JUDGMENT
Jawahar Lal Gupta, J.
1. The appellants and respondents No. 1 are close relations. The basic dispute relates to the allotment of land during consolidation proceedings. On April 17,1978. the Director of Consolidation of Holdings passed an order (Copy of Annexure P 6) in favour of Lalji, the predecessor-in interest of the present appellants. This order was challenged by his brother, Raju, respondent No. 1 through C. W. P. No. 2958 of 1978. The learned Single Judge having allowed the writ petition, the heirs of Lalji have filed the present appeal. A few facts may be noticed.
2. Lalji and Raju had a joint holding before the initiation of consolidation proceedings in the village. In the course of these proceedings, their land was ordered to be partitioned. According to the Scheme prepared for carrying out the consolidation of Holdings, in cases where the percentage of two rights holders was equal, the allotment had to be made in the alphabetical order according to the Dev Nagri script. The right holder whose name came first had to get his laud at the first major portion and the other right holder had to be shifted to the next place, Raju, the respondent was not allotted land in accordance with this principle in spite of the fact that in the alphabetical order, his name came before that of his brother Lalji. Instead, the land was allotted to Lalji at the first major portion. Aggrieved by this, it appears that the respondent Raju filed a petition under Section 42 of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) on June 18, 1975. It further appears that he filed another petition under Section 42 on August 18, 1975 Notice of the petitioner dated June 18, 1975 was issued to Lalji It is averred that on the intervention of the respectables of the village, the dispute between the two brothers was settled. Accordingly, Lalji and Raju appeared before the Director of Consolidation on October 30, 1975 and made a request that the proceedings “be dropped and that they will not now press this petition.” The Director accepted this prayer and ordered that the petition be filed A copy of this order dated October 30, 1975 is on record as Annexure P-1. It appears that the compromise between the parties fell through. As a result, the proceedings under Section 42 were revived. Vide order dated March 4, 1976, the Director accepted the claim of the Raju on the ground that “the allotment in this village should have been made according to the alphabetical order, and by doing so Shrt Raju’s name should have come first for allotting him area which could follow by his brother………”. This order appears to have been passed on the petition dated August 18, 1975. A copy of the order has been produced as Annexure P2 on the record of this case. The case was remanded to the Consolidation Officer which for decision under Section 21 (2) of the Act, vide order dated July 19, 1976 (Annexure P-3) the Consolidation Officer allotted land to Raju on the first major portion while Lalji was allotted land at the second major portion. This order was challenged by Lalji in an appeal before the Settlement Officer which was dismissed by order dated July 4, 1977 (Copy Annexure P-5) Undeterred, Lalji filed a petition under Section 4 before the Director of Consolidation. Vide orders dated April 17, 1978 (Annexure P-6) the Director accepted the petition and held that the order dated March 4, 1976 (Annexure P-2) passed in favour of Raju under Section 42 was not legally sustainable He accordingly, set aside the order and directed certain changes to be made regarding the allotment of land. Aggrieved by this order, the respondent, Raju filed a C. W. P. No. 2958 of 1978. The learned Single Judge having found that the Director had no jurisdiction to review the order passed by the predecessor on March 4, 1976 and that the order was contrary to the Scheme of Consolidation, allowed the writ petition and quashed the impugned order. Aggrieved by this order, the appellants who are the heirs of Lalji have come up in the present Letters Patent Appeal.
3. Mr. V. D. Gaur, learned counsel for the appellants has primarily contended that the order dated March 4, 1976 (Annexure P-2) passed by the Director was a review of the order dated October 30, 1975 (Annexure P 1) According to the learned counsel, the dispute between the parties had been settled by the order passed by the Director on October 30, 1975 and, thereafter, the Director had no jurisdiction to review the order. He also submitted that the order was in contravention of the Scheme. Learned counsel also submitted that in pursuance to the compromise arrived at between the parties, the possession of land had been exchanged and that it would not be just and fair to alter the position after the lapse of a long time.
4. On the other hand, Mr. R. S Mittal, learned counsel for respondent No. 1 contended that vide orders dated October 30, 1975, the proceedings had been merely ‘dropped’ and the petition had been ‘filed’. In fact, there was no decision. Consequently, the question of review did not arise. He further submitted that it has been found as a fact by the authorities as also the learned Single Judge that initially the allotment of land had not been made in accordance with the provisions of the Scheme of Consolidation. The wrong was rectified and now the appellants were not entitled to claim that the orders should not be carried out
5. We proceed to examine the respective contention raised by the learned counsel for the parties
6. The first question that arises for consideration is: Can the Director review an order passed under Section 42 of the Act ? This question has been settled by various decisions. In Deep Chand and Anr. v. Additional Director, Consolidation of Holdings Punjab, (1964) 66 P.L. R.318 (F. B.). a Full Bench of this Court held that-
“An Additional Director of Consolidation is not empowered to recall or review his earlier erroneous and unjust order whenever it is discovered that the error was due to his own mistaken view of the merits of the controversy.”
7. This view has the imprimatur of even the Apex Court. In Harbhajan Singh v. Karam Singh, A. I. R. 1966 S. C. 641. it was held that-
“There is no provision in the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act granting express power of review to the State Government with regard to an order made under Section 42 of the Act. In the absence of any such express power, the Director, Consolidation of Holdings, cannot review his previous order……………….”
