ORDER
H. Rangavittalachar, J.
1. These revision petitions are filed under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, both by the tenants and the ‘Landlord’ aggrieved by the common order passed by the learned District Judge, Mysore in rent revision petitions and that of the learned Munsiff, Mysore in H.R.C. eviction petitions.
2. H.R.R.P. Nos. 250 and 931 of 1994 are filed by the tenant Narsoji and Company and the landlords Lakshminarayana Gupta against the orders passed in the Rent Revision Petition No. 145 of 1985 and confirming the order of the learned Munsiff in part passed in H.R.C. No. 543 of 1979.
3. H.R.R.P. No. 366 of 1994 is filed by the tenant M/s. Thangam and Company against the order of the learned District Judge in Rent Revision No. 147 of 1985 confirming the orders of eviction passed by the learned Munsiff in H.R.C. No. 548 of 1979.
4. H.R.R.P. No. 430 of 1994 is filed by the tenant M/s. Gopalji and Sons against the orders of the learned District Judge in Rent Revision
Petition No. 149 of 1995 confirming the order of eviction passed by the learned Munsiff in H.R.C. No. 546 of 1979.
5. H.R.R.P. No. 618 of 1994 is filed by the tenant M/s. Boraiah and L. Ramaiab against the orders of the learned District Judge in Rent Revision No. 148 of 1995 confirming the order in part passed by the learned Munsiff in H.R.C. No. 544 of 1979 while H.R.R.P. No. 930 of 1994 is filed by Lakshminarayana Gupta against the said order.
6. H.R.R.P. Nos. 932 of 1994 and 1129 of 1994 are filed by Lakshminarayana Gupta and the tenant Laxman Rao against the orders of the learned District Judge in Rent Revision Petition No. 144 of 1985.
7. The facts of the case as gathered from the records are as follows:
The revision petitioner in H.R.R.P. No. 930 of 1994 “Venkateshwara Trading Corporation” is a partnership firm consists of the partner Lakshmi Narayana Gupta and his sons, carrying on the business of dealing in grains at Mysore for the past 25 years before the filing of eviction petition in 2 rented premises belonging to one Jagadish and another to S.D. Murthy.
The said firm by a registered sale deed dated 16-8-1978 purchased property bearing Municipal Nos. 425, 426, 409 measuring about 28 feet north to south and 160 feet east to west situated at Santhepet, Deveraj Mohalla from its rightful owner, one S.M. Nagaraj for a sale consideration of Rs. 1,80,000/-. This property consists of 5 shops, 2 facing Santhepet and 3 facing Deshika Road and 2 godowns together with a first and second floor. It is a country tiled building with Madras terrace. This is the premises that is the subject-matter of eviction in all these revision petitions. At the time of purchase, different portions of these premises were in occupation of various tenants, most of them are parties to these petitions. The tenant Lakshman Rao, respondent in H.R.R.P. No. 932 of 1994 is in occupation of a part of the premises in the ground floor, first floor and second floor and is running a Girls High School. He is paying a monthly rent of Rs. 250/-. The tenant Narsoji and Company are in occupation of another portion carrying on the business of “General Merchant and Commission Agents” on a monthly rent of Rs. 400/-. The tenants Boraiah and L. Ramaiah, petitioners in H.R.R.P. No. 619 of 1994 is in occupation of another portion, using the same as a godown on a monthly rent of Rs. 100/- and the tenant Gopalji and Sons is in occupation of another portion using the same as godown on a monthly rent of Rs. 100/-. The tenant Thangam and Company is in occupation of another portion carrying on the oil business on a monthly rent of Rs. 100/-another portion which was in occupation of the tenant one P.N. Muthu and Company.
The said firm, hereinafter referred to as “landlord” for clarity after purchase of the property issued “Attornment notices” to all the tenants thereafter filed eviction petitions against all of them under Section 21(1)(j) and (h) of the Karnataka Rent Control Act (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for brevity) on the file of the Principal Munsiff, Mysore.
8. It was contended in the eviction petitions, that the ‘landlord’ is under compulsion to shift his business from the rented premises as he has been ordered to vacate the godown portion of his business in an Ejectment Suit filed by the owner Sri Sharma and under the threat of eviction from his business premises on account of an eviction petition filed by one G.V. Murthy. It is his intention to demolish the entire premises in occupation of the tenants put up a new construction consisting of two floors. To. the ground floor he wants to shift his business, while he wants the first floor to start an additional business of having a LODGE. Thus the premises is required by the ‘Landlord’ for demolition and reconstruction and self-occupation.
