CASE NO.: Appeal (civil) 7536 of 1997 Appeal (civil) 7537 of 1997 PETITIONER: Balram Kumawat RESPONDENT: Vs. Union of India & Ors. . DATE OF JUDGMENT: 27/08/2003 BENCH: CJI, S.B. Sinha & Arun Kumar. JUDGMENT:
J U D G M E N T
S.B. SINHA, J :
QUESTION :
Whether ‘mammoth ivory’ imported in India answers the description
of the words ‘ivory imported in India’ contained in Wild Life
(Protection) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the said Act’) as
amended by Act No. 44 of 1991 is the question involved in these appeals
which arise out of a common judgment and order dated 20.3.1997 passed
by a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND :
The appellants M/s Unigems had imported mammoth fossil said to be
of an extinct species in the year 1987. The stock of mammoth fossil
held by the appellants is said to be periodically checked by the
statutory authorities. The appellant in the other case Balram Kumawat
is a carver.
Mammoth is said to be pre-historic animal which disappeared due
to climatic conditions prevailing in Alaska and Siberia. According to
the appellants the distinction between mammoth and elephant ivory is
that whereas mammoth belongs to an extinct species, the ivory of
elephant is of an extant living animal. The appellants state that
mammoth ivory is distinguishable by visual and non-destructive means
vis-à-vis elephant ivory and even in Convention on International Trade
in Endangered Species (CITES) their distinguishing features have been
pointed out.
SUBMISSIONS :
Mr. Sanghi and Mr. Parikh, the learned counsel would contend that
trade in mammoth fossil ivory is not banned either under the said Act
or under the CITES and, thus, the impugned judgment of the High Court
cannot be sustained.
The learned counsel would take us through the history of CITES as
mentioned in the impugned judgment of the High Court and would urge
that the purport and object of the Act cannot be sub-served by placing
a ban on trade in mammoth ivory. Taking us to the provisions of the
said Act, the learned counsel would argue that as mammoth ivory does
not answer the description of ‘wild animal’, the provisions contained
in Chapter VA of the said Act would not be attracted.
As Mammoth is an extinct species and as what is being used for
carving is its fossil which is called ivory because it has white and
hard dentine substance which is also available in other animals,
namely, Whale, Walrus, Hippos and Warthog; it was urged, they cannot be
included in the term ‘ivory’ within the meaning of the provisions of
the said Act.
It was contended that the High Court committed a manifest error
in passing the impugned judgment insofar as it failed to take into
consideration that mammoth ivory being deceptively similar to elephant
ivory to the naked eye, the impugned Act would be applicable in
relation thereto also. The learned counsel would contend that if this
is taken to its logical conclusion, then even trade in plastic articles
which would be deceptively similar to elephant ivory may also be held
to have been banned. It was argued that the intention of the
Legislature cannot be to ban any article irrespective of the purport
and object it seeks to achieve only on the ground that the same is
deceptively similar to the banned item. There exists scientific
procedure, it was urged, whereby and whereunder mammoth ivory can be
distinguished from elephant ivory and with a view to buttress the said
argument, a large number of literature had been placed before us.
The preamble of the Act as also the ‘Headings’, the learned
counsel would contend, should be taken into consideration for the
purpose interpreting the provisions of the said Act.
FINDINGS :
In the connected matter in Indian Handicrafts Emporium & Ors.
Vs. Union of India & Ors. (Civil Appeal No. 7533 of 1997)
disposed of this date, this Court upheld the constitutional validity of
the provisions of the said Act. This Court held that in terms of Sub-
Section (7) of Section 49-C of the Act all persons in general and
traders in particular have become disentitled from keeping in their
control any animal article including ivory imported in India.
This Court further held that as a logical corollary to the said
finding, the statutory authorities would be entitled to take possession
of such ivory in terms thereof; the purport and object of the Act
being to impose a complete ban on trade in ivory. A complete
prohibition has been imposed in the trade of ivory (whether imported in
India or extracted by killing Indian elephants) for the purpose of
protecting the endangered species. Trade in ivory imported in India
has been prohibited further with a view to give effect to the
provisions contained in Article 48A as also Article 51A(g) of the
Constitution of India.
Why despite passage of time the trade in stock could not be
disposed of within a period of four years has not been disclosed by the
appellants. It is not in dispute that even in terms of Act 44 of 1991,
six months’ time was granted for disposing the stock of ivory.
