JUDGMENT
A.D. Tated, J.
1. This criminal revision application is directed against the order dated 29th November, 1982 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Greater Bombay, in Criminal Appeal No. 75 of 1979 ordering the appeal memo to be returned to the petitioner for presentation to the proper Court.
2. One juvenile boy, son of the respondent No. 1 Kisansingh, was charged with the offence under section 384 read with section 114 I.P.C. for having extorted the amount of Rs. 1,02,000/- belonging to the petitioner complainant Baburao R. Maskar by giving threats to the complainant’s son Suresh (P.W. 2). During investigation a cash amount of Rs. 42,000/- in 42 currency notes of Rs. 1,000/- each, which is marked as Exhibit ‘B’, and the amount of Rs. 341/-, which is marked as Exhibit ‘G’, and the property alleged to have been purchased with the extorted amount, which is marked as Exhibit ‘F’ (Collectively), was recovered from the house of the respondent No. 1. The learned Metropolitan Magistrate presiding over the Juvenile Court, Umerkhadi, Bombay, after trial of the boy on the charge for the aforesaid offence, acquitted the boy and directed that he be handed over to his father, the respondent No. 1, and would be under the supervision of the Probation Officer for one year. As regards the property, the learned Metropolitan Magistrate ordered confiscation to the, Government of the amount of Rs. 42,000/- (Ex. ‘B’) and Rs. 341/- (Ex. -‘G’), and as regard the property (Ex. ‘F’ (Colly.) ) she ordered proclamation thereof. The complainant, feeling aggrieved, filed a criminal appeal, being Criminal Appeal No. 21 2 of 1979, in the Sessions Court, Greater Bombay. That appeal was heard by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Greater Bombay (Shri A.D. Kale). The learned Additional Sessions Judge held that the order passed by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate presiding over the Juvenile Court was under section 452 Cri.P.C. and in view of the provisions of section 454(1) Cri.P.C. read with section 69 of the Bombay Children Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as, the “Act”), the order passed by the Juvenile Court was the final order and as such the appeal would lie to the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate to whom the appeal lies from the conviction of a child by the Juvenile Court. In this view of the matter, he held that he had no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal, and directed that the appeal memo be returned to the complainant for presentation to the proper Court.
3. The learned Counsel for the petitioner-complainant contends that the order passed by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate presiding over the Juvenile Court regarding disposal of property is not a final order as defined in section 4(l)(g) of the Act and the appeals under section 94 of the Act are provided only against the final orders and, therefore, the appeal against the order of disposal of property by the Juvenile Court does not lie to the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate and as such the order passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge directing the appeal memo to be returned to the complainant for presentation to the proper Court is not correct. The Public Prosecutor Mrs. Manjula Rao, on the other hand, contends that in the Act there is no provision for passing an order by the Juvenile Court regarding disposal of property on conclusion of trial and, therefore, the provisions of section 452 Criminal Procedure Code would apply and as per the provisions of section 454 Criminal Procedure Code the appeal against such order would lie to the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate to whom the appeals ordinarily lie against the orders of the Metropolitan Magistrate presiding over the Juvenile Court under section 94(2)(a) of the Act. Thus, according to her, the order passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge is correct.
4. Section 4(l)(g) of the Act defines ,final order” thus :-
“(g)final ‘order’ means an order passed by a Juvenile Court or any Court empowered under section 8 to exercise the powers of a Juvenile Court, under the following sections, namely : 45 to 47, 71 to 76, 79, 81 to 84, 90 to 92, 101 and 103”.
The appeal provisions against the orders passed by the Presiding Officer of the Juvenile Court are found in section 94 of the Act. It reads as follows :
“94. (1). Any person aggrieved by a final order may appeal to the Courts hereinafter mentioned.
(2) If a final order is passed,—
(a) by a Juvenile Court, an appeal shall lie in the Greater Bombay to the Chief Presidency Magistrate (now the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate) and in other places to the Court of Sessions ;
(b) by a Magistrate, not being a Presidency Magistrate (now a Metropolitan Magistrate) empowered under section 8 to exercise the powers of a Juvenile Court, an appeal shall lie to the Court of Session ;
(c) by a Presidency Magistrate (now a Metropolitan Magistrate) or a Court of Session, an appeal shall lie to the High Court, (3) Except as provided in this section, no appeal shall lie from any order passed under this Act by a Juvenile Court or any other Court empowered to exercise the powers of a Juvenile Court under section 8." (Bracketed portions supplied.) 5. Section 95 of the Act provides for application of certain provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1 898, to appeals. It reads thus :---- "95. The provisions of sections 419 to 431 (both inclusive) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, shall mutatis mutandis apply to appeals against final order as if the said orders were the orders of conviction and sentence passed by the Criminal Court."
The sections corresponding to sections 419 to 431 in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, are sections 382 to 394 in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The order passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate presiding over the Juvenile Court on completion of a trial of a child is not a final order within the meaning of the said term as defined in Clause (g) of section 4(l) of the Act. None of the sections of the Act mentioned in the definition of “final order” applies to the finding of acquittal or to the youthful offender committing the offence. Therefore, the order passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate at the conclusion of the trial of a youthful offender is not final order as defined in Clause (g) of section 4(l). Consequently, no appeal lies against such order under section 94 of the Act. Section 454 of the code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, reads thus :–
“454. (1) Any person aggrieved by an order made by a Court under section 452 or section 453, may appeal against it to the Court to which appeals ordinarily lie from convictions by the former Court.
(2) On such appeal, the Appellate Court may direct the order to be stayed pending disposal of the appeal, or may modify, alter or annul the order and make any further orders that may be just.
(3) The powers referred to in sub-section (2) may also be exercised by a Court of appeal, confirmation or revision while dealing with the case in which the order referred to in sub-section (1) was made.”
As stated earlier, no appeal lies from the order of acquittal or otherwise passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate presiding over the Juvenile Court on conclusion of trial, it not being a final order within the definition of the said term in section 4(l)(g) of the Act. Therefore, no appeal would lie from the order of the Metropolitan Magistrate presiding over the Juvenile Court ordering disposal of property at the conclusion of trial, to the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate. In the Act specific provisions have been made for appeals against the orders made under it. It is a special Act for dealing with the Juvenile offenders and other matters concerning a child, and as the Act makes provisions for appeals against the final orders passed under it, the general provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, regarding appeals against the orders passed by the Criminal Courts cannot be resorted to. Persons aggrieved by the orders of the Metropolitan Magistrate presiding over the Juvenile Court can prefer appeals to the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate in case the order is a final order as defined in the Act. As against the other orders they will have to resort to other remedies available under the law. One such remedy is invoking the superintending jurisdiction of the High Court, the Juvenile Court being under the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court. Consequently, the finding of the learned Additional Sessions Judge that the appeal would lie against the impugned order of the Metropolitan Magistrate presiding over the Juvenile Court, to the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate is not correct and he was also not right in ordering the appeal memo to be returned to the petitioner-complainant for presentation to the proper Court. There is no provision either in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, or in the Act for return of the appeal memo to the complainant for presentation to the proper Court. The appeal before the learned Additional Sessions Judge was not competent, and, therefore, the only course open for him was to dismiss the appeal as not tenable. The complainant may resort to the remedy available to him under the law.
6. Consequently, the rule is made absolute accordingly.