JUDGMENT
K.A. Swami, C.J.
1. This appeal preferred against the order dated March 23, 1993 passed by the learned single judge in W.P. No. 18625 of 1991.
2. In the writ petition the appellant herein sought for quashing the order dated December 16, 1991, passed by the Deputy, Commissioner of Labour (Appeals). Madras, in T.S.E. No. 42 of 1991. The learned single judge has dismissed the writ petition holding that the order passed by the Deputy Commissioner of Labour (Appeals). Madras, under section 42(2) of the Tamil Nadu Shops and Establishments Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as “”the Act”), does not suffer from any infirmity.
3. Having regard to the rival contentions the following points arise for consideration :
(i) Whether it was open to the first respondent to withdraw his letter seeking voluntary retirement before it became effective and after the order passed by the bank accepting the letter and granting voluntary retirement ?
(ii) Whether the order accepting the voluntary retirement in a case where the person seeking voluntary retirement was not eligible on the date of his letter seeking voluntary retirement or on the date of acceptance of such letter, can be considered to be a valid order coining in the way of the first respondent to withdraw his letter of voluntary retirement before the voluntary retirement was to become effective ?
(iii) Whether the appeal preferred by the first respondent under section 41(2) was maintainable and whether the discretion was properly, exercised by the appellate authority in condoning the delay ?
(iv) Whether the first respondent is entitled to relief having regard to the fact that he had accepted the voluntary retirement benefits before filing the appeal before the appellate authority under the Act ?
4. For the purpose of determining the aforesaid points the necessary facts which are not in dispute are as follows : The first respondent was appointed as an officer in grade II in the appellant-bank on January 3, 1977. After promotion from time to time, he became the Senior Manager and came to be designated as Chief Manager (advances) and later on, he was transferred as the chief instructor in the appellant’s staff training centre at Mylapore. On October 8, 1990, he sent a letter to the Chairman of the bank seeking permission to retire voluntarily by the end of June, 1991, when he would attain the age of 55 with full benefits applicable for normal retirement. This permission was sought under rule 14 of the Bharat Overseas Bank Limited Officers’ Service Rules, 1990 (hereinafter referred to as “the Service Rules”). On October 29, 1990, the board directors of the appellant-bank met and considered the request of the first respondent seeking voluntary retirement and granted permission to the first respondent to voluntarily retire from the bank’s service with effect from June 30, 1991. This decision of the board of directors was also communicated to the first respondent on November 1, 1990. On November 24, 1990, the first respondent addressed a letter to the chairman of the appellant-bank stating that he withdrawing the premature retirement application and that he wants to serve till the completion of 58 years and, therefore, suitable instructions may be given that regard. This request of the first respondent was considered by the board of directors in their meeting held on March 21, 1991, and the same was rejected, expressing inability of the board to reconsider their decision made on October 29, 1990, permitting the first respondent to retire on June 30, 1991. This decision of the board of directors was also communicated to the petitioner on March 28, 1991.
5. Pursuant to that, the first respondent gave notice on June 17, 1991, to the appellant-bank. Accordingly, he filed a suit on June 25, 1991, in O.S. No. 4116 of 1991 in the City Civil, Court, Madras, which came to be assigned to the XIIth Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Madras. In the suit, an application I.A. No. 10175 of 1991 was filed seeking an order of temporary injunction restraining the appellant-bank from disturbing the first respondent from service before he completes the age of superannuation of 58 years. The bank appeared and filed its counter. However, the learned XIIth Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Madras, dismissed the application on July 4, 1991, on the basis of communication dated June 29, 1991, issued by the appellant-bank to the first respondent in terms of the earlier letters dated November 1, 1990, and February 28, 1991, that the first respondent is advised to retire from the service of the bank as on June 30, 1991. Thereafter, the first respondent was paid the provident fund along with the bank’s contribution, gratuity and privilege leave encashment as under :
(Rs. P.)
“1. Member’s Provident fund contribution : 69,541.65
2. Bank’s contribution : 69,541.65
3. Gratuity : 65,145.80
4. Privilege leave encashment : 54,527.70
————–
2,58,756.80
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6. Thus, a total sum of Rs. 2,58,756.80 was paid to the first respondent. The appeal filed by the first respondent against the order dated July 4, 1991, dismissing I. A. No. 10175 of 1991, filed in O.S. No. 4116 of 1991, before the IX Additional Judge, City Civil Court, Madras, was also dismissed on September 10, 1991.