For the reasons stated hereinafter, it may not be necessary for
us to go into the question as to whether scientifically mammoth ivory
can be deciphered from elephant ivory.
What has been banned is ivory. There is complete prohibition of
trade in ivory. Such a complete prohibition is a reasonable
restriction within the meaning of Clause (6) of Article 19 of the
Constitution of India. The impugned Act being not unreasonable does
not also attract the wrath of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
For the purpose of determination of the question, we need to
consider only the dictionary meaning of the term ‘ivory’. Commercial
meaning or technical meaning of an object or article is required to be
taken recourse to when the same is necessary for the purpose of meeting
the requirements of law. The law in no uncertain terms says that no
person shall trade in ivory. It does not say that what is prohibited
is trade in elephant ivory or other types of ivory. The purport and
object of the Act, as noticed in the judgment in Indian Handicrafts
Emporium (supra), is that nobody can carry on business activity in
imported ivory so that while doing so, trade in ivory procured by way
of poaching of elephants may be facilitated. The Parliament,
therefore, advisedly used the word ‘ivory’ instead of elephant ivory.
The intention of the Parliament in this behalf, in our opinion, is
absolutely clear and unambiguous. We cannot assume that the Parliament
was not aware of existence of different types of ivory. If the
intention of the Parliament was to confine the subject matter of ban
under Act 44 of 1991 to elephant ivory, it would have said so
explicitly.
As noticed hereinbefore, the object of the Parliament was not
only to ban trade in imported elephant ivory but ivory of every
description so that poaching of elephant can be effectively restricted.
An article made of plastic would by no means resemble ivory.
In the Shorter Oxford Dictionary, the meaning of ‘ivory’ is
stated as under:
(i) The hard, white, elastic and fine grain substance (being
dentine of exceptional hardness) composing the main part of
the tusks of the elephant, mammoth (fossil)…
(ii) A substance resembling ivory or made in imitation of it.
In Collins English Dictionary, ‘ivory’ has been defined as:
(i) A hard smooth creamy white variety of dentine that makes up a
major part of the tusks of elephants, walruses, and similar
animals.
(ii) A tusk made of ivory.
(iii) A yellowish-white colour; cream
(iv) A substance resembling elephant tusk.
(Emphasis supplied)
‘Ivory’, therefore, even as per dictionary meaning is not
confined to elephant ivory.
At this stage, we are not concerned with a criminal trial. The
appellants are not being proceeded against in a criminal case. Their
civil rights, if any, are only required to be dealt with. The
appellants in these matters complain of civil injuries only.
Contextual reading is a well-known proposition of interpretation
of statute. The clauses of a statute should be construed with
reference to the context vis-à-vis the other provisions so as to make a
consistent enactment of the whole statute relating to the subject-
matter. The rule of ‘ex visceribus actus’ should be resorted to in a
situation of this nature.
In State of West Bengal vs. Union of India [AIR 1963 SC 1241 at
p. 1265], the learned Chief Justice stated the law thus :
“The Court must ascertain the intention of the
Legislature by directing its attention not merely to
the clauses to be construed but to the entire
statute; it must compare the clause with the other
parts of the law, and the setting in which the clause
to be interpreted occurs.”
The said principle has been reiterated in R.S. Raghunath vs.
State of Karnataka and another [AIR 1992 SC 81 at p. 89].
Furthermore, even in relation to a penal statute any narrow and
pedantic, literal and lexical construction may not always be given
effect to. The law would have to be interpreted having regard to the
subject matter of the offence and the object of the law it seeks to
achieve. The purpose of the law is not to allow the offender to sneak
out of the meshes of law. Criminal Jurisprudence does not say so.
G.P. Singh in his celebrated treatise ‘Principles of Statutory
Interpretation’ distinguished between strict construction of penal
statutes which deals with crimes of aggravated nature vis-à-vis the
nature of the activities of the accused which can be checked under the
ordinary criminal law stating :
“In Joint Commercial Tax Officer, Madras
v. YMA, Madras, SHAH, J. observed : “In a
criminal trial or a quasi-criminal proceeding,
the court is entitled to consider the substance
of the transaction and determine the liability
of the offender. But in a taxing statute the
strict legal position as disclosed by the form
and not the substance of the transaction is
determinative of its taxability.” With great
respect the distinction drawn by SHAH, J. does
not exist in law. Even in construing and
applying criminal statutes any reasoning based
on the substance of the transaction is
discarded.
