is filed under Sub-section (4) of Section 25-B which, as we have already held, applies to cases under Sections 14-B, 14-C and 14-D as well. The intention of the Legislature, as is evident from Section 25-B(1), being that the procedure laid down in the entire section has to be followed, Sub-section (5) has to be so construed so as to give full effect to that intention. It was sought to be contended that the use of the words on the grounds specified in clause (e) of proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 14, or Section 14-A’ indicates that the said sub-section is applicable only to cases failing under those two provisions. We are unable to agree with this. In our opinion in order to give effect to the legislative intent, we have to regard the above quoted words of Sub-section (5) as being merely illustrative. In other words Sub-section (5) can be divided into two portions. The first portion being ‘The Controller shall give……….-.recovery of possession of the premises’ and the second portion being illustrative starting with the word ‘on the ground ………… Section 14-A’. Alternatively one can read or add a word ‘included’ after the word ‘premises’ and before the words ‘on the ground’ in said Sub-section (5). Unless Sub-section 5 is so construed an incongruous situation would arise where Sub-section (1) directs the Controller to decide an application under sub-sections B, C or D only according To the procedure laid down in Section 25-B but the rest of the sub-sections of Section 25 do not provide for any such procedure. This is a case where we feel that the court has to construe Sub-section (5) and hold that while dealing with the affidavit filed by the tenant under Sub-section (4) of Section 25-B the Controller has to decide whether the tenant has disclosed such facts as would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order of recovery of possession under Section 14-B, 14-C or 14-D. On the same parity of reasoning we must hold that Sub-section (10) will also apply to a case under sub-section B, C and D.
(28) The result of the aforesaid discussion, therefore, is that Section 25-B would apply to a case under Section 14-B, 14-C and 14-D, The Controller would be under an obligation to issue summons under the said section when an application under Section 14-B, 14-C or 14-D is filed after making suitable modification in the form specified in the Third Schedule. The landlord will have to make the necessary averments in the eviction petition so as to make out a case under Section 14-B, 14-C or 14-D. On the summons being issued the tenant would be at liberty to file ‘an affidavit stating the grounds on which he wishes to seek the leave to contest the application for eviction. The Controller will have to apply his mind, under Sub-section (5) of Section 25, and come to the conclusion whether such facts have been disclosed which could disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order of recovery of possession. It is pertinent to note that making of mere allegation by the tenant against the landlord is not enough to obtain leave to contest because of the use of the words ‘disclosed such facts’ in Sub-section (5). The Controller will have to determine whether facts, and not mere allegations, exist which would disentitle the landlord for obtaining relief under Sections 14-B, 14-C or 14-D.
(29) It was then submitted that the provisions of Section 14-C are discriminatory in nature as being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution, The submission was that Section 14-C applies only to landlords who are retired Central Government employees or of Delhi Administration. It was submitted that the tenants of such employees were under a distinct disadvantage as compared to other tenants because to the other tenants the provisions of Section 14(l)(e) would be applicable if the landlords want to recover possession on the grounds of personal need. It was submitted that Section 14(l)(e) contained many more safeguards for the tenants as compared to Section 14-C and therefore, Section 14-C was discriminatory in nature.
(30) At the outset we may mention that it was also contended that like Section 14-C provisions of Sections 14-B and 14-D were also liable to be struck down because a special class has been created.
(31) Incur opinion there is no merit in the aforesaid contention, It is no doubt true that all the cases envisaged or covered by Sections 14-B, 14-C and 14-D would have been covered under Section 14(l)(e) if the landlord wanted to recover possession on the ground of personal need. The Legislature felt that proceedings initiated under Section 14(l)(e) for the recovery of possession possibly took a long time to be concluded and that atleast with regard to certain category or class of landlords it was necessary to provide for situation where it would be easier, simple and speedier to obtain possession.