9. All the tenants contested the eviction petitions by filing a detailed statement of objections. The defences taken by all the tenant was that after the ‘Landlord’ purchased, he demanded from them higher rents and advances and when his demand was not met, he filed cases with an intention to evict them only to relet at higher rents. It was also contended that the building condition is not such as to require demolition and reconstruction nor the ‘Landlord’ is under compulsion to vacate the rented premises. They also contended that the “Landlord” is in possession of alternative premises where he can carry on the business.
10. Parties went to trial on the basis of their respective pleadings.
11. Learned Principal Munsiff at the request of the parties clubbed all the cases, recorded common evidence in H.R.C. No. 542 of 1979.
12. During trial, “Landlord” examined Laxminarayana Gupta, the partner of the firm as P.W. 1 in support of his case and one P. Nanjappa Setty as P.W. 2 to show that the later was willing to lend money for construction. He also produced the sale deed, Corporation approved plan, licences for putting up the building, Wealth Tax. Assessments, Estimates besides notices exchanged between the parties.
13. Similarly all the tenants examined themselves and produced various documents to show that the “Landlord” has alternative premises.
14. Learned Munsiff after enquiry by an elaborate order dated 14-6-1985 allowed all the eviction petitions by granting 3 months time to each of the tenants to vacate the premises. He has held that “the evidence of the tenants and also the ‘Landlord’ discloses that the “Landlord” is a grain merchant carrying on the business from 1956, therefore he has sufficient experience, that he has been ordered to vacate the godown on account of an Ejectment Decree obtained by the owner of the godown one Sharma and while the other portion where he is carrying on the business he is under the threat of eviction, on account of an eviction petition filed by its owner “Jagannath”, therefore “Landlord” has to shift from the rented premises. Besides the schedule premises is 100 years old. The “Landlord” has the capacity to demolish and reconstruct and is sincere about the same as he owns other properties and has a business turnover of Rs. 1 to Rs. 1.5 crores per year. He has obtained a necessary plan and licence for demolition and reconstruction and that he has also got an estimate prepared.
15. Learned Munsiff has repelled the defences of the tenants that “The Landlord” is having alternative premises viz., a shopping complex at Ashoka Road where he can shift his business on the ground, that the said premises has been allotted to his sons share at a partition effected between Lakshminarayana Gupta and his sons, he has relied on the certified copy of the partition deed for this purposes. According to him even otherwise in Ashoka Road no grain business is carried on.
16. On the question of hardship, learned Munsiff has in detail gone into the relative economic status and also the availability of alternative premises, to respective parties. He has held that the circumstances that landlord is under compulsion to vacate outweighs the hardship of the tenants as admittedly some of the tenants own alternative premises while some others are economically affluent. The tenant Laxman Rao has been residing in a part of the premises and using the other part to run a school. At a distance from the schedule premises in the same street, he is running another school. Apart from this, he has purchased a building at No. 379, Krishna Vilas Road, Mysore measuring 40 feet by 120 feet by which is very near to the schedule premises where he can shift the school besides he owns 2 other sites at Saraswathipuram. The tenants Boraiah and L. Ramaiah is a very wealthy man as he has a business turnover of RS. Three to Three and half lakhs per month and evidence on record shows that at Devaraj Urs Road, there are number of shops available for rent. The tenant Thangam has a business turnover of Rs. 1.00 crore per year and he is an income-tax assessee. The tenant Gopalji owns his own Godown in Santhepet, about 2-3 kms. away from the schedule premises and the tenant Narsoji and Company can also afford to shift.
17. About the feasibility of partial eviction, learned Munsiff after taking into consideration the dimension of the schedule property and also the various portions in occupation of each tenants and further fact that none of the parties produced any material regarding their actual requirements in terms of area has come to the conclusion that partial eviction is not feasible.
18. This order was challenged by all the tenants by filing rent revision petitions under Section 50 of the “Act before the learned District Judge, Mysore”.
