JUDGMENT
Elipe Dharma Rao, J.
1. Aggrieved of the judgment and decree dated 25.6.2004 passed in A.S. No. 1 of 2004 by the learned Senior Civil Judge, Kavali, confirming the judgment and decree dated 19.12.2003 passed in O.S. No. 423 of 2003 by the learned Principal Junior Civil Judge, Kavali, dismissing the suit, the plaintiff preferred this second appeal.
2. In a narrow compass, the case of the plaintiff – appellant, is that he was recruited as Driver in the year 1991 and that he was one of the Union Members at Kavali APSRTC Employees Union. While so, the plaintiff received an unsigned pending enquiry suspension Order No. 01/114(12)/03 KVL dated 20.5.2003 levelling three allegations that he has not constructed house even though obtained House Loan of Rs. 1,48,000/- from the defendants -respondents, gave false declaration that he got family planning incentive by producing false certificate and that he collected illegal gratification of Rs. 600/- from each employee promising them that he would get Provident Fund, Medical Loans withdrawal sanctioned by getting forged signatures of doctors from the Corporation Hospital, Tarnaka, Hyderabad. The plaintiff also filed a suit for recovery of money, which was collected by arrest of one G. Srinivasulu and thus he was having personal grudge against the plaintiff and the other employees working in RTC, are close associates of the said G. Srinivasulu and they gave statement at his instigation. Since copies of documents were not supplied to the plaintiff, he issued requisition on 12.6.2003 to the first defendant and on 14.6.2003 to the second defendant. It is further submitted that the plaintiff has to maintain his aged mother and his family and that in the month of April, 2003, he met with a scooter accident resulting in fracture to the left leg and head injury. Therefore, he filed the suit to declare the suspension order and charge-sheet as illegal and to set aside the same and for consequential order to take the plaintiff on duty treating the suspension period as duty period.
3. The case as espoused in the written statement by the defendants is that the Vigilance Wing of the Corporation conducted an enquiry basing on the complaint received against the plaintiff and found that the plaintiff has committed serious irregularities and cheated the Corporation and served the charge-sheet on 20.5.2003, and on representation of the plaintiff dated 24.5.2003, copies of the documents required by the plaintiff were supplied and in reply to the representation dated 4.6.2003 that since the suspension order was not signed, he cannot be prevented from discharging duties, it was informed to him that the said order was signed by Depot Manager and the plaintiff acknowledged the same as long back as on 20.5.2003. It is also contended that the Civil Court does not have jurisdiction to decide the issue and, therefore, sought for dismissal of the suit.
4. The only issue that was framed as per the orders of this Court in CMP No. 25272 of 2003 in CRP No. 5645 of 2003 is that whether the suit is maintainable or not. Since neither oral nor documentary evidence was adduced on behalf of both the parties, before the Trial Court, on hearing the arguments of both the Counsel, the Trial Court dismissed the suit holding that the civil Court has no jurisdiction to try the suit and the suit is not maintainable. Aggrieved of the finding, the plaintiff preferred appeal being AS No. 1 of 2004 and the learned Senior Civil Judge, Kavali, by the judgment and decree impugned herein, adverting to the point whether the plaintiff is entitled for setting aside the judgment and decree in OS No. 423 of 2003 dated 12.12.2003 passed by the learned Junior Civil Judge, Kavali, dismissed the appeal confirming the judgment and decree of the Trial Court, observing that the finding of the trial Judge with regard to the jurisdiction and maintainability of the suit, does not call for any interference.
5. Aggrieved of the same, the present second appeal is filed contending inter alia that the Courts below erred in holding that Regulations 11 and 12 of the APSRTC Employees (CC&A) Regulations, 1967 provide for procedure of initiation of disciplinary proceedings, the appellant is not entitled to approach Civil Court for redressal, when it is the case of the appellant that the action of the respondents in passing the impugned order is against the Regulations, 1967 more particularly when there is no provision in the Industrial Disputes Act barring the jurisdiction of the Civil Court, that the Courts below ought to have examined whether the dispute fall within the definition of Section 2K or 2A of the Industrial Disputes Act, when the case of the plaintiff is espoused and it is not a case of unions or group of employees. The substantial questions of law that are raised for consideration of this Court are:
1. Whether the dispute in question fall within the definition of Industrial Dispute as defined in Section 2K or 2A of Industrial Disputes Act and if so, whether it is amenable to the jurisdiction of Industrial Tribunal or Labour Court?
2. Whether an individual dispute constitutes an industrial dispute under Section 2k or 2A and if so, whether it is amenable to the jurisdiction of Industrial Tribunal or Labour Court?