(32) Ordinarily, every landlord has a right to recover possession from his tenant, subject to terms of lease/contract which may have been entered into between the parties. This right of the landlord, under the general law of the land, hag been abridged by the introduction of Section 14(1). There fore,it is because of the statute namely the Rent Control Act that a landlord is prevented from exercising his right for recovery of posiession. Conversely the tenant is given protection from being evicted by virtue of Section 14(1). The disability of the landlord to recover possession is sought to be minimised in the case of certain categories of persons. The first exercise in this behalf was undertaken when Section 14-A was enacted and the second exercise has been undertaken by the Legislature by enacting Sections 14-B. 14-C and 14-D. The question which arises is whether the classification which is now sought to be made under Sections 14-B, 14-C and 14-D is valid or not.
(33) Every classification which is made has to be judged with relation to the object which is sought to be achieved. In the present case the Object which was sought to be achieved by amending the Rent Control Act and inserting Sections 14-B, 14-C and 14-D was, as quoted hereinabove, to inter alia bring about a balance between the interests of landlords and tenants, boost housing activity and to reduce litigation between the landlords and tenants and to ensure expeditious disposal of the disputes between them. The Legislature possibly felt that the- dice was heavily loaded in favor of the tenants and therefore, certain relief was granted to a particular section of the landlords covered by Sections 14-A, 14-B, 14-C and 14-D. The Legislature possibly felt that it should be easier for these classes of landlords to get possession of the residences owned by them for their own needs. The use of the word ‘immediate’ in these three sections indicates that these four categories of landlords would require possession immediately under the circumstances envisaged there-in. In other words all those landlords who would require immediate possession of residences were excluded from the operation of Section 14(l)(e) and were given a right to apply under Sections 14-A, 14-B, 14-C or 14-D as.the case may be. We do not find any distinction between the class of landlords enumerated in Section 14-A, vis-a-vis class contained in Section 14-B, 14-C and 14-D. All these types of landlords require immediate possession of residences.
(34) When Section 14-A was enacted its validity was sought to be challenged. In Ram Dutt Sharma v. Rattan Lal Bhargava, it was observed as follows :- “IT was open to the Legislature to pick out one class of landlords out of the several covered by Section 14(l)(e) of the Rent Act so long as they formed a class by themselves and the Legislature was free to provide the benefit of a special procedure to them in the matter of eviction of their tenants as long as the legislation had an object to achieve and the special procedure had a reasonable nexus with such object to be secured”.
it will be seen that the ingredients of Section 14-A which were required to be proved for securing possession were different from Section 14(l)(e) but the court held that this was a class of landlords to whom the special procedure could be made applicable having relation to the objects to be secured. In the instant case, applying the analogy of the aforesaid decision, it would follow that persons falling under Sections 14-B, 14-C and 14-D form a class themselves and provisions could be made turn them.
(35) Our attention was also drawn to provisions of Madhya Pradesh Act which are similar to Sections 14-B, 14-C and 14D. In the case of B. Johnson v. C. S. Naidu; a Division Bench of Madhya Pradesh High Court was concerned with the validity of the amendment made to the Rent Control Act which created a special procedure inter alia in respect of following classes of landlords :- (1) A retired servant of any Government including a retired member of the defense services; or (2) A retired servant of a company owned or controlled either by the Central or State Government; or (3) A widow or a divorced wife; or (4) A physical handicapped person; or (5) A servant of any Government, including a member of defense services who, according to his service conditions, is not entitled to Government accommodation on hit posting to a place where he owns a house or. is entitled to such accommodation only on payment of a penal rent on his posting to such a place. It was observed by the Court that these landlords belong to a special category distinct from the remaining landlords and they deserve the benefit of special procedure on account of their need being more pressing and the handicap from which they suffer as compared to the remaining landlords. Following the decision of the Supreme Court in Ravi Dutt Sharma’s case (supra) the Madhya Pradesh High Court held that the challenge to the specified category of landlords was not well founded. We are in respectful agreement with the aforesaid reasoning and in our view also the category of landlords specified in Sections 14-B, 14-C and 14-D bear a direct and reasonable nexus to the object which is sought to be achieved namely-that they should be able to have immediate recovery of residences for themselves as their need was, possibly, more pressing, than those of other categories of landlords.