7. In the meanwhile, the first respondent filed an appeal under section 41(2) of the Act before the second respondent on October 25, 1991, along with an application for condonation of delay. The second respondent condoned the delay after notice to the bank and also decided the appeal on the merits. By order dated December 16, 1991, the appeal was allowed by the second respondent and the order refusing to accept the withdrawal of the letter seeking voluntary retirement was held to be not valid and it was held that it was open to the first respondent to withdraw his letter seeking voluntary retirement before the end of June, 1991. Hence, the writ petition was filed by the bank. As already pointed out, the learned single judge has dismissed the writ petition.
Points (i) and (ii)
Points (i) and (ii) go together; therefore, they, are considered together. Rule 14 of the Service Rules are of the Bank provides thus :
“14(i) An officer shall retire from the service of the bank on attaining the age of 58 years, provided that the board may, at their discretion, on review, by the special committee/special committees as provided hereinafter in clause (ii) retire an officer on or any time after the completion of 55 years of age or on or at any time after the completion of 30 years of total service in the bank, whichever is earlier :
Provided further that before retiring an officer at least three months’ notice in writing or an amount equivalent to three months’ emoluments shall be given to such officer :
Provided also that an officer who has completed 55 years of age or 30 years of total service, whichever is earlier, may be permitted by the board to retire from the bank’s service, subject to his giving three months’ notice in writing unless the requirement is wholly or partly dispensed with.
(ii) The board shall constitute a special committee/special committees consisting of not less than three officers to review whether an officer should be retired in accordance with the first proviso to this rule. Such committee/ committees shall from time to time review the case of each officer and no order of retirement shall be made unless the special committee/special committees recommend in writing to the board the retirement of an officer.
(iii) An officer under suspension shall not retire or be permitted to retire, as the case may be, but shall be retained in service until the enquiry into the charge is concluded and a final order is passed thereon unless the chairman, having regard to the circumstances of the case, is of the opinion that his retention in service is not necessary.
Explanation. – An officer will retire on the last day of the stipulated service or the age of retirement.”
8. As per the aforesaid rule, for the purpose of seeking voluntary retirement, an officer must have either completed 55 years of age or 30 years of total service. In the case of the first respondent herein, he was to attain 55 years of age on June 30, 1991, and had not admittedly completed 30 years of service on October 8, 1990, when he submitted the letter seeking voluntary retirement, because he had joined the service under the bank only, on January 3, 1977. No doubt, the board of directors of the bank acted upon the letter dated October 8, 1990, of the first respondent, accepted the same and permitted the first respondent to retire voluntarily at their meeting dated October 29, 1990, and the order was also communicated on November 1, 1990. But the question for consideration is whether it was open to the first respondent to withdraw his request seeking voluntary retirement and if so at what point of time.
9. It is not disputed before us that it was open to the first respondent to withdraw his letter seeking voluntary retirement. However, it was contended that no such withdrawal could be sought or granted once the request seeking voluntary retirement is granted by the board of directors and the decision is communicated. We have already, pointed out that the first respondent would become eligible to seek voluntary retirement only, on and from July 1, 1991, because he was to attain the age of 55 years by June 30, 1991. That was the earliest date on which he would have become eligible to seek voluntary retirement. That being so, in the absence of any rule preventing him or taking away his right to withdraw the request for voluntary retirement, it is not at all possible to hold that it was not open to the first respondent to withdraw his letter, requesting voluntary retirement on or before June 30, 1991. In fact, any permission granted before that date would be effective only on and from July 1, 1991. Therefore, the decision of the board of directors would have become enforceable only on and from July 1, 1991. The fact that the board of directors approved the request and granted permission on October 29, 1990, permitting the first respondent to retire voluntarily did not in any way change the legal position because rule 14, extracted above, does not contain any provision taking away the right of the first respondent to apply for withdrawal of the request made to permit him to retire voluntarily.
10. In Punjab National Bank v. P. K. Mittal (1989-I-LLJ-368) (SC), more or less a similar question arose for consideration. The regulation concerned in that case was regulation of the Punjab National Bank (Officers) Service Regulations, 1979, and it was as follows : (P. 370)
“20. (1) Subject to sub-regulation (3) of regulation 16, the bank may terminate the services of any officer by giving him three months’ notice in writing or by paying him three months’ emoluments In lieu thereof.
