JUDGMENT
Arun Kumar, J.
(1) These petitions under Section 482 Criminal Procedure Code have been filed for quashing Fir No. 174/93, Police Station Janak Puri under Sections 448/342/506 Ipc, Fir No. 251 /93, P.S. Janak Puri under Sections 307/457/34 Indian Penal Code read with Sections 27/54/59 Arms Act and Fir No. 252/93, P.S. Janak Puri, New Delhi under Sections 307/34 Indian Penal Code read with Sections 27/54/59 Arms Act.
(2) Parties in these petitions are common. The FIRs came to be lodged in view of a dispute over a plot bearing No. C-5, Kiran Garden, Uttam Nagar, New Delhi measuring 200 sq.yds. A civil suit for permanent injunction bearing Suit No. 97/93 was also filed in the Civil Court by Rakesh Kumar and Gulshan Kumar against Bishan Swarup in respect of the said plot. These persons are parties in the presentpetition. There was a dispute regarding possession of the said plot. On the day of the occurrence an altercation took place between two groups which resulted in cross cases being registered against the parties. It is averred that the disputes between the parties have been amicably settled out of Court and the compromise has been reduced into writing. None of the parties has any grievance against each other any more in view of the compromise. A copy of the compromise arrived at between the parties has been placed on record. Therefore, it is prayed that the offences may be allowed to be compounded and the FIRs be ordered to be quashed.
(3) Some of the offences subject matter of the FIRs are not compoundable in view of the provisions of Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. That is why the present petitions have been moved under Section 482 Criminal Procedure Code for permission to compound the offences and/or quashing of the FIRs.
(4) The learned Counsel appearing for the State raised a preliminary objection that those offences which are not compoundable under the Code of Criminal Procedure, cannot be allowed to be compounded by this Court. According to the learned Counsel even the provisions of Section 482 Code of Criminal Procedure cannot be invoked for such a purpose in view of a specific bar contained in Section 320(9), Cr.P.C.
(5) I have heard Counsel for the parties. Both sides have besides making oral submissions tried to support their respective stands with judgments of this Court,other High Courts and the Supreme Court.
(6) According to the learned Counsel for the petitioner in view of the compromise no useful purpose would be served in allowing the matter to be further investigated by the police and thereafter putting it up for trial. No witnesses are likely to come forward and it will be a futile exercise which will involve wastage of precious time of the Court. On the other hand according to the learned Counsel for the respondent it is only serious crimes which are not allowed to be compounded by Section 320 Code of Criminal Procedure. Some of the offences in the present petitions fall in that category. She submits that such serious offences are not only offences qua the individual victim, they are offences against the society and that is why they are not allowed to be compounded by the Code. If such offences are allowed to be compounded the offender will go scot free which will be against the interest of the society.
(7) It is true that criminal offences besides causing harm/injury to the individual concerned are crimes against the society. Individual’s feelings may be assuaged in view of the compromise between the parties, but social injustice resulting from the crime persists. Therefore, the Court rightly does not permit compounding of serious offences. Section 320 Code of Criminal Procedure contains lists of compoundable offences while Section 320(9) contains a ban in the following words: “No offence shall be compounded except as provided by this Section”.
(8) The question is in view of the aforesaid express bar should the High Courts have no power to allow non-compoundable offences to be compounded? For this one has to turn to Section 482 Code of Criminal Procedure which is reproduced asunder:- 482.Saving of inherent powers of High Court.-Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends ofjustice.”
(9) This Section starts with the words “Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court xxx”. What meaning is to be given to these words of Section 482 Code of Criminal Procedure? Section 320(9) contains a limitation on the powers of the Court to allow compounding ofoffences. Section 482 occurs after Section 320(9) and starts with the words quotedabove. Therefore, can it still be said that power of the High Court to allow compounding of non-compoundable offences is limited by Section 320(9) of the Code?