(36) It was sought to be contended that Section 14-C restricted its operation only to cases of retired employees of the Central Government and of Delhi Administration. The submission was that there arc other retired employees as well who could have been regarded as being similarly placed but who had not been granted the benefits of the provisions of Section 14-C. All the landlords requiring premises for their own need can invoke the provisions of Section 14(l)(e). The Legislature however, has given the benefit of Section 14-C only to two categories of the landlords namely-retired employees of the Central Government and Delhi Administration. Perhaps the need to the other retired employees could also have been provided for in the manner in which it has been provided in the Madhya Pradesh Rent Control Act. But the mere fact no special benefit has been granted to other types of retired employees would not, in our opinion, result in our opinion, result in our holding that Section 14-C should be struck down as being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. It is possible that the Legislature may, be amending Section 14-C at a later date, bring more categories of retired employees within the purview Of the said section but the exclusion of those employees from Section 14-C cannot persuade us to bold that Section 14-C should be struck down. In this connection we may note as held by the Supreme Court in Sakhawant Ali v. State of Orissa, that beneficial legislation need not be all embracing.
(37) It was contended by Shri Chandiok that whereas Section 14-A akin to the Madhya Pradesh Act the Central Legislation has departed from the Madhya Pradesh Act while enacting Section 14-C and 14-D and benefit has not been given to all retired officers, in Section 14-C, and to divorces in Section 14-D. There is no merit in the aforesaid contention. The Rent Control Acts are local laws framed by respective State Legislatures. The Ada are enacted after taking into consideration the local conditions and situations. There is no absolute uniformity in all the rent laws in India. Difference between various enactments may be minor or at times be quite significant. For instance the rent laws in Punjab permit a landlord applying for eviction of a tenant from commercial premises on ground of bona fide need but there is no such provision in the Delhi Act. Examples like this are mani-fold. Merely because under the Madhya Pradesh Act all types of retired persons are clubbed together, whereas under Section 14C benefit is granted only to 2 categories of retired personnel, cannot be a reason for striking down Section 14C. Similarly just because divorces are not given the benefit of Section 74-D, whereas under the Madhya Pradesh Act widows and divorcees have been bricketed together, cannot be a reason or valid ground for coming to the conclusion, the Section 14-D is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. The widow forms a special class by herself and giving her the benefit would even be protected by the provisions of Article 15(3) of the Constitution of India.
(38) As already noted, one of the contentions which was raised was. that provisions of Section 14-C are arbitrary and contain no guidelines on which the Controller is to act. At the outset we would like to observe that in view of the fact that the case before us is that of a Central Government employee to whom the provisions of Section 14-C are attracted, we do not propose, in the present case, to interpret Section 14-B or Section 14-D of the Act. We are presently concerned with the construction of Section 14-C in-order to see whether the said provision is arbitrary or not.
(39) The bare reading of Section 14-C would indicate that the right to retiring Central Government or Delhi Administration employee is not absolute. Section 14-C contains the ingredients on the basis of which an order for possession can be passed. Section 14-C applies if-(a) the landlord is a retired employee of the Central Government or Delhi Administration an (b) the premises let out by him are required for his residence and (C) Section 14-C can be invoked within one year of the date of the retirement or within a period of one year from the date of commencement of Delhi Rent Control (Amendment) Act, 1988, whichever is later.
(40) A person seeking to invoke Section 14-C has, firstly to apply within the period of limitation prescribed in Section 14-C. In the eviction petition it has to be alleged that the applicant is a. landlord who is retiring or has retired from Central Government or Delhi Administration. An important averment which has to be made is also that the premises let out by him are required for his residence. Unless and until these averments are made an order for possession will not be issued in his favor.
(41) In addition to the above there are certain other circumstances which are inherent in Section 14-C and which have to be satisfied before said section can be invoked. A question which has been raised is as to against whom can an application under Section 14-C be filed ? Can Section 14-C be invoked by a landlord in case of a tenant to whom premises bad been let after the landlord had retired ? Another question which arises is as to what is the meaning of the expression ‘premises let out by him ? Would it mean that it is only those premises which are actually let out by the landlord to whom Section 14-C will apply or can there be cases where the landlord inherits or acquires premises in which tenants are already in occupation, whose tenancy continues and was in existence at the tims when the landlord retired.
