ORDER
1. The petitioner, who is Vice President Wadhwan Municipality has challenged the order of the Collector passed under S. 258 of the Gujarat Municipalities Act, whereby he has directed the Chief Officer (who had refused to take on record the minutes and proceeding of the meeting of 1lth November, 1989) to take the same on record.
2. The meeting was scheduled to be held on 11-11-1989 at 8-00 a.m. There is a dispute and there are rival versions. According to the petitioner, the meeting was adjourned by the President at 7-00 in the morning and the notice to the effect was placed on the notice board on that day; and that was within the power of the President to adjourn the meeting before it was actually convened. The rival version is that the President had lost the majority. He had not remained present and his supporting members have also not remained present and he had also taken the keys of the meeting room. But 15 members out of the total strength of 25 members of the Municipality, had held the meeting and taken the proceedings and constituted committee. However, the Chief Officer was not recording the minutes of the meeting and, therefore, the Collector was moved for the aforesaid direction which the Collector has granted.
3. The learned counsel for the petitioner has raised the following contentions:
(1) That the Collector has no power under S. 258 of the Act to decide the validity of the adjournment of the meeting by the President.
(2) The meeting was validly adjourned by the President and, therefore, there was no question of continuing the meeting by the Councilors.
(3) That reliance placed by the Collector on the decision reported in the case of Dr. Kantilal Sanghavi v. Vinay Sharma, (1971) 12 Guj LR 741 is not right in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Jayantibhai Manubhai Patel v. Arun Somabhai Mehta, (1989) 1 Guj LH 59 1: (AIR 1989 SC 1289).
4. Section 258(l) reads as under:
“258. (1). If the opinion of the Collector the execution of any order or resolution of a Municipality or the doing of anything which is about to be done or is being done by or on behalf of a Municipality, is causing or is likely to cause injury or annoyance to the public or to lead to a breach of the peace or is unlawful, he may by order in writing under his signature suspend the execution or prohibit the doing thereof and where the execution of any work in pursuance of the order or resolution of the municipality is already commenced or completed direct the municipality to restore the position in which it was before the commencement of the work.”
5. The learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that it is only the act of the Municipality which could have been the subject matter of the proceeding under S. 258 and the Collector may have jurisdiction about the same, but the Collector has no jurisdiction to decide about the validity of an act as President which is different from the act of the Municipality and, therefore, according to the learned counsel for the petitioner the order of the Collector is without jurisdiction. Secondly, it is contended that in any case the act of adjourning the meeting was complete and it was not an act which was being done and, therefore, also the Collector has no jurisdiction. In this connection reliance has been placed on the decision of the Division Bench in the case of H. H. Parmar v. Collector, Rajkot, (1979) 20 (2) Guj LR 97.
6. In the present case it is not the act of the President of adjourning the meeting which is being independently challenged. The act which has been challenged is that of the Chief Officer who is refusing to record the minutes of the meeting alleged to have been held by 15 members of the Municipality. It is true that a decision on that question may involve decision on another questions including the question of validity of the adjournment by the President. Once the Collector has jurisdiction to decide about the act of the Municipality any question that arises in that proceeding and which is necessary to be decided, he has jurisdiction to decide any such question which arises in such proceeding.
7. The question which was raised before the Collector was regarding the act of the Chief Officer of the Municipality whereby he had refused to record the proceedings and minutes of the meeting said to have been held by the group of 15 members of the Municipality. In his letter to the Collector dated 5-12- Annexure-E, the Chief Officer has stated that no meeting of the Municipality was held to his notice on that day in the office of the Municipality and, therefore, he had refused to record such proceeding.
8. Before the Collector it was submitted that at the appointed date and time of the meeting, 15 members had held the meeting in the compound of the Municipality as the President who was reduced to minority had not remained present and had gone away with keys of the office and of the meeting room and, therefore, 15 members who had remained present had conducted the meeting by electing the President for the purpose of meeting and constituted the committee and has passed the resolution unanimously and had asked the Chief Officer to take the minutes and proceeding of the meeting on record and to act on it.
9. The President of the Municipality contested by stating that no meeting was at all held and held that it was not possible to hold the meeting in the atmosphere of threats and terror and, therefore, the meeting was already adjourned and notice was put up and that he had power to adjourn the meeting. As against that, 15 Councilors represented that as the President has lost the majority, the President and the Chief Officer had deliberately abstained and tried to prevent the majority members from exercising democratic right. Yet the majority members had without any threat or pressure validly undertaken the meeting and passed the resolution unanimously and, therefore, the Chief Officer should be directed to take the minutes and proceedings of that meeting on record and to act on it.
