PETITIONER:
BAL NIKETAN NURSERY SCHOOL
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
KESARI PRASAD
DATE OF JUDGMENT15/07/1987
BENCH:
NATRAJAN, S. (J)
BENCH:
NATRAJAN, S. (J)
MUKHARJI, SABYASACHI (J)
CITATION:
1987 AIR 1970 1987 SCR (3) 510
1987 SCC (3) 587 JT 1987 (3) 93
1987 SCALE (2)67
ACT:
Civil Procedure Code, 1908--Order 1 Rule 10---Bona fide
mistake in filing suit in name of wrong person--Duty of
Court to set right mistake by ordering addition/substitution
of the proper plaintiff.
U.P. Basic Education Act, 1972--School recognised under
the Act--Exempted from provisions of Rent Act--Proceedings
instituted to impugn recognition of school--Do not affect
status of school at time eviction suits were filed by
school.
U.P. Urban Building Regulation of Letting, Rent and
Eviction Act, 1972--Section 2(1)(b)--Landlord--A recognised
school--Exempted from provisions of Act entitled to file
suits through Manager for eviction of tenants.
HEADNOTE:
Section 2(1)(b) of the U.P. Urban Building Regulation of
Letting, Rent and Eviction Act, 1972 lays down that "nothing
in this Act shall apply to any building belonging to or
Vested in a recognised institution, the whole of the income
from which is utilised for the purpose of such institution."
The manager of the appellant school, a recognised insti-
tution under the U.P. Basic Education Act, 1972, run and
managed by a Registered Society issued notice of termination
of tenancy to the four tenants of the super-structures
(Khaprails) purchased by it, under Section 106 of the Trans-
fer of Property Act and demanded surrender of possession. As
the tenants failed to surrender possession, he filed sepa-
rate suits against the four tenants for ejectment and pay-
ment of arrears of rent. The respondent and the other ten-
ants contended that the school was not a recognised educa-
tional institution entitled to the benefit of Section
2(1)(b) of the U.P. Urban Building Regulation of Letting,
Rent and Eviction Act, 1972 and that the notice of termina-
tion of tenancy was not valid. The trial court rejected the
contentions of the tenants and decreed the suits in favour
of the school. The revisional court confirmed the judgment
and decree of the trial court and dismissed all the revision
petitions.
511
In the writ petitions before the High Court, it was
contended for the first time that the appellant school was
not a juristic person and was not, therefore, entitled to
file the suits through its manager. It was submitted on
behalf of the school that as a recognised institution under
the U.P. Basic Education Act, 1972, it has juristic status,
that the suit had been instituted by a person who was not
only the manager of the school but also the secretary of the
Registered Society and as such the suits were fully main-
tainable under law. The appellant school, also filed a
petition under Order 1 Rule 10 of Code of Civil Procedure
for amending the plaint by correcting the name of the plain-
tiff into the name of the Society by its secretary in place
of the name of the school by its manager.
The High Court held that in view of the specific provi-
sion in Clause (14) of the Constitution of the Registered
Society to the effect that "all the legal proceedings by the
Society and against the Society will be done either by the
Manager or by the Secretary or by a person authorised by
them", the appellant school was not a juristic person and
only the Registered Society had the authority and competence
to file the suits and that the suits filed by the appellant
school were not maintainable. It quashed the judgments and
decrees passed by the courts below in three suits since the
fourth suit had been compromised after the filing of the
writ petition.
Insofar as the application under Order 1 Rule 10 was
concerned the High Court held that the proper course for the
appellant school was to move the trial court for getting the
description of the appellant corrected and then pursue the
proceedings for eviction.