(42) The provision in Delhi Act is similar to that which existed in Bombay. In relation to that Act a question arose as to whether a similar provision would be applicable to premises which were let out by an Army Officer after he had retired The Supreme Court in the case of Winifired Ross v. Ivy Fonesca; came to the conclusion that it was difficult to hold that Section 13-A I, of the Bombay Rents, Hotels and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947, which is analogous to Section 14-B of Delhi Rent Control Act. could be availed of by an ex-member of the. Armed Forces to recover from the tenant possession of a building which bad been let out by him after his retirement. This decision was followed by the Supreme Court in the case of D. N. Malhotra v. Kartar Singh ; 1988(1) Rent Control Reporter 176. From the aforesaid discussion it is clear, therefore, that the landlord can evict only that tenant who was in occupation of the premises at the time when the landlord retired or is about to retire from service. Section 14-C,in other words, will have no application to a .case where premises are let out by the landlord after he has retired from service of Central Government of Delhi Administration.
(43) This beings to the next question namely-as to what is the meaning of the expression let out by him”? Such a question arose for the First time, as far this court is concerned in the case of Smt. V. L. Kashyap v. R. P. Puri; (2nd (1977) 1 Delhi 22). While construing Section 14-A a question arose a to what is the meaning of the expression ‘possession of any premises let out by him’. The contention which was raised on- behalf of the tenant was that the premises in dispute must have been let out by the landlord himself and if the premises had been let out by the predecessor-in-interest or by the agent of the landlord, then he is not entitled to obtain eviction. Repelling this contention B.C. Misra, J. held that the said expression “only means the premises in respect of which the petitioner is the landlord and ordinarily the rights and obligations of an owner of the property on succession or transfer are transmitted to the successor-in-interest and can be enforced by him as if in law he had let out the premises. The expression is therefore, not confined to the petitioner/landlord as having personally let out the premises. The successor landlord is entitled to obtain eviction of the tenants and of persons occupying the premises under the tenant, if the satisfies, the other conditions and happens to be the landlord of the premises owned by him or by his wife or any dependant children.”
(44) The matter is put beyond any doubt by the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of Kanta Goel v. B. P. Pathok ; (1977 Rlr 201) in which case it was observed by the Supreme Court, while interpreting Section 14-A and 25B, as follows : (“The scheme of the statute is plain and has been earlier explained by this Court with special reference to Sections 14-A and 25-B. The government servant who owns his house, lets it out profitably and occupies at lesser rent official quarters has to quit but, for that very purpose to be fulfillled, must be put in quick possession of his premises. The legislative project and purpose turn not on niceties of little verbalism but on the actualities of rugged realism, and so. the construction of Section 14-A(l) must be illumined by the goal, though guided by the word. We have, therefore, no hesitation in holding that Section 14A(1) is available as a ground if the premises are owned by him as inherited from his father in whose name the property stood. In his name’ and let out by him’. read in the spirit of the provision and without violence to the words of the section clearly convey the idea that the premises must be owned by him directly ‘and the lease must be under him directly, which is the case where he as heir, steps into his father’s shoes who owned the building in his own name and let it out himself. He represents the former owner and Lesser and squarely falls within Section 14-A. The accent on ‘name, is to pre-empt, the common class of benami evasions, rot to attach special sanctity to nominalism. Refusing the rule of ritualism we accept the reality of the ownership and landlordism as the touch stone.”)
(45) In the case of Shivram Anand Shroor v. Radhabai Shantaram, (1984) (1) Rent Control Reporter 599) dealing with Section 13-A 1 of the Bombay Act, and after referring to the observations of the Supreme Court in Winifred Ross’s case (supra) Chinnappa Reddy, J. observed as follows :- “BUT we find it impossible on the plain language of Section 13-A 1 to further read down the provision as enabling a member or a retired member of the armed forces to recover possession of the premises only if be had himself originally let out the premises when be was a member of the armed forces and not if the tenancy had commenced before he became the landlord of the premises either by inheritance, partition, or any other mode of transfer of property To place such an interpretation would be to virtually rewrite the provision. The language of Section 13-A 1 which be sufficiently plain does not warrant or invite such an interpretation. Nor is there any thing elsewhere in the Act which compels such a construction.”
