JUDGMENT
P.K. Misra, J.
1. This revision has been filed Under Section 18(3) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (in short, the “Act”) read with Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure (in short, the “C.P.C.”) challenging the order passed by the Land Acquisition Collector refusing to make a reference Under Section 18 of the Act to the Civil Judge (Senior Division) on the ground that the application for making reference had been filed beyond forty-two days of the date of the award.
2. The award was passed by the Collector on 4.6.1991 in presence of the petitioner. On 24.8.1991, notice was served on the petitioner intimating the petitioner about the award. On 4.6.1991, the petitioner received the awarded amount under protest and subsequently on 9.10.1991, he filed an application Under Section 18 of the Act to refer the matter to the Civil Court for payment of higher compensation. The said application was rejected by the Land Acquisition Collector on the ground that the application was barred by time, as it had not been filed within forty-two days of the date of the award.
3. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has raised two contentions. Firstly, he has submitted that the period of limitation of forty-two days should commence from the date on which the petitioner had actual knowledge about the essential contents of the award and not merely from the date of the award, or from the date of the service of notice regarding the award. It has been submitted that unless the claimant is aware of the contents of the award, he would not be in a position to know as to whether higher compensation should be claimed or not. In support of such contention, the counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the decisions reported in AIR 1963 Supreme Court 1604 (State of Punjab v. Mst. Qaisar Jehan Begum and Anr.) and AIR 1969 Ori. 198 (Ramahari Moharana and Ors. v. Land Acquisition Officer and Anr.). In the aforesaid cases, the award had not been made in presence of the party, but subsequently the party came to know about the award. In the aforesaid context, it was stated that only when the party was made aware of the contents of the award, the petition of limitation would commence for the purpose of filing application Under Section 18 of the Act.
On the other hand, the decision reported in JT 1997 (5) SC 123 = (1997 (4) Supreme 550) (The Land Acquisition Officer v. Shivabai and Ors.), which has been very fairly brought to my notice by the counsel for the petitioner himself, clearly lays down that when the award is passed in presence of the party, the application for reference must be made within forty-two days from the date of the award. In view of the subsequent decision of the Surpreme Court, the contention raised by the counsel for the petitioner cannot be accepted.
4. The learned counsel for the petitioner in course of argument had also submitted that even assuming that the application was barred by limitation, the Land Acquisition Collector could have condoned the delay by invoking jurisdiction Under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. In support of such contention, the learned counsel had placed reliance upon the decisions reported in AIR 1994 Bom. 317(FB) (Bhupal Premchand Shah and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra) : AIR 1989 Guj. 56 (Gopalbhai Becharbhai v. State of Gujarat and Anr.) and AIR 1985 Gujarat 115 (Mohan Vasta v. State of Gujarat). The aforesaid decisions squarely supported the submission made by the counsel for the petitioner. However, after close of argument when the revision had been reserved for judgment, the learned counsel for the petitioner very fairly brought to my notice the decision of the Supreme Court reported in JT 1996 (2) SC 278 (The Officer on Special Duty (Land Acquisition) and Anr. v. Shah Manila Chandulal etc.) wherein while interpreting similar provisions contained in the Land Acquisition Act, as amended in Maharashtra, it was held that provision of Section 5 of the Limitation Act shall not apply to the Land Acquisition Collector, as Land Acquisition Collector is not a “Court”. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted in his written notes of argument that though such decision is against the contention of the petitioner, the question as to whether the Land Acquisition Collector could be considered to be a “Court” had not been decided keeping in view all the relevant principles. The learned counsel for the petitioner has emphasised on the point that Under Section 18(3) of the Act, as amended in Orissa, a Civil Revision is maintainable against the order of the Land Acquisition Collector in the High Court, as if the Collector were a “Court subordinate to High Court”. He has submitted that in view of this deeming provision contained in Section 18(3) of the Act, the Collector exercising power under the Land Acquisition Act should be considered to be a “Court” for all purposes. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, it is well settled principle of interpretation that when a deeming provision is made, the Court is required to interpret such deeming provision and take it to its logical conclusion. Such submission of the counsel for the petitioner though on the face of it attractive cannot be accepted in view, of the specific decision of the Supreme Court reported in JT 1996 (2) SC 278 (supra). In the aforesaid case, the Supreme Court was construing the provisions contained in the Land Acquisition (Maharashtra Extension and Amendment) Act, 1964, wherein similar provision, as in Orissa, had been made. Since the aforesaid Supreme Court decision is binding, there is hardly any scope for examining or accepting the contention raised by the petitioner.
5. For the aforesaid reasons, I am unable to allow this Civil Revision, which is accordingly dismissed. There would be no order as to costs.
6. I must place on record the fair manner in which Shri S.K. Misra, learned counsel for the petitioner, has placed all the relevant decisions including the decisions which are apparently against his submissions. Such fairness on the part of a young and budding lawyer is expected to be emulated by all.