Allowing the appeal by special leave, this Court,
HELD: 1. It is well settled that if the court is satis-
fied that a bona fide mistake has occurred in the filing of
the suits in the name of the wrong person, then the court
should set right matters in exercise of its powers under
Order 1 Rule 10 and promote the cause of justice. The Courts
have also held that even if the suit had been instituted in
the name of a person who had no competence to file the suit,
the courts should set right matters by ordering the addition
or substitution of the proper plaintiff for ensuring the due
dispensation of justice. [519D-E]
2.1 By reason of recognition granted under U.P. Basic
Education Act, 1972, the appellant school stands clothed
with legal status, and is not a non-entity in the eye of
law. [517G]
512
2.2 Any proceedings instituted to impugn the recognition
of the school subsequent to the filing of the suits cannot
affect the status of the school at the time the suits were
filed. [518A]
2.3 The appellant constitutes the landlord of the ten-
ants after the property was purchased in its name and rents
from the tenants came to be collected. Once a jural rela-
tionship between landlord and tenants was formed between the
appellant and the tenants by operation of law, the appel-
lant's right to initiate actions against the tenants for
recovery of arrears of rent or recovery of possession of the
leased property cannot be questioned or disputed. [518C-D]
2.4 Even if the status of the appellant is to be judged
solely with reference to clause (14) of the Constitution of
the Society, the person who filed the suits is not only the
manager of the school but also the Secretary of the Society
and even as per this clause he is competent to file suits on
behalf of the Society. The suits, even if not instituted in
the name of Registered Society, are nevertheless competent
actions because they have been filed by the Manager of the
school who is competent to file suits on behalf of the
Society also for recovering possession of the leased proper-
ty. [518E-H; 519A]
2.5 The appellant is, therefore, entitled to file the
suits through its Manager to seek the eviction of the ten-
ants occupying the superstructure. [517]
3. The High Court was in error in sustaining the belated
objection. taken by the tenants regarding the competence of
the appellant to file the suits and quashing the decrees for
eviction passed against the tenants and remanding the suits
to the trial court for fresh disposal, after first consider-
ing whether the suits had been instituted in the name of the
wrong plaintiff due to a bona fide mistake and whether the
mistake called for rectification by allowing the petition
filed under Order 1 Rule 10 Code of Civil Procedure. [517D-
E]
4. Appeal allowed and the matter remitted to the High
Court for disposal on merits after allowing the application
filed under Order 1 Rule 10 Code of Civil Procedure by the
appellant and ordering the Society through its Secretary to
be also added as a plaintiff in the suits so as to make it
clear that the person who has filed the suits is represent-
ing not only the appellant school but also the Registered
Society. [522A-B]
Hughes v. The Pump House Hotel Company Limited (No. 2),
513
[1902] 2 Kings Bench 485; Krishna Bai v. The Collector and
Government Agent, Tanjore & Others, ILR 30 Madras 419; Sitla
Bux Singh v. Mahabir Prasad, AIR 1936 Oudh 275; Dinanath
Kumar v. Nishi Kanta Kumar and Others, A.I.R. 1952 Calcutta
102; Laxmi Kumar Srinivas Das v. Krishnaram Baldev Bank,
Lashkar and another, A.I.R. 1954 M.B. 156; Karri Somalu v.
Thimmalapalli Venkataswamy and others, [1963] 2 A.W.R. 138;
Udit Narain Singh Malpaharia v. Additional Member Board of
Revenue, Bihar and another, A.I.R. 1963 SC 786 and Murari
Mohan Deb v. Secretary to Government of India, [1985] 3 SCC
120, referred to.
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 55A of
1987.
From the Judgment and Order dated 8.10. 1985 of the
Allahabad High Court in Civil Misc. Petn. No. 2278 of 1981.
S.N. Kacker, R.N. Sharma, J.K Jain and N.N. Sharma for
the Appellant.
Gopal Singh and L.R. Singh for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
NATARAJAN, J. The question failing for consideration in
this appeal by special leave is whether the High Court has
erred in law in quashing the order of eviction passed
against the respondent by the Judge, Small Cause Court as
confirmed by the Additional District Judge and remitting the
suit to the trial court for fresh consideration in the event
of the trial court allowing an application by the appellant
under Order I Rule 10 Civil Procedure Code for correcting
the name of the plaintiff in the plaint.
The background of events to this Appeal may briefly be
stated. The appellant Bal Niketan Nursery School is a recog-
nised institution under the U.P. Basic Education Act, 1972,
and is run and managed by a Society, “Smt. Chandramukhi Ram
Saran Shiksha Samiti”, registered under the Societies Regis-
tration Act. Dr. Om Prakash is the Manager of the appellant
school and also the Secretary of the registered Society
mentioned above. On 10.3.1977 the Society purchased a plot
of the land adjoining the school together with four super
structures (Khaprails) standing thereon in the name of the
appellant school through its Manager Om Prakash Gupta. The
super-structures were in
514
the occupation of four tenants. The entire rental income
derived from the tenants is being utilised for the purpose
of running the school. Under the U.P. Urban Building Regula-
tion of Letting, Rent and Eviction Act, 1972 (for short the
Rent Act) the provisions of the Act would not apply to a
property owned by a recognised educational institution if
the whole of the income from the property is utilised for
the purposes of the institution. Section 2(1)(b) which
provides for the exemption is in the following terms:
“Nothing in this Act shall apply to any
building belonging to or vested in a
recognised institution, the whole of the
income from which is utilised for the purpose
of such institution.”