But the application of the rule does not
permit the court in restraining comprehensive
language used by the Legislature, the wide
meaning of which is in accord with the object
of the statute. The principle was neatly
formulated by LORD JUSTICE JAMES who speaking
for the Privy Council stated : “No doubt all
penal statutes are to be construed strictly,
that is to say, the court must see that the
thing charged as an offence is within the plain
meaning of the words used, and must not strain
the words on any notion that there has been a
slip; that there has been a casus omissus; that
the thing is so clearly within the mischief
that it must have been included if thought of.
On the other hand, the person charged has a
right to say that the thing charged although
within the words, is not within the spirit of
the enactment. But where the thing is brought
within the words, and within the spirit, there
a penal enactment is to be construed, like any
other instrument, according to fair commonsense
meaning of the language used, and the court is
not to find or make any doubt or ambiguity in
the language of a penal statute, where such
doubt or ambiguity would clearly not be found
or made in the same language in any other
enactment.” The above formulation has been
cited with approval by the House of Lords and
the Supreme Court. In the last-mentioned case,
SUBBARAO, J., referring to the Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1947, observed : “The Act was
brought in to purify public administration.
When the Legislature used comprehensive
terminology – to achieve the said purpose, it
would be appropriate not to limit the content
by construction when particularly the spirit of
the statute is in accord with the words used
there.” Similarly, the Supreme Court has
deprecated a narrow and pedantic construction
of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act,
1954 likely to leave loopholes for the
adulterator to escape. And on the same
principle the court has disapproved of a narrow
construction of section 135 of the Customs Act,
1962, Section 489A of the Penal Code, Section
12(2) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act,
1947, section 630(1)(b) of the Companies Act,
1956, section 52A of the Copy Right Act, 1957,
and section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments
Act, 1881. So, language permitting a penal
statute may also be construed to avoid a lacuna
and to suppress the mischief and advance the
remedy in the light of the rule in Heydon’s
case. Further, a commonsense approach for
solving a question of applicability of a penal
enactment is not ruled out by the rule of
strict construction. In State of Andhra
Pradesh v. Bathu Prakasa Rao, rice and broken
rice were distinguished by applying the
commonsense test that at least 50% must be
broken in order to constitute what could pass
off as marketable ‘broken rice’ and any grain
less than 3/4th of the whole length is to be
taken as broken.
The rule of strict construction does not
also prevent the court in interpreting a
statute according to its current meaning and
applying the language to cover developments in
science and technology not known at the time of
passing of the statute. Thus psychiatric
injury caused by silent telephone calls was
held to amount to ‘assault’ and ‘bodily harm’
under sections 20 and 47 of the Offence Against
the Person Act, 1861 in the light of the
current scientific appreciation of the link
between the body and psychiatric injury.”
(See also Lalita Jalan & Anr. Vs. Bombay Gas Co. Ltd. & Ors.
reported in 2003 (4) SCALE 52).
A statute must be construed as a workable instrument. Ut res
magis valeat quam pereat is a well-known principle of law. In
Tinsukhia Electric Supply Co. Ltd. vs. State of Assam [AIR 1990 SC
123], this Court stated the law thus :
“The courts strongly lean against any
construction which tends to reduce a statute to
a futility. The provision of a statute must be
so construed as to make it effective and
operative, on the principle “ut res magis
valeat quam pereat”. It is, no doubt, true that
if a statute is absolutely vague and its
language wholly intractable and absolutely
meaningless, the statute could be declared void
for vagueness. This is not in judicial review
by testing the law for arbitrariness or
unreasonableness under Article 14; but what a
court of construction, dealing with the
language of a statute, does in order to
ascertain from, and accord to, the statute the
meaning and purpose which the legislature
intended for it. In Manchester Ship Canal Co.
v. Manchester Racecourse Co. ((1900) 2 Ch 352,
Farwell J. said : (pp. 360-61)
“Unless the words were so absolutely
senseless that I could do nothing at all
with them, I should be bound to find some
meaning and not to declare them void for
uncertainty.”
