PETITIONER: BIHARI LAL BATRA Vs. RESPONDENT: THE CHIEF SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER & ORS DATE OF JUDGMENT: 12/03/1964 BENCH: AYYANGAR, N. RAJAGOPALA BENCH: AYYANGAR, N. RAJAGOPALA GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. (CJ) WANCHOO, K.N. SHAH, J.C. SIKRI, S.M. CITATION: 1965 AIR 134 1964 SCR (7) 192 ACT: Evacuee property-Land allotted to a refugee in urban area- Allotment is invalid under the rules-Displaced Persons Compensation and Rehabilitation Rules, 1955, Rule 2(h). HEADNOTE: The father of the appellant owned considerable agricultural property in Pakistan and he with the members of his family moved over to India on partition. The appellant's father had some unsatisfied claim for allotment and on December 29. 1955 he was allotted some plots in Urban area within a certain municipality. The appellant's father died in 1952 and the allotment made was actually to the appellant in lieu of the claim of his father. On the allotment being made, a sanad was issued to the appellant by the Managing Officer. When the appellant tried to take possession of these lands, disputes were raised by respondents Nos. 4 and 5. These respondents moved the Assistant Settlement Commissioner for cancellation of the allotment on the ground that these disputed plots were within an "urban area" within the meaning of r. 2(h) of the Displaced Persons, Compensation and Rehabilitation Rules, 1955 and, therefore, the allotment to the appellant was contrary to law. The Assistant Settlement Commissioner accepted the contention of the res- pondents and allowed the appeal and cancelled the allotment. The appellant then applied to the Chief Settlement Com- missioner in revision. He rejected the petition. Then the appellant moved a petition under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution before the High Court. This petition was also dismissed. the High Court granted certificate of fitness under Art. 133 of the Constitution and hence the appeal. Held:(i) Where an order making an allotment was set aside by the Assistant Commissioner or Settlement Commissioner the title which was obtained on the basis of the continuance of that sanad or order also fell with it. Shri Mithoo Shahani v. Union of India, [1964] 7 S.C.R. 103, relied on. (ii)The contention of the appellant that r. 2(h) of the Displaced Persons Compensation and Rehabilitation Rules, 1955, was unconstitutional as contravening Art. 14 of the Constitution must fail. This contention is based on the basis of the proviso to Rule 2(h). Rule 2(h) was framed under s. 40 of the Act. This rule along with other rules came into force on May 21, 1955. The allotment was made to the appellant on December 29, 1955 and the Sanad was issued two days later. In other words the allotment in favour of the appellant was after the rule came into force and was not one "already made" as stated in the proviso to r. 2(h). Therefore, if on the date of the allotment the land was in an urban area, the allotment would be governed by the main para of the definition and the proviso, had no application. 193 The discrimination is said to consist in the rule having drawn a dividing line at the date when it came into force, for determining whether the allotment was valid or not. Such a contention is patently self-contradictory. Every law must have a beginning or time from which it operates, and no rule which seeks to change the law can be held invalid for the mere reason that it effects an alternation in the law. It is sometimes possible to plead injustice in a rule which is made to operate with retrospective effect, but to say that a rule which operates prospectively is invalid because thereby a difference is made between the past and the future, is one which cannot be accepted. JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 543 of 1962.
Appeal from the judgement and order dated November 26, 1959
of the Punjab High Court in Civil Writ No. 678 1957.
Bishan Narain and N. N. Keswani, for the appellant.
B. K. Khanna and B. R. G. K. Achar, for respondent Nos.
1 to 3.
D. N. Mukherjee, for respondent No. 4.
R. V. S. Mani and T. R. V. Sastri, for respondent No.
5.
March 12, 1964. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by-
AYYANGAR, J.-This is an appeal on a certificate of fitness
granted under Art. 133 by the High Court of Punjab against
the order of that Court dismissing the appellant’s petition
to it under Art. 226 of the Constitution.
The point in controversy lies within a narrow compass and
hence of the voluminous facts we propose to set out only
those which are relevant for appreciating the contentions
urged before us. The father of the appellant owned con-
siderable agricultural property in Pakistan and he with the
members of his family moved over to India on partition. The
appellant’s father was allotted a considerable extent of
land in village Kharar, District Ambala, but we are not
concerned with that. He had still some unsatisfied claim
for allotment and on December 29, 1955 he was allotted by
the Managing Officer on quasi-permanent tenure Khasra Nos.
880, 881 and 882 which were within the municipal area of
Kharar with the regularity of which allotment alone this
appeal is concerned. It may be mentioned that the
appellant’s father had died in 1952 and the allotment made
was actually to the appellant in lieu of the claim of his
father. On the allotment being made, a sanad was issued to
the appellant on December 31, 1955 by the Managing Officer.
When the appellant tried to take possession of these lands,
disputes were raised by respondent&
L/P (D) ISCI-7 …..
194
Nos. 4 and 5. They were not displaced persons but they
claimed that they had been in possession of this property
from a long anterior date from which they could not be
disturbed and also that the property could not be the
subject of a valid allotment. These respondents moved the
Assistant Settlement Commissioner for cancellation of the
allotment and this appeal was allowed by the officer who
found that the land comprised in these three khasra numbers
were within an ” urban area” within the meaning of r.
