JUDGMENT
Srinivasan, J.
1. The plaintiff is the appellant. This appeal is against the Judgment and decree of the Subordinate Judge of Tiruvannamalai in A.S. No. 8 of 1979, which was in turn against O.S. No. 143 of 1978on the file of the District Munsif, Tiruvannamalai. The suit was tried along with six other suits filed by the same plaintiff against
the other tenants occupying its properties. The suits are disposed of by a common judgment by the District Munsif on 29.4.1978. The appeals against the judgments and decrees in all the suits were also disposed of by a common judgment by the Subordinate Judge dated 30.10.1979. Both the courts have held that the respondent herein and the other tenants are entitled to the benefits of the Tamil Nadu City Tenants’ Protection Act and the plaintiff is not entitled to the relief of possession. Consequently, the suits were dismissed.
2. The plaintiff filed this second appeal as well as Second Appeal Nos. 1461 to 1466 of 1980. Those second appeals were heard by a Division Bench and disposed of by judgment dated 20.10.1989. This second appeal was not posted along with those second appeals and learned Counsel states that he could not trace out this appeal and have it posted with the other appeals. Thus, this appeal was left out from the batch.
3. The judgment of the Division Bench is reported in Bhargarakula Nainargal Sangam, Thiruvannamalai v. Arunachala Udayar (1990) 1 L.W. 46. The matter was referred to a Bench by Ratnavel Pandian, J. on the question whether a tenant in respect of a vacant site, who denies title of the landlord, is entitled to the benefits of the Madras City Tenants’ Protection Act. The Division Bench answered the question in the negative and held that the tenant, who has denied the title of the landlord is not entitled to the benefits of the said Act. The Division Bench ruled that a tenant, who wants to claim the benefits of the Act must fulfil two requirements; firstly, he must be a person liable to pay rent in respect of the said land and secondly, such a liability should be under a tenancy agreement express or implied. The Division Bench pointed out that will not by any stretch of imagination apply to a case where the tenant denies the very agreement itself and claims title in himself.
4. The facts of the present case, which are similar to the facts of the cases decided by the Division Bench, are shortly as follows: The plaintiff claimed that the defendant was a tenant and filed an eviction petition under the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. That petition was dismissed on the ground that the demised premises was a vacant site and proceedings should be taken in a civil court. Subsequently, a notice determining the tenancy was issued by the plaintiff and the defendant was called upon to deliver possession. The defendant sent a reply denying the allegations made in the notice. Hence the suit was instituted.
5. In the written statement filed by the defendant, it was contended that the plaintiff had no title to the suit property as it stood registered in an individual name and not in the name of Sangam. It was contended that the Sangam, by no stretch of imagination could claim to be the owner of the property. There was no tenancy whatever in favour of the defendant. The tenancy set up in the plaint was specifically denied and the plaintiff was put to strict proof of the averments made in the plaint. It was also contended that the notice issued prior to suit was not valid. Subsequently, an additional written statement was filed in which it was pleaded that if, in any event, the Court found that the plaintiff Sangham was the landlord of the suit site, the defendant was entitled to the protection of the Madras City Tenants’ Protection Act.
6. At the time of trial, the plaintiff examined its President as P.W. 1. There was no cross-examination challenging his evidence. The defendant did not adduce any evidence on his side. Thus, he gave up the plea with respect to all the issues raised in the suit. Hence the issues were found in favour of the plaintiff.
7. The only question which survived for consideration was, whether the defendant was entitled to the benefits of the Madras City Tenants’ Protection Act (hereinafter called ‘the Act’) on the facts pleaded by the plaintiff. The Courts below have upheld the claim made by the defendant.