In Fawcett Properties Ltd. v. Buckingham County
Council ((1960) 3 All ER 503) Lord Denning
approving the dictum of Farwell, J. said :
“But when a Statute has some meaning,
even though it is obscure, or several
meanings, even though it is little to
choose between them, the courts have to
say what meaning the statute to bear
rather than reject it as a nullity.”
It is, therefore, the court’s duty to
make what it can of the statute, knowing that
the statutes are meant to be operative and not
inept and that nothing short of impossibility
should allow a court to declare a statute
unworkable. In Whitney v. Inland Revenue
Commissioners (1926 AC 37) Lord Dunedin said :
“A statute is designed to be workable,
and the interpretation thereof by a court
should be to secure that object, unless
crucial omission or clear direction makes
that end unattainable.”
The Courts will therefore reject that construction which will
defeat the plain intention of the Legislature even though there may be
some inexactitude in the language used. [See Salmon vs. Duncombe
[(1886) 11 AC 627 at 634]. Reducing the legislation futility shall be
avoided and in a case where the intention of the Legislature cannot be
given effect to, the Courts would accept the bolder construction for
the purpose of bringing about an effective result. The Courts, when
rule of purposive construction is gaining momentum, should be very
reluctant to hold that the Parliament has achieved nothing by the
language it used when it is tolerably plain what it seeks to achieve.
(See BBC Enterprises Vs. Hi-Tech Xtravision Ltd., (1990) 2 All ER 118
at 122-3)
In Mohan Kumar Singhania and Others vs. Union of India and
Others [AIR 1992 SC 1], the law is stated thus :’
“We think, it is not necessary to proliferate
this judgment by citing all the judgments and
extracting the textual passages from the
various textbooks on the principles of
Interpretation of Statutes. However, it will
suffice to say that while interpreting a
statute the consideration of inconvenience and
hardships should be avoided and that when the
language is clear and explicit and the words
used are plain and unambiguous, we are bound to
construe them in their ordinary sense with
reference to other clauses of the Act or Rules
as the case may be, so far as possible, to make
a consistent enactment of the whole statute or
series of statutes/rules/regulations relating
to the subject matter. Added to this, in
construing a statute, the Court has to
ascertain the intention of the law making
authority in the backdrop of the dominant
purpose and the underlying intendment of the
said statute and that every statute is to be
interpreted without any violence to its
language and applied as far as its explicit
language admits consistent with the established
rule of interpretation.”
In Murlidhar Meghraj Loya Vs. State of Maharashtra [(1976) 3 SCC
684] while dealing with the provisions of Food Adulteration Act it was
stated :
“5. It is trite that the social mission of food
laws should inform the interpretative process
so that the legal blow may fall on every
adulterator. Any narrow and pedantic, literal
and lexical construction likely to leave
loopholes for this dangerous criminal tribe to
sneak out of the meshes of the law should be
discouraged. For the new criminal jurisprudence
must depart from the old canons, which make
indulgent presumptions and favoured
constructions benefiting accused persons and
defeating criminal statutes calculated to
protect the public health and the nation’s
wealth.”
In State of U.P. vs. Chandrika [(1999) 8 SCC 638], this Court
held that in matters involving economic crime, food offence and other
cases, the doctrine of plea bargaining should not be applied. While
holding so it referred with approval Madanlal Ramchandra Daga vs. State
of Maharashtra [AIR 1968 SC 1267 = (1968) 3 SCR 34], Murlidhar Meghraj
Loya (supra), Ganeshmal Jashraj vs. Government of Gujarat [(1980) 1 SCC
363], Thippaswamy vs. State of Karnataka [(1983) 1 SCC 194] and
Kasambhai Abdulrehmanbhai Sheikh vs. State of Gujarat [(1980) 3 SCC
120].
Yet again in Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs to
Govt. of West Bengal Vs. Abani Maity [AIR 1979 SC 1029: (1979) 4 SCC
85] the law is stated in the following terms:
“19. Exposition ex visceribus actus is a long
recognised rule of construction. Words in a
statute often take their meaning from the
context of the statute as a whole. They are
therefore, not to be construed in isolation.
For instance, the use of the word “may” would
normally indicate that the provision was not
mandatory. But in the context of a particular
statute, this word may connote a legislative
imperative, particularly when its construction
in a permissive sense would relegate it to the
unenviable position, as it were, “of an
ineffectual angel beating its wings in a
luminous void in vain”. “If the choice is
between two interpretations”, said Viscount
Simon L. C. in Nokes v. Doncaster Amalgamated
Collieries, Ltd. ((1940) AC 1014, 1022) “the
narrower of which would fail to achieve the
manifest purpose of the legislation, we should
avoid a construction which would reduce the
legislation to futility and should rather
accept the bolder construction based on the
view that Parliament would legislate only for
the purpose of bringing about an effective
result.”