As the appellant was in dire need of additional area for
the growing needs of the school and as the property acquired
by the school attracted the ‘Exemption Clause’ in the Rent
Act, the Manager of the school issued notices of termination
of tenancy to the tenants on 30.5. 1977 under Section 106 of
the Transfer of Property Act and demanded surrender of
possession. As the tenants failed to surrender possession,
the appellant filed separate suits against the four tenants
for ejectment and payment of arrears of rent. The suits were
filed in the name of the appellant school through its Manag-
er Dr. Om Prakash. The Cause Title of the plaintiff in the
plaint was given as under:-
“BaI Niketan Nursery School, Near Ganj
Gurhatti, Moradabad through Dr. Om Prakash,
Manager of the School.”
All the four tenants including the respondent herein raised
only two defences in the suit, namely, that the appellant
school is not a recognised educational institution so as to
be entitled to the benefit of Section 2(1)(b) of the Rent
Act and secondly, that the notice of termination of tenancy
was not a valid notice because it had not been issued by an
institution having juristic status.
The Small Cause Court consolidated all the-four suits
and held a joint trial and rejected both the contentions of
the tenants and decreed the suits in favour of the school.
The tenants preferred revisions against the judgment to the
District Judge and the learned Judge confirmed the judgment
and decree of the Small Cause Court and dismissed all the
revisions.
515
Thereafter the tenants filed writ petitions under Arti-
cles 226/227 of the Constitution before the High Court ,of
Allahabad. Before the High Court it was contended for the
first time that the appellant school was not a juristic
person and was not, therefore, entitled to file the suits
through its Manager and as such the judgments of the Small
Cause Court and the District Judge were ineffective and the
decrees unenforceable. The counter argument of the school
was that as a recognised institution under the U.P. Basic
Education Act, 1972 it has juristic status and furthermore
it is the registered owner of the suit property, having
obtained the sale deed in its own name and over and above
all these the suit had been instituted by Dr. Om Prakash who
was not only the Manager of the school but also the Secre-
tary of the Registered Society and as such, the suits were
fully maintainable under law and consequently the judgments
and decrees of the Small Cause Court and the District Judge
were perfectly valid and enforceable. Besides putting forth
such contentions, the appellant school, by way of abundant
caution also filed a petition under Order 1 Rule 10 Civil
Procedure Code for amending the plaint by correcting the
name of the plaintiff into Smt. Chandramukhi Ram Saran
Shiksha Samiti by Secretary Om Prakash in place of the name
of the Bal Niketan Nursery School by Manager Dr. Om Prakash.
The High Court declined to uphold the contentions of the
appellant school as in its view Clause (14) of the Constitu-
tion of the Registered Society contained a specific provi-
sion to the following effect. “All the legal proceedings by
the Society and against the Society will be done either by
the Manager or by the Secretary or by a person authorised by
them” and as such, the appellant school was not a juristic
person and only the registered society.had the authority and
competence to file the suits. The High Court, therefore,
held that the suits filed by the appellant school were not
maintainable and consequently the judgments and decrees
passed by the Small Cause Court and the District Judge were
liable to the set aside and accordingly quashed them in
three suits alone since the 4th suit (SCC Case No. 259/1977)
had been compromised after the filing of the Writ Petition.
In so far as the application under Order 1 Rule 10 is con-
cerned, the High Court observed that the proper course for
the appellant school was to move the Small Cause Court for
getting the description of the plaintiff corrected and then
pursue the proceedings for eviction. The High Court also
gave directions to the Small Cause Court as to how the suits
were to be dealt with after amendment of the plaint in the
following terms:-
516
“It is made clear that in case the Judge Small
Cause Court exercises the powers under Order 1
Rule 10, C.P.C. by correcting the description
of the plaintiff, i.e. by getting the juristic
person the Society substituted as plaintiff in
the suit the defendant would be entitled to
file additional written statement and the
parties shall be afforded opportunity to lead
fresh evidence in the case.”
Aggrieved by the judgment of the High Court the appel-
lant school has preferred this appeal by special leave. Mr.