8. Inspite of the fact that the Division Bench has disposed of the connected cases and given a ruling holding that the tenant, who denies the title of the landlord is not entitled to the benefits of the Act, learned Counsel for the defendant/respondent contends that the Division Bench has failed to take note of an earlier ruling of another Division Bench and the matter requires fresh consideration. He invites my attention to a Judgment in Sanjeevi Naidu v. Chittibabu Mudaliar (1953) 1 M.L.J. 260. In that case, suits were filed for recovery of possession and mesne profits. Decrees were passed and when they were sought to be executed, an objection was raised that notwithstanding the decree, the defendant was not liable to be evicted because of the provisions of Section 7(1) of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act of 1949. That contention was upheld by the Master, who dismissed the execution petition and on appeal it was confirmed by a single Judge. On further appeal, the Division Bench confirmed the order of the learned single Judge holding that the decree could not be executed because of the provisions of Section 7(1) of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. The relevant part of the judgment reads as follows:
So it may be taken as established that under the general law the tenancy in favour of Chittibabu had been duly terminated. But the definition of “tenant” in the Rent Control Act expressly includes a person continuing in possession after the termination of the tenancy in his favour. Chittibabu would certainly be such a person. In accordance with the findings of the trial court which has since been affirmed by us, Chittibabu did not have title to the property at any time. He must therefore be deemed to have continued all along in possession as a tenant. He would be a tenant-holding over. Under the general law a tenant holding over is deemed to be governed by the same terms as the terms of the tenancy under which he came into occupation. One of such terms would be the payment of monthly rent of Rs. 25. We therefore hold that Chittibabu was a tenant within the meaning of Section 2(4) of the Rent Control Act, as a person by whom rent was payable and as a person continuing in possession after the termination of the tenancy in his favour.
Section 7(1) expressly provides that a tenant in possession of a building shall not be evicted there from, whether before or after the termination of the tenancy, whether in execution of a decree or otherwise, except in accordance with the provisions of that section. This provision is a complete answer to the execution petition filed by Sanjeevi for eviction. In this view it is not necessary to consider the effect of the proviso because the procedure indicated in the proviso has not been followed in this case. That proviso contemplates first a petition before the Rent Controller himself for eviction and a denial of title in such proceedings. If the controller decides that the denial of title is bona fide and records a finding to that effect, then the landlord will be entitled to sue for eviction of the tenant in a civil court. But even here the decree for eviction can only be passed on any of the grounds mentioned in Section 7. Though the proviso in terms will not have any application to the facts of this case, the principle of the proviso supports the view which we have already taken as regards the status of Chittibabu as a tenant under the Act. The effect of the proviso is that even if a civil court finds that the claim of the tenant is not well founded the tenant can be evicted only on any of the grounds mentioned in Section 7. In other words, even when the tenant has denied the title of the landlord and his denial has been found to be without foundation, he will be entitled to the benefits of Section 7(1).
9. The ruling cannot have any bearing in the present case as the provisions of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act will stand on a different footing. As pointed out by the Division Bench itself there is a specific provision for eviction under the Act on the ground of denial of title. The Rent Control Act has always been held to be a self contained Act and a complete Code with regard to eviction of tenants occupying buildings on lease thereof. Section 7(1) of the Act, which was then in force, provided that a tenant shall not be evicted whether before or after the termination of the tenancy, whether in execution of a decree or otherwise, except in accordance with the provisions of that section. Hence the Division Bench held that though the tenancy was terminated in accordance with the provisions set out in Section 11 of the Transfer of Property Act, that would not enable the landlord to recover possession; with the result he could not execute the decree which he had obtained in the suit.
