JUDGMENT
J.N. Dubey, J.
1. This writ petition is directed against order dated 27.11.1993 of the respondent No. 2, the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal-cum-Additional District Judge, Pakur, rejecting the application of the petitioner under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short ‘the Act’) on the ground of limitation.
2. It appears that Subhas Mandal, husband of the petitioner, died in a motor accident on 6.1.1989. She filed an application for compensation under Section 166 of the Act before the respondent No. 2, which was rejected on the ground of limitation on 27.11.1993. Feeling aggrieved she has approached this court under Article 226 of the Constitution.
3. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that Sub-section (3) of Section 166 of the Act has been omitted by Section 53 of the Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act of 1994 (for short ‘the amending Act’) and, as such, the impugned order is liable to be set aside. According to him, this writ petition was pending for hearing in this court on 14.11.1994, the date of enforcement of the amending Act and, therefore, she was entitled for the benefit of omission of Sub-section (3) of Section 166 of the Act irrespective of the fact that the amending Act was not given retrospective effect.
5. I find substance in the argument of the learned counsel. In New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Ramesh Bhai C. Patel 1997 ACJ 938 (SC), the Supreme Court held as under:
The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the relief granted by the High Court of entertaining the claim petition in view of the deletion of Sub-section (3) of Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act could not have been given in a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution. He submits that only an appeal in the High Court under Section 173 of the Act could have been treated as a pending matter in which the benefit of deletion of Sub-section (3) of Section 166 of the Act could have been given. He also submits that there is a limitation prescribed for filing an appeal under Section 173 which had expired and this presented a further difficulty in the present case.
In our opinion, these are mere procedural or technical objections which should not frustrate the course of justice. The object of omitting Sub-section (3) of Section 166 of the Act to remove the bar of limitation for a claim petition is obvious. This being so, a matter which was pending in the High Court when this change was brought about, should be governed by the effect of omission of Sub-section (3) of Section 166. In the present case, the petition under Article 227 of the Constitution is deemed to be an appeal to the High Court under Section 173 of the Act and condoning the delay in filing the appeal (sic. Claim application) the benefit of omission of Sub-section (3) of Section 166, is granted to the claimants. The High Court’s order directing the claim petition to be entertained and decided on merits is sustained on this basis.
6. The case of the petitioner is squarely covered by the above decision of the Apex Court and, as such, the impugned order is liable to be quashed.
7. In the result, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The order dated 27.11.1993 of the respondent No. 2 is quashed and it is directed to decide the claim of the petitioner afresh on merit expeditiously. No order as to costs.