ORDER
D.V. Shylendra Kumar, J.
1. In all these writ petitions, except in Writ Petition No. 37436 of 2003, petitioners are all tenants in the premises located in different places wherein the provisions of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as ‘1961 Act’ for short) was applicable and the respective landlords had initiated proceedings under this Act for eviction of these tenants invoking the different provisos to Section 21(1) of the 1961 Act.
2. The eviction petitions had been allowed even if not on all the grounds urged by the landlords, but at least on some of the grounds. The result was that the tenants were ordered to be evicted. Such tenants being aggrieved by the eviction orders, had preferred revision petitions under Section 50 of the 1961 Act to the respective revisional Courts having jurisdiction.
3. In Writ Petition No. 37436 of 2003, the landlord also had preferred a revision petition, though had obtained an order of eviction at the hands of the Trial Court under the provisions of Clauses (a) and (p) of the proviso to Section 21(1) of the 1961 Act, but as the petition had been rejected under proviso to Section 21(1)(h) of the 1961 Act on the ground of bona fide requirement of the landlord. The revision petitions of the tenant and the landlord which were pending before the Principal District Judge, Mysore, in Rent Revision Nos. 107 and 121 of 2001 respectively were disposed of in terms of common order dated 30-7-2002 holding that both the revision petitions initiated under Section 50 of the 1961 Act stood abated as on 31-12-2001 and there is no occasion for the Court to pass any further orders on an application which had been filed therein.
4. The Revisional Court was of this view for the reason that the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 stood repealed as from 31-12-2001 and was replaced by Karnataka Rent Act, 1999 (hereinafter referred to as ‘1999 Act’ for short) and in terms of the provisions of Section 70(2)(c) of the 1999 Act, such revision petitions being pending proceedings in respect of the premises to which the 1999 Act did not apply, the proceedings abate in terms of this provision and accordingly the order was passed.
5. Likewise, in Writ Petition No. 35023 of 2002, the order of the Revisional Court, namely, Court of District Judge at Shimoga passing the order dated 31-8-2002 holding that the Rent Revision No. 15 of 2000 which had been filed by the petitioner-tenant before that Court stood abated with effect from 31-12-2001 in terms of the order passed by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Mercury Press, Bangalore v. Ameen Shacoor and Ors., is questioned by the aggrieved tenants.
6. The subject-matter of Writ Petition No. 34018 of 2002 is a similar order dated 31-8-2002 passed by the Principal District Judge, Shimoga in Rent Revision No. 53 of 1999 also holding that the revision petition stood abated as on 31-12-2001.
7. Likewise, Writ Petition No. 34290 of 2002 is also a petition by an aggrieved tenant questioning the legality of the order dated 31-8-2002 passed in Rent Revision No. 9 of 2002 on the file of the Principal District Judge, Shimoga on the premise that in view of the provisions of Section 70(2)(c) of the 1999 Act, the proceedings stood abated with effect from 31-12-2001 in the light of the ruling of this Court in Mercury Press case.
8. Notices had been issued to the respondents and the respondents are served and represented by Counsel and the matter is heard for disposal.
9. I have heard the learned Counsels for the petitioners, namely, Sri P. Shivanna in W.P. No. 29764 of 2002, Sri R. Gopal in W.P. No. 34018 of 2002, Sri Krishnamurthy in W.P. No. 35023 of 2002 and Sri R.V. Jayaprakash in W.P. No. 34290 of 2002 and Sri M. Sivappa, learned Counsel for the Caveator-respondent 1 in W.P. No. 35023 of 2002, Sri Jayakumar S. Patil, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondents in W.P. No. 34290 of 2002, who is fact represent the version on behalf of other landlords also and made submissions generally on behalf of all the respondent-landlords in these writ petitions for defending the petitions preferred before this Court at the instance of the tenants.
10. At the threshold, it had been pointed out by the learned Counsel appearing for the landlords generally that there is no scope for interference in these writ petitions, particularly, as the Revisional Court has only noticed the position of law in view of the provisions of Section 70(2)(c) of the 1999 Act and following the ruling of this Court interpreting the very provision, having observed that the revision petitions stood abated as from 31-12-2001, these writ petitions are to be dismissed in limine without examining anything further.
11. Learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners would not agree to this proposition. Learned Counsel for the petitioners submitted that the ruling of the Division Bench of this Court in Mercury Press case does not cover the case of the petitioners; that the Division Bench has examined the provisions of the 1999 Act and it is the effect on the proceedings under the 1961 Act in the context of the provisions of Section 70 of the 1999 Act, a section which provides for repeal and savings; that the present situation is one which does not even attract the provisions of Section 70 and therefore even assuming Section 70 had come in for interpretation and the interpretation is based on any of these provisions, such interpretation cannot affect the case of the petitioners, in the sense, the rent revision petitions that were pending before the Revisional Court were not in any way affected by the ruling of this Court in Mercury Press case; that the very provision being not applicable to the cases of the rent revision petitions of the present tenants, the petitioners before the Rent Revisional Court, the matter requires to be examined independent of the decision of the Division Bench of this Court etc.
12. Submission on behalf of the petitioners by their learned Counsel proceeds on the premise that the 1999 Act which though can be said to be one replacing the 1961 Act and as successor to that Act, the 1999 Act is not made applicable to all areas in the State, in the sense, it is not brought into force throughout the State; that the different provisions of the 1999 Act are brought into force at different areas as provided for under sub-section (3) of Section 1 of the 1999 Act only through a notification issued by the State Government under this provision; that in respect of the areas wherein the petitioners-tenants had taken out the premises on lease from their respective landlords, not all the provisions of the 1999 Act had been brought into force by issue of a notification; that Section 2 of the 1999 Act indicating the application of the Act, expressly provides for Chapters I to III and Chapters V to VIII of this Act shall apply to areas specified in the First Schedule and Chapters I and IV shall apply only to areas specified in the Second Schedule and Sub-section (3) of Section 2 provides for certain exemptions, vis-a-vis, the kind of premises mentioned in sub-section (3) of Section 2 as also to certain situations like special type of tenancies as indicated in Clause (b) of Section 2(3) of this Act and such being the case, until and unless the requirement of Section 1(3) of the 1999 Act is satisfied and the area being one as specified in the First Schedule to the 1999 Act, all the provisions of the 1999 Act are not applicable and even if some provisions of the 1999 Act are applicable, if it is an area which is not included in the First Schedule; that Chapters I to III and V to VIII are not applicable even then and the location of the premises in which all the petitioners were tenants being in such areas, namely, in Nanjangud and Sagar, which are in the nature of Town Municipalities which is neither within the area constituted under the Karnataka Municipal Corporations Act, 1976, nor the area within the limits of City Municipal Councils constituted under the Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964; that they are not places which are covered even under the areas to which Chapters I to IV apply as in Second Schedule to the 1999 Act; that none of the chapters from Chapters I to VIII in the 1999 Act are applicable to the areas where the petitioners had taken the premises on lease and if so, learned Counsel submits that Section 70 of the 1999 Act providing for savings and repeal occurring in Chapter VIII is also equally not applicable at all and if that is the factual situation even about the applicability of the Act, the premises cannot be considered to be as one in respect of which the provisions of Section 70(2) of the 1999 Act can apply nor the cases can be said to be covered by the decision of this Court in Mercury Press case interpreting these provisions. It is for this reason that the learned Counsel for the petitioners submit that the present cases are not covered by the decision rendered by the Division Bench of this Court in Mercury Press case.
13. Submission on behalf of the respondents-landlords generally is that the matters are squarely covered by the decision of the Division Bench of this Court; that, in fact, the decision has received further support in terms of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Mahendra Saree Emporium v. G.V. Srinivasa Murthy; that both this Court and the Supreme Court had an occasion to examine in great detail as to the applicability of the provisions in respect ,of the premises in respect of which were pending proceedings; that the scope of Section 70(3) of the 1999 Act has also been examined by the Division Bench of this Court; that while under Section 70(2) of the 1999 Act, this Court had broadly categorized all the premises in respect of which proceedings were pending either before the original Court or before the Revisional Court into two categories, one category of the premises to which the provisions of the present Act, namely, Karnataka Rent Act, 1999 are applicable, in which event, such proceedings are saved and to be disposed of by applying the corresponding provisions of the current Act and the other category in respect of those premises to which the provisions of the 1999 Act are not applicable, in which event, all pending proceedings in respect of such premises abate and the premises in respect of which the petitioners were tenants being one to which the present Act in any view of the matter is not applicable, such pending proceedings necessarily stands abated as on 31-12-2001; that what is left for being saved in terms of Section 70(3) of the 1999 Act is only such rights and liabilities which had been saved in view of the proceedings under the 1961 Act; that the provisions of Section 70(3) of the Act is not applicable for the purpose of considering the effect of the 1999 Act in any pending proceedings; that all pending proceedings are governed under the provisions of Section 70(2) of the 1999 Act and therefore necessarily, the rent revision petitions stood abated as on 31-12-2001 and the writ petitions are liable to be dismissed.
