PETITIONER: BALO YADAV AND OTHERS Vs. RESPONDENT: STATE OF BIHAR DATE OF JUDGMENT: 29/04/1997 BENCH: G.N. RAY, K.T. THOMAS ACT: HEADNOTE: JUDGMENT:
J U D G M E N T
Thomas, J.
The six appellants before us were among the 14 accused
arrayed in the Sessions court indicted for the murder of one
Ram deo Yadav during the wee hours on 30th October, 1975.
Although the Sessions Court convicted all the thirteen
accused of the offences of rioting and murder (with the aid
of section 149 IPC) the High Court confirmed the conviction
only in respect of the seven appellants before us. They have
been sentenced to imprisonment for life for the offence of
murder and to rigorous imprisonment for two years for the
offence under section 148, Indian Penal Code.
Facts are Simple : Deceased Ram deo Yadav and his son
Gajendra Yadav (PW 8) after their dinner at home went to a
nearby field presumably for watching the crop thereon.
Deceased went to sleep on a wooden plank in one field while
his son (PW 8) slept in the adjoining field. Some time after
midnight these appellants and few others came to this place
armed with lethal weapons such as spears (bhala) and gupti
and surrounded Ram deo Yadav, dragged him out and showered
bloody assault on him with the weapons. Gajendra Yadav (PW
8) on hearing the sound of a commotion woke up and rushed to
the scene with his torchlight and saw the assailants
attacking his father. He made a hue and cry, but somebody
among the assailants snatched away his torchlight. By then a
few of the neighbouring cultivators rushed to the scene. The
assailants who succeeded in inflicting large number of
injuries on the deceased fled from the place with the
weapons. Ramdeo Yadav who sustained extensive wounds died on
the spot.
Gajendra Yadav went to the local Police Station and
lodged the complaint on the basis of which FIR was
registered. After completing investigation the case was
charge-sheeted against the fourteen accused.
There is no dispute that Ram deo Yadav was murdered at
the time and place mentioned by the prosecution. The large
number of anti-mortem injuries observed by the doctor who
conducted the autopsy have been detailed in the post-mortem
certificate. Some of the injuries have perforated his vital
organs and without difficulty we could observe that deceased
would have died instantaneously.
Among the eye-witnesses examined by the prosecution the
evidence of PW5 – Sipehi Yadav, PW6 – Harilal Yadav and PW8
– Gajendra Yadav was found reliable by the Sessions Court.
But High Court did not act on the evidence of Harilal Yadav
(PW 6). However, the evidence of PW 8 was found quite
reliable, yet the High Court chose to confirm the conviction
only as against the appellants since the version of PW 8 was
corroborated by PW 5 only in respect of them.
Learned senior counsel confined his arguments to
assailing the evidence of PW 5 and PW 8 and contended that
the said evidence should not have been relied on due to
certain drawbacks high-lighted before us. According to the
learned counsel, as the High Court did not rely on the
evidence of PW 8 in regard to the acquitted accused it
should have been a logical step to spurn down his evidence
even in regard to the appellants as well.
This is not a case where the High Court declined to act
on the testimony of PW 8. In fact, High Court has observed
in clear terms that there is no reason to reject the
evidence of PW 8, though High Court was not inclined to base
a conviction on his evidence without corroboration from
other materials. If the High Court thought it unsafe to
convict any of the accused on the uncorroborated evidence of
a single eye-witness it does not mean that the evidence of
the witness stands castigated. It is no stigm a against the
evidence of any eye-witness if the Court only wanted re-
assurance from yet other sources. The corroboration was what
the court required as a matter of prudence and as a step of
caution. The premise of the contention of the learned
counsel that evidence of PW 8 has been stigmatised is,
therefore, erroneous.
Another point upon which learned counsel harped heavily
was the failure of the investigating officer to seize the
torchlight which the eye-witnesses claimed to have flashed
for witnessing the occurrence. We are unable to appreciate
this argument. If the accused had used a torchlight or if
the victim had a torchlight with him during the occurrence
there would be much force in insisting that the
investigating officer should have seized it as the same
could be used as a material object during trial but a
torchlight used by the witness to see the occurrence cannot
be equated with the torchlight used buy the victim or the
assailants in the encounter for evidentiary purposes. Non
seizure of such a torchlight cannot, therefore, be
considered as a lapse on the part of any investigating
officer, much less a ground for impairment of the testimony
of the eye-witness concerned.
It was lastly contended that the weapons which the eye-
witnesses identified in the hands of the appellants are
totally incompatible with the injuries found on the dead
body of the deceased. Apparently, those were sharp cutting
weapons. One of them could have been a pointed and sharp
weapon. All the injuries of the deceased were incised wounds
and two of them had penetrated into the body and perforated
some of the vital organs. The doctor who conducted the
autopsy has said in evidence that the injuries which he
noticed could have been caused with those weapons.
None of the points raised before us by t he learned
counsel for the appellants is capable of changing the
conclusion reached by the High Court against the appellants.
Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.