Kacker, learned counsel for the appellant advanced five
contentions set out below to impugn the judgment of the High
Court. The contentions are as follows:-
(1) The appellant school being a recognised
institution under the U.P. Basic Education
Act, 1972 is a legal entity and is, therefore,
entitled to file the suits in its own name.
(2) Besides, the suit property has been
purchased in the name of the appellant school
and as the owner of the property the appellant
is by itself entitled under law to file suits
for seeking ejectment of the tenants.
(3) Consequent upon the purchase of the land
and super-structures and the vesting of
possession in it, the appellant became the
landlord of the tenants and the entire rental
income is being used for running the school.
Therefore, in its capacity as the landlord of
the tenants the appellant school is entitled
to file the suits for ejectment
notwithstanding clause 14 of the Constitution
of the Registered Society.
(4) Even if it is viewed that the Registered
Society is alone entitled to-file the suit Dr.
Om Prakash who is competent to file the suit
on behalf of the Registered Society has filed
the suits on behalf of the school and as such
the Society is fully represented by Dr. Om
Prakash and thereby Clause (14) of the
Constitution of the Soceity stands satisfied.
(5) Even if a hyper-technical view is to
prevail requiring the suits to be filed only
in the name of the Registered Society through
its Secretary/Manager, the High Court should
have allowed the petition under Order 1 Rule
10 C.P.C. and disposed of the Writ Petitions
on merits instead of quashing the concurrent
findings of
517
the courts below and remitting the suits to
the Small Cause Court for fresh disposal after
dealing with the petition under Order 1 Rule
10 C.P.C.
Learned counsel for the respondent refuted the conten-
tions of Mr. Kacker and strenuously argued that the appel-
lant is not a recognised school but even if it is treated as
a recognised institution under the U.P. Basic Education Act
and even if the sale deed pertaining to the land and super-
structures has been obtained in the name of the school, it
is only the Registered Society which can lawfully institute
suits on behalf of the school or defend actions against it
and that Clause (14) of the Constitution of the Society has
overriding effect, and hence the suits filed by the appel-
lant school are not maintainable.
Having given our careful consideration to the arguments
of the learned counsel and the view taken by the High Court
we are of the opinion that the High Court was in error in
sustaining the belated objection taken by the tenants re-
garding the competence of the appellant to file the suits
and quashing the decrees for eviction passed against the
tenants and remanding the suits to the Small Cause Court for
fresh disposal after first considering whether the suits had
been instituted in the name of the wrong plaintiff due to a
bona fide mistake and whether the mistake calls for rectifi-
cation by allowing the petition filed under Order 1 Rule 10
C.P.C. The reasons which have prompted us to come to this
conclusion are manifold and may be enunciated in the follow-
ing paragraphs.
Under the U.P. Basic Education Act, the appellant school
has been granted recognition as a recognised institution and
by reason of such recognition the school is conferred cer-
tain rights and obliged to perform certain duties. One of
the rights flowing from the recognition granted to the
school is an exemption from the provisions of the Rent Act.
Consequently, the appellant school has acquired rights by
reason of the statutory recognition given to it under the
U.P. Basic Education Act and to that extent the appellant
school stands clothed with legal status. It is not, there-
fore, a non-entity in the eye of law. Viewed from that
perspective the appellant is entitled to file the suits
through its Manager to seek the eviction of the tenants
occupying the superstructures. Of course, the learned coun-
sel for the respondent tried to contend that certain pro-
ceedings have been initiated for impugning the recognition
granted to the appellant school under the U.P. Basic Educa-
tion Act and as such the appellant’s status as a recognised
institution cannot be taken for granted. We cannot counte-
nance this argument
518
because any proceedings instituted to impugn the recognition
of the school subsequent to the filing of the suits cannot
affect the status of the school at the time the suits were
filed. Furthermore, the respondent has not produced any
material to show that the recognition granted to the school
has been subsequently withdrawn.
Secondly, apart from the legal status acquired by the
school as a recognised institution, it is admittedly the
registered owner of the suit property even though the pur-
chase price may have been provided by the society. It is not
in dispute that the sale deed pertaining to the land and the
super-structures has been obtained in the name of the
school. Even as a benami owner of the property, the appel-
lant is entitled in law to preserve and protect it and to
institute actions in that behalf so long as they do not
conflict with the rights of the society. As a corollary to
this proposition it follows that the appellant constitutes
the landlord of the tenants after the property was purchased
in its name and rents from the tenants became to be collect-
ed. Once a jural relationship of landlord and tenants was
formed between the appellant and the tenants by operation of
law the appellant’s right to initiate actions against the
tenants for recovery of arrears of rent or recovery of
possession of the leased property cannot be questioned or
disputed.