(2) No officer shall resign from the service of the bank otherwise than on the expiry of three months from the service on the bank of a notice in writing of such resignation :
Provided further that the competent authority may reduce the period of three months, or remit the requirement of notice.”
Considering the aforesaid regulation, the Supreme Court observed thus at (P. 372)
“Dr. Anand Prakash emphasises that as clause (2) and its proviso are intended only to safeguard the bank’s interests they should be interpreted on the lines suggested by him. We are of the opinion that clause (2) of the regulation and its proviso are intended not only for the protection of the bank but also for the benefit of the employee. It is common knowledge that a person proposing to resign often wavers in his decision and even in a case where he has taken a firm, decision to resign, he may not be ready to go out immediately. In most cases, he would need a period of adjustment and hence likely to defer the actual date of relief from duties for a few months for various personal reasons. Equally, an employer may, like to have time to make some alternative arrangement before relieving the resigning employee. Clause (2) is carefully worded keeping both these requirements in mind. It gives the employee a period of adjustment and rethinking It also enables the bank to have some time to arrange its affairs, with the liberty, in an appropriate case, to accept the resignation of an employee even without the requisite notice if he so desires it. The Proviso, in our opinion, should not be interpreted as enabling a bank to thrust a resignation on an employee with effect from a date different from the one on which he can make his resignation effective under the terms of the regulation. We therefore agree with the High Court that in the present case the resignation of the employee could have become effective only on or about April 21, 1986, or on June 30, 1986, and that the bank could not have ‘accepted’ that resignation on any earlier date. The letter dated February 7, 1986, was, therefore, without jurisdiction.
11. The result of the above interpretation is that the employee continued to be in service till April 21, 1986, or June 30, 1986 on which date his services would have come normally to an end in terms of his letter dated January 21, 1986. But, by that time, he, had exercised his right to withdraw the resignation. Since the withdrawal letter was written before the resignation became effective, the resignation stands withdrawn, with the result that the respondent continues to be in the service of the bank. It is true that there is no specific provision in the regulations permitting the employee to withdraw the resignation. It is, however, not necessary that there should be any such specific rule. Until the resignation becomes effective on the terms of the letter read with regulation 20, it is open to the employee, on general principles, to withdraw his letter of resignation. That is why in some cases of public services, this right of withdrawal is also made subject to the permission of the employer. There is no such clause here. It is not necessary to labour this point further as it is well settled by the earlier decisions of the Supreme Court in Raj Kumar v. Union of India. (1970-1-LLJ-13), Union of Indian v. Gopal Chandra Misra, (1978-1-LLJ-492) and Balram Gupta v. Union of India. (1987-II-LLJ-541);
12. In the instant case also, we have already pointed out that there is no clause contained in the service rules disabling the officer or taking away his right, to withdraw the request for voluntary retirement made. If that be so, the fact that an order accepting the request for voluntary retirement was passed did not in any way affect the right of the first respondent to withdraw the same, before it became effective.
13. However, learned counsel for the appellant relied upon several decisions in support of his contention that, once the request for permission retire voluntarily was accepted and the decision was communicated, it was not open to the first respondent to withdraw the request made by him seeking voluntary retirement. We will now refer to those decisions.
14. Raj Kumar v. Union of India, (supra), was a case of resignation by a member of the I.A.S. (Indian Administrative Service), governed by the rules framed under Article 309 of the Constitution. The petitioner therein sought for permission to relieve him from service. The Government accepted it. But before communication of the order accepting his resignation reached him, he withdrew his offer of resignation. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner had no locus penitentiae to so withdraw his offer of resignation after it was accepted; that the principle that an order terminating employment is not effective until it is intimated to the employee could not apply to the facts of the case; that there is no rule framed under Article 309 of the Constitution as to when the resignation becomes effective; that clauses (c) and (d) contained in the Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs Memo dated May 6, 1958, have no statutory force and that, it being no order of dismissal. Article 311 of the Constitution was not attracted. Thus, it is clear that the decision in Raj Kumar’s case, (Supra) turned upon the rules which governed his services and as such it has no bearing on the point involved in the case on hand. Learned counsel specifically placed reliance on the observations contained in paragraph 5 of the decision about the communication of the order. As already pointed out, the rule laid down therein is not attracted to the facts of the case, because, as per that rule, the resignation was to acts of the case, because, as per that rule, the resignation was to become effective no sooner it was accepted and there was no rule or law governing the conditions of service to the contrary. Therefore, it was not open to the public servant to withdraw his resignation after it was accepted by the appropriate authority. Further, in that case, there was no date fixed for the resignation to take effect.