3. Vide Section 9 of Civil Procedure Code whether there is an express or implied bar under the I.D. Act for Civil Court to entertain the dispute in question?
4. Whether Regulation 22 of APSRTC (CC&A) Regulation, 1967 provides for an appeal with respect to dispute in question especially when there is no order passed as contemplated under Regulation 22?
6. Before adverting to these submissions made by the learned Counsel for the appellant, be it noted that aggrieved of the impugned Order No. 01/114(12)/03 KVL dated 20.5.2003, the appellant invoked extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution and filed Writ Petition No. 13419 of 2003 through Mr. V. Malik, Advocate, seeking a writ of mandamus to declare the said order of suspension as illegal, arbitrary and unenforceable, which was dismissed by a learned Single Judge of this Court on 14.7.2003. Though copy of the affidavit in the said writ petition is not filed by the appellant, yet, as can be gathered from the order passed in the said writ petition, the impugned order of suspension as assailed solely on the ground that the competent authority has not passed any order in law, inasmuch it did not contain any signature, which was replied by the learned Standing Counsel that the said order was signed by the competent authority, a computer print-out was furnished to the petitioner. It was further averred in the counter-affidavit filed in the said writ petition, that based on a report of the Vigilance Wing of the Corporation, certain charges were levelled against the appellant and he was placed under suspension pending enquiry. Having regard to the submissions made therein, the learned Single Judge of this Court passed the following order:
“…The impugned order is one for suspension, pending enquiry and except the ground referred above, which is duly answered, no other ground is raised nor pleaded. In that view of the matter, there are no grounds for interference in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed. However, as it is stated in the counter affidavit that charge-sheet is already filed, the respondent authorities are directed to conduct and complete the enquiry as expeditiously as possible. No costs…”
7. Thereafter, the appellant herein resorted to file the suit OS No. 423 of 2003 seeking to declare the impugned suspension order as illegal and to set aside the same and for consequential orders to take the appellant herein to on duties and to treat the suspension period as duty period. Along with the said suit, he also filed IA No. 1263 of 2003 seeking to grant interim injunction of all further proceedings in pursuance of the impugned order and charge-sheet. Strangely, the appellant herein, did not chose to mention about the filing of the writ petition and its dismissal by a learned Single Judge of this Court. What the appellant contends is that the dispute between the plaintiff and the defendant is not covered under Industrial Disputes Act and it is only an individual dispute between the employee and employer and, as such, the civil Court has got jurisdiction to entertain the suit. It is his further contention that there is no remedy for him before the Labour Court in regard to any service matter except for removal, retrenchment, dismissal and termination under Section 2(2) of the I.D. Act and, therefore, there is no remedy for him before the Labour Court, in this case, as the acts of the respondents herein are contrary to the principles of natural justice and in support of these contentions, reliance is sought to be placed on a decision of the Apex Court in The Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation and Anr. v. Krishna Kant, etc. etc., . Reliance is further placed on a decision of the Apex Court in Workmen of Indian Express Newspaper Private Limited v. The Management of Indian Express Newspaper Private Limited, .
8. The case of the respondents herein is that on a communication received from the Chief Minister’s Office, the Vigilance Wing of the Corporation has conducted preliminary enquiry and on coming to know that there is a prima facie case against the appellant which requires detailed enquiry, served the impugned suspension memo and charge-sheet.
9. The learned Principal Junior Civil Judge, Kavali, having regard to the direction of a learned Single Judge of this Court formulated a preliminary issue as to the maintainability of the suit, facts and circumstances of the case and on appreciation of the evidence available on record, dismissed the suit on 19.12.2003, on maintainability ground and thus CRP No. 6703 filed against the order in IA No. 1263 of 2003 has become infructuous. It is observed by the learned Judge that the Road Transport Corporation is established by the Government of Andhra Pradesh, in exercise of the powers conferred under Section 45 of the Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950, and, therefore, the respondents herein draw their power to suspend the employee under the A.P. Road Transport Corporation Employees (CC&A) Regulations, 1967 and Rules 11 and 12 of the Rules deal with the procedure for initiation of disciplinary proceedings. When the Regulations themselves provide for a specific procedure, the contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant that the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable cannot be countenanced. That apart, when the appellant was dealt with under the Regulations, which are self-contained and self-explanatory, the question of resorting to the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act will not arise.
10. Aggrieved of the said dismissal of the suit, the appellant herein preferred AS No. 1 of 2004 before the learned Senior Civil Judge, Kavali, which was also dismissed after elaborate consideration of the authorities relied on by the parties.