Even if we are to close our eyes to the right of the
appellant to file suits against the tenants in its capacity
as a recognised institution or as the ostensible owner of
the property or as the landlord of the tenants and are to
judge the status of the appellant solely with reference to
Clause (14) of the Constitution of the Society it may be
noticed that Dr. Om Prakash is not only the Manager of the
School but also the Secretary of the Registered Society. The
suits against the tenants have admittedly been filed by Dr.
Om Prakash and even as per Clause (14) of the Constitution
of the Society he is competent to file suits on behalf of
the Society. The school as well as the Registered Society,
being institutions, they can file suits or defend-suits only
through a competent office-bearer managing the affairs of
the school or the Registered Society. Inasmuch as the suits
have been instituted by Dr. Om Prakash albeit as Manager of
the school he has not ceased to be the Secretary of the
Society and it can, therefore, will be taken that the suits
have not been instituted by an incompetent person who is not
empowered under the Constitution of the Society to file
suits on behalf of the Society. There is, therefore, no
merit in the belated objection raised by the tenants that
the suits are not maintainable in view of Clause (14) of the
Constitution of the Society. The suits, even if not insti-
tuted in the name of the Registered Society, are neverthe-
less competent actions
519
because they have been filed by Dr. Om Prakash who is compe-
tent to file suits on behalf of the Society also for recov-
ering possession of the leased property to the school.
The last and final ground which needs setting out in
some detail is that even if a rigid view is taken and it is
to be held that the suits have not been instituted in the
name of the proper person viz. the Society, the High Court
should have seen that Order 1 Rule 10-has been expressly
provided in the Civil Procedure Code to meet with such
situations so that the rendering of justice is not hampered.
The Rule provides that if a suit has been instituted in the
name of a wrong person as plaintiff or if there is a doubt
as to whether the suit has been instituted in the name of
the right plaintiff the court may, at any stage of the suit,
if it is satisfied that the suit has been instituted due to
a bona fide mistake and that is necessary for the determina-
tion of the real matter in dispute so to do, order any other
person to be substituted or added as plaintiff upon such
terms as the court thinks just. The scope and effect of
Order 1 Rule 10 has been considered in numerous cases and
there is a plethora of decisions laying down the ratio that
if the court is satisfied that a bona fide mistake has
occurred in the filing of the suit in the name of the wrong
person then the court should set right matters in exercise
of its powers under Order 1 Rule 10 and promote the cause of
justice. The courts have gone so far as to hold that even if
the suit had been instituted in the name of a person who had
no competence to file the suit, the courts should set right
matters by ordering the addition or substitution of the
proper plaintiff for ensuring the due dispensation of jus-
tice. We may only refer to a few decisions in this behalf.
In Hughes v. The Pump House Hotel Company Limited (No.
2), [1902] 2 Kings Bench 485) a dispute was raised regarding
the competence of the plaintiff to file a suit because
doubts were cast as to whether the plaintiff had made an
absolute assignment of his claim against the defendants, or
only an assignment by way of charge. Thereupon an applica-
tion was made under Order XVI Rule 2 (corresponding to Order
1 Rule 10 CPC) for substitution of another person as plain-
tiff. The application was allowed and that was upheld by the
Court of Appeal and it was pointed out that the fact that
the original plaintiff had no cause of action would not take
away the jurisdiction of the court to order the substitution
of another person as plaintiff.
In Krishna Bai v. The Collector and Government Agent,
Tanjore & Others, (ILR 30 Madras 419) when it was found that
a suit for ejectment of a defendant had been brought by the
Collector and
520
Government Agent due to a bona fide mistake instead of the
beneficiaries of the estate, the court allowed an applica-
tion for substitution of the correct plaintiff and it was
further held that the fact that the Collector had no right
to institute the suit would not stand in the way of the
court ordering the substitution of the correct plaintiff.
In Sitla Bux Singh v. Mahabir Prasad, (AIR 1936 Oudh
275) it was held that where a person prohibited from dealing
in actionable claim under Section 136 Transfer of Property
Act obtained an assignment of a bond through a bona fide
mistake and instituted a suit on the basis of the same, the
provisions of Order 1 Rule 10 would apply and the assignor
can be substituted in place of the assignee as plaintiff and
allowed to continue the suit.