From the aforesaid discussion it must follow that just as, while interpreting Section 14-A of Delhi Act the expression ‘let out by him’ has been understood to mean premises let out by the predecessor in interest of the landlord we see no reason as to why a departure should be made while interpreting the same expression in Section 14-C of the Act. .The expression ‘premises let out by him’ must mean premises of which he was the landlord on the date of retirement or at the time when application for eviction was filed, in case it is filed before his retirement. When a tenant attorns to a new landlord it must be held that as from that date it is the landlord who has let out the premises. In our opinion it will be defeating the purpose and object of enacting Section 14-C if a very restricted meaning was to be given to Section 14-C. If, therefore, the premises are acquired by the landlord either by inheritance or even by purchase and the tenant is in occupation thereof under that landlord on the date of the land lord’s retirement or when he files an application under Section 14-C it will have to be held that the premises were let out by the landlord and he will be in a position to maintain the said application.
(46) It was contended by Shri Chandiok that protection is granted under Sub-section (6) of Section 14 to a tenant to the effect that a landlord who acquires premises by transfer can not apply for recovery of possession unless a period of 5 years has elapsed but this protection would not be available to cases falling under Section 14-C. It is true that this protection is granted to the tenant under section 14(1)(e) but Section 14-C is a special class of landlords to whom Section 14(1)(e) has been, in a sense, made in applicable. If Section 14(l)(e) does not’ apply to a case falling under Section 14-C it must logically, follow that Section 14(6) which is a fetter on Section 14(l)(e) should also not apply to Section 14-C. We see no incongruity or arbitrariness in such a construction of the Statute.
(47) It was also contended that Section 14(l)(e) applies to a case where the premises were let out for residential purpose and it had no application. where the premises were let out either for commercial’ purpose or were let out turn a composite purpose of residential-cum-commercial. The submission was that the same restriction or ingredients have to be read into Section 14-C, We are unable to agree with this submission. Section 14(l)(e) no doubt applies to a case where the premises have been let for residential purposes. Section 14-C, on the other hand uses expression ‘premises’ and further states that the same are required by the landlord ‘for his residence’. As we read Section 14-C it appears that the premises to which the said provision will apply must be those which are residential in nature. A landlord cannot invoke the provisions of Section 14-C in respect of premises which are commercial in nature. Far example if a landlord, who is a government employee, lets out office premises or shop then he cannot invoke Section 14-C and contend that he is entitled to the possession thereof as he requires those premises for his residence. This will be contrary to the very spirit of the said provision. Special provision contained in Section 14-C has been enacted in order to provide residential accommodation to the landlord and is not to be used merely as a modus operandi for getting rid of an inconvenient tenant. At the same time. Section 14-C cannot be made inapplicable if residential premises have been let out by the landlord for commercial or residential-cum commercial purpose, as long as the landlord requires those premises for his own residence It will be for the Controller to Judge whether the premises are required by the landlord for his residence or not. If the premises are such which are residential in nature and the Controller comes to the conclusion that they are required by the landlord for his residence then on the other ingredients of Section 14-C being satisfied, the landlord application where the premises were let out commercial purpose or were would be entitled to regain the possession of the said premises even if they had been let out out for a composite or a commercial purpose. To give an example if a house in a residential colony is given to a business organisation for residential-cum-commercial purpose or for running an office then the nature of the premises will always remain residential and on the ingredients of Section 14-C being satisfied the landlord should be able to recorder the possession thereof if the premises are needed by him for his own residence.
(48) Another contention which has been raised is that if a landlord was to apply under Section 14(l)(e) then, by virtue of the provisions of Sub-section (7) of Section 14, a tenant would be given not less than 6 months period to vacate the premises. The submission is that by virtue of the provisions of Section 25-C in the case governed by Section 14-A the period of 6 months under Section 14(7) has been reduced to 2 months but in, Sections 14-B, 14-C and 14-D there is no period which was specified. It was contended that when an order under Sections 14-B, 14C and 14-D is passed the tenant should be granted six months time to vacate the premises, on the analogy of Section 14(7) of the Act.
