JUDGMENT
Sachchidanand Jha, J.
1.This writ petition is directed against the order of the Ranchi University as contained in the letter of its Register dated 27,4.95 by which, in the words of the petitioner, “respondent No. 4 has been made Principal Incharge of Chotanagpur Law College, Ranchi” (hereinafter called ‘the College’). The petitioner also seeks quashing of the appointment of respondent No. 4 Rakesh Kumar: Verma as Lecturer in the College Vide letter dated 31.12.82 Tiue copies of the aforesaid letter have been marked Annexures-9 and 3, respectively, to the writ petition.
2. The case of the petitioner may be set as follows. The petitioner applied for the post of par-time Lecturer, in the College pursuant to advertisement issued by the University Service Commission. After interview etc. his name was recommended by the Commission under its letter dated 19.8.69 and in course of time he was appointed as a part-time Lecturer by the Governing Body of the College on 2.3.70. As against the appointment of the petitioner pursuant to the recommendation of the Commission, respondent No. 4 was appointed without any advertisement and selection process, by the Secretary of the College on 31.8.82. As the appointment of respondent No. 4 and others was violative of the provisions of the Bihar State Universities Act, 1976 (in short, ‘the Universities Act‘) and the Statutes framed thereunder, they were terminated by the Governing Body on 13.3.95. An advertisement was thereafter published inviting applications for appointment to various posts including those of principal, Vice-Principal, Lecturer (whole time) and part-time Lecturer on 14.3.95. the petitioner applied pursuant to the said advertisement for the post of Principal. Respondent No. 4 also applied for the post of Lecturer. While respondent No. 4 was appointed as Lecturer by order as contained in Annexure-6 dated 22.3.95, the petitioner was appointed to the post of Principal by order as contained in Annexure-7 on the same day. By the impugned order as contained in Annexure-9, however, the University has purported to ‘appoint’ respondent No. 4 as the Principal.
3. It may be stated that it is not the case of the respondents that respondent No. 4 has been appointed to the post of Principal. Annexure-9 which is a communication from the Registrar of the University to the Principal Incharge of the College, merely conveys the decision of the University regarding formation of the Governing Body for the College consequent upon the grant of affiliation on 25.4.95. It may also be stated here that the affiliation earlier granted to the College had lapsed on 21.5.92. The communication (Annexure-9) cannot be read as order of appointment although it does describe him as the Principal Incharge. But as would be evident from paragraph-2 of the Communication, he has been recognised as the Principal Incharge being “senior most qualified full time teacher having administrative experience”. In other words, even the communication describes his substantive status as that of a full time Lecturer and not Principal, he has been recognised as the Principal Incharge (really Professor Incharge) for the purpose of constitution of the Governing Body inasmuch as Principal of the College is an ex officio member of the Governing Body.
4. Mr. Anil Kumar Sinha, learned Counsel for the petitioner, however, has contended that the petitioner being the seniormost teacher, or at least senior to respondent No. 4, he (respondent No. 4) could not have been made Principal Incharge. In this connection, he referred to the case of the petitioner that he has been the only teacher working in the College appointed on the basis of the recommendation of the Commission. Counsel also urged that the petitioner having been appointed as full-fledged Principal by the Governing Body, treating respondent No. 4 as the Principal Incharge amounts to his (petitioner) ouster from the post.
5. The case of the petitioner that he was appointed pursuant to and on the basis of the recommendation of the Commission has been denied by the respondents. According to them, the petitioner was recommended as the 9th candidate against 8 sanctioned posts all of which were filled by the candidates placed above him. However, as one of the appointees, Akhauri Brajnandan Sahay later left the College, the petitioner was appointed against the resultant vacancy. According to the respondents, thus, by virtue of the appointments of the aforesaid 8 persons, the recommendation made by the Commission stood exhausted and in the circumstances, it cannot be said that the appointment of the petitioner was pursuant to the Commission’s recommendations, According to the respondents further, the petitioner is not eligible for appointment as Lecturer inasmuch as he does not possess the degree of LLM which has been prescribed as a necessary qualification of the post of Lecturer, It has been argued that if a candidate who does not possess L.L.M. Degree is not eligible for appointment as Lecturer, he cannot be said to be eligible for the post of Principal. In this connection, reliance has been placed on Statute dated 24.4.78 laying down the mode of appointment, pay scale and qualification for the post of teachers of affiliated degree Colleges.
6. In reply to the argument regarding lack of qualification counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the aforesaid statute dated 24.4.78 is applicable to the faculties of Arts, Science and Commerce alone, as expressly mentioned therein, and, therefore, anything contained therein cannot be applicable to the post in the faculty of Law. According to the counsel, it is the qualification as laid down in Article 172 of the Ranchi University Code, Part II which lays down the qualification for appointment to various posts in the faculty of law. Pointed reference was made to addendum to Article 172(d) as per which one of the alternative qualifications for the post of Principal in the faculty of law is “at least 10 years teaching experience as (full-time) lecturer in Law Classes, or 12 years’ teaching experience as part-time lecturer in law Classes with ten years’ practice at the Bar.” It was submitted that the provisions of Code are saved by Section 76 of the Universities Act.