19. Learned District Judge after reappraising the evidence, by his order dated 30-9-1993 though has concurred with the learned Munsiff on most of the points but has allowed the 3 revision petitions viz., R.R.P. Nos. 144 of 1985, 145 of 1985 and 148 of 1985 filed by the tenants Laxman Rao, Narsoji and Company, Boraiah and L. Ramaiah in part mainly on the ground “That since the petition of the landlord is filed under Section 21(1)(h) and 21(1)(j) of the Act” and in such a case, whenever it is possible Courts have to lean in favour of tenants by holding the petitioner as filed under Section 21(1)(j) and a right of re-entry has to be provided to the said tenants while dismissing other 3 rent revision petitions of the tenants.
20. As stated, these 2 orders are challenged both by the “landlord” and the tenants.
21. Another factor that also requires consideration is during the pendency of these revision petitions, certain applications have been filed requesting the Court to take note of the subsequent events by the tenants and also objections have been filed by the “Landlord”. The same will be dealt with at this appropriate place.
22. Before this Court Sri A.G. Holla, learned Senior Counsel addressed arguments on behalf of the “Landlord”. Sri Padmaraj, Hiremath and other Counsels addressed arguments on behalf of the tenants.
23. Sri Holla, learned Counsel submitted that the procedure adopted by the learned District Judge to bifurcate the eviction petition of the landlord as one filed under Section 21(1)(h) of the Act in respect of ground floor of the premises and as one filed under Section 21(1)(j) of the Act in respect of the first floor, though the eviction petitions were a composite one filed both under Section 21(1)(h) and 21(1)(j) on the basis of the decision of this Court in P.K. Upadhyaya v A. Venkatesh and Others, is erroneous in view of the said decision being overruled by the Supreme Court in M/s. Modern Tailoring Hall v H.S. Venkusa and Others. According to the learned Counsel, when a landlord seeks an eviction for self-occupation under Section 21(1)(h) but after demolition and reconstruction the Court has to consider the case only under Section 21(1)(h) and not under Section 21(1)(j). When eviction is sought under Section 21(1)(j) and 21(1)(h), Section 21(1)(j) merges with Section 21(1)(h) and that the Courts are required to consider the case only about the requirements for “Self-occupation” and not for demolition and reconstruction under Section 21(1)(j). It was submitted that in a case like the one on hand, all that was required to be considered was whether the landlord requires the premises for his own use, and to whom the greater hardship would be caused, but not required to be considered regarding the feasibility of partial eviction. According to him, the language of Section 21(1)(h) and (j) of the Act and its analysis clearly indicate that in a case of “Self-occupation” but after demolition and reconstruction the tenanted premises in its original form no longer exists and a new construction would come in its place. In a newly constructed premises, if the Courts were to ask the landlord to accommodate the tenant under the guise of “Partial eviction”, Courts would be providing a “Right of re-entry to the tenant” and thus the case would be as one under clause (j) of the Act, which is impermissible. The learned District Judge having concurred with the Munsiff on both the points should have dismissed the tenants revision petition and ordered the eviction.
24. Per contra, learned Counsel appearing for some of the tenants Sri Padmaraj submitted that according to the “Landlord”, he is under compulsion to shift the existing business, therefore at best he is entitled to ask only so much of that area and not beyond is what is meant by
“Reasonable requirement” as envisaged under Section 21(1)(h) of the Act. It was further submitted that subsequent to the order of the learned Munsiff, one of the tenants P.N. Muthu who was in occupation of part of the premises has vacated in pursuance of an eviction order which premises would satisfy the need and therefore there was no need to disturb other tenants. Learned Counsel further submitted that the “Landlord” owns a large number of other premises, if his need is held to be genuine, the Court should have held that the same is met by the ”Landlord” occupying other premises. It was also submitted that the premises in question does not require any demolition and reconstruction and the Courts below were not justified in evicting some of the tenants as the “Landlord” could have been provided enough space in the premises vacated by Muttu for shifting the business. Learned Counsel relied on the decisions of this Court in M/s. Chandrika Enterprises, Bangalore v G. Vittala Rao and Another and Smt. Vimala Devi and Others v A. Venkatesha Murthy and Another .
25. Sri Hosmath, learned Counsel who appeared for some of the tenants adopted the arguments of Sri Padmaraj.
26. Having heard the rival submissions and after going through the records and the relevant provisions of law, I am of the view that the order of the learned District Judge cannot be sustained.