(49) As we have already noted, under Sections 14-B, 14-C, 14-D the landlord is entitled to immediate possession of the premises. Section 14(1)(e) does not use the word ‘immediate’. The Legislature must have been conscious of the fact that by virtue of the provisions of Sub-section (7) a period of six months is granted to the tenant to vacate the premises, when an order is passed under Section 14(l)(e). Nevertheless the Legislature used the expression ‘immediate’ in Sections 14-B, 14-C and 14D which, in our opinion, was a conscious departure from the provisions of Section 14(7). It would, therefore, be safe to conclude, that the Legislature did not envisage or contemplate that the tenant should get six months lime to vacate the premises if an order is passed in favor of the landlord under the newly added provision. At the same time it certainly could not have been the intention of the Legislature that the word ‘irnmediate’ should be construed’as meaning, instanceous. The Legislature had in this very Act used the word ‘immediate possession’ in Section 14-A, Therefore, while interpreting Sections 14-B, 14-C and 14-D, it would be safe to take the provisions of Section 14-A read with Section 25-C(2) as a guide. Section 25-C is a part of Chapter III-A and, by virtue of Section 25-B the provision of that Section apply not only to Section 14-A but also to Sections 14B, 14 C and 14D. Therefore, as far’as possible, all the four provisions should be harmoniously and similarly construed. As such even though the provisions of Section 25-C(2) had been specifically applied to Sections 14-B, 14-C and 14-D nevertheless when a Controller passes an order under 14B, 14 C and 14D the tenant would ordinarily be entitled to two months time to vacate the premises.
(50) It was also contended that the non obstante words used in Sec- tion 14-A are not used in Sections 14-B, 14-C and 14-D and therefore, the provisions of Section 14-B 14-C and 14-D can be invoked by the landlord subject to the terms of the lease which he may have executed in favor of the tenant, or any other law for the time being in force. In other words if a law prohibits the eviction of the tenant or if there is a lease deed in his favor then the alleged right given under Sections 14-B, 14-C and 14-D is ineffective. We are unable to.agree with this contention. Section 25-A provides that the provisions of the Chapter are to apply notwithstandiog’anything inconsistent there- with contained elsewhere in the Act or any other law for the time being in force, therefore, once the provisions of Section 25-B are made applicable to Sections 14-B, 14-C and 14-D then the Controller can pass an order under Section 25B notwithstanding anything contained’in any law because of the provisions of Section 25-A. In other words, even though the non obstante words arcot included in Section 14-B, 14-C and 14-D but because of the pro- visions of Section 25-A the effect is as if the said provisions are non. obstante.
(51) It will be useful in this behalf to refer to the decision of the Constitution bench of the Supreme in the case of V. Dhanapal ChetUar v. Yesodai Ammal’, . The question which arose in that case was whether it was necessary to terminate the tenancy of a tenant under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act before an application for eviction could have been filed under the tenancy Act. The Supreme Court came to the conclusion that it was not necessary to terminate the tenancy by giving a notice under Section 106 of the Act. It was observed in this connection as follows :-
“IT will bear repetition to say the under the Transfer of Property Act in order to entitle the landlord to recover poss.ession determination of the lease is necessary as during its contract he could not recover possession, while under the State Rent Act the landlord becomes entitled to recover possession only on the fulfillment of the rigour of law provided therein. Otherwise not. He cannot recover possession merely by determination of tenancy. Nor can he be stopped from doing so on the ground that he has not terminated the contractual tenancy. Under the Stale Rent Control Act the concept of the contractual tenancy has lost much af its significance and force”
In our opinion, therefore, the right which is created under Section 14-C is an absolute and independent right with the landlord who is entitled to recover possession of the premises on his satisfying the ingredients of Section 14-C and nothing mbre. The provisions of Transfer of property Act would not stand in his away..
(52) In the present case as the Rent Controller has passed the order of eviction against the petitioner, we are not inclined to go into the merits of the said order because the petitioner has remedies open to him under the provisions of Section 25-B(8) of the Act, if now available.
(53) For the aforesaid reasons the petition is dismissed and the interim order stands vacated; There will be no order as to costs.