10. The Collector held that there was no such serious situation so as to require the adjournment of the meeting and for that he observed that if it was so serious and two members were abducted there would be some complaint to the police, but no such complaint is filed. The Collector has also noticed that there is serious contradiction between the versions of the President and the Chief Officer. The President has stated that he was present till 8.30 a.m. and no one was present and he had adjourned the meeting at 8.30 a.m. whereas the Chief Officer states that he had received the order of adjournment of the meeting between 6.30 to 7.00 a.m. and he had put that order on the notice board. Both these cannot be true and cannot stand together. The Collector has also noticed that 15 members who constituted majority had no reason to remain absent and, therefore, the version of the President and the Chief Officer was not considered free and reliable. The Collector came to the conclusion that the act of the President of adjourning the meeting was not bona fide and was not in accordance with law and justice and ultimately held that the proceedings taken by 15 Councilors were legal and valid and those resolutions are required to be implemented and the Chief Officer, who had refused to take those resolutions on record was directed to take the same on record and to implement the same.
11. The petitioner has submitted that the matter was already adjourned before the meeting was convened which was scheduled at 8:00 a.m. and it was already adjourned at 7.00 a.m. and, therefore, it was within his power and it was not necessary to consult the house for adjournment.
12. In this connection reliance had been placed on the Supreme Court case in the case of Jayantibhai M. Patel (AIR 1989 SC 1289) (supra). Even if it is assumed that the meeting was adjourned by the President before the time of its meeting, the Supreme Court has observed that- “This power must be exercised bona fide and not for a collateral purpose. The power must be exercised for a proper purpose. If the Mayor is unable to show this, then the postponement of the meeting must be held to be bad.” In the present case, the petitioner has failed to show that the powers were exercised for a proper purpose. There is nothing to substantiate that there was any such serious situation which required the postponement of the meeting. The so-called notice, Annexure A which purports to have shown the time of 7.00 O’clock in the morning is utterly vague. It does not state as to which particular members had made such representation. No names are given. It is not stated whether any written representation is made. It does not state as to which two members have been abducted and what were the threats and terror. The President who is a high public officer of the city has not cared to see that the other public authorities like District Magistrate and Police Authorities are immediately informed about the same nor family members of the so-called abductee have filed any complaint or have expressed any anxiety about the abductees. No police protection is sought. No protection of any other authority is sought. If really the meeting was adjourned at 7.00 a.m. and notice was published, it would be known to the large member of the people including the persons who were interested in attending the meeting. But this is not known to these persons. The learned counsel for the petitioner at one stage tried to submit that 15 members who had gone to the Collector to make a representation, had admitted about the notice matters. However, going through all these annextures it is seen that there is no such admission and no reference whatsoever to such notice. It appears that this notice is an afterthought. Even at the stage when this notice is prepared, names of the members who are said to have complained and whether such complaint is written complaint or not and which two Councilors were kidnapped, nothing is mentioned and deliberately gaps of vegueness, were kept so as to fill the lacuna later on. The real fact is that the President is in hopeless minority. If he postponed the meeting in such circumstances, it is clear that the existence of the power, even if he had any, was not bona fide and was for collateral purpose. As observed by the Supreme Court , it is for the President to show that the power was bona fide exercised and if the President is unable to show this the postponement of the meeting must be held to be bad. In the present case also the Collector held that the postponement was not for bona fide purpose.’ Therefore, the postponement is bad.
13. Moreover, the postponement does not seem to be before the time of the meeting The President himself has stated that he had adjourned the meeting at 8.30 a.m. and nobody else was present. At that stage, the President could not have adjourned the meeting by himself, because the time of the meeting was at 8.00 a.m. In that case the judgment in the case of Dr. Kantilal Sanghavi (1971 (12) ,Guj LR 741) (supra) would be applicable and after convening of the meeting it is the House who has power to adjourn the meeting. Thus, for both the reasons that the meeting was not adjourned bona fide and was not adjourned before the time of the its convening, the adjournment of the meeting is utterly illegal, and mala fide. In these circumstances, it was open to the members present to hold the meeting and continue the proceeding and such meeting and proceedings are legal and valid and the Chief Officer cannot refuse to record its minutes and proceedings and refuse to implement those resolutions.
14. This act of the Chief Officer is directly covered by Sec. 258(l) of the Act which provides that if doing of anything is unlawful he may prohibit the doing thereof. In the present case the act of the Municipality through its Chief Executive Officer to refuse to record the minutes and to refuse to implement the resolutions is utterly unlawful and the Collector has jurisdiction to give directions and prohibit the Chief Officer and the Municipality from doing so.
15. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that no meeting of 15 members had taken place as alleged and that the so-called meeting if at all was held later on, it cannot be said to be held in pursuance to the agenda which was scheduled at 8.00 a.m. For that purpose he has referred two letters addressed to the Collector Annexures B and C and it is contended that in Annexure B letter to the Collector it is not stated that the meeting has been held and proceedings were conducted and it is only in Annexure C which is received by the Collector after 12.00 O’clock it is stated that the meeting has been conducted. From this it is not possible to come to such conclusion that immediately the meeting was sought to be held and the Collector is informed of the meeting held. Moreover this question was not raised before the Collector and, therefore, such factual question cannot be raised for the first time in this petition.
16. The impugned order of the Collector is not in any way illegal, erroneous and all the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner fail. Hence, the petition is summarily dismissed.
17. Petition dismissed.