27. The learned District Judge seems to be mainly influenced by Upadhyaya’s case, supra, in partly allowing the case under Section 21(1)(h) and partly under Section 21(1)(j) of the Act. Section 21(1)(h) and Section 21(1)(j) of the Act with its consequent rights and liabilities are set out hereinbelow:
“‘Section 21(1)(h).–That the premises are reasonably and bona fide required by the landlord for occupation by himself or any person for whose benefit the premises are held or where the landlord is a trustee of a public charitable trust, that the premises are required for occupation for the purposes of the trust.
Section 21(4).–No decree for eviction shall be passed on the ground specified in clause (h) of the proviso to sub-section (1) if the
Court is satisfied that having regard to all the circumstances of the case including the question whether other reasonable accommodation is available for the landlord or the tenant, greater hardship would be caused by passing the decree than by refusing to pass it.
If the Court is satisfied that no hardship would be caused either to the tenant or to the landlord by passing the decree in respect of a part of the premises, the Court shall pass the decree in respect of such part only.
Explanation.–For the purpose of clause (h) of the proviso to sub-section (1), the expression “Landlord” shall not include a rent farmer or rent controller or estate manager,
Section 25.–(1) Where a decree for eviction has been passed by the Court on the ground specified in clause (h) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 21 and the premises are not occupied within a period of three months from the date the landlord recovers possession, or the premises are re-let within one year of the said date to any person other than the original tenant, the Court may, on the application of the original tenant made within thirteen months of such date, order the landlord to place such tenant in occupation of the premises on the original terms and conditions, and such order being made, the landlord and any person who may be in occupation of the premises shall give vacant possession to the original tenant.
Section 21(1)(J).–That the premises are reasonably and bona fide required by the landlord for the immediate purpose of demolishing them and such demolition is to be made for the purpose of erecting a new building in place of the premises sought to be demolished.
Section 26. Recovery of possession for demolishing building and re-entry.–(1) Where a decree for eviction has been passed by the Court on the ground specified in clause (j) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 21 and the work of demolishing the premises has not been commenced by the landlord within the period specified in the decree, the tenant may give the landlord a notice of his intention to occupy the premises from which he has been evicted and if the landlord does not forthwith deliver to him vacant possession of the premises on the same terms and conditions on which he occupied then immediately before the eviction, the tenant may make an application to the Court within six weeks from the date of expiry of the period specified in the decree.
(2) If the Court is satisfied that the landlord has not substantially commenced the work of demolishing the premises within the period of one month in accordance with his undertaking, the Court shall order the landlord to deliver to the tenant vacant possession of the premises on the terms and conditions on which he occupied it immediately before the eviction on such order being made, the landlord shall forthwith deliver vacant possession of the premises of the tenant. Such order shall be deemed to be an order within the meaning of clause (14) of Section 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.
(3) Any landlord who recovers possession on the ground specified in clause (j) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 21 and fails to demolish and construct a new building without any reasonable excuse or fails to comply with the order of the Court under sub-section (2) shall without prejudice to his liability in
execution of the order under sub-section (2) on conviction, be punished with fine which may extend to five hundred rupees”.
28. In a case when an eviction petition is filed by the landlord under Section 21(1)(h) of the Act for self-occupation to occupy the premises but after demolition and reconstruction under Section 21(1)(j) of the “Act”, whether the Courts should consider the case of the landlord only under clause (h) of Section 21(1) of the Act or one under both clauses was first considered by the Division Bench of this Court in Smt. Rohinibai v Vishnumurthy and it has held that the “Ambit of clauses (h) and (j) of the Act are totally different. The two clauses relate to two different circumstances and the obligations and rights of the landlord and the tenant under the two clauses are not the same and therefore the two clauses are mutually exclusive”. This view was followed and reiterated by another Division Bench in the case of A.M. Obedulla v S.M. Shaft.
29. However, later, three learned Single Judges of this Court took a different view on this question. In Upadhyaya’s case, supra, one learned Single Judge of this Court took the view that “If there be, when an occasion arises to choose between clauses (h) and (j) in directing eviction of a tenant, Court will have to lean in favour of clause (j) rather than ordering eviction under clause (h) of Section 21(1) of the Act”. This view was followed by two other different Single Judges later in two cases viz., in K.K. Sanjeeva Murthy Shetty v T.S. Geetha alias Geetha “Ramakrishna . In Sanjeev Shetty’s case, supra, it has been held:
“If there is a choice for the Court between clauses (h) and (j) for directing eviction of a tenant, the Court will have to lean in favour of clause (j) rather than order eviction under Section 21(1)(h) of the Act. If the entire reconstructed premises is required by the landlord for his own occupation, Section 21(1)(h) will be applicable. But, if the reconstructed premises could accommodate the tenants and also would reasonably satisfy the requirements of the landlord, then an eviction order under Section 21(1)(j) would advance the object of the Act”.