15. In J. P. Mudaliar v. A. C. Choubey [1975] Lab. IC 750, it was held that the resignation could always be withdrawn before it becomes operative. Learned counsel placed much reliance on the observations contained in paragraph 9 which are as under :
“Their Lordships distinguished the case of State of punjab v. Amar Singh Harika (1996-II-LLJ-188) (SC). Thus, their Lordships laid down that the resignation can always be withdrawn before it has started to become operative. Where the authority competent to accept the resignation accepts it before it has started to become operative, the discretion is with that authority either to permit the employee to withdraw it or not. The authority can certainly say that it will act on the resignation and will not permit the employee to withdraw it.”
16. With great respect to the learned judges constituting the Full Bench, it is not possible to agree with the view expressed therein that it is left to the discretion of the employer either to permit the employee to withdraw his letter of resignation or not, and the further statement of law that the authority could certainly say that it would act on the resignation and would not permit the employee to withdraw it. Such a wide proposition cannot be accepted, in the absence of any specific rule in that regard governing the service. It will all depend upon the rules governing the service and also the date from which the resignation has to become effective. We have already pointed out that in the case on hand the very voluntary, retirement was to become effective on and from July 1, 1991, and there is no rule taking away the right of the first respondent to withdraw the request seeking voluntary retirement or empowering the bank to refuse permission to withdraw such request.
17. Learned counsel placed reliance on the decision of a learned single judge of the Allahabad High Court in Nand Keshwar Prasad v. Labour Court, (1993-I-LLJ-449), wherein it was held at p. 502 that acceptance of the resignation effective from a prospective date and payment of wages for the intervening period were sufficient to disable the employee to seek the withdrawal or revocation of the resignation. In that case, the employee contended that the resignation submitted by him was not voluntarily written and he was forced to tender the resignation and he was also forced to receive the acceptance letter and he was not allowed to resume the duties. The Labour Court, negatived the contentions, held that the resignation was voluntary. Further, on the facts and circumstances of the case, it was held that it was accepted. Therefore, it is clear that the said decision turned upon the facts and circumstances of the case. Further it, is also not possible to agree with the proposition that it was not open to the employee to withdraw the resignation before it was accepted. In that case, after the resignation was accepted, the employee also accepted the wages paid in lieu of the period of notice therefore, it was held that he was not entitled to revoke the resignation tendered by him. Hence, the said decision cannot be applied to the case on hand. Moreover, the case of resignation stands on a different footing from a case where voluntary retirement is sought and it has to become effective only from a prospective date.
18. The decision in J. K. Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of U. P., (1991-I-LLJ-39) (SC), turned upon the provisions contained in the certified standing orders, according to which, what all the employee was required to do was to give a notice to quit and on the expiry of the notice period, his services would come to an end. The Supreme Court held that a formal acceptance of the employee’s desire by the employer could not mean that it was the employer who put an end to the contract of employment and it would be unfair to saddle the employer with the liability to pay compensation even where the service was terminated on the specific request of the employee, and that such an intention could not be attributed to the Legislature. It was also held that were a contract of service was determined on the employee exercising his right to quit, such termination could not be said to be at the instance of the employer so to fall within the first part of the definition of retrenchment in section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act. Therefore, it is clear that the question that was considered by the Supreme Court was as to whether acceptance of the resignation by the employer could be termed as “retrenchment”. However, reliance was placed on the other observations made in the decision, that the resignation is not complete until it is accepted by the proper authority and before such acceptance an employee can change his mind and withdraw the resignation, but once the resignation is accepted the contract comes to an end and the relationship of master and servant stands snapped. Therefore, it is contended that, in the instant case also, once the request for voluntary retirement was accepted, it became effective and it was not open to the first respondent to withdraw the request seeking voluntary retirement. We have already pointed out that, as per rule 14(1) of the Service Rules of the Bank, the voluntary retirement itself could become elective only on and from July 1, 1991, and long before the expiry of three months from the date of filing the application for voluntary retirement, the first respondent withdrew the same. Therefore, the aforesaid decision is also of no assistance to the appellant.