10. It is to be pointed out that this Court has consistently been taking the view that the civil court has not lost its jurisdiction to pass a decree for possession even after the advent of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, but such decrees cannot be executed, except in accordance with the provisions of the said Act -vide : Mohamed Unni v. Melapurukkal Unni (1949) 1 M.L.J. 452, Section 7(2)(vi) of the Act of 1949, which corresponds to Section 10(2)(vii) of the Act of 1960, provided that where a tenant has denied the title to the landlord or claimed a right of permanent tenancy and that such denial or claim was not bona fide, the Rent Controller could pass an order evicting the tenant and direct the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building. On the other hand, if the denial or claim was bona fide, Section 7(1) proviso, corresponding to Section 10(1) of the 1960 Act was to the effect that the Rent Controller shall record a finding to the effect and the landlord shall be entitled to sue for eviction of the tenant in a civil court and the civil court may pass a decree for eviction on any ground mentioned in the section, notwithstanding the fact that the court found that such denial did not involve forfeiture of the lease. That provision is very significant and express reference is made to that provision by the Division Bench. This provision contained inScc.7 of the old Act, corresponding to Section 10 of the present Act, clearly prescribed the procedure by which a landlord could evict his tenant in the case of denial of title. If the denial of title is not bona fide, eviction can be obtained before the Rent Controller and if the denial is bona fide eviction has to be obtained in a civil court and that too only on the grounds set out in the Act. It is only because of that the Division Bench held that a tenant who had denied title and incurred forfeiture, which led to termination of tenancy under Section 11 of the Transfer of Property Act, was still a tenant within the meaning of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, being entitled to invoke the provisions thereof. The definition of “tenant” in that Act includes a person who continues in occupation after the termination of the tenancy.
11. That ruling will have no relevance to a case. arising under the City Tenants’ Protection Act. In so far as this Act is concerned, there is no provision similar to the one found in the Buildings Act. This Act does not prescribe the ground for eviction. This Act will come into play only in cases where the tenancies are determined by the lessons of the property under the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act. When a suit for revetment is filed it is open to the tenant who is a tenant within the meaning of the Act to claim the benefits of the Act under Section 3or See.9. The only change which is brought about by this Act is found under Section 11 of the Act, which provides that notice should be issued in accordance with the provisions contained therein, in the event of the tenant being entitled to the benefits of the Act. If a suit for revetment is filed without complying with provisions of Section 11 of the City Tenants Protection Act, it will have to be dismissed because of the provisions contained therein. Apart from that, there is no other provision in the Act will impinge upon the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act.
12. The Division Bench has in the connected batch discussed the matter in detail at length and come to the conclusion that a person who denies title of his Iandlord is not entitled to claim the benefits of the City Tenants’ Protection Act. Hence, it is not necessary for me to repeat the reasoning or add thereto.
13. It is because the learned Counsel wanted to rely on the judgment of the Division Bench in Sanjeevi Naidu v. Chiuibabu Mudaliar (1953) 1 M.L.J. 260, and contended that the matter requires reconsideration, I had to refer to the above provisions. I hold that the ruling in Sanjeevi Naidu v. Chittibabu Mudaliar (1953) 1 M.L.J. 260, has no relevance to a casein which the tenant makesa claim under the City Tenants’ Protection Act. Hence, there is no necessity for reconsideration of the matter once again.
14. Learned Counsel invites my attention to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Dhanapal Chettiar v. Yesodai Ammal . In that case the Supreme Court held that no notice is necessary under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act before instituting a proceeding under the provisions of the Rent Control Act. The Court held it was unnecessary and mere surplus age because the landlord cannot get eviction of the tenant even after such notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. While discussing the different arguments put forward by the learned Counsel on both sides, the Supreme Court considered the position of a tenant, who had incurred forfeiture of tenancy of dental of title under Section 111(g) of the Transfer of Property Act, though such a question did not arise on the facts of the case. The relevant passage in the judgment on which reliance is placed by learned Counsel is as follows:
On a careful consideration and approach of the matter in the instant case we think that we cannot approve of the view expressed in the passage extracted above. In Ratan Lal v. Vardesh Chander , Krishna Iyer, J. delivered the judgment on behalf of a Bench of this Court consisting of himself, Chandrachud, J. as he then was and Gupta, J. The case related to a building in Delhi. The Court was concerned with Clause (g) of Section 11 of the Transfer of Property Act. Tracing the history of the legislation it was pointed out by the Court at page 918 that the requirement as to written notice provided in Section 111(g) cannot be said to be based on any general rule of equity and therefore forfeiture of lease brought about in terms of Section 111(g) of the Transfer of Property Act not by notice but on the application of justice, equity and good conscience was held to be good determination of the lease. Quoting from Manujendra’s case it was said at page 911:
We are inclined to hold that the landlord in the present case cannot secure an order for eviction without first establishing that he has validly determined the lease under the Transfer of Property Act? why this dual requirement? Even if the lease is determined by a for feature under the Transfer of Property Act the tenant continues to be a tenant, that is to say, there is no forfeiture in the eye of law. The tenant becomes liable to be evicted under the State Rent Act, not otherwise. In many State statutes different provisions have been made as to the grounds on which a tenant can be evicted and in relation to his incurring the liability to be so evicted. Some provisions overlap those of the Transfer of Property Act. Some are new which are mostly in favour of the tenants but some are in favour of the landlord also. That being so the dictum of this Court in Brij Raj case comes into play and one has to look to the provisions of law contained in the four corners of any State Rent Act to find out whether a tenant can be evicted or not. The theory of double protection or additional protection, it seems to us, has been stretched too far and without a proper and due consideration of all its ramifications.