30. And so is the view of M/s. Chandrika Enterprises case, supra.
31. The ratio of Rohinibai’s case, supra, of Division Bench and also Upadhyaya’s case, supra, of the learned Single Judge came up for consideration before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in M/s. Modern Tailoring Hall’s case, supra. In the said case the question that came up for consideration was “When a landlord seeks eviction under Section 21(1)(h) of the Act, that he bona fidely requires the premises for his own use and occupation but after demolition and reconstruction, whether such a case was based on only Section 21(1)(h) or was it under Section 21(1)(j) of the Act”. It was held that Section 21(1)(h) and Section 21(1)(j) are mutually exclusive and it was only clause (h) of Section 21(1) of the Act that
applies declaring the ratio in Rohinibai’s case, supra, as correct law, as according to the Court, “A demolition and reconstruction of a premises by the landlord for his own use and occupation, after getting the order of eviction clearly based under clause (h) of Section 21 and not under
clause (j)”.
32. About the validity of the view of the learned Single Judge, on this question in Upadhyaya’s case, supra:
“That is a lone voice however made by a learned Single Judge of the High Court in Upadhyaya’s case, supra, to rule that if thereby with the Court an occasion to choose between clauses (h) and (j), in directing eviction of a tenant, it will have to lean in favour of clause (j) rather than ordering eviction under clause (h) of Section 21(1) of the Act, This has been pressed into service to opt for eviction under Section 21(1)(j). This attempt of the learned Single Judge to demolish the exclusivity of the two sub-clauses (j) and (h) of Section 21(1), well-drawn by the Division Bench in Smt. Rohinibai’s case, supra, is uncalled for. The ground for eviction given in the two provisions being mutually exclusive have flowing therefrom separate individual rights and obligations and they cannot be permitted to overlap so as to confer on the Court the discretion of employing one provision over the other. An application of the landlord, if not falling under Section 21(1)(h), would on its own, merit dismissal. The Court cannot treat it in its discretion as one under Section 21(1)(j) and order an unwanted eviction. The distinction qualitatively has to be maintained. We therefore decline to take a view to the contrary, even if it be possible, than the one taken by the High Court based as it is on the decision of this Court in Ramniklal Pitambardas Mehta v Indradaman Amratlal Sheth”.
33. Thus Upadhyaya’s case, supra, on this point has been overruled. In view of the same, the decision of the other two learned Judges on this question in Sanjeev Murthy’s case, supra, and M/s. Chandrika Enterprises case, supra, is no longer good law.
34. What emerges by the decision of Rohinibai’s case, supra, and M/s. Modern Tailoring Hall’s case, supra, is “Where eviction petition is filed by the landlord on the ground that the premises is required “Reasonably and Sana fide” for his own use and occupation, but after demolition and reconstruction that is under Section 21(1)(h) and (j) of the Act, if the landlord establishes his case for self-occupation, under Section 21(1)(h), it is unnecessary to go into the question whether the landlord still makes out a case under Section 21(1)(j) on the reasoning that once the landlord obtains possession for self-occupation, it is his choice to occupy the premises in whatever condition, it is, or it should be, to, suit his needs, is exercise of his ownership rights. See the decision of the Supreme Court in Mehta’s case, supra, relied by the Division Bench in Rohinibai’s case, supra; if the Court finds the landlord has not made out
a case for self-occupation as required under Section 21(1)(h) of the Act, the Court has no option but to dismiss the petition. It cannot after holding that the landlord has not made out a case under Section 21(1)(h) find out whether the landlord has made out a case under Section 21(1)(j) and thereby impose obligations as stated under Section 26 and provide a Right of re-entry to the tenant. Conversely when the landlord establishes his case to occupy the premises under Section 21(1)(h), the Court has to grant relief only under the said clause together with consequent obligations on the landlord and rights whatever that may accrue to the tenant. It cannot combine both the clauses and grant relief thereon on that basis.