In Dinanath Kumar v. Nishi Kanta Kumar and Others,
(A.I.R. 1952 Calcutta 102) the court allowed an application
under Order 1 Rule 10 CPC and permitted a person who claimed
that he was the real owner of the property and the original
plaintiff was only a benamidar to be added as plaintiff in
order to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and that he was a
necessary party to the proceedings.
In Laxmikumar Srinivas Das v. Krishnaram Baldev Bank,
Lashkar and another, (A.I.R. 1954 M.B. 156) it was held that
the words “where a suit has been instituted in the name of
the wrong person as plaintiff” must be construed to include
those suits which the instituted by persons who had no right
to do so and that the fact that the person instituting the
suit had no cause of action would not take away the court’s
jurisdiction to order substitution of another as plaintiff.
In Karri Somalu v. Thimmalapalli Venkataswamy and oth-
ers, (1963 2 A.W.R. 138) it was held that the expression
“wrong person” in Order 1 Rule 10 cannot be confined merely
to a person wrongly described but would also extend to
include a person whose name ought not to have figures as
plaintiff for want of right to file the suit and that the
object of the Rule is to save suits instituted honestly
although in the name of the wrong person as plaintiff and to
ensure that honest plaintiffs do not suffer.
In Udit Narain Singh Malpaharia v. Additional Member
Board of Revenue, Bihar and another, (A.I.R. 1963 SC 786) it
was held that in proceedings for a writ of certiorari it is
not only the Tribunal or Authority whose order is sought to
be quashed but also the parties in whose favour the said
order is issued who are necessary parties and
521
that it is in the discretion of the court to add or implead
proper parties for completely settling all the questions
that may be involved in the controversy either suo motu or
on the application of a party to the writ or on application
filed at the instance of such proper party.
In Murari Mohan Deo v. Secretary to Government of India,
[1985] 3 SCC 120 the dismissal of a petition under Article
226 of the Constitution by the Judicial Commissioner was
challenged by the appellant therein. The Judicial Commis-
sioner found that the appellant who was a forester in the
employment of Tripura Government had been wrongly removed
from service by an order of compulsory retirement but never-
theless refused to grant relief to the appellant because he
had failed to implead the Government of India which was a
necessary party to the proceedings. This Court disapproved
the dismissal of the writ petition on the technical ground
and observed as follows:-
“Respondent 1 is shown to be the Secretary to
the Government of India, Ministry of Home
Affairs. If there was technical error in the
draftsmanship of the petition by a lawyer, a
Forester a Class IV low grade servant should
not have been made to suffer. An oral request
to correct the description of the first
respondent would have satisfied the procedural
requirement. By raising and accepting such a
contention, after a lapse of six years, the
law is brought into ridicule. The court could
have conveniently read the cause title as
Government of India which means Union of India
through the Secretary, Ministry of Home
Affairs instead of the description set out in
the writ petition and this very petition would
be competent by any standard. The contention
is all the more objectionable for the
additional reason that the appointing
authority of the appellant, the Chief Commis-
sioner of the Government of Tripura as well
the Chief Forest Officer who passed the
impugned order were impleaded and they
represented the administration of Tripura
Government as well as the concerned officers.
Therefore, not only the petition as drawn up
was competent but no bone of contention could
be taken about its incompetence.”
Having regard to this settled position of law the High
Court ought not to have sustained the objection raised by
the tenants regarding the competency of the appellant to
file the suits and quashed the orders of eviction concur-
rently passed by the Small Cause Court and
522
the Appellate Judge and remitted the suits for fresh consid-
eration with directions to consider the merits of the appli-
cation under Order 1 Rule 10 CPC but should have itself
allowed the petition and added the Registered Society repre-
sented by its Secretary Dr. Om Prakash who is already on
record, also as a party and disposed of the writ petitions
on their merits.
We, therefore, allow the appeal and remit the matter to
the High Court for disposal on merits after allowing the
application filed under Order 1 Rule 10 CPC by the appellant
and ordering Smt. Chandramukhi Ram Saran Shiksha Samiti
through its Secretary Dr. Om Prakash to be also added as a
plaintiff in the suits so as to make it clear that Dr. Om
Prakash is representing not only the appellant’s school but
also the Registered Society and dispose of the writ peti-
tions on merits after the formal amendments have been car-
ried out in the pleadings. The parties are directed to bear
their respective costs.
N.P.V. Appeal
allowed.
523