15. I have already pointed out that a ruling under the Buildings Act cannot be applicable to a case in which the benefits of the City Tenants’ Protection Act are claimed. The case before the Supreme Court arose under Buildings Act and has nothing to do with the claim under the City Tenants’ Protection Act.
16. Learned Counsel for the respondent contends that the definition of “tenant” in both the Acts is almost the same. In both the cases, a person who continues to be in possession after the termination of tenancy is considered to be a tenant. It may be so. But the two Acts are entirely different in their scope and objects. It is rightly pointed out by learned Counsel for the appellant that under the Buildings Act, the landlord need not necessarily be the owner of the building. The landlord” is defined as in clouding a person who is receiving or is entitled to receive the rent of a building, whether on his own account or on behalf of another. But that cannot be the position under the City Tenant’s Protection Act. Section 9 of the Act confers a privilege on the tenant to purchase the land on which he has erected a superstructure if the conditions prescribed in the section are complied with. That can be done only if the proceeding is against the owner of the land. Hence necessarily the landlord under the City Tenants’ Protection Act has to be the owner, who is capable of conveying the title in the land to the tenant. That is a fundamental difference between the two Statutes. Apart from that, I have already referred to the circumstances that the Buildings Act is a self-contained Act with regard to eviction of tenants. On the other hand, the City Tenants’ Protection Act will come into play only when the tenancies are determined under the provisions of Transfer of Property Act. Therefore, the ruling of the Supreme Court will not help the respondent in the present case.
17. Learned Counsel for the respondent places reliance on a judgment of Karnataka High Court in Govindanuma v. Murugesh Mudaliar . That is a case under the Karnataka Rent Control Act. That will have no application to the present case. Even otherwise, there is a judgment of a Division Bench of this Court. Since it is binding on me, there is no point in relying on the judgment of the Karnataka High Court.
18. In the present case, the denial of title was, even prior to the institution of the suit in the reply notice issued by the tenant. Even if the denial is made in the course of the proceedings for eviction, it is held by the Supreme Court recently that such a denial would he a ground far eviction, vide : Subbarao v. Krishna Rao
19. In the result, the judgments of the courts below are erroneous and unsustainable. The second appeal is allowed. The judgments and decrees are set aside. O.S. No. 143 of 1989 on the file of the District Muns if, Tiruvannamalai, is decreed as prayed for by the plaintiff, with costs throughout. Learned Counsel for the respondent prays for time. Learned Counsel for the appellant is agreeable for grant of three months time, If the respondent files an affidavit of undertaking. Hence the respondent is granted time till 313.1992 to vacate the premises and hand over possession to the Landlord, on condition that he files an affidavit in this Court on or before 15.11.1991 undertaking to vacate the premises on or before 31.3.1992 without driving the appellant to execution proceedings. Learned Counsel for the respondent is directed to give a copy of the affidavit of undertaking to learned Counsel for the appellant in this Court. If the affidavit is not filed, the respondent will not be entitled to the benefit of grant of time.