35. In the facts of this case, learned District Judge though has agreed with the learned Munsiff viz., that landlord has made out a case under Section 21(1)(h) inasmuch as has established his need to occupy the ground floor in the portion to be constructed by him, but has held that he has not made out a case for self-occupation of the first floor (in the building to be constructed) to start the business of a lodge, therefore in the first floor which he constructs the tenants must be given a right of re-entry and he has chosen the tenants in H.R.R.P. Nos. 930, 931 and 932 of 1994 for the same, and has provided a “Right of re-entry” to them relying on Upadhyaya’s case, supra, which has been over-ruled by the Supreme Court.
36. It is difficult to appreciate that the landlord has no need to start the additional business in the first floor.
37. Once the need of the landlord is accepted as genuine and bona fide to occupy the premises, and an eviction is ordered on that ground landlord has a right to not merely use the premises for the purpose for which he sought eviction, he can also carry on additional business, in his exercise of his “Ownership rights” and “Right to business”. It is no part of Court’s power to prohibit a landlord from carrying on any other business other than the one for which he sought eviction, nor equally to direct a landlord when he seeks an eviction under Section 21(1)(h) after demolition and reconstruction, to put up the new construction in a manner to accommodate the evicted tenants also that is not the scope of enquiry under Section 21(1)(h):
38. Under Section 21(1)(h) of the Act, a landlord has to establish that he requires the premises reasonably and bona fide for his own use and occupation. Once the Courts are satisfied about the need of the landlord to occupy, Courts are further required only to enquire about the “greater hardship” the tenant or the landlord suffers, if the Courts feel that the tenant suffers greater hardship by an eviction order. Courts could not pass the order of eviction. In this part of enquiry, Courts also are obliged to mitigate the hardship by restoring the “partial eviction” subject to various factors so that the premises may accommodate both the landlord and the tenant, but under guise of exercising the power to order partial eviction, Courts cannot direct the landlord to put up the new construction in a manner to accommodate the tenant.
39. Once it is held that the requirement of the landlord to occupy the premises for shifting his business is held as “Reasonable and bona fide”, Courts cannot direct the landlord to confine his activity only to the existing business, in the absence of such restriction being clearly spelt out in the language of the statute itself. Section 21(1)(h) of the Act does not spell out such restriction by its language nor remotely suggest such an interpretation.
40. Under Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control Act) a landlord is entitled to recover possession when he establishes “Bona fide requirement” of additional accommodation for personal use. The Kerala High Court had taken the view in Davis v Sebastin, that the expression “Personal Use” was meant to confine to the existing business or its expansion only. But the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the appeal in Davis case, supra, held that to what use the additional accommodation should be put, is the choice of landlord and it should be left entirely to his option in the following passage:
“Now, what is the meaning of the expression “personal use” in sub-section (8)? It is a well-settled principle of interpretation that words in a statute shall be given their natural, ordinary meaning; nothing should be added to them nor should any word be treated as otiose. Two comprehensive expressions “additional accommodation” and “Personal use” are employed in sub-section (8). The expression “additional accommodation” takes in both residential as well as non-residential buildings. “Personal Use” is also an expression of wide amplitude. There is nothing in the sub-section which restricts the import of that expression. The said requirement of sub-section (8) will be complied with on the satisfaction of the controller about bona fide need of the additional accommodation for personal use of the landlord. To what use the additional accommodation should be put, is the choice of the landlord. It is the case of a non-residential building whether a new business should be set up in the additional accommodation or whether it should be used for expansion of the existing business, is left entirely to the option of the landlord. This, being the intendment of the Legislature, the Court cannot impose any restriction with regard to the use of the additional accommodation from which the eviction of the tenant is sought”.
41. The principle enunciated therein has application to the facts herein.
42. Reverting to the facts of this case, both the Courts have held on the basis of the admission of some of the tenants and also on the evidence of landlord that the landlord is under a compulsion to shift his business as he has already suffered an Ejectment decree and is under threat of eviction. Before this Court, this factual position is not disputed.
43. Once it is held that the landlord requires the premises of his own use and occupation, he cannot be directed to restrict the activity only to the present business. If he intends to take up a new venture, later he should also establish the bona fides for the same that cannot be the intendment of Section 21(1)(h).
