JUDGMENT
Kanhaiya Singh, J.
1. The suit which hag given rise to this appeal
was brought by the plaintiff-appellant to recover
from the defendant-respondent Union of India, as
representing the East Indian Railway Administration, Rs. 1,051-14-0, as compensation for the loss of five bags of Shellac and also Rs. 16 on account of advocate’s fee for sending a notice under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the total claim laid being Rs. 1,067-14-0.
2. The facts about which there is no controversy are these: A consignment of 106 bags of Shellac was despatched from Grahwa Railway Station for Howrah on the 27th November, 1950, deliverable to the plaintiff’s agent Messrs. D. Mukherjee and Co., of Calcutta. The plaintiff’s agent took delivery, after obtaining a short delivery certificate from, the Goods Superintendent Howrah. The said plaintiff’s agent, thereafter, preferred a claim for compensation on account of the loss of five bags of shellac under Section 77 of the Indian Railways Act and demanded payment of Rs. 1,051-14-0 as the price thereof from the Chief Commercial Manager of the East Indian Railways. The Railway Authorities informed the plaintiff’s agent on the 7th August, 1951 that the claim was not entertainable as the loss occurred from a running train. The plaintiff, thereupon, served a notice under Section So of the Code of Civil Procedure upon the defendant and instituted the present suit on the 12th February, 1952,
3. The defendant denied the liability for the claim and pleaded limitation. Both the Courts below concurrently found that the plaintiff was entitled to recover compensation from the Railway on account of the loss of the five bags of shellac but held that the suit was barred by limitation with this difference that, according to the trial Judge, Article 30 of the Limitation Act applied to the facts of the case, whereas, the learned Judge of the Court of appeal below has held that Article 31 of the Limitation Act governed the case.
4. The only point that falls for determination is whether the suit is barred by limitation, and this involves the question whether Article 30 or Article 31 of the Limitation Act applies. Having regard to the facts of this case, there is no doubt–and it is not seriously disputed in this Court–that Article 31 of the Limitation Act governs the suit. Article 30 provides a period of one year for a suit against a carrier for compensation for losing or injuring goods, the period of limitation to run from the date when the loss or injury occurs.
Strictly speaking, the instant suit was not one for compensation for loss of, or injury to goods. Article 31, on the other hand, provides for a suit against a carrier for compensation for non-delivery of or delay in delivering goods,’ and the period of Limitation is one year to be computed from the date on which the goods ought to be delivered This article is more appropriate in the instant case. It does not, however, prescribe any firm date from which the period of Limitation has to be computed. The question is: What is the meaning of the expression “when the goods ought to be delivered”? If there is any date fixed by contract for the delivery of the goods then undoubtedly it is that date which must be taken to be the date from which the period of one year prescribed by Article 31 is to be computed. The difficulty arises where no such date is fixed. In cases where no date was fixed, then, according to the general rule of interpretation, the time for the delivery of goods must be taken to be a reasonable time. In this connection a distinction has to be made between “reasonable time” and “ordinary time” for delivery of goods. “Ordinary tune” indicates normal time which must be the time within which the good? are ordinarily delivered. It is not the ordinary time which is envisaged by this Article. It con templates a reasonable time within which the goods ought to be delivered., What is reasonable time must depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. No hard and fast rule can be laid down to determine what would be reasonable time within which the goods ought to have been delivered. No date was agreed upon in this case for delivery of the goods.
In order to determine what was the reasonable time within which the goods in question ought to have been delivered, it is well to remember that. in this case, there was only one consignment dispatched only in one wagon and not more consignments in different packages and sent in different wagons. We find that the wagon in which the consignment was booked reached the destination station, namely, Howrah on the 9gth December, 1950. A Major part of the consignment namely, 101 bags out of 106 bags, was delivered to the plaintiff’s agent on that date. There is no dispute about that. If the decision turned upon this fact, in my opinion, there is no room for doubt that the remaining goods in question also ought to have been delivered on the same date, that is, the 9th December, 1950. When the entire consignment was loaded in one wagon, it will be wholly unreasonable to assume that the consignment may have been delivered piecemeal on different dates. Therefore, if the case rested there and there was nothing more the suit was, no doubt, barred by limitation, because it was brought after more than one year from that date, namely, on the 12th February, 1952.
