JUDGMENT
H.H. Kantharia, J.
1. As common questions of facts and law are involved in these ten writ petitions, they are being disposed of by this common judgment.
2. The first respondents in all the petitions (hereinafter referred to as “the workmen”) were in the employment of the petitioners for diverse number of years ranging from 1949 to 1970. Their services were terminated from 1st July, 1978. Earlier, they were laid off for 37 days in 1976, 95 days in 1977 and 59 days in 1978 till the end of June without any wages. They were not paid bonus for the years 1975, 1976 and 1977. Even their earned wages for some time and the C.D.S. amounts were not paid. Payment of gratuity amount at the time of termination of their services was also not made. They, therefore, filed applications under Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”) in the Labour Court for computation of money due to them on account of wages for 191 days for no work in the years 1976, 1977 and 1978, unpaid earned wages, gratuity, one month’s notice pay, retrenchment compensation and bonus for the years 1975,1976 and 1977. The applications were resisted by the petitioners on a spacious ground that the services of the workmen were never terminated and they were thus not retrenched but they themselves stopped reporting for work on or after 1stJuly, 1978.
3. On behalf of the workmen, Vishram Krishna Shirke was examined and the petitioners examined one of their partners by name, Bipin Bhagwandas Bhawsar. On considering the oral as well as documentary evidence placed before him, the second respondent-Labour Judge, came to the conclusion that the workmen were not entitled to the payment of wages for 191 days for no work given to them, unpaid earned wages, gratuity and bonus, in applications under Section 33C(2) of the Act but their services were terminated which amounted to retrenchment and, therefore, they were entitled to one month’s notice pay and retrenchment compensation. He accordingly computed the money due to the workmen and by his common order dated 6th September, 1982 granted different amounts to them depending upon the period of service and their last salaries drawn. The said order has been impugned in these petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, by the petitioner-employer.
4. Mr. Cama, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioners, submits that the fact as to retrenchment was in dispute which could not have been decided by the labour Court in applications filed under Section 33C(2) of the Act and that being so it could not be said that there was an existing right in favour of the workmen for retrenchment compensation and, therefore, applications under Section 33C(2) of the Act, were not maintainable. Mr. Cama further submits that the evidence adduced on behalf of the workmen, only through one of them, as regard mination and, therefore, the workmen were not entitled to retrenchment compensation. In the submission of Mr. Cama, each and every concerned workman should have been examined in the labour Court. Miss Menon, who argued the matter on behalf of the workmen as a friend of the Court, urges that the dispute raised by the petitioners as to the fact of retrenchment is only a ruse and ingenious way adopted by the employer to defeat the just and legitimate claims of the workmen. In the submission of Miss Menon, the question of termination of service was incidental to the main problem of computation of money due to the workmen and nothing prevented the Labour Judge from considering the said issue in order to come to a correct decision as to what was due to the workmen. Miss Menon further canvasses that the evidence on behalf of the workmen was common as regards the fact of their termination and the other evidence was a matter of record and, there-foe, there was nothing wrong that only one workman was examined on behalf of all. Miss Menon emphatically submits that the plea of he petitioners that the workmen had abandoned the services and had not reported for work from 1st July, 1978 is an unbelievable story in as much as there were 19 workmen and it is just not possible that all of them would leave their long employments for no rhyme or reason.
5. Before I deal with the matter on merits, let me first dispose of a point made by Mr. Cama about some error that has crept into the impugned order as to the correct date of termination of services of the workman. He points out that it was recorded by the Labour Judge that the termination was effective from 1st October, 1976. In my opinion, this could be either a typing error or a genuine mistake committed by the learned Labour Judge but on account of such an error committed by the Judge, a litigant and in this case poor workmen should not suffer. And what I find from the record placed before me is that the services of the workmen were terminated from 1st July 1978 and not from 1st October, 1976. Thus, on behalf of the workmen, Vishram Krishna Shirke deposed in clear terms that from 1st July 1978 the workmen were retrenched and other workers were engaged to do their work. He reiterated in the cross-examination, “we were retrenched from 1-7-1978”. It is no doubt true that he had no documentary evidence to show that the workmen were retrenched on and from 1st July, 1978 but there could be no documentary evidence because the workmen were orally told that there was no work for them as can be seen from his further evidence in the cross examination that after 1st July, 1978 they (workmen) were not allowed to work and thereafter they did not report for work. He flatly denied a suggestion made in the cross examination that from 1st July, 1978 they (workmen) had not reported for work to the factory on their own. Even the evidence of employer’s witness, Bipin Bhagwandas Bhawsar, suggests that from 1st July, 1978 ; the workmen were not provided work because he states that from 1st July, 1978 the workman did not report for work. I am not inclined to accept his version that from 1st July, 1978 the workmen did not report for work because it is : unreasonable to believe and does not appeal to sense of justice that all the workmen would abandon their employments of long period for no rhyme or reason. Bipin Bhawsar admitted that on 8th June, 1978 he had told the workmen that there was no work for them. All this goes to show that the workmen were denied work from 1st July, 1978 and thus their services were terminated and prior to that they were harassed and humiliated by laying them off time and again : at the sweet will of the employer.