14. An examination of the brief history of the Rent Control Legislation in the State of Karnataka reveals that the 1961 Act was introduced as a price of temporary legislation for the purpose of providing certain protection to tenants, particularly, in areas where there was great demand for premises, where the buildings for occupation were less and demand was more; that it had resulted in the owners of the buildings taking undue advantage of the situation; that the tenants were being subjected to considerable harassment and hardship and the market forces operating resulting in demands of very high rents and that certain protection was required to be extended with the intervention of the legislation etc. The 1961 Act introduced as a piece of temporary measure itself was a successor of similar earlier temporary enactments and initially was for a period of 10 years and had come to be extended from time to time and the last of such extension was in terms of Karnataka Act No. 10 of 2000 and upto 31-12-2001. This Act was replaced by the Karnataka Rent Act, 1999. The 1961 Act was not extended beyond 31-12-2001 and as indicated in the Statement of objects and reasons etc., the stress here is for providing a limited protection to the tenants, in the sense, protection to a lesser extent than what was provided under the 1961 Act. The aim was to bring about a legislation which was perhaps uniform for such purposes throughout the country and to make it in-line with such intendment and also to encourage the construction activity to increase by making the provisions of protection to tenants less rigorous on the landlords so that more premises become vacant easily and are available to the landlords for putting up a new construction and so that more premises become available later on etc.
15. It is no doubt true that the 1999 Act provides for a lesser degree of protection to the tenants which inevitably will be to the advantage of the landlord, inasmuch as, the restrictions on the right of the landlord for enjoyment of their leased premises is reduced under the later Act. The Division Bench of this Court as well as the Supreme Court had an occasion to look into such objects of the present enactment while interpreting the provisions of Section 70 of the 1999 Act which provides for savings and repeal. The present examination is more in the context of the applicability of these provisions themselves and not so much so as to the effect of these provisions in respect of any premises or outcome on an understanding of these provisions.
16. Submission of learned Counsel for the petitioners is that the examination both by the Division Bench in Mercury Press case and decision of the Supreme Court in Mahendra Saree Emporium’s case was expressly in the context of the provisions of Section 70 of the 1999 Act; that the effect of Section 70(2) of the 1999 Act in respect of pending proceedings and the examination was in respect of the premises located in the area to which the Act was made applicable; that the provisions of Chapters I to III and IV to VIII were also applicable and as a result the consequence of the provisions of repeal and savings etc.
17. Submission is that when the Division Bench as also the Supreme Court did not examine a case wherein the very provisions of the 1999 Act were not made applicable, in the sense, a premises located in an area to which the 1999 Act was not at all made applicable and the examination was only in a situation where the 1999 Act was applicable, but to a premises to which the Act was not made applicable in terms of the very provisions of this Act, the decision cannot constitute an authority for the question as to what should happen in a situation where the 1999 Act itself is not applicable.
18. Learned Counsel submit that the premises in occupation of the petitioners-tenants in all these writ petitions are premises located in an area to which the 1999 Act is admittedly not made applicable in terms of the present Act i.e., the Karnataka Rent Act, 1999; that in none of the earlier decided cases, such questions had arisen nor the Court had an occasion to examine such situations and pronounced upon it; that the question as has arisen in these writ petitions presented for determination for the first time before this Court and it is of no help for the respondents-landlords to rely upon the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Mercury Press case and also the decision of the Supreme Court in Mahendra Saree Emporium’s case.
19. The provisions of Sections 1, 2 and 70 of the 1999 Act read as under:
“1. Short title, extent and commencement.–(1) This Act may be called the Karnataka Rent Act, 1999.
(2) It extends to the whole of the State of Karnataka.
(3) It shall come into force from such date as the State Government may, by notification, appoint and different dates may be appointed for different areas or for different provisions of this Act.
2. Application of the Act.–(1) Chapters I to III and Chapters V to VIII of this Act shall apply to areas specified in the First Schedule.
(2) Chapters I and IV shall apply only to areas specified in the Second Schedule.
(3) Nothing contained in this Act shall apply.-
(a) to any premises belonging to.–
(i) the State Government or the Central Government or a local authority;
(ii) a Muzarai or religious or charitable institution;
(iii) a Wakf.
70. Repeal and Savings.–(1) The Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 (Karnataka Act 22 of 1961) is hereby repealed.