Learned counsel appearing for the appellant, however, contended that there was correspondence between the plaintiff’s agent and the Railway Administration, and 4he Railway Administration, by their letter dated the 7th August, 1951, refused to entertain the claim of the plaintiff and that, therefore, the date of refusal, namely, the 7th August, 1951, must be taken to be the date when the consignment ought to have been delivered and, therefore, the period of limitation should be computed not from the 9th December, 1950, but from the 7th August, 1951, from which point of view the suit is well within time. This contention appears to be prima facie plausible, but on a closer examination, it has no substance. To accept this contention will be to import in Article 31 something which is not there. If the intention of the Legislature was that the date of refusal by the Railway Administration to pay the compensation would be the starting point of limitation, there was nothing easier than mentioning this date in Article 31.
This Article rather says that the suit for compensation for non-delivery of goods has to be filed within one year from the date when the goods ought to be delivered. It will be idle to argue that the date of refusal by the Railway Administration must invariably be taken to be the date on which the goods ought to be delivered within the meaning of Article 31, of the Limitation Act. If that were so, under Article 31, there will be two dates from which the period of limitation should be computed, depending upon whether or not there was correspondence. If there was correspondence, the date of refusal and where there was no correspondence the date when the goods ought to be delivered. It will be wrong to attribute such intention to the legislature, specially when the plain words of the Article do not warrant such a construction. It is not the requirement of the law that the plaintiff must lodge a claim before bringing the suit. The plaintiff cannot by a fruitless correspondence obtain an extended period of limitation. If that were so, it will be easy to evade the provisions of this Article by laying a false claim.
At the same time, it cannot be said that, where there is correspondence between the plaintiff and the Railway Administration, it has no bearing at all on the question of limitation. The solution of the question depends upon the nature of the correspondence. The correspondence may furnish the circumstance which may in a given case indicate the reasonable time for computation of the period of limitation. The nature of the correspondence in each case has, therefore, to be taken into consideration. If, in a particular case, the Railway Administration, by their letter, have given a hope to the plaintiff that his claim was under investigation and was likely to be entertained, the date of eventual refusal of the claim may justly be regarded as the date for the computation of the period of limitation, not on the strength of the correspondence, but because of implied acknowledgment of the liability. No such acknowledgment is involved where there is a simple demand and refusal. Where the Railway Administration by such evasive reply made the plaintiff wait as long as entire matter was under investigation, it will not be reasonable and fair to hold that the date of delivery of the major part of the consignment must be taken to be the date of which the remaining part of the consignment ought to have been delivered. If, however, the correspondence does not disclose that the plaintiff had any reasonable basis for hoping that his claim would be entertained, and he files his suit after the expiry of the period of limitation, the date of refusal by the Railway Administration will not extend the date from which the period of limitation, has to be computed, under Article 31 of the Limitation Act.
Therefore, the correspondence which makes the plaintiff wait until the final reply is sent to him by the Railway Administration, is, in my opinion, important. We cannot, therefore, lay down as a general proposition of law that, in all cases of non delivery of goods, the date of the final reply by the Railway Administration is necessarily the date from which the period of limitation has to be computed under Article 31 of the Limitation Act. If we keep this vital distinction in mind there wilt be no difficulty in distinguishing the cases on which reliance was placed by learned counsel for the appellant. He referred in support of his proposition to the following cases: B. and N. W. Rly., Co., Ltd. v. Kameshwar Singh, AIR 1933 Pat 45,. Governor-General in Council v. Kasiram Marwari, AIR 1949 Pat 268, Union of India v. Bansidhar Modi, AIR 1954 Pat 548, Union of India v. Khemchand, AIR 1959 Pat 114, Union of India v. Textile Trading Co., AIR 1960 Pat 102, Dominion of India v. Amin Chand Bhola Nath, (S) AIR 1957 Punj 49 (FB), Mutsaddi Lal v. Governor-General in Council, AIR 1952 All 897 (FB), Dominion of India v. S. G. Ahmad, AIR 1954 Nag 115 and Shambhuram Agarwala v. Union of India, AIR, 1958 Pat 118.
