JUDGMENT
Nagendra Rai and S.K. Chattopadhyaya, JJ.
1. These two appeals are directed against the judgment dated 17th May, 1991 passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court in First Appeal Nos. 188 and 189 of 1991 (R), by which he has held that the appellant is not a ‘person interested’ within the meaning of Section 3 (b) of the Land Acquisition Act (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) and accordingly the appeals filed by the appellant are not maintainable.
2. Admittedly, the said appeals were filed by the appellant against the judgment and award dated 9th September, 1987 and 17th September, 1987 passed in Reference Case Nos. 4/83 and 10/83 arising out of Land Acquisition Case No. 76/83.
3. To appreciate the rival contention raised by the learned Counsels for the parties, it is necessary to state the facts in brief. An agreement dated 12.6.1976 was entered into between the Bihar State Industrial Development Corporation (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Corporation’) and three private companies to establish a new undertaking for manufacturing of caustic soda and chlorine. In terms of the said agreement the appellant came into existence. The Central Government, under the relevant provisions, granted licence on 21.3.1980 to the appellant to manufacture the aforesaid items. On 7th August, 1978 the Secretary of the Government of Bihar. Department of Industries and Technical Education. Patna wrote a letter to the Deputy Commissioner. Daltonganj requesting him to acquire some land for the appellant-company which is an undertaking of the Corporation and that it has agreed to meet the whole or part of the land acquisition cost out of public revenue. In pursuance of the said letter, it appears that on 16th March, 1980 a notification under Section 4 of the Act was issued by the Collector (D.C.) mentioning therein that the land is needed for public purpose i.e. for the appellant-company on Government cost and declaration under Section 6 of the Act was published on 16th August, 1980, a copy of which is Annexure-5, which shows that the land was acquired fore establishment of the appellant- company at the Government cost.
4. On 18.11.1982 a notice under Section 12 of the Act was issued, thereafter the respondents aggrieved by the award, made an application before the Collector for making reference and he made reference under Section 18 of the Act which were numbered as Reference Cases Nos. 4/83 and 10/83. While the reference cases were pending before the Reference Court, on 17.7.1985 there was an agreement between State of Bihar on the one hand and the appellant- company on the other, by which the appellant company agreed to pay the entire amount of compensation for the land acquired and further agreed to pay enhanced compensation, if any. The amount of compensation and enhanced compensation both have been paid by the appellant company. The appellant did not appear before the Reference Court. However, when the appellant came to know that the amount of compensation has been enhanced by the Reference Court, the appellant preferred the aforesaid appeals before this Court. The respondent took objection regarding maintainability of the appeals and this Court held that appeals are not maintainable as the appellant is not a ‘person interested’ in terms of Section 3 (b) of the Act.
5. The learned Counsel for the appellant contended that notification shows that the land has been acquired for the appellant company and as such, the appellant company is an interested person and the learned Single Judge was not right in holding that the appeals were not maintainable on the aforesaid grounds.
6. The counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents, on the other hand, contended that the land was acquired by the State Government at its own cost, and the appellant was nowhere in the picture at the time when the award was being prepared. The appellant came into picture only after an agreement in the year 1985 and as such, the State is the only interested person and the learned Single Judge rightly held that the appeals by the appellant were not maintainable.
7. The facts stated above clearly show that the acquisition of the land was for the establishment of the appellant-company, though in the notification it was mentioned that the land was acquired at the Government cost but later on there was an agreement between the State and the appellant and the appellant agreed to pay the cost of acquisition and in terms of the said agreement the compensation as well as enhanced compensation have been paid by the appellant-company.
8. The question as to who is the person interested for the purpose of Act is not longer res integra and had has been settled by the several judgments of the Apex Court.
