JUDGMENT
K.C. Jagadeb Roy, J.
1. The petitioner was appointed as a constable in the Central Industrial Security Force with effect from 12-3-1973 and on completion of training was posted in its Steel Plant Unit, Rourkela.
2. In contemplation of a departmental proceeding, the petitioner was placed under suspension by the order of the Commandant, CISF Unit, opp. party No. 2 with effect from 9-4-1984 by order dated 9-4-1984. The petitioner was supplied with the statement of articles of charge and the statement of Imputation of misconduct by memo dated 3-6-1984. It was mentioned in the said memo that an inquiry would ‘ be held only in respect of those articles of charge which are not admitted and required the petitioner to submit his written statement of defence within seven/ten days of the receipt of the memo. The petitioner however submitted his written statement of defence on 20-9-1984 as per Annexure-4 of this writ application.
3. As it appears from the written statement of defence of the petitioner, the petitioner was detailed ‘A’ shift duty from 05.00 hours to 13.00 hours on 4-4-1984 and he was on duty along with Naik Bhim Pallie. After being informed that someone was running away with some stolen materials on a bicycle, the petitioner followed the thief. While following the thief, he gave signals to another constable S. D. Naik who was coming from the power plant and blew his whistle and raced the cycle speedily to catch hold of the thief at which point of time the thief threw away the stolen materials and fled away towards the power plant. The petitioner could not catch the thief but seized the materials lying on the ground and while coming with those materials on his cycle, crime staff Head Constable K. N. Raju met him to whom he handed over the materials which was witnessed by the other two Constables S. D. Naik and K.N. Raju. The petitioner thereafter went with the Head Constable Raju. Constable S.D. Naik, Constable K. K.R. Nair and deposited the materials in ‘C’ post office. In view of his explanation, he claimed innocence and desired that necessary orders be passed in that regard.
Prior to the filing of the written statement of defence, opp. party No. 2, however, by his order dated 13-7-1984 appointed Sri G. Singh, A.C./ Inspector, CISF Unit, Steel Plant, Rourkela as the Inquiry Officer to enquire into the charges levelled against the petitioner.
The inquiry was made by the Inquiry Officer Sri G. Singh who submitted his report to the Disciplinary Authority, namely the opp. party No. 2. A copy of the report even though was wanted by the petitioner was not supplied to him. On the other hand, opp. party No. 2 did not act upon the report of the Inquiry Officer as it did not satisfy him, and by his order as per Annexure-5 of this writ application directed a de novo inquiry to be carried out from the stage of the charge-sheet by his order dated 4-3-1985 and appointed Sri I. R. Uppal, A. C. C. I. S F. Unit, Steel Plant, Rourkela as the Inquiry Officer by his order dated 27-4-1985.
By order dated 4-3-1985 as per Annexure-5, the opp. party No. 2 found, according to him, some irregularities in the inquiry. For instances, he has stated that while writing the heading for cross-examination the word ‘Cross-Examination’ by the charged officer’ should invariably be written. He took exception to the Inquiry Officer examining a number of prosecution witness himself from which opp. party No 2 implied that the Inquiry Officer was against the prosecution and construed the inquiry as not impartial On the face of it, the reasons are absolutely not tenable for holding a fresh inquiry. It is open to the Inquiry Officer to put questions to any witness if he so desired and that cannot be a ground for an inference that he was not impartial. On the facts and circumstances of this particular case, there was no occasion for the opp. party No 2 to older for a de novo inquiry. Subsequently, however, opp party No. 2 again, changed this newly appointed Inquiry Officer Mr. Uppal and appointed another Inquiry Officer by name Sri. H. P. Singh, Inspector in place of Sri I. R. Uppal, Asst. Commandant to conduct the de novo inquiry against the petitioner.
4. The petitioner made serious objections to this as he felt prejudiced by such action of opp. party No. 2 and made representation against such appointment. His representation was however rejected and Sri H. P. Singh, Inspector continued to conduct the Inquiry at which stage the petitioner approached this Court in this writ application by filing the writ on 1-10-1985. When the matter was pending in this High Court for hearing, the opp party No. 2, however, on consideration of the inquiry report submitted by the last Inquiry Officer, namely Sri H P. Singh passed his order finding the petitioner guilty of the charge framed against him and passed the orders that the pay of the petitioner be reduced by three stages from Rs. 250/- to Rs. 238/- in the time scale of pay for a period of two years with effect from 31-10-1985 and he would not earn increment during the period of reduction and on expiry of the period, the reduction will have the effect of postponing his future increments of pay, and directed that the suspension period from 9-4-1984 forenoon to 8-5-1987 will not be treated as duty disqualifying for service (leave, increments) and pension etc. and the petitioner not to get anything more than what he has already received as subsistence allowance during the aforesaid period of suspension.