(2) Notwithstanding such repeal and subject to the provisions of Section 69.–
(a) all proceedings in execution of any decree or order passed under the repealed Act, and pending at the commencement of this Act, in any Court shall be continued and disposed off by such Court as if the said enactment had not been repealed;
(b) all cases and proceedings other than those referred to in clause (a) pending at the commencement of this Act before the Controller, Deputy Commissioner, Divisional Commissioner, Court, District Judge or the High Court or other authority, as the case may be in respect of the premises to which this Act applies shall be continued and disposed off by such Controller, Deputy Commissioner, Divisional Commissioner, Court, District Judge or the High Court or other authority in accordance with the provisions of this Act;
(c) all other cases and proceedings pending in respect of premises to which this Act does not apply shall as from the date of commencement of the Act stand abated;
(3) Except as otherwise provided in Section 69 and in Sub-section (2) of this section, provisions of Section 6 of the Mysore General Clauses Act, 1899 (Mysore Act III of 1899), shall so far as may be applicable in respect of repeal of the said enactment, and Sections 8 and 24 of the said Act shall be applicable as if the said enactment had been repealed and re-enacted by this Act”.
On an examination, it is indicated that the area wherein the premises are involved i.e., subject-matter of these writ petitions are located, are areas to which the 1999 Act are not made applicable at all. Chapter VIII wherein figures Section 70 also is not applicable, in which event, neither any of the provisions of this Act including the provisions of Sub-section (3) of Section 2 of this Act which provides for non-applicability of the Act to certain premises even when the Act is applicable as also the provisions of Section 70 providing for repeal and savings are not attracted to the present situation. The examination earlier in Mercury Press case and Mahesndra Saree Emporium’s case was in the context of the applicability of the 1999 Act to such premises located in areas where the Act applied, but, nevertheless, the provisions of the Act did not apply in terms of Sub-section (3) of Section 2 and as to what should happen in respect of pending proceedings in respect of such premises as provided under Section 70(2) of the 1999 Act which on a proper understanding can only mean such premises to which the 1999 Act either applied or not applied in terms of Section 2 of the 1999 Act.
20. It is no doubt true that pending proceedings were under the provisions of the earlier Act, particularly, under Section 50 of the 1961 Act, but for the purpose of determining the fate for such pending proceedings, the provisions of Section 70 of the 1999 Act was pressed into service. If it can be said that the premises is one such as in the present case to which the very Act is not made applicable, it cannot be said that they are also the premises to which the provisions of Section 70(2) of the 1999 Act will have to be applied and the result worked out. So also the provisions of Section 70(3) of the 1999 Act as to what is made applicable under Section 70(3) is in respect of such situations to which the provisions of Section 70(2) were not applicable and have been governed by Section 6 of the Mysore General Clauses Act, 1899. If the very Act is not applicable, no provisions of Section 70 of the 1999 Act can be pressed into service and therefore it is as though the 1999 Act has no bearing at all in respect of the proceedings which had been initiated under the 1961 Act.
21. That can only leave us with the situation as to what should happen to such proceedings or petitions under Section 50 of the 1961 Act which were pending before the Courts and in respect of premises located in the areas to which the 1999 Act is not at all made applicable. The answer to this question is to be found in the 1961 Act itself. As observed earlier, the 1961 Act was a temporary piece of legislation and it had come to be extended from time to time. The 1961 Act was in force till 31-12-2001. Thereafter, the Act has ceased to be in force by efflux of time, being a temporary piece of legislation or legislation for a limited period. Normally, in respect of a temporary legislation and on the expiry, the provisions of Section 6 of the Mysore General Clauses Act, 1899 are not attracted. But, in the present situation, the 1961 Act in terms of Section 1(4) read with proviso to Sub-section (6) of Section 2 of the 1961 Act, provided that even on the expiry of the 1961 Act, the provisions of Section 6 of the Mysore General Clauses Act, 1899 should apply as though the Act was a permanent Karnataka Act and as though it was repealed by a later Karnataka Act immediately before its expiry i.e., a fiction is created under Section 1(4) of the 1961 Act, where under before the expiry of the Act, namely, prior to 31-12-2001, it is as though the Act is one which is a permanent Karnataka Act and this permanent Karnataka Act is repealed by another Karnataka Act, namely, any other Act which may follow. In fact, reading of Section 1(4) and proviso to Sub-section (6) to Section 2 of the 1961 Act, make it clear that even in a situation where this Act ceases to operate to certain areas alone, as the State Government had the power either to extend the applicability of the Act or otherwise withdraw the applicability and on such withdrawal of the applicability of the Act to certain areas, provisions of Section 6 of the Mysore General Clauses Act, 1899, would spring into action and would apply accordingly.