None of these cases is applicable to the facts of the present case. In all these cases, the correspondence disclosed that the claim was under investigation and the Railway Administration desired the plaintiff to await the final result. After investigation the plaintiff was informed that the claim was not entertainable, but in the meantime, the period of limitation prescribed by the Limitation Act had already expired. In these cases, it was therefore, laid down that the period of limitation would be computed from the date of refusal by the Railway Administration for the simple reason that, by their conduct, they encouraged the plaintiff to entertain a hope that his claim would be settled and satisfied by them. In these circumstances, the plaintiff had no option but to wait till tile final decision by the Railway Administration. If, however, there was a mere correspondence and forthright refusal without encouraging any hope of settlement of the claim, such refusal does not furnish the starting point of limitation and for the proposition, I rely on the decision of this Court in Gopi Ram Gouri Shankar v. G. I. P. Rly. Co., AIR 1927 Pat 335 and Gajanand Rajgoria v. Union of India, (S) AIR 1955 Pat 182. In the first case, it has been laid down by a Bench of this Court that —
“In a suit for non-delivery, where no portion of the consignment has been delivered, it is sometimes necessary to take evidence on the question of when the consignment ought to have been delivered, which must in any case be regarded as a question of fact, but where a great part of a consignment) has been delivered on a certain day, there is ordinarily no necessity to enter into evidence on the question of when the balance of the consignment ought to have been delivered, because the time when the consignment as a whole ought to have been delivered is manifestly the time when the greater part of the consignment arrived at its destination.”
This case will certainly come under that class of cases where there is no correspondence between the plaintiff and the Railway Administration. If there is no correspondence, in a case of part delivery of consignment, it is futile to enter into evidence in order to determine when the consignment ought to have been delivered, because it must be held that the date of delivery of a greater part of the consignment is the date when the remaining portion of the consignment ought to have been delivered. Even when there is correspondence, it does not conclude the matter as it was pointed out in the second case. In that case also, there was correspondence and the claim of the plaintiff was rejected, and it was held that such refusal by the Railway Administration does not extend the period of limitation on the ground that there is no acknowledgment of liability under Section 19 of the Limitation Act by mere refusal. This is exactly what happened in the present case. The plaintiff laid claim with the Railway Administration and it was refused. Such a refusal as in that case, cannot have the effect of extending the period of limitation prescribed by Article 31 of the Limitation Act.
The position would have been different if the Railway Administration, by their conduct, had encouraged the plaintiff to think that his claim was under investigation and might be allowed in course of time. If however, the Railway Administration did not raise any hope in the plaintiff that his claim would be entertained, mere refusal had not the effect of enlarging the period of limitation prescribed under Article 31 of the Limitation Act. In the present case, the plaintiff was informed long before the expiry of the period of one year from the date of delivery of the major part of the consignment that his claim could not be entertained. Still the plaintiff did not think it proper to file his suit within the prescribed period of limitation. In my opinion, the Court of appeal below is right in holding that the claim of the plaintiff is barred by time under Article 31 of the Limitation Act.
5. Assuming that Article 30 governs the present case, -I think it makes no difference to the result of the case. The date on which the major part of the consignment was delivered to the plaintiff's agent was the date when the loss occurred to the plaintiff, and the period of one year prescribed under this Article expired long before he filed this suit. Therefore, taking any view, whether Article 30 or Article 31 applies to the facts of the present case, it must be held that the suit is beyond time. 6. In the result, this appeal is dismissed with costs. Ramratna Singh, J. 7. I agree.