JUDGMENT
Rajive Bhalla, J.
1. In this writ petition filed under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India the petitioner prays for quashing the orders dated 7.5.1963, 4.5.1987 and 16.6.1988 (Annexure P-3, P-4 and P-5) passed by the Special Collector, Commissioner and Financial Commissioner, Punjab respectively.
2. The facts that have led to the filing of the present writ petition need not be adverted to in detail as the learned Financial Commissioner has primarily dismissed the revision petition, filed by the petitioner, on the ground that the appeal filed before the Commissioner was barred by limitation.
3. The petitioner, admittedly was not a party to the proceedings to declare surplus, land owned by one Thakar Hamir Singh s/o Sohan Singh, who has since passed away and is now represented by his legal representatives-respondents No. 5 to 10. The petitioner derived knowledge of the fact that the land, which he claims to have received from Thakar Hamir Singh, in exchange for land handed over by him in Village Saidanwala, had been declared surplus, upon service of a notice on 17.2.1983 under Section 9 of the Punjab Land Reforms Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the 1972 Act’). Vide this notice the petitioner was called upon to hand over possession of the land in dispute as it had been declared surplus.
4. The petitioner, filed objections, which were dismissed on 13.3.1984, whereafter he preferred an appeal before the Commissioner, Ferozepur Division, Ferozepur, impugning the original order declaring, the land which had been received by him in exchange, as surplus.
5. The learned Commissioner dismissed the appeal, primarily, on the ground that the appeal was barred by limitation. The revision preferred by the petitioner, before the Financial Commissioner, Punjab, was dismissed mainly on the ground that the appeal filed before the Commissioner was barred by limitation. A fleeting reference was, however, made to the merits of the controversy.
6. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the pleadings.
7. It is settled law that limitation to impugn an adverse order, when the aggrieved person is not a party to the proceedings, commences from the date of its knowledge. Judicial precedents that support the above proposition of law are reported as Vir Singh v. State of Punjab and Ors., 1970 P.L.J. 70 and C.W.P. of 2610 of 1980, Tek Ram v. State of Haryana and Ors.,. The law of limitation has its genies in the endeavour to shut out stale claims that seek to unsettle established positions. Limitation by its very nature is a doctrine of defence. The shield of limitation should not be used as a sword, to fell just causes. A reference to a judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, namely, Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and Anr. v. Mst. Katiji and Ors., 1987 S.C. 1353 would be appropriate. The relevant extract from the above mentioned judgment reads as follows:
“1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.
2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.
3. “Every days’ delay must be explained” does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour’s delay, every second’s delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.
4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.
5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.
6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.”
8. To condemn a person or a cause unheard would be an anti thesis to the due process of law, and a violation of principles of natural justice enshrined in the Constitution.
9. Coming to the present controversy, it appears that the learned Financial Commissioner lost sight of the fact that the petitioner had at no stage been associated with the proceedings to declare surplus, the land, owned by Thakar Hamir Singh. The petitioner was never issued any notice to come present and oppose the declaration of surplus area. The revenue record, referred to by the learned counsel for the petitioner, shows the petitioner in possession pursuant to an exchange. Whether the revenue record was genuine or not, the exchange legal or not, bonafide or not, liable to be ignored or not were all questions of fact that required a detailed adjudication. It is also not denied that the petitioner had no knowledge of the passing of the order dated 7.5.1963, declaring the land alleged to have been received by him in exchange as surplus. The petitioner became aware of the aforementioned order, for the first time on 17.2.1983 upon service of a notice under Section 9 of the 1972 Act. Consequently, the learned Financial Commissioner was not justified in busting the petitioner, on the ground of limitation.
10. In so far as the finding of the Commissioner, as confirmed by the learned Financial Commissioner that even if the petitioner were to be granted allowance for lack of knowledge of order dated 7.5.1963, the appeal would be barred by limitation, the said findings suffer from a inherent flaw. Once it was held that the petitioner had no knowledge of the order dated 7.5.1963, a major part of the delay stood explained. A delay of a few days or a few months, after the dismissal of the objections, should not have prevented the revenue authorities from adjudicating the petitioner’s plea on merits. The learned Financial Commissioner also lost sight of the fact that his power of revisions entitle him to exercise suo moto powers to undo injustice. Suo moto powers have been conferred with the object of enabling the highest authority on the revenue side to undo injustice wherever apparent or noticed. Technicalities of law and the mesh of procedure cannot be allowed to stand in the way of undoing injustice.
11. The petitioner’s grievance that his land, received by him in exchange, was sought to be declared, surplus, without any notice to him was a plea that should have best tried the Financial Commissioner into a detailed examination on merits.
12. In view of the aforementioned facts and keeping in view the principles regarding limitation, enunciated by t he Hon’ble Supreme court in Collector, L and Acquisition, Anantnag and Anr. v. Mst. Katiji and Ors. (supra) relevant extract where of has been reproduced above, this Court is of the considered opinion that the learned Financial Commissioner failed to exercise his revisional jurisdiction in accordance with law The petitioner had successfully established sufficient cause to explain the delay in approaching the revenue authorities.
13. Learned counsel for the State has been unable to put forth any substantial argument in support of the findings returned by the revenue Courts that the plea raised by the petitioner was barred by limitation.
14. In so far as the merits of the controversy, the petitioners has raised a plea that prior to the coming into force of the Act, land which has been declared surplus, had been transferred to him pursuant to an oral exchange with the big land owner. In lieu of this land, the petitioner transferred land to the brothers of the big land owner as the land transferred to the petitioner, was part of a joint khata. Pursuant to the oral exchange, a mutation was recorded, which was subsequently entered in the Revenue Record. Counsel for the petitioner contends that entries in the Revenue Record are evidence of the oral exchange that was effected prior to the coining into force of the Act. The learned Courts below have erroneously held that as the exchange was recorded in the revenue record after the coming into force of the Act, it had to be ignored. It is also contended that the Commissioner and the Financial Commissioner have committed an error of fact while holding that the petitioner did not transfer any land in lieu of the land received by him in exchange. The petitioner received land from the big land owner, from his joint khata and transferred his land to the brothers of the big land owner.
15. In view of the fact that in the preceding part of the judgment, it has been held that the claim of the petitioner should not have been dismissed on the ground of limitation. I deem it appropriate to refrain from expressing any opinion on the merits of the controversy, lest it prejudice the case of the parties.
16. In view of what has been stated above, the writ petition is allowed. The order dated 16.6.1988 of the learned Financial Commissioner is set aside and the matter remitted to the Financial Commissioner (Appeals), Punjab, for a decision afresh on merits. It is, however, made clear that any observations made or finding returned on the merits of the controversy, shall not be construed to be an expression of opinion in respect thereof. The learned Financial Commissioner shall be free to decide the matter on merits.
17. The learned Financial Commissioner shall make every endeavour to decide the revision petition within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order.
No costs.