44. Coming to the submissions of the tenants before this Court as already noted above viz., no doubt the landlord is under compulsion to vacate, but that does not mean he can claim to the entire area of 28 feet by 160 feet for self-occupation. According to tenants, landlord at best is entitled to only so much of space as he is in occupation in the rented premises which has an area of twelve and half feet x thirty feet; If the arguments of the tenant is accepted, it would virtually amount to put a premium on space for a person to carry on the business in any manner that is best suited to him and ask him not to aspire to carry on the business in a bigger place than the one he is carrying on in a rented premises. This would amount to imposing an unreasonable restriction on the ownership rights as well as the “Right to carry on business” which is not the intendment of Rent Control Act. It is the landlord’s choice to carry on the business in the manner that suits him best. No doubt the actual requirements in terms of space of a landlord may be relevant factor while considering the feasibility of partial eviction subject to other situations and circumstances but certainly is not a factor while appreciating his bona fides. Therefore the contention deserves to be rejected.
45. The submission of the tenants, as stated that the landlord is a wealthy man, owns a large number of premises. Whereas the tenants have no place nor they are economically sound and having regard to intendment of the rent legislation viz., the beneficial piece of legislation intended to advance the interests of the tenants, Courts below should not have ordered eviction on the ground it is not “Reasonable” within the meaning of Section 21(1)(h) of the Act. The tenants relied on the decision of the Court in K. Appanna v S. Rajasekhar and Chandrika Enterprises case, supra.
46. The meaning of the expression “Reasonable requirement” is now well-settled by a large number of judicial decisions which have held the expression “Reasonable” has relation only to need of the landlord to occupy the premises and in considering the same, the economic status of the landlord is irrelevant, though it may have a bearing while considering the question of “Hardship”. In Mst. Bega Begum and Others v Abul Ahad Khan (deceased) by L.Rs and Others, while stating the meaning of the expression “Reasonable” occurring in various Rent Acts in the Country. This is what is stated:
“Moreover, Section 11(h) of the Act uses the words Reasonable Requirement, which undoubtedly postulates that there must be an element of need as opposed to a mere desire or wish; The distinction
between desire and need should doubtless be kept in mind but not so as to make, even the genuine need as nothing but a desire as the High Court has done in this case. It seems to us that the connotation of the term “Need” or “Requirement” should not be artificially extended nor its language so unduly stretched or strained as to make it impossible or extremely difficult for the landlord to get a decree for eviction. Such a course would defeat the very purpose of the Act which affords the facility of eviction of the tenant to the landlord on certain specified grounds. This appears to us to be the general scheme of all the Rent Control Acts prevalent in other States in the Country”.
47. The decisions in Chandrika Enterprises, supra and K. Appanna, supra, do not give any other different meaning to the expression “Reasonably required”. In a fact situation like the one on hand, “Where a person is ordered to vacate one portion already a decree of the Court and is under the threat of eviction in respect of other portion, it cannot be said by any reasoning his requirement to occupy his own premises is not a “Reasonable requirement”.
48. Therefore the contention deserves to be rejected.
49. As stated, during the pendency and hearing of the revision petitions, some of the tenants have filed application under Order 41, Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure, requesting the Court to take note of certain subsequent events, which defeat the bona fides of the landlords. Let me consider the said applications.
50. In H.R.R.P. No. 619 of 1994, the tenant Boraiah has filed an application I.A. IV, dated 20-1-2000 under Order 41, Rule 27 read with Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code by producing a copy of the registered sale deed dated 17-11-1999 to the effect that one Muttu has sold a property measuring 61 feet x 14 feet with a 14 square building in favour of B.L. Suresh and B.L. Ramesh who are the sons of Laxminarayana Gupta and partners of the Firm of “Landlord” together with encumbrance certificate with a request to take the same on record. On the said basis, it was contended that the landlord can shift his businesses to the said acquired place.
51. Similarly, tenant Lakshman Rao in H.R.R.P. No. 932 of 1994 has filed an LA. dated 14-1-2000 producing a copy of the order passed in a public interest petition in W.P. No. 2017 of 1995, dated 24-3-1999 wherein this Court observed that the Municipal Authorities of Mysore have assured the Court in the said writ petitions that no fresh licences will be issued to put up any new construction in the Krishnavilas Road and heavy vehicular traffic in the said road will also be regulated. On this basis it was contended that since it is impossible in law for the landlord to demolish and reconstruct as he cannot obtain any licence to construct any premises in Krishnavilas Road and the case of landlord being to demolish and reconstruct and thereafter shift his business. No order of eviction can be ordered in a situation like this.