22. If the 1999 Act is not at all applicable having not been brought into force in the areas with which we are concerned and where the premises, subject-matter of the litigation is located, Section 70 of this Act also does not operate, in which event, we have to fall back on the provisions of the 1961 Act to find out as to what should happen in respect of pending proceedings that had arisen under the provisions of the 1961 Act and in the light of the provisions of Section 1(4) and proviso to Sub-section (6) of Section 2 of the 1961 Act, one is left with no doubt that Section 6 of the Mysore General Clauses Act, 1899 operates, in which event, such pending proceedings are saved till its culmination.
23. Learned Counsel for the petitioners-tenants have placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Punjab v. Mohar Singh Pratap Singh, AIR 1955 Sc 84 in support of their submission.
24. Submission placing reliance on this decision is that Section 6 of the Mysore General Clauses Act, 1899, is applicable to a situation of the present nature, inasmuch as, the situation is not governed by the provisions of Section 70 of the 1999 Act.
25. Learned Counsel for the petitioners also seek to distinguish the decision of this Court in the case of Mercury Press and also that of the Supreme Court in the case of Mahendra Saree Emporium, as discussed earlier.
26. Reliance is also placed on the decision of the Full Bench of this Court in the case of Haricharandas v. V.K. Satyanarayan, ILK 1978 Kar. 1573 (FB).
27. The Full Bench of this Court had an occasion to examine the effect of deletion of Section 50 of the 1961 Act which provided for a revision to the High Court in respect of an order passed in appeal by the District Court as the Appellate Court over the eviction orders passed by the Rent Control Courts. This Court held that notwithstanding the deletion of Section 50 providing for a revision to the High Court, the proceedings pending before the High Court under Section 50 of the 1961 Act as it stood earlier is to be continued on the principles embedded in Section 6 of the Mysore General Clauses Act, 1899 though such proceedings are not expressly saved under the Repealing Act i.e., the 1975 Act.
28. Likewise, reliance is also placed on the decision of this Court in the case of Lakshmi Hardware Stores and Anr. v. G. V. Srikantayya and Anr., 1983(2) Kar. L.J. 161 which was also a decision in the context of the provisions of the 1961 Act and as to the consequence that will ensure on the expiry of this Act by afflux of time etc.
29. That was a situation where the Act had expired and subsequently ordinances were promulgated to keep alive the provisions of the Act, which also came to an end with lapse of time and thereafter as to what should happen to the pending proceedings that had been initiated under the 1961 Act. This Court held even then the pending proceedings are saved in view of the provisions of Section 6 of the Mysore General Clauses Act, 1899.
30. The present situation is one where respect of the areas where the premises is located, while the 1999 Act is not applicable and therefore the provisions of Section 70 of the 1999 Act are also not attracted, the proceedings which were initiated under the 1961 Act, namely, revision under Section 50 of this Act were pending on the day when this Act also expired by lapse of time as on 31-12-2001. The provisions of the 1961 Act in these areas where it was applicable earlier, came to an end because of lapse of time or its lifetime being over and not because of a repeal under the provisions of the 1999 Act. If it was not a case of repeal under the 1999 Act, none of the provisions of Section 70 of this Act can govern such situations, but one will have to look into the provisions of the 1961 Act itself. The 1961 Act expressly provided for the applicability of the Mysore General Clauses Act, 1899, to apply. On the expiry of the 1961 Act and in the present situation, the cases in hand are precisely that in respect of pending proceedings in which the orders have been passed and which are in challenge in these writ petitions, are one to which the provisions of Section 6 of the Mysore General Clauses Act, 1899 is attracted, in which event, are necessarily saved for being disposed of in accordance with the provisions of the 1961 Act.
31. In the result, the impugned orders of declaration by the revisional Courts holding that the revision petitions have abated are hereby set aside by issue of a writ of certiorari,
32. It is declared that in respect of such pending revision petitions, the proceedings are to be continued in the light of the provisions of Section 6 of the Mysore General Clauses Act, 1899 and the proceedings continue to be governed by the 1961 Act and are to be disposed of in accordance with such provisions of law.
33. The result is the same even in Writ Petition No. 37436 of 2003. In Act, the order is one common though petitions are two in respect of the very order one at the instance of the tenant and this petition at the instance of the landlord.
34. All these petitions are allowed.
35. Rule issued and made absolute in all these writ petitions. The Revisional Courts are hereby directed to dispose of the matters as expeditiously as possible and at any rate not later than six months from this day, having regard to the fact that litigation between the parties have been pending for considerable time and that the landlords are eager to secure their premises and it is only fair that they know the outcome of their attempts to secure their premises at the earliest.
36. I place on record my appreciation of the valuable assistance rendered by the learned Counsel appearing for both the petitioners and the respondents in these writ petitions.