9. In this connection, reference may be made to in the case of Himalayan Tiles and Marble (P) Ltd. v. Francis Victor Coutinho, . From the facts of the said case, it appears that appellant of that case, a private company, was carrying on a business of manufacture and sale of artificial marbles and tiles etc. The company moved the Government for acquiring, additional land for its purposes and a notification under Section 4 was issued. Thereafter notification under Section 6 was issued and award was prepared and Government informed the owner of the acquired land that possession would be taken from them. The aggrieved persons challenged the acquisition on the ground that the acquisition was not for a ‘public purposes’. The said writ was allowed.The company preferred an appeal before a Division Bench and the Division Bench dismissed the appeal on the ground that the company was not person interested under Section 18 (1) of the Act and as such, the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned Single Judge. Dealing with the said question, the Apex Court in paragraph 8 held as follows:
It seems to us that the definition of ‘a person interested’ given in Section 18 is an inclusive definition and must be liberally construed so as to embrace all persons who may be directly or indirectly interested either in the title to the land or in the quantum of compensation . In the instant case, it is not disputed that the lands were actually acquired for the purpose of the company and once the land vested in the Government, after acquisition, in stood transferred to the company and the Government. Thus, it cannot be said that the company had no claim or title to the land at all. Secondly, since under the agreement the company had to pay the compensation, it was most certainly interested in seeing that a proper quantum of compensation was fixed so that the company may not have to pay a very heavy amount of money. For this purpose, the company could undoubtedly appear and adduce evidence on the question of the quantum of compensation.” It was held by the Apex Court that a person interested given in Section 18 is an inclusive definition and it should be interpreted in liberal manner.
10. In the case of Neyvely Lignite Corporation Ltd. v. Special Tahsildar (Land Acquisition), , the land was acquired for the appellant-corporation and the prayer of the company to be added as party before the reference court was rejected and the same was upheld by the High Court in Revision. In the appeal filed by the State against the judgment of the reference court under Section 54 of the Act, the company filed an application for addition which was rejected on the ground that the company was not an interested person. Against that order the company went before the Apex Court. It was held that the local authority or company is a person interested and it has right to participate in reference proceeding under Section 18 or prefer an appeal under Section 54 of the Act or to file a writ application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It is apt to quote paragraph 12 of the judgment which is as follows:
It is true that Section 50 (2) of the Act gives to the local authority or the company right to adduce evidence before the Collector or in the reference under Section 18 as it was specifically stated that in any proceeding held before the Collector or the Court, the local authority or the company may appear and adduce evidence for the purpose of determining the amount of compensation. However, it has no right to seek reference, Based thereon, the contention is that the limited right of adduction of evidence for the purpose of determining the compensation does not carry with it the right to participate in the proceedings or right to be heard or to file an appeal under Section 54. We cannot limit the operation of Section 3 (b) in conjunction with Sub-section (2) of Section 50 of the Act within a narrow compass. The tight given under Sub-section (2) of Section 50 is in addition to and not in substitution of or in derogation to all the incidental, logical and consequential rights flowing from the concept of fair and just procedure consistent with the principles of natural justice. The consistent tread that runs through all the decisions of this Court starting from Himalayan Tiles case is that the beneficiary, i.e. local authority or company, a cooperative society registered under the relevant State law, or statutory authority is a person interested to determine just and proper compensation for the acquired land and is an aggrieved person. It flows from it that the beneficiary has the right to be heard by the Collector or the Court. If the compensation is enhanced it is entitled to canvass its correctness by filing an appeal or defend the award of the Collector. If it is not made a partv, it is entitled to seek leave of the Court and file the appeal against the enhanced award and decree of the Civil Court under Section 26 or of the judgment and decree under Section 54 or is entitled to file writ petition under Article 226 and assail its legality or correctness. When the award made under Section 11 of the Collector is vitiated by fraud, collusion or corruption, the beneficiary is entitled to challenge it in the writ petition apart from the settled law that the conduct of the Collector or Civil Judge is amenable to disciplinary enquiry and appropriate action. These are very valuable and salutary rights. Moreover in the language of Order 1, Rule 10, CPC, in the absence of the beneficiary who ultimately is to bear the higher compensation, no complete and effectual determination of binding just and proper compensation to the acquired land would be made. So it is concomitantly a proper party if not a necessary party to the proceedings under Order 1, Rule 10, CPC. The denial of the right to a person interested is in negation of fair and just procedure offending Article 14 of the Constitution.
11. Recently the matter has been considered by a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of U.P. Awas Evam Vikas Parishad v. Gyan Devi and Ors. , wherein the Apex Court after considering the earlier cases of the court held in paragraph 24 as follows:
To sum up, our conclusions, are : 1. Section 5 (2) of the L.A. Act confers on a local authority for whom land is being acquired a right to appear in the acquisition proceedings before the Collector and the reference court and adduce evidence for the purpose of determining the amount of compensation.
2. The said right carries withit the right to be given adequate notice by the Collector as well as the reference court before whom acquisition proceedings are pending on the date on which the matter of determination of compensation will be taken up.
3. The proviso the Section 50 (2) only precludes a local authority from seeking a reference but it does not deprive the local authority which feels aggrieved by the determination of the amount of compensation by the Collector or by the reference court to invoke the remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution as well as the remedies available under the L.A. Act.