19. Learned counsel for the appellant placed reliance on the decision in P. Kasilingam v. P. S. G. College of Technology, (1981-I-LLJ-358). Which was also a case of resignation. It was contended therein that the resignation was not voluntary. Ultimately. It was found that the resignation was voluntary. During the course of the judgment, it has been observed in paragraph 13 that the services of a Government servant normally, stand terminated from the date on which the letter of resignation is accepted by the appropriate authority. Based upon this, it was contended that on the date the letter seeking voluntary retirement was accepted, the first respondent lost the right to withdraw his request to grant voluntary retirement. In the very same decision, it has been further observed thus (at page P. 362)).
“It was held that the services of a Government servant normally stand terminated from the date on which the letter of resignation is accepted by the appropriate authority, unless there is any law or statutory rule governing the conditions of service to the contrary, there is no reason why the same principle should not apply to the case of any other employee.”
20. As already pointed out, the rule specifically provides that one would become eligible to seek voluntary retirement only on attaining the age of 55 years or after the completion of 30 years of total service. As already pointed out, the first respondent had not completed either, on the date he applied for voluntary retirement or on the date the decision of the board was taken. He became eligible only on June 30, 1991, to seek voluntary retirement, therefore, it was open to him to withdraw his request, especially when there was no specific provision contained in the rules preventing the withdrawal of the letter filed by him for grant of voluntary retirement before it became effective.
21. Therefore, point No. (i) is answered in the affirmative and point No. (ii) in the negative. It is held that acceptance of the letter filed by the first respondent seeking voluntary retirement and communication of that decision to him too, did not come in the way of the first respondent to withdraw his letter seeking voluntary retirement, because the decision of the board of directors accepting the letter seeking voluntary retirement could have been passed only after June 30, 1991 the date on which he became eligible to seek voluntary retirement, and such request for voluntary retirement was to become effective on or after June 30, 1991.
Point No. (iii) : It is contended that the appeal preferred before the appellate authority was not maintainable because there was no determination or dismissal from service of the first respondent by the appellant-bank.
Section 41 of the Act reads thus :
“41. Notice of dismissal. – (1) No employer shall dispense with the services of a person employed continuously for a period of not less than six months, except for a reasonable cause and without giving such person at least one months notice, or wages in lieu of such notice, provided, however, that such notice shall not be necessary where the services of such person are dispensed with on a charge of misconduct supported by satisfactory evidence recorded at an inquiry held for the purpose.
(2) The person employed shall have a right to appeal to such authority and within such time as may be prescribed either on the ground that there was no reasonable cause for dispensing with his services or on the ground that he had not been guilty of misconduct as held by the employer.
(3) The decision of the appellate authority shall be final and binding on both the employer and the person employed.”
Sub-section (1) of section 41 lays down that no employer shall dispense with the services of an employee who has served continuously for six months, except for a reasonable cause and without giving such person at least one month’s notice or wages in lieu of such notice. However, in the case of dismissal on a charge of misconduct, notice is not required to be given and even dismissal on the ground of misconduct can be made only after satisfactory evidence is recorded at the enquiry held for the purpose. Sub-section (2) provides for the right of appeal to such authority within such time as may be prescribed either on the ground that there was no reasonable cause for dispensing with his services or on the ground that he had not been guilty of misconduct as had been held by the employer. The contention is that as the first respondent had sought voluntary retirement and it had been accepted, and he was permitted to retire voluntarily the rejection of his subsequent request for withdrawing the request made by him to permit him to retire voluntarily, did not and could not have the effect of dispensing with his services, as it was not the employer-bank who put an end to service whereas, it was the voluntary act of the employee himself which was the cause for putting an end to his service. It is not possible to accept this contention. The decision of the board of directors refusing to accept the letter of withdrawal submitted by the first respondent seeking voluntary retirement and treating him as voluntarily retired. even though he was not eligible to be voluntarily retired on the date the decision was taken, itself amounted to termination of service by the employer. It was no more a termination of service at the instance of the employee because the employee sought to withdraw his request made for voluntary retirement. We have already held, while considering points Nos. (i) and (ii) that the first respondent was well within his right in withdrawing the letter requesting voluntary retirement and the refusal to grant such request by the board of directors was illegal. That being so, the resultant effect was that there was illegal termination of service without any reasonable cause. as such, the first respondent was entitled to go up in appeal under section 41(2) of the Act. The appeal was permissible and as such it was maintainable.