8. Consequently, it is the settled position of law that the Director has no power of review under the Act.
9. What is ‘review’ ? According to Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, review means ‘judicial re-examination; a second or repeated review; renewed study; to view or see again to examine again; to re-examine judicially’. Mr. Gaur referred to the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Sadhu Singh v. The State of Punjab, I.L.R. (1968) 1 Pb. and Hry. 378. to point out that review according to the Oxford Dictionary inter alia means ‘to re consider to submit to examination or revision. In the present context, it can be said that review means to revise or to view again,
10. In this background, it has to be considered. Did the Director review the decision dated October 30, 1975 when he passed the order dated March 4, 1976? In this context, it is apt to notice the order passed by the Director on October 30, 1975. It reads as under : –
“Shri Raju s/o Mehru resident of Village Khera, Tehsil Bhiwani Khera, District Bhiwani has filed this petition under Section 42 of the East Punjab Holdings Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948. His prayer was for the adjustment of the area between the two brothers.
2. The notice was served to the parties and they have appeared today with the request that the proceedings may now be dropped because a compromise has been effected and they will not now press this petition. I accept their prayer and file this petition. Announced 30 10.1975″
11. Is this a decision ? According to Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, ‘decision’ means ‘the act of deciding the act of settling or terminating (as a contest or controversy) by giving judgment a determination arrived at after consideration a legal adjudication or judicial determination of a question or cause the act of forming an opinion or of deciding upon a course of action’.
12. What is the position in the present case ? A perusal of the order as quoted above shows that the parties had requested the Director that “the proceedings may now be dropped ” This request was accepted. The petition was ordered to be ‘filed’. This was not a decision. The Director had not settled or terminated the controversy by giving a judgment. Ha had not considered the merits of the case and arrived at a determination. He had formed no opinion. He had recorded no judgment He had merely dropped the proceedings and filed the petition He had not declared a winner or a loser. Consequently, he had delivered no decision or judgment when he passed the order dated October 30, 1975. Subsequently, when the compromise fell through, no petition for the review of the order was ever filed. The petition dated August 18, 1975 which had been presented well before the passing of the order had come up for consideration This petition was considered by the Director, He found that the respondent (Raju who had filed the petition under Section 42) had not been allotted land in accordance with the provisions of the Scheme. He, thus, decided the dispute between the parties and remanded the case to the Consolidation Officer. This was the only decision delivered by the Director in exercise of his powers under Section 42 of the Act He had not judicially re-examined the order dated October 30, 1975. There was no renewed study of the order or judicial re-examination thereof He had not revised or reviewed the earlier order. In fact, even an objection regarding the maintainability of the petition or the jurisdiction of the Director to decide the matter was not raised.
13. In view of the above, we hold that the order dated March 4, 1976 was legal and valid. We affirm the finding recorded by the learned Single Judge on this aspect of the case.
14. Mr. Gaur also contended that while passing the order dated April 17, 1978 (Annexure P 6), the Director had not reviewed the order dated March 4, 1976 (Annexure P-2). According to the learned counsel, the Director had not examined the legality and propriety of the orders passed by the Consolidation Officer (Annexure P-3) and the Settlement Officer (Annexure P 5).
15. A perusal of the order Annexure P-5 clearly shows that the Director has held that the order dated March 4, 1976 is illegal. He has set it aside It was thus a clear review of the order. It was wholly without jurisdiction. Consequently, the contention raised by the learned counsel has no merit and is rejected.
16. It was next contended that the order passed by the Director was in contravention of the Scheme.
17. We find no merit in this contention. Para No. 7 of the Scheme (Annexure R-l/A) provides that “in case of equal percentage, allotment will be made as per Dev Nagri Alphabetic i. e. the right holder whose name will come first, by first word, his right will be determined first ” It is the admitted position that in the Dev Nagri Script, ‘ra’ comes before ‘la’. It is also admitted that the two brothers had equal share in the joint holding. Accordingly, the land had to be allotted first to the respondent at the first major portion as provided for in the Scheme and, thereafter, to Lalji. This is precisely what was held by the Director vide his order dated March 4, 1976. The order has been rightly up-held by the learned Single Judge after a thorough examination of the provisions of the Scheme. We find no reason to take a different view.
18. Mr. Gaur finally submitted that the re-partition had taken place many years back and that the appellants have been in possession since then. Consequently, he prays that the status quo should be maintained.
19. We are unable to accept this submission. Land was not allotted to the respondent in accordance with the provisions of the Scheme. Consequently, a wrong was done to him. This wrong was sought to be perpetuated by the order dated April 17, 1978 passed by the Director. This order was wholly without jurisdiction The Director had no jurisdiction to review the order passed by his predecessor under Section 42 of the Act. If we accept the contention of the learned counsel for the appellants, we would be up-holding an order which was wholly illegal. It would amount to perpetuating a wrong. We are nit persuaded to do so.
20. Accordingly, we find no merit in this appeal. It is dismissed. Keeping in view the fact that the parties are close relations, we make no order as to costs.