Even though the petitioner received the copy of the final order passed by the opp. party No. 2, he never chose to amend the, writ application earlier and filed an application for amendment of the writ application on 10-5-1991 when the matter was being heard in this Court.
5. The. petitioner has averred in the said amendment petition dated 10-5-1991 that since he had made a prayer for quashing the inquiry proceeding on the ground mentioned in the writ application, it was felt not necessary to make further prayer for quashing the final order passed but being conscious of the legal position ultimately he had made this application for amendment. Though in normal course, such a prayer in the belated stage would not have been allowed but since the very inquiry appears to be perverse and against the principle of natural justice not being conducted in a fair manner, no serious objection can be taken at this stage in accepting this amendment incorporating the prayer made in the said writ application.
From the final order passed by the opp. party No. 2 dated 31-10-1986 it is quite clear that Sri G. Singh who was appointed as the first Inquiry Officer conducted the inquiry and submitted his findings on 24-9-1984 holding that the charges were not proved against the petitioner and the opp. party No. 2 finding some procedural discrepancies in the inquiry desired a de novo inquiry.
6. Law is now well settled that where there is some evidence, which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court in a petition for a writ under Art. 226 to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence. The High Court may undoubtedly interfere where the departmental authorities have held the proceedings against the delinquent in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair decision by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and the merits of the case or by allowing themselves to be influenced by irrelevant considerations or where the conclusion on the very face of it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at that conclusion, or on similar grounds.
There is no doubt that there is no provision corresponding Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure (res judicata), Section 403 of the Cr. P. C. (autrefois accult or autrefols convict) or Art. 20 of the Constitution in existence any where in the Service Rules, nor has any law or rule been pointed out which bars a second departmental enquiry after the first enquiry has resulted in favour of the public servant. Nevertheless a second departmental enquiry if ordered after the previous one has resulted in the exoneration of a public servant, the danger of harassment to the public servant would, in my opinion, be quite immense. There could be circum- stance, however, where a second inquiry can be ordered if the first one was conducted in a very slipshod manner.
7. in the present case there was no finding of exoneration passed earlier and the only report that was obtained on the enquiry was of the opp. party No. 2 dated 30-10-1985. In this case there was not an order asking for a second inquiry but de novo inquiry after rejecting the inquiry report of the first Inquiry Officer. The principles of natural justice are not embodied in exact terms anywhere. What particular rule of natural justice should be applied in a particular case depends on the facts and circumstances of that case. The Courts are to see if the non-observance of these principles in a given case is likely to have resulted in deflecting the course of justice. The principle of natural justice is to prevent miscarriage of justice. Arriving at a just decision is the aim of both the quasi judicial inquiries as well as the administrative inquiries. It was held in the case of A. K. Kraipak and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors., reported in 1969 S. L. K. 445(454) as follows :
“The aim of the rules of natural justice is to secure justice or to put it negitively to prevent miscarriage of justice. These rules can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. In other words, they do not supplant the law of the land but supplement it. The concept of natural justice has undergone a great deal of change in recent years. In the past, it was thought that it included just two rules namely (I) no one shall be a judge in his own case (Hemo debat case index propris causal) and (ii) no decision shall be given against a party without affording him a reasonable hearing (audi alteram partem). Very soon thereafter a third rule was envisaged and that is that quasi judicial enquiries must be held in good faith, without bias and not arbitrarily or unreasonably. But in the course of years many more subsidiary rules came to be added to the rules of natural justice. Till very recently it was the opinion of the Courts that unless the authority concerned was required by the law under which it functioned to act judicially there was no room for the application of the rules of natural justice. The validity of that limitation is now questioned. If the purpose of the rules of natural justice is to prevent miscarriage of justice one fails to see why those rules should be made Inapplicable to administrative enquiries. Often time it is not easy to draw the line that demarcates administrative enquiries from quasi judicial enquiries. Enquiries which were considered administrative at one time are now being considered as quasi judicial in character. Arriving at a just decision is the aim of both the quasi judicial inquiries as well as the administrative inquiries……”
In the present case, once an inquiry was held by the first Inquiry Officer who has given his finding holding the delinquent officer not guilty of the charge, for no good reasons tenable in law, the opp. party No. 2 has ordered the de novo inquiry again by another Inquiry Officer just because It did not suit his will. The inquiry conducted by the first Inquiry Officer was not slipshod and should have been considered appropriately by the opposite party No, 2. It is alleged by the petitioner that even though he wanted, a copy of the first inquiry report was not supplied to him which is also not a fair play on the part of the disciplinary authority. In view of this, the order imposing punishment on the petitioner as per Annexure-9 to this writ application cannot be sustained and accordingly quashed. The petitioner is entitled to his full service benefit during the period of suspension..
8. In the result, the writ application succeeds. The impugned order as per Annexure-9 is quashed. In the circumstances, however, there shall be no order as to costs.