22. Learned counsel for the appellant placed reliance on the decision in C. R. Ramaswami v. Needle Industries (I) Ltd., [1981] Lab. IC 765. That was a case in which the employee submitted his resignation to the employer, who accepted the same and relieved him from his duties. In such a situation, it was held that it could not be said that the employer had dispensed with the services of the employee; therefore, the appeal was not maintainable. As already pointed out, such is not the situation in the case on hand; therefore, the decision in C. R. Ramaswami’s case, (Supra) cannot be applied to the case on hand.
23. It is next contended that there was delay of 12 days in filing the appeal and the appellate authority did not judicially exercise the jurisdiction in condoning the same. It may be pointed out that the appellate authority noticed the fact that the first respondent was avalling of the remedy before the civil court under the bona fide belief that, that was the forum to seek the relief and it accepted the same and condoned the delay. The learned single judge has also agreed with the discretion exercised by the appellate authority. In the cases of condonation of delay, unless the discretion is exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably or the decision is arrived at without considering the relevant facts disclosing sufficient cause for not filing the appeal in time, we are of the view that, in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, interference with such discretion which is not found to be arbitrary, is not called for. Accordingly, point No. (iii) is answered in the affirmative.
Point No. (iv) : The contention of the appellant is that as the first respondent has accepted the benefits of voluntary retirement, in that, he has accepted the provident fund contribution, bank’s contribution to the provident fund, gratuity and privilege lease encashment, details of which have already been extracted in the earlier portion of this judgment, and that the said amount was paid towards full and final settlement of the amounts payable to him on his voluntary retirement, he is not entitled to any relief. It may be pointed out here that, in spite of the letter written by the first respondent withdrawing his earlier letter seeking voluntary retirement, the bank arbitrarily rejected it and by the letter dated June 29, 1991, produced at page 43 of the typed set of records, informed the first respondent as follows :
“In terms of our letters dated November 1, 1990 and March 28, 1991, we advise that you are retiring from the service of the bank as on June 30, 1991.
We wish you a happy and peaceful retired life.”
24. As already pointed out, long before the aforesaid letter, the petitioner had withdrawn the letter submitted by him seeking voluntary retirement. In spite of that, if the bank were to insist that he had retired from service and paid the amount and obtained a receipt and by that time he had already filed the suit seeking relief, the fact that he filed an appeal before the appellate authority on August 16, 1991, after the amount was received by him did not disable him from continuing the appeal and seeking the relief. It may be pointed out here that on the date when the bank informed the first respondent on June 29, 1991 that as per its earlier orders, he was to retire from service of the bank as on June 30, 1991, acceptance of the amount by him was of no consequence because he had already filed a suit in the civil court challenging the very act of the appellant-bank refusing to grant permission to withdraw the letter filled by him seeking voluntary retirement. Further, there is no evidence produced before us that he has given up the right to seek the relief in the suit; nor has he agreed to relinquish his right to go up in appeal. In such circumstances, the Supreme Court in Bennett Coleman and Co. P. Ltd. v. Punya Priya Das Gupta [1970] 37 FJR 498, has held that the right to seek the relief by way of a claim should not be held be to have been relinquished. Accordingly, point No. (iv) is answered in the affirmative.
25. For the reasons stated above, the appeal fails and the same is dismissed. The appellant shall now implement the order in accordance with law within a period of three months. On the submission made by both sides, it is further ordered that the amount received by the first respondent towards the provident fund, the bank contribution towards provident fund, gratuity and leave encashment, shall, be treated as final payments and the first respondent is not entitled to any further amount on the aforesaid counts. Consequently, the first respondent will be entitled to the arrears of salary up to June 30, 1994, and other benefits, if any, available under law, as the first respondent has attained the age of superannuation on June 30, 1994. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.