This decision was followed in State of Karnataka and Others vs.
Saveen Kumar Shetty [(2002) 3 SCC 426].
In State of Himachal Pradesh vs. Pirthi Chand and Another
[(1996) 2 SCC 37], this Court while dealing with a case of contraband
article following amongst others in Abani Maity (supra) stated :
“It would be seen that the organised
traffic in contraband generates deleterious
effect on the national economy affecting the
vitals of the economic life of the community.
It is settled law that illegality committed in
investigation does not render the evidence
obtained during that investigation
inadmissible. In spite of illegal search
property seized, on the basis of said search,
it still would form basis for further
investigation and prosecution against the
accused. The manner in which the contraband is
discovered may affect the factum of discovery
but if the factum of discovery is otherwise
proved then the manner becomes immaterial.”
The said principle has been reiterated in Khet Singh vs. Union of
India [(2002) 4 SCC 380] stating :
“Law on the point is very clear that even if there is
any sort of procedural illegality in conducting the
search and seizure, the evidence collected thereby
will not become inadmissible and the court would
consider all the circumstances and find out whether
any serious prejudice had been caused to the
accused.”
In State of Maharashtra Vs. Natwarlal Damodardas Soni [AIR 1980
SC 593: (1980) 4 SCC 669] this Court was concerned with search and
seizure of gold under the Customs Act and the Defence of India Rules.
The Court was dealing with smuggling of gold into India affecting the
public economy and financial stability of the country and in that
context the Court applied the Mischief Rule. While interpreting the
words ‘acquires possession’ or ‘keeping’ in Clause (b) of Section
135(1) of the Customs Act, this Court observed that they are not to be
restricted to ‘possession’ or ‘keeping’ acquired as an owner or a
purchaser of the goods observing :
“Such a narrow construction – which has been
erroneously adopted by the High Court – in our
opinion, would defeat the object of these
provisions and undermine their efficacy as
instruments for suppression of the mischief
which the legislature had in view. Construed in
consonance with the scheme of the statute, the
purpose of these provisions and the context,
the expression “acquires possession” is of very
wide amplitude and will certainly include the
acquisition of possession by a person in a
capacity other than as owner or purchaser. This
expression takes its colour from the succeeding
phrase commencing with the word “or”, which is
so widely worded that even the temporary
control or custody of a carrier, remover,
depositor, harbourer, keeper or dealer of any
goods which he knows or has reason to believe
to be smuggled goods or prohibited goods
(liable to confiscation under Section 111),
cannot escape the tentacles of clause (b). The
expressions “keeping” and “concealing in the
second phrase of clause (b) also cover the
present case.”
This Court while setting aside a judgment of acquittal passed in
favour of the Respondents therein on the basis of the interpretation of
the Customs Rules observed:
“The High Court has held that those rules do
not apply because the accused-respondent had
not acquired possession of these gold biscuits
by purchase or otherwise within the meaning of
these rules. Such a narrow construction of this
expression, in our opinion, will emasculate
these provisions and render them ineffective as
a weapon for combating gold smuggling. As was
pointed out by this Court in Balkrishna
Chhaganlal v. State of West Bengal (AIR 1974 SC
120), Rule 126-P(2)(ii) penalises a person who
has in his possession or under his control any
quantity of gold in contravention of any
provision of this Part, and the court cannot
cut back on the width of the language used,
bearing in mind the purpose of plenary control
the State wanted to impose on gold, and exempt
smuggled gold from the expression “any quantity
of gold” in that sub-rule. These provisions
have, therefore, to be specially construed in a
manner which will suppress the mischief and
advance the object which the legislature had in
view. The High Court was in error in adopting
too narrow a construction which tends to
stultify the law. The second charge thus had
been fully established against the respondent.”
These decisions are authorities for the proposition that the rule
of strict construction of a regulatory/penal statute may not be adhered
to, if thereby the plain intention of the Parliament to combat crimes
of special nature would be defeated.