2(h) of the Displaced Persons Compensation and
Rehabilitation Rules, 1955 and consequently that the
allotment to the appellant was contrary to law. He,
therefore, cancelled the allotment. The appellant
thereafter applied to the Chief Settlement Commissioner in
revision and not being successful there moved the High Court
by a, petition under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution..
As stated earlier, this petition was dismissed and it is the
correctness of this dismissal that is challenged in the
appeal before us.
Mr. Bishan Narain, learned Counsel for the appellant urged
in the main two contentions in support of the appeal. The
first was (1) that after the Managing Officer granted a
sanad on December 31, 1955 in the name of the President of
India, the appellant obtained an indefeasible title to the
property and that this title could not be displaced except
on grounds contained in the sanad itself even in the event
of the order of allotment being set aside on appeal or
revision. We have considered this point in Shri Mithoo
Shahani and Ors. v. The Union of India and Ors.(1) which was
pronounced on March 10, 1964 and for the reasons there
stated this submission has to be rejected.
The second point that he urged was, and this was in fact the
main contention raised before the High Court, that rule 2(h)
of the Displaced Persons Compensation and Rehabilitation
Rules, 1955 was unconstitutional as contravening Art. 14 of
the Constitution and so the original allotment to the
appellant must be held to be lawful. We consider that there
is no substance in this argument. In fact, we are unable to
appreciate the ground on which the contention is being
urged. Section 40 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation
and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954 enables the Central Government
by Notification in the Official Gazette to make rules to
carry out the purposes of the Act, and in particular on an
elaborately enumerated list of matters. It was not
suggested that the rules of 1955 were not competently made
under s. 40. These rules were published on May 21, 1955
when they came into force. Rule 2(h) the validity of which
is impugned in these proceedings is a rule containing the
definitions. Rule 2(h) reads, to extract what is material:
(1) [1964] 7 S.C.R. 103.
195
“2. In these rules, unless the context
otherwise requires-
(a) to (g)…………………………….
(h) ‘Urban area’ means any area within the
limits of a corporation, a municipal
committee, a notified area committee,
a town
area committee, a small town committee, a
cantonment or any other area notified as such
by the Central Government from time to time;
Provided that in the case of the quasi-perma-
nent allotment of rural agricultural lands
already made in the States of Punjab and
Patiala and East Punjab States Union, the
limits of an urban area shall be as they
existed on the 15th August, 1947.”
The words ‘of rural agricultural lands’ occurring in the
proviso to this rule were replaced by an amending Notifica-
tion of 1957 by the words ‘in rural area’, but this
amendment is obviously of no significance. “Rural area” is
defined by rule 2(f) to mean ‘any area which is not an urban
area’.
Pausing here, it would be useful to state two matters which
are not in dispute: (1) that the allotment to the appellant
was made on December 29, 1955, the sanad being issued two
days later. It was therefore an allotment which was made
after May 21, 1955 when the rules came into force; (2) the
other matter is that Khasra Nos. 880, 881 and 882 were
included in urban limits on February 10, 1951 by the
municipal area of Kharar being extended to cover these
plots. It would, therefore, be obvious that on the date
when the allotment was made, the allotted land was in an
“urban area” and therefore it could not have been validly
allotted.
We must confess our inability to comprehend what precisely
was the discrimination which the rule enacted which rendered
it unconstitutional as violative of Art. 14. So far as we
could understand the submission, the unreasonable discri-
mination was said to exist because of the operation of the
proviso. Under the proviso in regard to quasipermanent
allotments ‘already made, i.e. made before May 21, 1955 in
the States of Punjab and PEPSU, the test of what was to be
considered an “urban area” was to be determined on the basis
of the state of circumstances which obtained on 15th August,
1947. The allotment in favour of the appellant was after
the rules came into force and was not one “already made”.
Therefore if on the date of the allotment the land was in an
urban area, the allotment would be governed by the main para
of the definition and so could not have been validly made
and that was the reason why it was set
L, P(D) 1 SCI-, (a)..
196
aside. The discrimination is said to consist in the rule
having drawn a dividing line at the date when it came into
force, or determining whether the allotment was valid or
not. It is the discrimination that is said to be involved
in this prospective operation of the rule that we find it
difficult to appreciate. It is possible that before the
rules were framed the land now in dispute could have been
allotted, but because of this it is not possible to suggest
that the rule altering the law in this respect which ex
concessis is within the rule-making power under the Act, is
invalid. Such a contention is patently self-contradictory.
Every law must have a beginning or time from which it
operates, and no rule which seeks to change the law can be
held invalid for the mere reason that it effects an
alteration An the law. It is sometimes possible to plead
injustice it’, a rule which is made to operate with
retrospective effect, but to say that a rule which operates
prospectively is invalid because thereby a difference is
made between the past and the future, is one which we are
unable to follow.
There are no merits in this appeal which fails and is dis-
missed with costs.
Appeal dismissed.
197