52. Objections have been filed to both the applications. Insofar as the acquisition of property from Muttu, it is stated that the same is acquired in the individual capacity of Suresh and Ramesh and the same will not inure to the benefit of “Landlord” more so after the partition effected among the members of family in 1975; Besides 80% of the said building is fallen down and the said property is situated in the residential locality. Similarly about the contention taken on the basis of W.P. No. 2017 of 1995, it is stated in the objection that the property is situated in between Santhepet and Deshikar Road and the undertaking given by the Municipal Authorities is only regarding future constructions.
53. Both the applications filed by the tenants are liable to be rejected.
54. With regard to the acquisition of property as contended, it is not even stated by the tenants that this property is for the benefit of the landlord and is suitable to shift his business. It cannot be said any acquisition of property by the divided son will inure to the benefit of the divided father also. In fact the similar contention by the tenants before the Courts below regarding the availability of alternative premises, acquired by the sons in their individual name has been rejected as being the acquisitions of divided sons after partition. Such contention cannot be accepted.
55. On the contention that no Municipal Licences will be issued to fresh constructions in Krishnavilas Road the landlord has produced a xerox copy of the licence for construction along with his objection. A perusal of which shows that the schedule premises can be reached both by Santhepet and Deshikar Road and even if the assertion of the tenant viz., that Deshikar Road and Krishnavilas Road are one and the same is accepted, there does not look to be any prohibition to put up the building on the Santhepet Road. The contention therefore is also liable to be rejected.
56. Both the Courts have concurrently held on facts that the requirement of landlord for self-occupation is both “Reasonable and bona fide” and the landlord suffers greater hardship and according to the learned Munsiff partial eviction is not feasible. But the learned District Judge possibly did not go into the question of partial eviction as he was providing a Right of Re-entry under Section 21(1)(j) (Which part of the order is illegal is what is held above). In my view, non-consideration of “Feasibility of partial eviction” in this case by the learned District Judge is not fatal.
57. As rightly contended by Sri A.G. Holla, learned Senior Counsel; once the Courts hold that the need of the landlord to occupy the premises under Section 21(1)(h) is upheld, the question of feasibility of partial eviction has to be considered only in a case where the premises which was tenanted continues to exist substantially in its original form but not in a case where a landlord intends to demolish and reconstruct in such a manner to suit his requirements. Section 21(1)(4) of the Act as stated is a clause intended to mitigate the hardship that may be caused while exercising the power under Section 21(1)(h). Section 21(1)(4) reads as under:
“Section 21(1)(4): No decree for eviction shall be passed on the ground specified in clause (h) of the proviso to such section (1) if the Court is satisfied that, having regard to all the circumstances of the case including the question whether other reasonable accommodation is available for the landlord of the tenant, greater hardship would be caused by passing the decree than by refusing to pass it.
If the Court is satisfied that no hardship would be caused either to the tenant or to the landlord by passing the decree in respect of the part of the premises, the Court shall pass the decree in respect of such part only”.
58. Therefore it is manifest that in the case of partial eviction tenant need not vacate the entire premises, but only a part of it. The premises that was leased to the tenant will remain the same in its original condition, in its “Form” substantially. The effect of partial eviction is only to shrink the area of tenanted premises. The premises does not undergo any structural alterations or a new building comes in its place.
59. For the reasons stated above, the following order is passed:
The rent revision petitions filed by the tenants in H.R.R.P. Nos. 250 of 1994, 366 of 1994, 430 of 1994, 619 of 1994, 1129 of 1994 are dismissed. The rent revision petitions filed by the landlord in H.R.R.P. Nos. 930 of 1994, 931 of 1994, 932 of 1994 are allowed, by setting aside that portion of the order of the learned District Judge, holding that the landlord has no need to occupy the first floor of the proposed construction and thereby providing a “Right of re-entry” leaning on clause (j) of Section 21(1) of the Act, and the order of the learned Munsiff is restored, and consequently the eviction petition filed by the landlord under Section 21(1)(h) is allowed.
60. Tenants in all the revision petitions are granted one year time from today to vacate the premises.