We are, however, not oblivious of the fact that potential public
mischief cannot be a ground to invoke the court’s interpretative role
to make a new offence. Making of legislation is not the job of the
judiciary. Making of a penal legislation by the Judiciary is strictly
out of its bound. However, when the law working in the field is clear
then what is necessary for it is to find out as to whether any offence
has been created or not. Once it is held that the subject matter comes
within the purview of the law, the Court may not go further and say by
interpretive reasonings that the same is not so created.
We do not think that in a case of this nature where the
principles of law as enunciated hereinbefore as also the doctrine of
purposive construction, which have been discussed in details in Indian
Handicraft Emporium (supra), any useful purpose would be served by
referring to a large number of decisions relied upon by Mr. Parikh as
regards efficacy of referring to the preamble of a statute or its
heading, in view of the well-settled principles of law that where plain
and dictionary meaning can be given, reference to preamble or a heading
may not be of much use. The submission of Mr. Parikh that in a case of
this nature a restrictive meaning should be attributed to the word
‘ivory’ cannot be acceded to inasmuch as, in our opinion, the
dictionary meaning should be adhered to for the purpose of giving
effect to the purport and object of the Act.
It is no doubt true that normally a technical meaning should be
attributed rather than a common meaning to a word if the same relates
to a particular trade, business or profession, art or science or words
having a special meaning as has been held in Union of India vs. Garware
Nylons Ltd. [AIR 1996 SC 3509 and Unwin vs. Hanson [1891 (2) QB 115].
But we are not dealing with an ordinary/taxing statute. We are dealing
with a law which has been enacted in larger public interest and in
consonance with Articles 48A and 51A(g) of the Constitution of India as
also International Treaties and Conventions.
As pointed out hereinbefore, the Parliament has enacted the
Amending Acts of 1986, 1991 and 2003 not only for the purpose of
banning a trade in elephant ivory but with a view to create a blockade
of the activities of poachers and others so that a complete prohibition
in trade in ivory is achieved. By reason of the Amending Acts, the
Parliament was anxious to plug the loop-holes and impose a ban on trade
in ivory so that while purporting to trade in imported ivory and
carvings therefrom, poaching of Indian elephants and resultant illegal
trade by extracting their tusks may not continue.
The submission of Mr. Parikh that the doctrine of proportionality
should be applied in a case of this nature cannot also be acceded to.
In Om Kumar and Others vs. Union of India [(2001) 2 SCC 386], to
which a pointed reference has been made, this Court made a distinction
between the primary and secondary review of administrative orders. As
indicated in Indian Handicraft Emporium (supra), this Court while
construing the provisions of the Act vis-à-vis restrictions imposed in
terms of clause (6) of Article 19 of the Constitution of India has come
to the conclusion that the provisions of the Amending Acts satisfy even
the strict scrutiny test. In Om Kumar (supra), this Court pointed out
that the area of discretion of administrator would vary in different
situations stating :
“While the courts’ level of scrutiny will be
more in case of restrictions on fundamental
freedoms, the courts give a large amount of
discretion to the administrator in matters of
high-level economic and social policy and may
be reluctant to interfere : (R. v. Secy of
State for the Environment, ex p Nottinghamshire
County Council (1986 AC 240 : (1986) 1 All ER
199 : (1986) 2 WLR 1 (HL)); R. v. Secy. of
State for Environment, ex p Hammersmith and
Fulham London Borough Council ((1991) 1 AC 521
: (1990) 3 All ER 589 : (1990) 3 WLR 898) (AC
at p. 597). Smith speaks of “variable margin of
appreciation”. The new Rule 1 of the Civil
Procedure Rules, 1999 permits the courts to
apply “proportionality” but taking into account
the financial issues, complexities of the
matter and the special facts of the case.”
In Papanasam Labour Union vs. Madura Coats [(1995) 1 SCC 501]
whereupon Mr. Parikh has placed reliance, this Court held that while a
power has been conferred upon a higher authority, a presumption can be
raised that he would be conscious of its duties and obligations and so
would act promptly and reasonably.
There is also no quarrel on the proposition of law laid down
therein for the purpose of judging the constitutionality of the
statutory provisions in the light of Article 19 of the Constitution of
India. The impugned acts fulfill the said criteria.
For the reasons aforementioned, we are of the opinion that the
impugned judgment cannot be faulted. Accordingly, the appeals are
dismissed but without any order as to costs.