4. In the event of denial of the right conferred by Section 50 (2) on account of failure of the Collector to serve notice of the acquisition proceedings, the local authority can invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution.
5. Even when notice has been served on the local authority the remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution would be available to the local authority on grounds on which judicial review is permissible under Article 226.
6. The local authority is a proper party in the proceedings before the reference court and is entitled to be impleaded as a party in those proceedings wherein it can defend the determination of the amount of compensation by the Collector and oppose enhancement of the said amount and also adduce evidence in the regard.
7. In the event of enhancement of the amount of compensation by the reference court if the Government does not file an appeal, the local authority can file an appeal against the award in the High Court after obtaining leave of the court.
8. In an appeal by the person having an interest in land seeking enhancement of the interest in land seeking enhancement of the amount of compensation awarded by the reference court, the local authority should be impleaded as a party and is entitled to be served notice of the said appeal. This would apply to an appeal in the High Court as well as in this Court.
9. Since a company for whom land is being acquired has the same right as a local authority under Section 50 (2), whatever has been said with regard to a local authority would apply to a company too.
10. The matters which stand finally concluded will, however, not be reopened.
12. Thus the Law is well settled that a company or local authority for whom the land is acquired has right to appear in acquisition proceeding as well as before the reference court. It was held by the Apex Court that if a person is not a party before the Collector in a land acquisition proceeding then he can challenge the order by filing a writ and if not a party in reference court then he can file an appeal under Section 54 of the Act after obtaining the leave of the Court.
13. Law laid down in Himalayan Tiles and Marble case (supra) was held to be a good law by the Constitution Berch subject to this modification that company for whom the land is acquired is an interested person in view of the provisions of Section 50 (2) of the Act and it is not a ‘interested person’ under Section 18 (1) of the Act because in this case it would be entitled to seek a reference against the award of the Collector which would be contrary to the provisions of Section 50 (2) of the Act.
14. In view of the aforesaid authoritative pronouncement, we are of the view that the appellant-company is an interested person. Though it was not a party before the reference court, it can challenge the judgments of the reference by filing an appeal after obtaining the leave of the court.
15. However, It will be proper to refer to the decisions relied upon by Mr. Tiwary on behalf of the respondents in support of his submission that at the instance of respondents the appeal is not maintainable. he has referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Manubhai jethalal Patel v. State of Gujarat, . After perusal of the said judgment, it appears that the said case has no relevancy in this case. In that case the question was whether the acquisition of land for company without following the procedure under Part VII of the Act was valid or not. The questions involved in these appeals were not in controversies in that case. As such the said decisions is of no help to the respondents.
16. He has relied upon another decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Hindu Kanya Maha Vidyalaya, Jind v. Municipal Committee, . In that case land was acquired for an improvement trust created under the Punjab Town Improvement Act. Later on possession of the land was given to the successor Municipal Committee. The committee sold the lands to the Mahavidyalaya and school, appellants before the Supreme Court. Dealing with the matter the Apex Court held that as the land was not acquired for the purposes of the appellants rather the land was acquired for the Trust/Municipal Committee. After the award the Municipal Committee took possession of the land and transferred portion of the same to the appellants and as such, they are not interested persons within the meaning of the Act. This decision is also not applicable in these cases for the simple reason that the lands were not acquired for the appellants before the apex court.
17. Lastly he has relied a decision of the Full Bench of this Court in the case of Amar Singh Yadav v. Shanti Devi, reported in 1987 PLJR 184. From perusal of the said judgment it is clear that the Full Bench held that the words ‘person interested’ should be given a wider meaning as held by the Apex Court in the case of Himalayan Tile and Marble (P) Ltd. (supra). However, it further held that if a person was not a party before the Collector in land acquisition proceeding, he cannot be allowed to be impleaded in the reference proceeding before the Land Acquisition Judge under Order I, Rule 10 of the Code. The aforesaid observation is no longer good law in view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of U.P. Awas Evam Vikas Parishad (supra).
18. Thus, one of the decisions cited by the learned Counsel for the respondents, in support of his contention, is helpful to him. After considering the matter from different angle and in view of the lad laid down by the Apex Court, we are of the view that the appellant is an interested person’ and his appeal before the learned Single Judge was maintainable. The leave to file appeal is granted.
19. In the result, both the appeals also allowed and the impugned judgments passed in both appeals are set aside. The appeals filed before the Single Judge should be disposed of on merit.