11. During the pendency of appeal AS No. l of 2004, the appellant preferred CRP No. 80 of 2004 and the Corporation has filed CRP No. 5645 of 2003. The learned Counsel for both the parties have extensively canvassed their contentions relying on plethora of decisions. In CMP No. 311 of 2004 in CRP No. 80 of 2004, a learned Single Judge of this Court directed that all further proceedings including enquiry and issuance of show-cause notice may go on, but the final order may not be passed pursuant to the charge-sheets and enquiry report. Thus having regard to this direction, a learned Single Judge of this Court, without expressing any opinion on the merits or otherwise of the case, disposed of batch of revision petitions filed by the appellant and the respondents as well, directing the learned Senior Civil Judge, Kavali, to dispose of AS No. 1 of 2004 within a period of two weeks and the above order dated 8.1.2004 made in CMP No. 311 of 2004 was kept operative.
12. The Apex Court in Krishna Kanth ‘s case, has laid down certain guiding principles under which the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not barred. But as I observed in the foregoing paragraphs, ex facie, the dispute is frivolous and vexatious. That apart, the Regulations, 1967 provide remedy for appeals, etc. In such circumstances, the appellant is not entitled to approach the Civil Court.
13. Evidently, the appellant herein was suspended pending enquiry, based on the report received from the Vigilance Wing of the respondent-Corporation, with a view to conduct fair and impartial enquiry resorting to Rules 11 and 12 of the Regulations. Thus there is a machinery provided under the Regulations. At the outset, it should be remembered that suspension pending enquiry is not a punishment. If the appellant is found not guilty of the charges levelled against him, he would be exonerated of the charges and if found guilty thereof, for any reason, the Regulations provide further course of action to be taken. Thus, by no stretch of imagination, it can be said that Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure covers the lis now sought to be sorted out by the appellant. The appellant at the inception itself, tried to stall the proceedings by invoking extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court by filing WP No. 13419 of 2003 which was dismissed. Probably, at the advice of the legal luminaries of his choice and with a mala fide intention, has suppressed filing of this writ petition, in the suit. Unfortunately, the grounds which are raised in the suit were not raised in the writ petition, for the reasons best known to the appellant. It is a settled position of law, that a party who comes to the Court, shall raise all the pleas that are available to him in a single proceedings and not in piecemeal inasmuch as provisions of Section 11 CPC comes into play. It appears, the appellant was intending to prolong the Us and therefore, he did not chose to narrate filing of writ petition, so as to keep this ground open for filing the suit. This sort of protraction of the litigation should be deprecated and the attitude of the appellant is liable to be mulcted with costs. Once this Court has dismissed the writ petition, the appellant ought to have allowed the respondent authorities to proceed with the enquiry, which he did not chose to do and stalled the proceedings by filing the civil suit. As stated earlier, as per Rules 11 and 12 of the A.P. State Road Transport Corporation Employees (Classification, Control and Appeal) Regulations, 1967, the respondents are empowered to conduct enquiry and impose penalties and Rules 22 to 27 thereof, provide procedure for preferring appeal therefrom. The appellant departing from the Rules invoked jurisdiction of the civil Court. This apart, the appellant having invoked the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, cannot, now contend that he cannot be estopped from invoking the jurisdiction of civil Court. Under the Regulations, an appeal does not lie on the order of suspension. Having regard to these facts and the dismissal of the writ petition, the Trial Court ought not to have entertained the suit, more particularly when it is the case of the appellant that the suspension order was not afflicted with mala fides and also having regard to Para 11 of the counter filed therein, about the dismissal of the writ petition. Thus the appellant, by suppression of facts, has fritted away the valuable time of more than one forum, in frivolous and vexatious litigation. I am fortified in my opinion by a decision of this Court in State of Orrisa v. Bimal Kumar Mohanty, , wherein it is held that the suspension is not a punishment, but it is only one way of forbidding or disabling an employee to discharge the duties of office or post held by him. It is further held that the suspension is a step in aid to the ultimate result of the investigation or enquiry, apart from keeping the public interest of the impact of the delinquent’s continuance in office while facing departmental enquiry or trial. For these reasons, the contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant that since there is no express bar under Section 9 of the CPC from entertaining the dispute like the present one, cannot be sustained, inasmuch as all these facts constitute an implied bar on the Civil Court to decide the legality or otherwise of the impugned order. In view of the foregoing circumstances, I need not dwell upon the judicial pronouncements cited at the Bar on behalf of the appellant. Therefore, I do not see any reasons to differ from the findings arrived by both the Courts below and, consequently, the second appeal fails and is accordingly dismissed, with costs throughout. Before parting with the case, it is made clear that the respondents shall proceed with the enquiry and complete the same, within a period of six months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order, if not already completed and the appellant herein is directed to co-operate with the respondents in early completion of the same.