JUDGMENT
R.H. Zaidi, J.
1. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner, learned Standing Counsel and also perused the record.
2. By means of this petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, petitioner prays for issuance of a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari quashing the order dated 18.8.1990 passed by the licensing authority under the Arms Act suspending the licenses of the petitioner of a N. P. Bore rifle and of a 12 bore S.B.B.L. gun and the order dated 5.10.1990 passed by the appellate authority dismissing the application filed by the petitioner for interim relief and entertaining/ admitting the appeal filed by the petitioner.
3. It has been stated that the petitioner, who is the holder of aforesaid licenses of a rifle and of a 12 bore gun. never misused his guns nor any first information report was ever lodged against him. He took a loan from the bank after following the procedure prescribed under the law.
According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, the whole amount of loan has been repaid by the petitioner. In the village, there was parti bandi. One Mr. Mata Prasad. M.L.A.. was against the petitioner and belonged to Janta Dal while the petitioner was a member of the Congress-I party. Mata Prasad approached the licensing authority and got his licenses suspended wholly on frivolous ground that the licenses of the petitioner were hurdle in the recovery of loan. It has been stated that to this effect, no first information report was ever lodged by any authority or any person against the petitioner at any Police Station. The licensing authority acting wholly arbitrarily suspended licenses of the petitioner vide its order dated 18.8.1990 merely on the ground that the licenses of the petitioner were hurdle in the recovery of the loan, as stated above, without affording him an opportunity of hearing before suspension of licenses. Challenging the validity of the said order, an appeal was filed by the petitioner before the Commissioner. He has also made an application for grant of interim relief. However, the said application filed by the petitioner was rejected by the Commissioner by his order dated 5.10.1990. The appeal filed by the petitioner is still pending. Hence, the present petition.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently urged that the order passed by the licensing authority does not come within the purview of anyone of the clauses of Sub-section (3) of Section 17 of’the Arms Act. It was urged that in the present case, no allegation of abuse or misuse of the said guns has been made in the order of suspension nor any first information report is alleged to have been filed. According to him. even filing of a first information report is not sufficient to take any action for suspension or cancellation of arm licence. Further, in this case period for which suspension shall remain operative, has not been specified, therefore, suspension order is wholly illegal and without jurisdiction. He referred to the decisions of this Court in Ram Murari Madhukar v. District
Magistrate, Sitapur. 1998 (31 AWC 2191 : Raghubir Sahai v. District Magistrate. Jhansi. 1986 (23) ACC 480 and Jugul Kishore v. District Magistrate. Jalaun. 1978 (8) ACC 389 in support of his submissions.
5. On the other hand, learned standing counsel submitted that several complaints were made against the petitioner, therefore, the licensing authority was justified in passing the impugned order against him.
6. I have considered the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties. 7. Sub-section (3) of Section 17 of the Act provides as under : " 17 (3). The licensing authority may by order in writing suspend a licence for such period as it thinks fit or revoke a licence :
(a) it the licensing authority is satisfied that the holder of the licence is prohibited by this Act or by any other law for the time being in force, from acquiring, having in his possession or carrying any arms or ammunition, or is of unsound mind, or is for any reason unfit for a licence under this Act ; or
(b) if the licensing authority deems it necessary for the security of the public peace or for public safety to suspend or revoke the licence : or
(c) if the licence was obtained by the suppression of material information or on the basis of wrong information provided by the holder of the licence or any other person on his behalf at the time of applying for it ; or
(d) if any of the conditions of the licence has been contravened ; or
(e) if the holder of the licence has failed to comply with a
notice under Sub-section (1] requiring him to deliver-up the licence.”
8. From a reading of the aforesaid statutory provision, it is apparent that specification of the period for which the licence shall not remain operative, is necessary in the order of suspension of licence passed by the licensing authority. !n Ram Murari Madhukar’s case (supra), it has been held by (his Court that if the period is not specified, for which the suspension shall remain operative, the order is illegal and Invalid. In the impugned order of suspension, no period has been specified. The impugned order simply says that the licenses were suspended till final orders were passed from immediate effect. The petitioner was asked in surrender his guns at the police station. Thus, the order was wholly illegal. This Court rightly granted an interim order by which the operation of the impugned orders was stayed vide order dated 17.10.1990, which is still operative.
9. In the impugned orders, although it has been staled that two licences were hurdle in the recovery of the loan but there is no allegation that anybody complained about the same or that the petitioner ever misused his guns. Even assuming that there was some complaint against the petitioner, as claimed by the learned standing counsel, there is no reference to such complaint in the impugned orders. It is well-settled in law that an order can be read as it is and nothing can be subtracted nor anything can be added in it in view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in Mohinder Singh Gill and Anr. v. Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi and Ors.. AIR 1978 SC 851, wherein it was ruled as under ;
“8. The second equally relevant matter is that when a statutory functionary makes an order based on certain grounds, its validity must be judged by the reasons so mentioned and cannot be supplemented by fresh reasons in the shape of affidavit or otherwise. Otherwise, an order bad in the beginning may, by the
time it comes to Court on account of a challenge, get validated by additional grounds later brought out. We may here draw attention to the observations of Bose. J. In Gordhandas Bhanji, AIR 1952 SC 16 (at p. 18) :
“Public orders publicly made, in exercise of a statutory authority cannot be construed in the light of explanations subsequently given by the officer making the order of what he meant, or of what was in his mind, or what he intended to do. Public orders made by public authorities are meant to have public effect and are intended to affect the acting and conduct of those to whom they are addressed and must be construed objectively with reference to the language used in the order itself.”
Orders are not like old wine becoming better as they grow older.”
10. Thus, the submission made by the learned standing counsel to the contrary cannot be accepted. For the sake of argument, if it is accepted that somebody has lodged a report or any criminal case was pending, lodging of a report or pendency of a criminal case have also been held to be not suif’icient ground for taking an action under Section 17 of the Act. A reference in this regard may be made to the decisions of this Court in the cases of Raghubir Sahai and Jugul Kishore (supra).
11. It is also well-settled in law that an order of suspension cannot be passed by licensing authority without affording an opportunity of hearing in violation of principles of natural justice. In the present case, there is nothing to show that before the impugned order was passed by the licensing authority, the petitioner was afforded any opportunity of hearing in any form. Therefore, the impugned order of suspension is also hit by the principles of natural justice, the same is non est and without jurisdiction. In the present case, the order of suspension is a final order and there is nothing to show that petitioner was afforded opportunity of hearing in any form. A reference in this regard may be made to the decision in the case of Vidyadevi v. District Magistrate, 1993 (I) AWC 75 : 1993 All LJ 145.
12. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, the order passed by the licensing authority is wholly illegal, without jurisdiction and the same deserves to be quashed. The appellate authority has also acted illegally in refusing to grant the interim relief prayed for by the petitioner. Although the appeal filed by the petitioner is still pending disposal before the appellate authority but after what has been stated above it will serve no purpose to permit the appellate authority to decide the appeal on merits because the appellate authority is bound by the observations made by this Court and cannot go against the judgment of this Court. Therefore, this petition deserves to be allowed.
13. In view of the aforesaid facts, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed. Orders dated 18.8.1990 and 5.10.1990 as well as the proceedings of appeal pending before the appellate authority, respondent No. 1, are hereby quashed.