(10) One view can be that in view of the wording of Section 482 of the Code the power of the High Court to secure ends of justice cannot be limited or affected by any other provision in the Code. Section 482 leaves a wide discretion with the HighCourt to pass orders to secure ends of justice. The High Court being the highest Court of the State is entrusted with this discretionary power with the confidence that the same will be exercised only in appropriate cases which fully justify the exercise of such power. The power is not meant to be exercised in routine. It will be exercised only in particular cases when the High Court is satisfied that the nature of the offence, its social repercussions and other relevant aspects require that theoffence may be permitted to be compounded. The High Court is expected to balance the social aspect of the crime and the need to permit compounding of the offences to secure the ends of justice. Social aspect does not only mean that criminals should be punished. It also involves other considerations like not wasting the limited and precious resources of the society in a futile trial. Sometimes interests of the parties involved will also have prime importance because a trial may have other ruinous affects on the parties. It may be relevant to consider that in view of the compromise arrived at between the parties no witness would becoming forth to depose against the accused. Without evidence it may not be possible to establish his guilt. Such a trial will mean wastage of precious time of theCourt, the Public Prosecutor and the law enforcement agency. It will also result in expenses and harassment to the accused. Harassment may also be in the shape of continued incarceration. In view of all such conflicting interests it may be appropriate to leave the matter to the discretion of the High Court to be exercised on the basis of merits of each case. There should be no self imposed limitation on the High Court in not permitting compounding of an offence which falls outside Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
(11) The other view as propounded by the learned Counsel for the State is that there should be an absolute bar on the power of the High Court in allowing compounding of non-compoundable offences. The learned Counsel for the respondent has in support of her contention strongly relied on State of Karnataka v. H.S Ravanasiddappa etc., 1994 Crl.L.J-2928 and a recent Full Bench decision of the Rajasthan High Court reported as Mohan Singh & Ors. v. State, 1993 Crl .Law Journal 3193. These judgments hold that the High Court cannot grant permission to compound offences which are not covered under Section 320(1) or (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure in view of specific bar contained in Sub-section (9) of Sec.320. None of these cases has considered the affect of the opening words of Section 482 of the Code in this behalf. In my view the opening words of Sec-482 are in the nature of a non-obstante clause and deserve due consideration.
(12) The Full Bench decision of the Rajasthan High Court notes in para 12 the judgment of the Supreme Court in Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra, where the Supreme Court expressed that the High Court possessed and possesses inherent powers to be exercised ‘ex-debito justitiae’ to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone the Court exists. However,in relation to the exercise of such inherent powers the Supreme Court had laid down the following principles:- “(I)that the power is not to be resorted to if there is a specific provision in the Code for the redress of the grievance of the aggrieved party;(ii) that it should be exercised very sparingly to prevent abuse of process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice;(iii) that it should not be exercised as against the express bar of lawen grafted in any other provision of the Code.”
(13) In this case the Supreme Court was concerned with the question whether Section 482 Criminal Procedure Code could be invoked to revise an order revision whereof is otherwise barred under Section 397(2) of the Code. The case really went on a consideration as to which will be an interlocutory order falling within Sub-sec.(2) of Section 397.What meaning is to be given to the opening words of Section 482 was really not under consideration.
(14) Further it was noted that in Sooraj Devi v. Pyarelal, it has been reiterated that inherent power could not be exercised for doing that which is specifically prohibited by the Code. Another Supreme Court decision noticed in this behalf is Mst. Simrikhia v. Smt. Dolley Mukherjee, . Both these cases are on the power of the High Court to review its own judgment. It was held that in view of provisions of Section 362 of the Code review was not permissible by invoking Section 482.
(15) Before the Full Bench a judgment of the Supreme Court in Mahesh Chand v. State of Rajasthan, was cited. In that case the Supreme Court had in the peculiar facts of the case permitted an offence under Section 3071.P.C.to be compounded. Regarding this design the Full Bench observed that in special cases the Supreme Court may have power to direct compounding of non-compoundable offences but the High Court has no such power. The decision in MaheshChand’s case (supra) has been cited before me also by the learned Counsel for the petitioner. Besides this the learned Counsel for the petitioner has cited Ram Parsad & Anr. v.State of U.P., , in which offences under Section 307 were converted into one under Section 324 Indian Penal Code read with Section 34 and compounding was allowed.
(16) Judgments of this Court in Charan Singh Sharma v. State, 48(1992) DLT(SN) 2; Arvind Bhushan Chug & Ors. v. Dr. Promilla Rita & Ors., ; and Vinod Kumar v. State, Iv (1993) Ccr 2590 have also been cited on behalf of the petitioner as illustrations where compounding of non-compoundable of-fences was permitted. However, these judgments do not contain a discussion of the points raised before me and noticed hereinabove.
(17) I may also note here that in several cases involving matrimonial disputes under Sections 406/498-A Indian Penal Code etc. are being allowed to be compounded and FIRs in such cases are being allowed to be quashed in the interests of justice particularly in view of the fact that the parties have or have had such close relationship. If on principle and as a matter of law compounding of non-compoundable offences cannot be permitted, I see no basis how an exception can be made in such cases.
(18) It may also be worthwhile to note here that in various judgments including the latest judgment in State of Haryana & Ors. v. Ch.Bhajan lal & Ors., , the Supreme Court has recognised the power of the High Court to quash FIR in certain circumstances. If the High Court has power to quash an Fir in exercise of its powers under Section 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure, is it not appropriate to recognise that High Court should have powers to allow compounding of offences which have been made non-compoundable by Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure?Having regard to the important issues involved I am of the considered view that the matter be placed before the Hon’ble the Chief Justice for constitution of a larger bench for an authoritative pronouncement in this behalf.