7. It is not in dispute that respondent No. 4 was appointed a whole time lecturer in 1982 and he continued to function on the post till the alleged termination of his services on. 13.3.95. (It is said that there is only one sanctioned post of whole-time lecturer in the College). It is also not is dispute that he has again been appointed to the post of Lecturer (whole time) on 22.3.95. It is further not in dispute that initial appointment of the petitioner was as a part-time Lecturer which continued upto 22.3.95 when he is said to have been appointed to the post of Principal pursuant to so-called advertisement which itself is shrouded in controversy.
8. The respondents have assailed the aforesaid advertisement issued by the Governing Body on 14.3.95 during Holi festival as being illegal, and in bad faith. They have also challenged the validity of the appointment of the petitioner as Principal as being violative of provisions of Sections 35 and 57-A of the Universities Act vide decision in the case of Akhilan and Pandey v. Ranchi University, Ranchi 1995 (1) BLJR 678. It has also been pointed out that besides being violative of the statutory provisions the order of appointment has already spent its life after 6 months and, therefore, the status of the petitioner cannot be more than that of a part-time Lecturer.
9. Our attention was drawn to Article 172 of the Ranchi University Code by the counsel for the respondents as well but for another purpose. The said Article has categoried the teachers of admitted college, so far as law colleges are concerned, into four categories, namely, (a) Principal, (b) Vice-Principal (c) Full-time Lecturer and (d) Part-time Lecturer. There cannot be any doubt that each category of post constitutes a separate class. That being the position, if the petitioner and respondent No. 4 had been appointed to the post of part-time Lecturer and whole-time Lecturer, respectively, (which is not in dispute), it is beyond my comprehension as to how the petitioner can claim seniority over the respondent. The question of seniority can arise as between persons in the same grade or cadre. If the posts are different, they would be deemed to belong to different classes of posts and no question of interse seniority would arise. The post being different and scale of pay being higher, a lecturer will certainly rank senior to a part-time lecturer notwithstanding the length of service. In such a case, the ‘length of service’ test cannot be relevant. The reliance placed on in the Direct Recruits case or Kashav Chandra Joshi v. Union of India or Jaibir Jha v. L.N. Mithila University 1987 PLJR 838 is misconceived. It has been held in those cases that persons appointed earlier in point of time would rank senior to those who were appointed later but that proposition of law would be applicable only in a case and with respect to persons in the same cadre or grade of service.
10. So far as the question of invalidity of appointment of either the petitioner or respondent No. 4 is concerned, it appears to me that the State of affairs right since the birth of the College in 1954 have been far from satisfactory, Appointments have been made without following provisions of the Act or statutes. It is true, not only in the case of petitioner but respondent No. 4 as well. According to the petitioner, he is the only person who was appointed on the basis of the recommendation of the Commission but as seen above, he was appointed against a resultant vacancy when one of the recommandees Akhauri Brajnandan Sahay resigned from the post. His appointment, therefore, would also amount to one made by the Governing Body on its own and not pursuant to any recommendation which stood exhausted after 3 notified posts were filled up by the first 8 candidates.
11. It would, however, appear that the plea of the petitioner is founded on two alternative grounds. He claims also on the basis of the appointment to the post of Principal allegedly made on 22.3.95. So far as latter claim is concerned, on the admitted case of the petitioner his appointment came to an end on expiry of period of six months on 21.9.95. So far as the other claim on the ground of seniority is concerned, for the reasons stated above, that too is not maintainable.
12. I have referred to the relief claimed by the petitioner in the writ petition at the outset of this judgment. He seeks quashing of an order by which respondent No. 4 has been made Principal Incharge of the College but from the facts stated here in above, it is clear that there is no appointment to the post so far either by the University or any other authority. He has merely been described as Principal Incharge (really Professor Incharge) for the purpose of his induction as ex officio member of the Governing Body in terms of Section 60(1)(i) of the Universities Act as being the seniormost “qualified full-time lecturer.” The petitioner being admittedly a part-time lecturer in the College and so-called appointment as Principal being not only illegal but also having to an end, he is not competent to challenge the same.
13. The other relief claimed by the petitioner regarding quashing of appointment of respondent No. 4 made about 13 years ago is equally misconceived. The two being separate in grade and cadre the appointment cannot be challenged at instance of the petitioner much less after delay of 13 years, merely on the ground that the prescribed procedure had not been followed. I may not be misunderstood as putting a seal of approval to the appointment but if the Court were to interfere in the matter at this stage, appointments of practically all the teachers would have to be held to be illegal which would result in a statement and also affect the interest of the students. I, however, take this opportunity to direct the concerned authorities to take steps for making regular appointments to the sanctioned posts of Principal, Vice-Principal, Lecturer and part-time Lecturer.
14. For the reasons stated above, I do not find any merit in the writ petition which is, accordingly, dismissed. I would make no order as to cost.
Pramod Kumar Sarin, J.
15. I agree.