6. Now, as per Section 2(oo) of the Act, “retrenchment” means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever. Therefore, there is absolutely no doubt that the workmen here were retrenched by the petitioners from 1st July, 1978. I find no substance in the submission of Mr. Cama that the oral evidence adduced on behalf of the workmen is too inadequate to come to a conclusion that the workmen were retrenched. It is important to bear in mind that it is not the quantity of the evidence but the quality of the same that has to be looked into and the evidence should be read as a whole. Regard being had to the entire evidence on record, I am more than convinced that the workmen here were retrenched as pleaded and proved by them and the case put up by the petitioners is absolutely false. I am also in full agreement with the submission of Miss Menon in this behalf.
7. The most vehement argument of Mr. Cama is that the retrenchment being in dispute the Labour Court could not have entertained and decided the application under Section 33C(2) of the Act. In support of his contention the relied upon a Supreme Court judgment in U.P. Electric Supply Co. Ltd. v. R.K. Shukla and Ors. . But, in the facts and circumstances of the instant case, can it at all be said that there was a dispute about the retrenchment? As stated above, here the question was whether the services of the workmen were terminated with effect from 1st July, 1978 and if that fact was proved, it goes without saying that they were retrenched from that day as per definition of retrenchment under Section 2(OO) of the Act. From the evidence discussed above, it is crystal clear that the termination was proved beyond shadow of doubt. And merely because the petitioners contended that they had not terminated the services of the workmen we cannot throw away the applications preferred under Section 33C(2) of the Act. When such a dispute if raised by an employer, it has to be looked into and resolved. It is well settled law that an application under Section 33C(2) of the Act is maintainable where a workman claims an amount of money but such a claim has to be based on an existing right. The existing right itself should have vested in the workman either under a settlement or an award or under the provision of statute. Once the right is shown to be existing, the Labour Court has the necessary jurisdiction to entertain the application. Mere denial of such an existing right by an employer does not take away the jurisdiction of the Labour Court to entertain the application. Denial of such a right would only require the Labour Court to enquire whether there is an existing right. The Labour Court has the jurisdiction to decide and determine that question. Such an enquiry would be incidental to the main determination which has been assigned to the Labour Court by Section 33C(2) of the Act. Just as an executing Court is competent to interpret a decree, so also the Labour Court is competent to construe the settlement, award or statute under which the right is claimed by a workman. Right of a workman under either a settlement, or an award or statute when disputed by an employer, the Labour Court would be within its jurisdiction to determine whether such a right is vested in the workman and, in doing so, it has to interpret the settlement, award or statute under which the right is claimed. Therefore, in our case, just because the petitioners pleaded that the services of the workmen were not terminated and, therefore, they were not retrenched and that they voluntarily abandoned the services, the jurisdiction of the Labour Court, as pointed out above, was not ousted. And assuming for the sake of argument that on facts and law there is some doubt in reaching to such a conclusion, even then I am not inclined to exercise discretionary jurisdiction vested in this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, in favour of the petitioners. It was held by the Supreme Court in K.C.P. Employees Association, Madras v. Management of K.C.P. Ltd., Madras (1977 I LLJ 322) that;
“In industrial law interpreted and applied in the perspective of Part IV of the Constitution, the benefit of reasonable doubt, on law and facts, if there be such doubt, must go to the weaker section labour.” There is no dispute about the computation of money due to the workmen as done by the second respondent.
8. In this view of the matter, I find no substance in these writ petitions and they deserve to be dismissed. But before I finally do so, I would like to mention here that the workmen in this case were unrepresented by a legal practitioner. They did not know what to do in the matter. They told me that they knew nothing about the matter and why at all they were called in this Court. Looking at their plight, I requested Miss Menon who was present in the Court to help the workmen. Miss Menon readily accepted the suggestion and I am happy to record that she, though comparatively a junior lawyer, at a short notice, very ably represented the workmen and canvassed their cause for which I am grateful to her. I propose to compensate her suitably for the labour she has put in arguing the writ petitions, out of the costs which I propose to award to the workmen.
9. In the premises, the petitions fail and the same are dismissed. Rule is discharged with costs of Rs. 1,000/- in each one of them. The office is directed to pay Rs. 2,000/- to Miss Menon out of the costs.
10.The petitioners are directed to pay the money as computed under the impugned order to the workmen before the forthcoming Diwali festival. If the petitioners fail in doing so by 15th October, 1987 they shall be liable to pay interest at the rate of 15% per annum till the realisation of the full amounts by the workmen. I am informed that the first respondent-Vithal Shankar Dabholkar in writ petition No. 613 of 1984 and the first respondent-Waman Shankar Naik in writ petition No. 614 of 1984 have died. The petitioners are directed to pay money due to them to their legal heirs and representatives viz. in case of Vithal Shankar Dabholkar to his wife and in case of Waman Shankar Naik to his two sons.